APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves child support in a Title IV-D proceeding. In the parents’ divorce trial, the father was not present, so income was imputed to him, and he was ordered to pay child support. In post-divorce proceedings, the State filed contempt petitions on behalf of the mother, alleging that the father was in arrears on his child support obligation. Orders were entered holding the father in contempt and ordering payments on the arrearage. The father filed a motion for modification of his child support obligation, asserting that his income was substantially less than the amount imputed to him, and that he had an additional minor dependent for whom he was required to pay child support. The trial judge denied the father’s motion to modify his child support and sentenced him to jail for contempt. The father appeals the criminal contempt conviction and asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to modify his child support obligation. We vacate the criminal contempt finding and reverse the denial of the father’s motion to reduce his child support obligation.

The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss in a medical malpractice action initially filed prior to the effective date of the notice and certificate of good faith provisions subsequently codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 29-26-122, and nonsuited and re-commenced after the effective date of the provisions despite Plaintiff’s failure to fulfill the statutory requisites. We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse and remand for dismissal.

The Petitioner, Conal Decker, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis or writ of habeas corpus challenging judgments in cases from 1994 and 1998 which were used to enhance the federal sentence he is currently serving. He claims in the cases he is challenging that he was never provided counsel or that his waiver of counsel was improper. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the coram nobis court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the coram nobis court is affirmed.

Appellant, Jonathan Londono, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, facilitation of felony murder, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of forty-nine years. Appellant was resentenced after an unsuccessful appeal to this Court, an unsuccessful appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, a remand from the United States Supreme Court to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and a remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court to the trial court for resentencing. As a result, Appellant’s sentence was enhanced based upon one enhancing factor, that he had a previous history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of forty-nine years. Appellant appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred in basing the application of the enhancing factor on convictions that occurred in the time between the commission of the offenses in question and the imposition of his sentence for the offenses in question. We determine that based upon prior case law in this State the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Arlie Ray Thomas, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to challenge the affidavits supporting the arrest and search warrants, and that counsel failed to properly interview a witness. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Stephen Parks, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1003 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years’ confinement, with six months to be served in the Blount County Jail and the remainder to be served on supervised probation with multiple special conditions. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred during sentencing by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) imposing the maximum sentence in the range and ordering confinement, and (3) imposing unreasonable terms of probation. We affirm the conviction and the length of the Defendant’s sentence, but we modify the special conditions of probation.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael W. Poe, was convicted of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202, -15-402(b). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of life in prison for his first degree felony murder conviction and twenty-five years as a violent offender for his aggravated child abuse conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial after one juror made a comment to another juror about the trial; (3) the trial court erred in failing to ask the other jurors whether they heard the comment at issue; (4) the trial court erred when it failed to remove or disable the televisions and radios from the jurors’ motel rooms; (5) the trial court erred when it applied two inapplicable enhancement factors and failed to consider one mitigating factor; (6) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (7) the trial court did not award the proper amount of jail credit; and (8) the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the indictment. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal from a class certification. The named plaintiffs, former owners of preferred stock in Equity Inns, Inc., filed a class action against the company’s former directors. Their amended complaint asserted breaches of the fiduciary duties allegedly owed to the preferred shareholders during the negotiation and approval of a merger. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification with respect to “[a]ll holders of Equity Inns preferred stock as of June 21, 2007.” We vacate and remand for further consideration.

This appeal involves a failed real estate transaction. Real estate brokers and Raymond Morrow (“Seller”) entered into an agreement to show an unlisted property. Seller did not own the property, but he claimed to have the property under contract with the owner. After the brokers showed the property to Morgan Development and Del Morgan (“Buyers”), Buyers and Seller entered into an agreement for the sale of the property. The transaction was never completed because Seller could not deliver marketable title. Buyers initiated a lawsuit against the brokers along with Seller and the owners of the property, alleging negligent business representation and fraud. The brokers moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Buyers’ suit against the brokers because the purchase agreement included a disclaimer. Buyers appeal. We affirm.

Aggrieved of his convictions of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the petitioner, Charles Lamb, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. In this appeal, he challenges the denial of his bid for post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner Andrew Thomas appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury found Petitioner guilty of felony murder based on the killing of James Day during an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The jury found that Petitioner had previously been convicted of one or more felonies for which the statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury further found that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then sentenced Petitioner to death. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361 (Tenn. 2005). On January 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On November 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis and an amended petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing in October 2007. On August 4, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order denying Petitioner postconviction relief. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) Petitioner’s trial counsel were ineffective; (2) Petitioner’s appellate counsel were ineffective; (3) Petitioner is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; and (4) Tennessee’s death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Monroe County jury convicted Petitioner of second degree murder. State v. Darrell Fritts, No. 132, 1992 WL 236152, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 25, 1992), perm. app. dismissed, (Tenn. Feb. 1, 1993). Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal. Id. at *10. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief that was denied. Darrell Fritts v. State, No. 03C01-9803-CR-00116, 1999 WL 604430, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 12, 1999). On appeal, this Court upheld the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus relief in the Monroe County Court. The first writ was dismissed because it was filed in Monroe County as opposed to the Johnson County Court which is the closest court in distance. With regard to the second writ, the State filed a motion to dismiss based upon the fact that the issues had already been determined by this Court on appeal from the denial of the post-conviction petition and that ineffective assistance of counsel at trial is not a cognizable issue for habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court granted the motion. Petitioner appeals the dismissal of both writs. The appeals have been consolidated in this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the dismissal of the writs was correct. Therefore, we affirm the dismissals by the habeas corpus court.

Citing decreased income, Husband filed a petition to modify alimony and child support, and Wife filed a contempt petition against Husband. The trial court reduced both Husband’s alimony and child support obligations, it refused to hold Husband in contempt, and it declined to award Wife her attorney fees and court costs. We reverse the trial court’s modification of Husband’s alimony obligation and we reinstate the provisions of the Consent Order with regard to alimony; we affirm the trial court’s finding of a significant variance, but we remand for a modification of Husband’s child support obligation consistent with this opinion; we affirm the trial court’s finding regarding contempt; we award Wife her reasonable attorney fees and court costs expended in defending Husband’s petition to modify and in filing her petition for contempt, and we remand for a determination of such fees; and finally, we decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

The trial court awarded Defendant summary judgment on the basis that Defendant had negated the element of damages in this personal injury action. We reverse and remand for further  proceedings.

This is an appeal of a grant of summary judgment to a hospital and physician in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs also appeal the denial of their motion that the trial court recuse itself due to the court’s membership on the board of directors of the defendant hospital and the court’s denial of their motion for default judgment based on spoliation of evidence. We reverse.

The Defendant, Danny Lynn Davis, was convicted at a bench trial in the Washington County Criminal Court of theft of property valued at $60,000 or more, a Class B felony; official misconduct, a Class E felony; and twenty-five counts of forgery, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103 (theft); 39-16-402 (official misconduct); 39-14-114 (forgery). He was sentenced to ten years for the theft conviction and to one year for each of the Class E felony convictions, all to be served concurrently with one year of split confinement and the remaining nine years on probation. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the victim, the city of Johnson City, had no standing to allege the crimes, (2) the prosecution of the forgery and official misconduct offenses was barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (4) the trial judge should have recused himself because the judge’s wife was an employee of the city of Johnson City; and (5) he was deprived of the opportunity to prepare a proper defense because the trial court failed to release his income tax records during discovery. We note that two of the convictions were rendered on counts dismissed by the State during trial. We vacate the convictions for forgery in Counts 23 and 27, but we affirm the remaining judgments of the trial court.

In this case the Blount County property assessor assessed ad valorem taxes against defendant for certain raw materials the defendant used to fabricate sheets of aluminum at its manufacturing facility in Blount County. The State Board of Equalization and the Chancery Court for Blount County upheld the assessment. Defendants have appealed to this Court arguing that Article II, Sections 28 and 30 of the Tennessee Constitution provide exemptions from ad valorem taxes for "the direct product of the soil in the hands of the producer, and his immediate vendee". We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

Appellant, pro se, raised as issues the Trial Judge ordering him to deposit half of his income tax refund, and in ordering him not to have his children around fiance. The record contains an Order by the Trial Judge ordering appellant to pay into the Court half of his income tax refund, but the record is devoid of any order pertaining to the latter issue. The Order on the income tax refund recites that evidence was heard on that issue, but appellant has filed no transcript or statement of the evidence. Accordingly, the Trial Judge's ruling is conclusively presumed to be correct, and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Adrian Ann Crain, appeals the revocation of her probation sentence, claiming that the state denied her right to a speedy trial and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction when it revoked her sentence and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence in the  Tennessee Department of Correction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Purchasers of home filed this action against the sellers for negligent misrepresentation and fraudulent misrepresentation for the failure to disclose defects in the home. The trial court found for the purchasers on their claim of negligent misrepresentation but denied their claim of fraudulent misrepresentation and their request for rescission. Purchasers appealed contending the trial court erred by not finding fraudulent misrepresentation and partially denying their motion to alter or amend the judgment in which they sought to introduce new evidence. We affirm the ruling of the trial court in all respects.

Father filed a petition to relocate with minor child, and mother filed a petition for change of custody. After a hearing, the trial court denied father’s petition to relocate and mother’s petition to change custody but increased mother’s parenting time. A week after the court’s order was entered, mother filed a petition to reopen the proof, and the court granted her motion. After another hearing, the trial court granted mother’s petition for a change of custody. On appeal, father argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition to relocate, in reopening the proof, and in granting mother’s petition to change custody. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Monroe County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellants, Michael Aaron Jenkins and Perley Winkler, Jr., of two counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder and one count of attempted aggravated arson. After sentencing hearings, Jenkins received an effective seventeen-year sentence and Winkler received an effective forty-year sentence. On appeal, the appellants contend that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court erred by prohibiting them from questioning one of the victims, David Senn, about a prior felony conviction. In addition, Jenkins contends that the trial court should have allowed him to cross-examine Senn in front of the jury about Senn’s untruthfulness during an offer of proof, that the trial court should have granted his motion to sever his trial from that of his codefendant, and that the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing argument. Winkler contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to question a second victim about a threatening message Winkler allegedly left on a cellular telephone and that his sentence is excessive. After a review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court properly sentenced Winkler. The appellants’ remaining issues are waived because the appellants failed to provide an adequate record on appeal.

In this action to terminate the parental rights of the mother, the petitioner alleged statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The mother answered, defending her right to remain a parent. At trial, the parties stipulated that there were statutory grounds for termination of the mother's parental rights. The only issue at trial, was whether or not it was in the best interest of the child for the mother's rights to be terminated. Following the evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court found that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, we concur with the Trial Court that there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of the child to terminate the mother's parental rights.

The petitioner, James Patterson, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Shelby County. He was convicted of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony,  criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, Class A felonies. The petitioner received an effective sentence of thirty-two years. The convictions and sentence were upheld on direct appeal. See State v. James Patterson, No. W2005-01416-CCA-R3CD, 2007 WL 162175, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 23, 2007). The petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which alleged that trial counsel was ineffective. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner relief. On appeal, the petitioner claims he is entitled to a new post-conviction hearing because post-conviction counsel failed to diligently investigate and present reasonable claims for relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Employee filed a complaint for workers’ compensation benefits against her former employer alleging that her work for her former employer advanced pre-existing arthritis in both knees and required her to have joint replacement surgery on her right knee. The employer denied her claim, contending that her condition was unrelated to her employment. The trial court found that she had sustained a compensable aggravation of her arthritis and that she had not had a meaningful return to work. It awarded 78% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. The employer appealed,¹ contending that the trial court erred by finding the award was not subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). We agree with employer that employee is entitled to an award of one and one-half times her impairment rating and decrease the award to 39% PPD to the body as a whole. We affirm the judgment as modified.