APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioner, Jarret Alan Guy, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner contends that (1) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement because Petitioner and is family were threatened by a police detective; and that (2) counsel failed to file a motion to suppress his statement based on Petitioner’s alleged intoxication at the time of the interview. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves post-divorce modification of child support. After a prior appeal, the case was remanded to the trial court to determine whether the father was entitled to a reduction in his child support obligation when one of the parties’ children reached majority. On remand, the trial court declined to reduce the father’s child support. The father appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, Joann Williamson, pled guilty to facilitation of the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and two counts of child abuse and neglect, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-417 (2010); T.C.A. § 39-15-401 (Supp. 2008) (amended 2009). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six months’ incarceration and three years, six months’ probation for the facilitation conviction and four years’ probation for each of the child abuse convictions, to be served consecutively to the facilitation conviction for an effective twelve-year sentence. The Defendant’s plea agreement reserved a certified question of law regarding the legality of the warrantless search of her home. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence and that the State should not be allowed to rely on more than one exception to the warrant requirement. The State contends that the Defendant did not properly reserve the certified question. We hold that the Defendant’s certified question was not properly reserved. The appeal is dismissed.

The trial court dismissed the City’s request for injunctive relief to enforce a permit revocation on the common law grounds of prior suit pending based on a pending certiorari action challenging the revocation. Because an original action for injunctive relief cannot be joined with a certiorari action that is appellate in nature, the rule of prior suit pending does not apply. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court.

Petitioner, Antonio D. Richardson, appeals from the trial court’s order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner asserts that his counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Timothy D. McGlory, was convicted following the entry of his guilty pleas to attempted second degree murder and possession of a Schedule I drug for resale. Pursuant to the plea agreement, Petitioner was sentenced to 12 years for his attempted second degree murder conviction and eight years for the drug offense, and his sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of 12 years. Petitioner now appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his guilty pleas were involuntarily entered; that the prosecution failed to disclose evidence favorable to Petitioner; and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to relief and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a breach of employment contract action filed by Dean G. Hafemen (“the Employee”) against Protein Discovery, Inc., a Tennessee corporation (“the Employer” or “the Company”) after the Employer terminated the Employee’s employment before the expiration of the term of his “Amended and Restated Employment Agreement” (“the Agreement”). The complaint alleges that the Employee is entitled to certain severance benefits provided for in the Agreement for any termination that does not qualify as a “Termination For Cause” as defined in the Agreement. After a bench trial, the court found that the termination was for cause and entered judgment in favor of the Employer. The Employee appeals. We reverse.

This is the second appeal of this case, which arises from the grant of a writ of certiorari by the Shelby County Chancery Court. Upon review of the Memphis City Council's record, the trial court found that the Appellee City had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or illegally in either approving a planned development, or in approving the companion street closure. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City, thereby affirming the City Council’s action in approving the planned development. The issue of the companion street closure proceeded to hearing, with the trial court ultimately affirming the City Council’s decision. Appellant appeals, arguing that the City Council’s decision was made in violation of the Memphis City Charter and ordinances, and that the decision was the product of corruption within the City Council. Discerning no error, we affirm the action of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Joseph John Borger, pled guilty to multiple offenses stemming from his driving while intoxicated, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II Offender to an effective sentence of seven years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that his sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff requested records from a nonprofit foundation pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act. The nonprofit foundation refused the request, stating that the foundation was not a government agency and that the records were not public. Plaintiff filed a Petition for Access to Public Records in chancery court, which held that the records were available because the  nonprofit foundation was the functional equivalent of a government agency. The Court of Appeals affirmed. We hold that the nonprofit foundation’s records are not available pursuant to the Tennessee Public Records Act because it is not the functional equivalent of a government agency. We also hold that its records are not available pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 10-7-503(d) (1999) because the nonprofit foundation has no more than two full-time staff members. We therefore reverse the judgment of the lower courts and dismiss the case.

The Petitioner, Joseph Brown, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea to one count of facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The sellers of a mobile home park appeal the trial court’s decision to rescind two real estate sales contracts and refund the purchasers their down payment. The purchasers asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, and breach of fiduciary duty, all of which arose from alleged misrepresentations by the sellers regarding the condition and income potential of the property at issue. Following a lengthy and convoluted procedural history, including a jury trial, the granting of a new trial, and several waves of amended pleadings, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The sellers asserted various defenses including, inter alia, that the purchasers’ claims were time barred. Finding that the sellers fraudulently induced the purchasers into buying the property, and that the statute of limitations had been tolled due to the sellers’ concealment of material facts, the trial court denied the sellers’ motion, granted summary judgment to the purchasers. For relief, the trial court rescinded the sales contracts and awarded the purchasers a refund of their down payments. We affirm.

Employee sustained a compensable injury to her lower back. Employer initially provided medical treatment, but Employer’s insurer subsequently declined to provide additional medical treatment. Employee sought treatment on her own. Her treating physician found that she retained a 15% permanent impairment as a result of her injury. An examining physician for Employer opined that she had no impairment. A physician was selected through the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process. That physician also stated that Employee had no permanent impairment. The trial court found that Employee rebutted the presumption of correctness of the MIR physician’s rating by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) and awarded 20% permanent partial disability. Both sides appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Lee White, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.” The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of  Criminal Appeals. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Timothy Ruskin, worked as a maintenance technician for Ledic Realty Services, Ltd. (Ledic), which managed several apartment buildings. Mr. Ruskin was injured while responding to an after-hours call from a tenant of one of the apartment buildings. In response to his compensation claim, Ledic asserted as an affirmative defense that Mr. Ruskin’s injuries resulted from his intoxication. After a hearing, the trial court ruled in Ledic’s favor, and Mr. Ruskin appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee, on behalf of Kenneth S. L. (“Father”), filed a petition for child support against Melissa G. M. (“Mother”). The hearing for child support was continued on three separate occasions. With each continuance, the trial court instructed Mother to bring medical  documentation verifying her inability to work. At the fourth scheduled hearing, Mother failed to produce documentation from her medical providers. The trial court proceeded to set monthly child support payments and imputed a gross income of minimum wage to Mother. Mother appeals. We affirm.

A divorced mother of two children filed a petition for child support, alleging that although the father had legal custody of the children and she had been under an order to pay child support to him, the children had actually resided with her for the past six years. The father did not deny that the children had been living with the mother during that entire period. After negotiation, the parties entered into an agreed order, whereby the father was to pay $35,000 in back child support to his former wife. Twenty-three months later, the father filed a Rule 60.02 motion for relief, contending that the agreed order was void as against public policy because it amounted to an impermissible retroactive modification of child support. The trial court denied the father’s motion on the ground that it was entitled to presume that parties who are represented by counsel and who submit a signed agreement to the court have taken every pertinent factor into consideration. We affirm.

John Jay Hooker has filed a motion requesting this Court (1) to set aside its June 21, 2010 order directing the Clerk of the Appellate Courts to decline to accept any of his further filings in this case and (2) to rescind its January 7, 2010 order enforcing the October 20, 2008 order of the Chancery Court for Davidson County suspending his license to practice law for thirty days. Mr. Hooker has also requested that all the members of the Court recuse themselves from this proceeding because they “are prejudiced against him as a consequence of a contentious political dispute before the legislature . . . regarding the [c]onstitutionality of the [r]etention [e]lection [s]tatute.” In order to address Mr. Hooker’s first two requests, the Court must first address his renewed insistence that all the members of this Court are disqualified from any proceedings involving his law license. It is, therefore, ordered that the Clerk of the Appellate Courts is directed to accept and file the motion lodged by Mr. Hooker on January 14, 2011. It is further ordered that Mr. Hooker’s  motion requesting all the members of this Court to recuse themselves from this proceeding is  denied.

The appellant, Karim El-Amin, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to two counts of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value more than five hundred dollars but less than one thousand dollars, a Class E felony, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value equal to or less than five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant was to receive an effective four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request of alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This matter is before the court for a second time. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County initiated suit to compel two developers to complete an unfinished portion of a road in a planned unit development or to recover damages equal to the cost of completing the road if it completed the road itself. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that the amended complaint did not provide a legal basis for requiring either developer to complete the road. On appeal this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for the court to consider the appropriate allocation of responsibility for construction of the road between the two developers. While the appeal was pending, the Metropolitan Government acquired the land and subsequently completed the unfinished portion of the road. On remand, the trial court assessed costs of constructing the road to the developers equally, but assessed the land-acquisition costs entirely to one developer. The Metropolitan Government appeals. Finding no error in the trial court’s allocation of responsibility, we affirm.

The Sequatchie County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, John Anthony Partin, for one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one count of violation of the implied consent law. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence collected as a result of his interaction with the law enforcement officer. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Subsequently, Appellant pled guilty to one count of DUI, first offense and reserved a certified question of law for appeal to this Court. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that Appellant did not properly reserve his certified question. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from defendant developer, but the purchase contract required plaintiffs to use defendant construction company to build their home. Before the home was completed, defendant construction company defaulted on paying materialmen and suppliers and abandoned the project. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that developer knew, or should have know, that the construction company was incapable of performing the required construction services, and that the developer owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty to provide a contractor who could perform the work in a good, workmanlike manner. They further alleged a breach of contract, in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A default judgment was entered against the construction company, and the developer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court ultimately granted against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal involves child support in a Title IV-D proceeding. In the parents’ divorce trial, the father was not present, so income was imputed to him, and he was ordered to pay child support. In post-divorce proceedings, the State filed contempt petitions on behalf of the mother, alleging that the father was in arrears on his child support obligation. Orders were entered holding the father in contempt and ordering payments on the arrearage. The father filed a motion for modification of his child support obligation, asserting that his income was substantially less than the amount imputed to him, and that he had an additional minor dependent for whom he was required to pay child support. The trial judge denied the father’s motion to modify his child support and sentenced him to jail for contempt. The father appeals the criminal contempt conviction and asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to modify his child support obligation. We vacate the criminal contempt finding and reverse the denial of the father’s motion to reduce his child support obligation.

The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss in a medical malpractice action initially filed prior to the effective date of the notice and certificate of good faith provisions subsequently codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 29-26-122, and nonsuited and re-commenced after the effective date of the provisions despite Plaintiff’s failure to fulfill the statutory requisites. We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse and remand for dismissal.

The Petitioner, Conal Decker, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis or writ of habeas corpus challenging judgments in cases from 1994 and 1998 which were used to enhance the federal sentence he is currently serving. He claims in the cases he is challenging that he was never provided counsel or that his waiver of counsel was improper. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the coram nobis court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the coram nobis court is affirmed.