APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Gerardo Gomez, appeals as of right from the Knox County Criminal Court’s summary denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In 1997, the Petitioner pled guilty to possession with intent to sell not less than 10 pounds nor more than 70 pounds of marijuana, a Class D felony, and received a sentence of 24 months, suspended to probation. As a result of his conviction, the Petitioner, who had been granted legal permanent residency status in 1990, was removed from the United States. The Petitioner then illegally re-entered the United States and was arrested. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition, concluding that the petition was untimely. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his claim is based on a constitutional right that did not exist at the time he pled guilty and that he is entitled to post-conviction relief from this court. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant insurance company denied benefits under policy of life insurance, alleging the decedent made material misrepresentations in her application for insurance. The trial court found the decedent did not make misrepresentations on her application, and entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant insurance company appeals. We dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Gary Thomas Reed, was convicted of initiating the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to 16 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in permitting expert testimony; (3) that the trial court erred in permitting lay opinion testimony; (4) that the trial court erred in permitting testimony from a witness who had not been disclosed to defense counsel; (5) that the trial court erred by failing to permit testimony from a potential defense witness; (6) that the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial; and (7) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the conviction and sentence but remand the case for the entry of a corrected judgment consistent with this opinion.

In this action to terminate the parental rights of the mother to the two minor children, the Trial Court, after hearing evidence, held that the statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights were established by clear and convincing evidence, and that it was in the best interest of the children that the mother's parental rights be terminated. The mother appealed and on appeal we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

Petitioner, James Johnson, Jr., was convicted by a Shelby County Jury for one count of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced Petitioner to twenty-three years. State v. James Johnson, No. W2003-02009-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2378256, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Oct. 20, 2004), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Mar. 21, 2005). On appeal, this Court modified Petitioner’s sentence to twenty-one years based upon the fact that the trial court had misapplied certain enhancement factors during sentencing. Id. at *14. On March 27, 2006, Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Following a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied the petition. Petitioner appeals this decision. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has not shown that trial counsel’s representation was ineffective. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Petitioner, Kevin McFerren, appeals the Criminal Court of Shelby County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief and petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A jury convicted the petitioner, Justin Mathis, of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court upheld the petitioner’s conviction and sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the petitioner now appeals. Following a review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The trial court affirmed the determination of the State Board of Equalization that taxpayer’s leasehold interest in tax-exempt property belonging to an Industrial Development Board was not exempt from ad valorem taxation where the parties had executed a payment in lieu of taxes agreement under Tennessee Code Annotated § 7-53-305 as it existed during the relevant tax period. We affirm.

The Defendant, Erika Y. Johnson, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s revocation of her probation and order that she serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve the remainder of her sentence in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this post-divorce proceeding, the mother appeals the trial court’s calculation of the father’s child support obligation. The trial court found that residential lease and car lease payments paid by father’s employer should be excluded from the calculation of father’s income for child support purposes. Finding that the trial court erred in excluding the payments from the calculation of the father’s income, the judgment is vacated in part and the case remanded for reconsideration of the father’s support obligation.

This appeal involves a business transaction for the assignment of oil and gas leases. The parties are sophisticated in the oil and gas industry and include CNX Gas Company, LLC (“CNX”), Miller Petroleum, Inc. (“Miller”), Atlas America, LLC (“Atlas”), and Wind City Oil & Gas, LLC (“Wind City”). CNX and Miller entered into a binding Letter of Intent (“LOI”) for the assignment of oil and gas leases owned by Miller. Prior to signing the LOI, CNX knew that the leases were the subject of pending litigation between Miller and Wind City. The letter of intent outlined the details of the transaction and a closing date. On the closing date, Miller refused to close the transaction with CNX, claiming that it did not have possession of the leases. Approximately one week later, Miller entered into a similar deal for the assignment of those leases with Atlas. The transaction between Miller and Atlas was worth substantially more than the transaction with CNX. Thereafter, CNX sued Miller for breach of contract; CNX also sued Atlas and Wind City for inducement to breach a contract. Miller and Atlas filed motions for summary judgment following discovery that involved depositions. After a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment finding that the LOI permitted Miller to opt out of the closing. CNX appeals. After reviewing the record, we find the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. The LOI only provided CNX with the option to opt out of the transaction. Accordingly, we reverse.

An MPD patrolman appealed his “separation” from employment to the Civil Service Commission. The Commission found the separation was “administrative” in nature, and, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The chancery court denied the patrolman’s petition to reverse and/or modify the Commission’s decision, and we affirm.

This case stems from an employment contract dispute. James Eric Crain (“Crain”) was terminated by his employer, CRST Van Expedited, Inc. (“CRST”). CRST demanded payment from Crain pursuant to a clause in his employment contract. Crain filed suit in the Knox County Chancery Court (the “Trial Court”), seeking, among other things, injunctive relief. CRST filed an answer and counterclaim in the Trial Court seeking damages, among other things. CRST also filed a lawsuit, based on the same facts and issues, against Crain in Iowa. CRST prevailed in the Iowa lawsuit before the suit in Tennessee went to judgment. CRST filed a motion for summary judgment in the Trial Court, which was granted. Crain appeals, raising a number of issues. We hold that the Trial Court did not err in granting CRST’s motion for summary judgment relying on the doctrine of res judicata. We further hold that the Trial Court did not err in finding that CRST also was entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. We affirm.

A Claiborne County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Wayne C. Burkhart, Jr., of three counts of aggravated child abuse, 11 counts of rape, and 11 counts of incest, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of 50 years’ incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s denial of his motion for a mistrial, and the propriety of consecutive sentencing. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has appealed the habeas corpus court’s order summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the habeas corpus court was correct in summarily dismissing the habeas corpus petition and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Bobby Jackson, of first degree murder in the perpetration of a robbery and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced him to life imprisonment for the first degree murder conviction and to twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction, to be served concurrently in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence the videotaped preliminary hearing testimony of an allegedly unavailable witness, that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to view the videotaped testimony in the jury room during deliberations, and that the trial court erred by admitting into evidence a letter purportedly written by the defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Marcus D. Bell, was convicted by a Montgomery County Circuit Court jury of two counts of possession of a firearm by a person previously convicted of a felony drug offense, a Class E felony, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of four years as a Range II offender, to be served consecutively to the defendant’s prior sentences in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Rodrickus Carlos Jefferson, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, Defendant argues: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in allowing him to represent himself; and (3) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves child support arising out of a paternity action. After paternity was established, the mother sought discovery regarding the father’s income. After protracted discovery disputes, the juvenile court set child support based on income that included the father’s winnings from gambling. The juvenile court did not permit the gambling winnings to be offset by the father’s gambling losses. After the father requested a rehearing on child support, years of delay ensued, and his rehearing request was ultimately dismissed. The father now appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand, holding inter alia, that in determining an obligor parent’s income for child support purposes, provable gambling losses may offset gambling winnings, up to the amount of the gambling winnings for the year in question.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to dismiss or in the alternative to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner, Eric C. Pendleton, has appealed the trial court’s order dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus in which Petitioner alleged that the indictments upon which he was convicted were void for failing to name all the essential elements of the crimes. Upon a review of the record in this case, we are persuaded that the trial court was correct in dismissing the petition for habeas corpus relief and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, Jeffrey Lance Cochran, pled guilty to violations of the Motor Vehicle Habitual Offender Act, implied consent law, and driving under the influence, fourth offense. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently to each other; Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of one year and six months. He was ordered to serve a mandatory minimum sentence of 150 days and the remainder of the sentence on probation. On the same day, Appellant also pled guilty to failure to appear. He was sentenced to one year and six months for this conviction, to be served consecutively to the effective sentence for the other convictions. Subsequently, Appellant was charged with violating the terms of his probation. Following a hearing, Appellant’s probation was revoked. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Appellant appeals this decision. Because we determine that the trial court properly revoked Appellant’s probation, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, William Paul Bogus, was convicted of first degree felony murder. See State v. William Paul Bogus, No. 02C01-9506-CC-00169, 1998 WL 22031, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 22, 1998), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Nov. 2, 1998). Petitioner later alleged in a petition for habeas corpus relief that his conviction was void because he was not convicted of the underlying felony and because the indictment was defective. The lower court dismissed the petition without a hearing. Petitioner appeals. Because nothing on the face of the judgment shows that Petitioner’s life sentence has expired or that the conviction is void, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for habeas corpus relief.

Defendant-Appellant, Christopher Ivory Williams, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree premeditated murder and felony murder. The trial court merged the felony murder conviction with the first degree premeditated murder conviction and sentenced Williams as a violent offender to life imprisonment. On appeal, Williams argues that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the felony murder count of the indictment on the ground that no underlying felony was specified in the indictment; (3) the trial court erred in allowing the victim’s mother to authenticate pictures of the victim at trial; (4) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments; (5) the trial court erred in considering Williams’ prior arson conviction for impeachment purposes. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Sevier County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, John Anthony Lethco, of aggravated burglary, see T.C.A. § 39-14-403; possession of burglary tools, see id. § 39-14-701; theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, see id. § 39-14-103, -105(5); and theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000, see id. § 39-13-103, -105(2). At sentencing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve an effective sentence of 27 years’ incarceration. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred (1) by denying his motion to sever offenses, (2) by allowing hearsay testimony from witnesses other than the victim concerning ownership of stolen items at trial, (3) by denying him the opportunity to confront his accuser at trial, (4) by denying his motion for new trial, and (5) by allowing argument by the State at trial concerning his reputation as a drug dealer. Because the defendant filed his notice of appeal prior to filing his motion for new trial, the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on the motion for new trial. Thus, any issues raised therein are waived. We discern, however, an anomaly in the judgment of theft of property valued at more than $500 but less than $1,000 that requires correction on remand. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tavarus Detterio Griffin, was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery and two counts of aggravated kidnapping. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. Judgments of conviction were entered on October 2, 2008. An untimely motion for new trial was filed on January 30, 2009. On May 12, 2009, the trial court entered an order purporting to deny the motion for new trial, rather than dismissing the untimely motion as requested in a written response filed by the State. An untimely notice of appeal was filed May 12, 2009. Defendant, through counsel, has raised only two issues on appeal: (1) whether Defendant was denied his right to due process and a fair trial because the jury pool was allowed to see Defendant in the courtroom wearing jail clothing and restrained by leg irons and handcuffs; and (2) whether counsel who represented Defendant throughout the trial and sentence hearing (who is not the same counsel who filed the motion for new trial) rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the only issues raised on appeal are waived as a result of not being included in a timely-filed motion for new trial, we conclude that this is not a case where timely filing of the notice of appeal should be waived. Accordingly, Defendant’s appeal is dismissed.