APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The issue presented in this case is whether the employee’s complaint states a cause of action for relief under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. The employee, hired as a university professor and department head, filed suit against the university after he was removed as department head. On motion of the university, the trial court concluded that the complaint failed to allege that the employee was discharged or terminated or that he was discharged or terminated for refusing to participate in or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities and dismissed the complaint pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03. A cause of action arises under the Act when an employer discharges or terminates the employee for refusing to participate in or for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities. We determine that because the employee was neither terminated nor discharged from his employment, only removed as department head, the complaint does not allege facts from which we can reasonably infer a claim under the Tennessee Public Protection Act. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.03 dismissal of the employee’s complaint.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of a majorityof this Court that the plaintiff’s pleadings are insufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the element of termination.

Judge Glenn, Judge Woodall, and I all agree that the trial court inappropriately applied a single enhancement factor when considering the defendant’s sentence. I write separately because each of us has different opinions as to what process should be used in determining the end result in circumstances in which the trial court inappropriately applied a single enhancing factor. Because I believe the trial judge is “closer to the case,” I would prefer to remand this case to the trial court for resentencing. I do not have that option as a result of my other two colleagues’ decisions. Therefore, with the trial court not having a presumption of correctness, I have reviewed the case de novo and, after giving consideration to the principles of sentencing, have concluded that the defendant’s appropriate sentence is two years. The result that I reached is the same reached by Judge Glenn’s opinion announcing the decision of the court. However, I think Judge Woodall has expressed appropriate concerns about the language contained in that opinion.

In this divorce case, the husband appeals the trial court’s division and valuation of the marital estate. On appeal, the husband raises several issues and essentially argues that the trial court should have restored the parties to their respective premarital situations due to the short duration of the marriage. The wife also challenges the trial court’s division of the marital estate. After an extensive review of the record, we find no error in the trial court’s division and valuation of the marital estate in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(a)(1). Therefore, we affirm.

In this case petitioner wife obtained an order of protection against her husband. The husband, following trial, filed a Motion to reopen the proof, pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59, and attached numerous affidavits contradicting some of petitioner's evidence presented at trial. The Trial Court overruled the Motion and the husband has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Plaintiff sought access to a plethora of public records from several state prison officials. Access was granted, but the name(s) of the supplier(s) of the substances necessary to carry out lethal injection executions and the employees who procured those substances were redacted based on the defendants’ interpretation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-504(h)(1). Plaintiff filed suit under the Public Records Act and the trial court determined that the names were not to be redacted. Defendants filed a notice of appeal and sought a stay under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(e), but the trial court ruled it did not have jurisdiction. Defendants moved this court for a stay, which this court granted. We affirm the trial court’s decision as to the redaction of the names but reverse the trial court’s decision as to its jurisdiction to provide the certification under Tenn. Code Ann. § 10-7-505(e).

Defendant, Christopher Anthony Holman, appeals from the Montgomery County Circuit Court’s sentencing of him on multiple felonies following entry of “open” guilty pleas. Defendant does not challenge the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court, and does not contest the trial court’s order of partial consecutive sentencing. The sole issue on appeal is Defendant’s assertion that the order of service by incarceration of the effective sentence of twenty-two years is error. He argues that he “should be resentenced with the opportunity to enter a drug rehab [sic] program that accepts sex offenders.” After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In an indictment returned by the Davidson County Grand Jury, Defendant Wayne Lamar Donaldson, Jr., was charged with possession of, with intent to sell or deliver, twenty-six grams or more of a substance containing cocaine within a drug-free school zone. The drugs were seized after a traffic violation stop of Defendant by an officer of the Metropolitan Davidson County Police Department. Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized during the stop. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court entered an order which granted the motion,and subsequently entered an order dismissing the indictment based upon the State’s acknowledgment that it could not proceed to trial without the evidence. The State has appealed. Based upon the finding of facts made by the trial court and the application of the law to those facts, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Susan Renee Bise, was convicted by a Greene County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of aggravated burglary and two counts of theft of property in an amount greater than $1000 but less than $10,000, all Class D felonies, and was sentenced to an effective term of three years as a Range I offender. On appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence of her theft convictions and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the defendant’s convictions, but we conclude that the trial court inappropriately enhanced the defendant’s sentences. Therefore, we modify the defendant’s sentences to the minimum in the range of two years.

I concur with the majority opinion in affirming the convictions. I respectfully dissent  from the majority opinion’s conclusion that the effective sentence must be modified to the minimum sentence of two years, based upon the majority’s conclusion that the one enhancement factor found by the trial court was inappropriately applied. I do agree that the enhancement factor was inappropriately applied. I conclude, however, that in order for our sentencing scheme to be in full compliance with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 1245 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and that case’s progeny, we cannot reduce an enhanced sentence imposed by a trial court which is within the appropriate range, for the sole reason that no statutory enhancement factors are applicable.

Plaintiffs' action was dismissed by the Trial Court by summary judgment. Plaintiffs then appealed to this Court and defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the Judgment entered by the Trial Court was not a final judgment. Plaintiffs responded to that Motion, acknowledging that the final judgment had not been entered in the case below, but sought a stay of the appeal. We grant the Motion to Dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the Judgment below is not final and this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the appeal.

The Defendant, Larry Wayne Webb, pled guilty to possession with intent to sell twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and to possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-17-417 (2010); 39-17-418 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to nine years for the possession with intent to sell conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the misdemeanor possession conviction, to be served concurrently. He was order to serve fifteen weekends in the Blount County Jail with the balance of his sentences on community corrections. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Dickson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael Anthony Saunders, of one count of aggravated assault, see T.C.A. § 39-13-104(a)(1)(B) (2006), and one count of vandalism of propertyvalued at $1,000 or more butless than $10,000,see id.§ 39-14-408. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of three years and two years, suspended to probation following the service of six months’ incarceration in the county jail. In addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions, the defendant contends on appeal that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a mistrial based upon inflammatory statements made by the victim, (2) denying his request for judicial diversion, and (3) denying him full probation. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
 

Inmate filed a petition for writ of certiorari challenging his conviction of the prison disciplinary offense of conspiracy to violate state law. The chancery court considered the merits of the inmate’s petition and granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. We affirm.
 

The trial court reformed a lease agreement, finding certain terms had been erroneously transposed.  Appellants contend the reformation was error. We affirm.

Defendants Jemarow Deverius Tillison and Dequon Letray Boyd were originally indicted separately by the Hamilton County Grand Jury for offenses that occurred in the same shooting incident against the same victims. Upon motion of the State and by agreement between the parties, the indictments were consolidated, and a superceding indictment charged both defendants with attempted first degree premeditated murder of Darlisa Wynn; first degree premeditated murder of Casey Woods; felony murder of Casey Woods; especially aggravated robbery of Darlisa Wynn; aggravated assault of Darlisa Wynn; reckless endangerment; and especially aggravated burglary of the home of Kysha Henderson. Following a jury trial, Defendant Boyd was convicted of attempted first degree premeditated murder; first degree premeditated murder; felony murder; two counts of aggravated assault, one as charged and the other as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated robbery; reckless endangerment; and aggravated criminal trespass as a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated burglary. Defendant Boyd’s felony murder conviction was merged with his conviction for first degree murder, and both aggravated assault convictions were merged with his conviction for attempted first degree murder. He received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. Defendant Tillison was convicted of facilitation of attempted first degree premeditated murder; facilitation of first degree premeditated murder; facilitation of felony murder; aggravated assault of Darlisa Wynn; attempted aggravated assault, a lesser included offense of aggravated assault; reckless endangerment; and aggravated criminal trespass, a lesser-included offense of especially aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of 25 years imprisonment. On appeal, both Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Defendant Boyd also raises the following additional issues: 1) whether the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial following testimony that he was a gang member; and 2) whether the prosecutor’s statement during closing argument that the jury had a duty to the community to convict constitutes misconduct. After a careful review of the record before us, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Devaron Taylor, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for two counts of felony murder and one count each of aggravated burglary and attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery. Prior to trial, one count of felony murder was dismissed on motion of the State. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of felony murder, attempt to commit especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated burglary. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for his felony murder conviction and concurrent sentences of eight years for attempted robbery and three years for aggravated burglary for an effective sentence of life imprisonment. In this appeal, Defendant raises the following issues for our review: 1) whether the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial after a juror was dismissed for sleeping; 2) whether the trial court erred by failing to restrict the State’s use of a hypothetical fact pattern during voir dire and by limiting Defendant’s voir dire. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Kenneth McIntyre, pled guilty to a violation of the habitual motor vehicle offender (HMVO) order, a class E felony, and passing worthless checks under the value of $500, a class A misdemeanor. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the Defendant-Appellant agreed to be sentenced as a career offender with the time and manner of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The Defendant-Appellant received a sixyear term of imprisonment for the HMVO conviction, and eleven months and twenty-nine days imprisonment for the worthless check conviction. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. In this appeal, the Defendant-Appellant argues the trial courterred inimposing sentence. Because the Defendant-Appellant filed his notice of appeal more than five months after the judgment became final, we dismiss this appeal.

Petitioner,Terrance Cecil,was found guilty by a Maury County jury of possessing twenty-six grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to serve ten years in the Department of Correction as a Range I standard offender. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the judgment. See State v. Terrance Cecil, No. M2004-00161-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 3044896 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 30, 2004) app. denied (Tenn. May 23, 2005). Petitioner timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court granted relief to the extent of setting aside the sentence and granting a new sentencing hearing. The State has not appealed from that order. Petitioner has appealed from the post-conviction court’s denial of the relief requested by Petitioner to set aside his conviction. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner failed to prove that he suffered any prejudice from any alleged deficiencies by his counsel. Since the prejudice prong was not proven, we need not address the alleged deficiencies of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Terry Johnson, was convicted of aggravated robbery of a Family Dollar Store in Memphis. The offense involved the theft of merchandise from the store. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, relying upon State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. 2000) and State v. Swift, 308 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2010), Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to testimony concerning another theft related offense by Defendant of the same store, also involving merchandise, which occurred about two weeks prior to the offense in the case sub judice. After a thorough analysis, we distinguish Owens and Swift. We also conclude that the admission into evidence of the prior theft related offense was not error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony Clinton, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony.  See T.C.A. § 39-13-401 (2010). He was sentenced as a career offender to 15 years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial Defendant, Terry Johnson, was convicted of aggravated robbery of a Family Dollar Store in Memphis. The offense involved the theft of merchandise from the store. The trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal, relying upon State v. Owens, 20 S.W.3d 634 (Tenn. 2000) and State v. Swift, 308 S.W.3d 827 (Tenn. 2010), Defendant asserts that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by overruling his objection to testimony concerning another theft related offense by Defendant of the same store, also involving merchandise, which occurred about two weeks prior to the offense in the case sub judice. After a thorough analysis, we distinguish Owens and Swift. We also conclude that the admission into evidence of the prior theft related offense was not error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the filing of three separate orders of protection that were requested by Misty Nanette Brooks (“Wife”) seeking protection from Stephen Earl Brooks (“Husband”). Based upon Wife’s initial petition, the trial court issued the first order of protection, which included a provision regarding the division of the mortgage payment for the marital home. Wife subsequently filed a motion to show cause as to why Husband should not be held in contempt for violating the protective order, and the trial court entered a second order of protection that also included the mortgage rovision. Wife subsequently filed two motions to show cause as to why Husband should not be held in contempt for violating the second protective order. The first motion related to Husband’s unwanted contact with Wife, while the second motion related to the mortgage payment. Following a hearing on the first motion, the trial court entered a third order of protection that did not include the mortgage provision. Following a hearing on the second motion, an order was entered by the trial court evidencing an agreement between the parties that Husband was to pay his portion of the mortgage payment. Wife then filed another motion to show cause as to why Husband should not be held in contempt for his failure to pay his portion of the mortgage, and a hearing was held on that motion. The trial court dismissed the motion, finding that the court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order directing Husband to pay his portion of the mortgage. Wife appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Juvenile Court terminated the parental rights of Andre T. (“Father”) to the minor child London V. P. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and § 36-1-113 (g)(6) (2010). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights to this Court. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and § 36-1-113 (g)(6), and that clear and convincing evidence existed that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s January 3, 2011 order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

In August 2003, the Petitioner, Thaddius Brown, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of especially aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, he received an effective twenty-year sentence. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, and the post-conviction court denied relief. On appeal, the crux of the Petitioner’s argument is that he received an illegal sentence because both boxes were checked on his judgment forms for especially aggravated kidnapping indicating that his sentences should run at 30% and 100%. The post-conviction court found that the error in the Petitioner’s judgment forms was a clerical error and that his plea was voluntarily and knowingly entered. We agree. We remand solely for entry of corrected judgment forms to reflect a single release eligibility of 100% for the Petitioner’s especially aggravated kidnapping convictions.