APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This matter is before the Court on the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner, Willie Bob King, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied, and this Court affirmed on appeal. Thereafter, the Petitioner did not file for permission to appeal to the supreme court. After the period in which to file such an application expired, the Petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, seeking a delayed appeal to the supreme court. The post-conviction court denied this petition without a hearing and refused the Petitioner’s request to reconsider its decision. The Petitioner appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his second petition for post-conviction relief. Upon our review of the record in this case, we conclude that the Petitioner is not entitled to a delayed appeal and that this case meets the criteria for affirmance pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The trial court granted Defendant’s motion to set aside the judgment arising from a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs in this medical malpractice/wrongful death action. It also conditionally granted Defendant’s alternative motion for a new trial. In light of Abshure v. Methodist Healthcare, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This petition was filed as a common law writ of certiorari in the circuit court of Davidson County to challenge the validity of the petitioner’s 1998 felony convictions in the criminal court of Davidson County. The circuit court dismissed the writ finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition and that the claims pertain to actions governed by the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure for which there is no relief under a common law writ of certiorari. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Geoffrey Alexander, appeals the revocation of his probation. In this appeal, Alexander argues that (1) the trial court erred by revoking his probation and (2) the trial court should have granted his request for a continuance. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Decedent executed a will in 1988 which could not be found upon her death. Decedent’s stepchildren sought to establish a copy of the 1988 will as Decedent’s last will and testament, but the trial court found that they had failed to rebut the presumption that the will had been destroyed and revoked. We find that Appellants failed to prove that Decedent did not revoke her will. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s involuntary dismissal of Appellants’ claim as well as its order that Decedent’s Estate be administered as an intestate estate.

This is a termination of parental rights case pertaining to Tylon L.D. (“the Child”), the minor child of Pamela D. (“Mother”). Eighteen months after the Child was placed in her care, the Child’s prospective adoptive parent, Carman E. (“Foster Mother”), filed a complaint seeking to terminate Mother’s parental rights and asking to adopt the Child. After a trial before Chancellor Thomas R. Frierson, II (“the trial court”), the court terminated Mother’s rights upon finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that multiple grounds existed for terminating her parental rights and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. ¹ Mother appeals. We affirm.

These consolidated actions are before this Court on a Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9 interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. We are asked to consider whether, as a matter of law, a plaintiff is barred from maintaining a suit against an employer under a sole theory of respondeat superior where the plaintiff settles her claim against the employee, executes a release of all claims as to the employee, but reserves her claim against the employer in a court order dismissing the employee with prejudice. We hold that the plaintiff’s suit is barred. The judgment of the trial court is reversed, summary judgment is granted to the employer, and the case is dismissed.

The Petitioner, Eric D. Wallace, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of felony murder and attempted first degree murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and to a consecutive fifteen-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender for the attempted first degree murder conviction, for an effective sentence of life plus fifteen years. He subsequently filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Hardeman County Circuit Court, which was summarily dismissed. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief because (1) he asserts that he is “actually innocent” of the charges, (2) his indictments are defective, and (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on flight. Upon review, we affirm the judgment summarily dismissing the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Plaintiffs appeal from the denial of a second Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. Eight months after the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute, Plaintiffs filed the first of two Rule 60.02 motions alleging they did not receive notice of the motion to dismiss their case and that they did not receive the order dismissing the case. The trial court denied the first Rule 60.02 motion and plaintiffs did not appeal that ruling. Plaintiffs then filed a second Rule 60.02 motion, asserting the same grounds as in the first motion. The trial court denied the second Rule 60.02 motion, which is the ruling at issue in this appeal. We have determined the issues presented in the second motion are res judicata because no new issues were presented in the second motion and, therefore, affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Kelly Walker, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of facilitation of first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty-five years and six years, respectively, to be served consecutively in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves the enforcement of a restrictive covenant. A group of neighbors filed suit seeking permanently to enjoin a musician and his wife from using their property for nonresidential purposes. The trial court ruled in favor of the neighbors after a bench trial, prohibiting the homeowners from parking a tour bus, two panel trucks, and several employee vehicles on their property and ordering the homeowners to remove a portion of a parking lot and driveway built to accommodate the vehicles. The court later awarded discretionary costs to the neighbors. We reverse the grant of injunctive relief requiring the homeowners to remove a portion of the parking lot and driveway but affirm the trial court in all other respects.

In this action plaintiff alleged she was injured when the roof on the deck at defendant's house fell upon her, causing injuries. Defendant denied any responsibility for plaintiff's injuries and moved for summary judgment. The Trial Court, in sustaining the summary judgment motion, held that none of the parties knew of any defect in the patio roof, and there was no evidence in the record of what actually caused the collapse of the roof. The defendant possessed no constructive notice of any defective condition causing the collapse. Plaintiffs have appealed and we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court and remand.

The appellant, Jennifer Renee Dennis, admitted in the Bedford County Circuit Court that she violated probation sentences she was serving for two felony theft convictions, and the trial court ordered her to serve her original twelve- and three-year sentences in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentences in confinement and that the trial court should have reinstated her probation. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Felix Tamayo, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, with the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of 12 years as a Range I, standard offender for each count, for a total effective sentence of 60 years. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentences and in ordering consecutive sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a divorce case. Wife appeals the trial court’s order concerning: (1) the valuation of Husband’s medical practice; (2) the division of certain marital debt; and (3) the award of transitional alimony, rather than alimony in futuro, and the amount thereof. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a personal injury lawsuit, wherein plaintiff filed suit for injuries suffered in the course of his employment. Plaintiff's employer was allowed to intervene to assert a subrogation lien to recover workers’ compensation benefits paid to plaintiff. Plaintiff settled his claim against the defendants, and an order of voluntary dismissal was entered. The intervenors moved to set the case for trial, asserting that the settlement between plaintiffs and defendants was negotiated without the consent of the intervenors and did not take into account plaintiff’s future medical expenses, for which intervenors would be responsible. The trial court granted the intervenors’ motion to set the case for trial, but subsequently dismissed the intervening petition, finding that the settlement resolved all claims against the defendants and that the intervening petition failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Finding that dismissal of the intervening petition was error, the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded.

The Petitioner, James DuBose, appeals the Morgan County Circuit Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1993 conviction for first degree murder by aggravated child abuse. He claims his judgment of conviction is void because the indictment was invalid and charged him with violating a statute that did not exist at the time of his offense. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, John Richard Sprouse, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s revocation of his probation. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his six-year sentence in incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A show cause order was entered in this case on January 31, 2011, directing the pro se appellant to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based upon the untimely filing of the notice of appeal. The appellant has failed to respond to the show cause order. The record supports that the notice of appeal was filed untimely. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

This is an appeal from the trial court’s order dismissing Appellant’s petition for access to public records under Tennessee Code Annotated Section 10-7-505. The trial court dismissed the petition upon its finding that: (1) the Appellee records custodian responded to Appellant’s records request; (2) the fee charged to Appellant was reasonable and in compliance with those set by the open records counsel; and (3) Appellant had, in fact, received the records that he requested. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The juvenile court terminated Father’s parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to provide support and substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans. Because we have concluded that the Department of Children’s Services failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that Father’s failure to pay support was willful or that the Department’s efforts to help Father find housing were reasonable, we reverse the juvenile court’s decision.

Petitioner brought this action styled: "Petition for Declaratory Judgment", naming the Tennessee Department of Corrections and the Tennessee Board of Paroles as defendants. The Trial Judge, responding to a Motion to Dismiss, dismissed the Department of Corrections on the grounds that it was not a proper party to challenge a parole board decision. The Trial Court then treated the Petition as a common law writ of certiorari, and held that the writ was not timely filed. Petitioner has appealed to this Court and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an appeal from the decision of the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission reversing the decision to terminate Clifton Cattron’s employment with the City of Memphis. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the Civil Service Commission’s decision that the City of Memphis lacked a reasonable basis for terminating Mr. Cattron’s employment.

Appellant, John D. Barnhart, was indicted by the Robertson County Grand Jury for aggravated assault and violation of the Sexual Offender Registration Act. Appellant pled guilty. In conjunction with the guilty plea, Appellant received a two-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender for the conviction for violation of the Sexual Offender Registration Act and a six-year sentence for the aggravated assault conviction. The manner of service of the sentence was left to the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve his sentence in incarceration and ordered the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying an alternative sentence and in ordering the sentences to run consecutively. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Gary Thomas Reed, was convicted of initiating the process of manufacturing methamphetamine, a Class B felony. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to 16 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) that the trial court erred in permitting expert testimony; (3) that the trial court erred in permitting lay opinion testimony; (4) that the trial court erred in permitting testimony from a witness who had not been disclosed to defense counsel; (5) that the trial court erred by failing to permit testimony from a potential defense witness; (6) that the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial; and (7) that the trial court erred in sentencing the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the conviction and sentence but remand the case for the entry of a corrected judgment consistent with this opinion.