APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

After the death of her husband, the plaintiff filed suit against their agents/financial planners based upon several theories of recovery in regard to the termination of a life insurance policy from one company and the acquisition of a replacement policy from a second company. After initially contesting the award of benefits, the second company, which was also named as a defendant in the suit, settled with the plaintiff. At the conclusion of the bench trial as to the liability of the agents, the plaintiff was awarded substantial damages as to each policy based upon various theories of recovery: the agents’ failure to procure a life insurance policy as directed, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, but held that the damages in contract relating to the failure to procure should be offset by the amount of the plaintiff’s pre-trial settlement with the second insurance company. Because of the nature of the issues presented, this Court granted permission to appeal. As to the policy for which benefits were denied by the second company, we hold that (1) a cause of action may arise for the failure of the agents to procure a policy not subject to contest; (2) the claim for failure to procure may be actionable, notwithstanding the policy holders’ admission that they did not read the insurance application; and (3) because the settlement by the second life insurance company was not specifically resolved based upon contract, the agents are not entitled to a credit against damages caused by their failure to procure. As to the policy terminated by the plaintiff, we hold that the evidence preponderates against any award of damages based upon negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, or violations of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Finally, we hold that the ad damnum clause in the complaint provided the agents with sufficient notice to support a damage award in the amount of $1,000,000 plus pre-judgment interest. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for determination of post-judgment interest.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a medical malpractice case. Plaintiffs, parents of child who suffered severe, permanent brain injuries during the course of his labor and delivery, filed suit against their physician, physician’s employer, and related hospitals. The physician and her employer settled prior to trial, leaving the related hospitals as the only defendants. This case has been tried twice. Following the first trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, which the trial court set aside pursuant to the thirteenth juror rule. The second trial resulted in a verdict for plaintiffs, with the jury assigning 3.75 percent of fault to the defendants and 96.25 percent of fault to the nonparty physician. Because the evidence shows that the members of the jury agreed to be bound by the result of a predetermined averaging process, we have concluded that the jury reached a quotient verdict, which is impermissible. Consequently, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial.

The Employee suffered a compensable injury while working on an automobile assembly line. A few months after the Employee filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, his employer, through a highly-publicized bankruptcy, sold a majority of its assets to a newly created entity. The trial court held that because the Employee, who was employed by the new entity, had not returned to work for his pre-injury employer, he was entitled to permanent partial disability benefits in excess of the cap established by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). The employer has appealed, contending that the unique circumstances of its bankruptcy sale compel this Panel to rule that the Employee returned to work for his pre-injury employer. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Two former employees of the City of LaVergne claimed that the defendants retaliated against them in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act for complaining of race discrimination in the workplace and for filing claims with the EEOC. One of the plaintiffs asserted an additional claim for hostile work environment discrimination. The jury returned a verdict for both plaintiffs for retaliation and for hostile work environment for one plaintiff. The defendants appeal the trial court’s admission of certain testimony and evidence about an alleged listening device as well as the jury verdict for hostile work environment and the amount of damages for humiliation and embarrassment. We find that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony, but that the error was harmless. The court did not err in admitting evidence about the alleged listening device. We conclude that there is material evidence to support the jury verdict’s for a hostile work environment as well as the amount of the award for damages.

Defendant, Joseph Valentine Hill, was charged with one count of DUI, second offense, a class A misdemeanor, and with seven counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a class C felony. He entered pleas of guilty as charged in each count and submitted to a sentencing hearing with no agreement as to the length or manner of service of the sentences. The trial court sentenced Defendant to four years for each aggravated assault conviction and to 11 months and 29 days for the DUI second offense conviction. The DUI sentence and three of the aggravated assault sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other. The remaining four aggravated assault sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with each other, but consecutively to the first grouping of sentences, for an effective sentence of eight years. The trial court ordered the eight-year sentence to be served in incarceration. Recognizing that the DUI, second offense conviction requires a mandatory minimum period of incarceration, Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred by declining to grant him probation after serving the above-noted mandatory minimum confinement. After careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Elizabeth Diane Carr (“Petitioner”) filed for and obtained an ex parte order of protection against her cousin, Gregory F. Allen (“Respondent”). Pursuant to statute, a hearing was conducted on whether to dissolve or to extend the order of protection. In accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-605(b), a trial court has two options at such a hearing: (1) to dissolve the order of protection; or (2) to extend the order of protection for a definite period of time not to exceed one year. With respect to taxing costs, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-3-617(a) expressly prohibits taxing costs against a victim, even if the order of protection is dissolved. If the order of protection is extended, the costs must be taxed against the respondent. In the present case, following the hearing on whether to extend or dissolve the order of protection, the Trial Court instead entered a mutual restraining order and taxed costs equally to both parties. Because neither action was authorized by statute, we vacate the judgment of the Trial Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

This appeal involves the transfer of a case from the chancery court to the circuit court. The plaintiff was terminated from her employment with the defendant municipality. She filed this lawsuit against the municipality for wrongful termination, seeking only unliquidated damages. The municipality filed a motion to transfer the case to circuit court, asserting that the chancery court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under Tennessee’s Governmental Tort Liability Act and also based on Tennessee Code Annotated § 16-11-102, which addresses the chancery court’s jurisdiction over claims for unliquidated damages. The chancery court denied the motion to transfer. The municipality now appeals. We reverse, concluding that once an objection to jurisdiction was made under Section 16-11-102, the chancery court was required to transfer the case to the circuit court.

The employee alleged that he injured his back in the course of his employment. His employers denied the claim based upon failure to give timely notice of the injury. The employee saw two medical doctors and a chiropractor shortly after his injury. Their records contained no reference to a work injury; one stated that the injury had happened at home. The trial court found that the employee did not provide timely notice of his alleged injury and, alternatively, that he failed to sustain his burden of proof concerning causation. The employee has appealed from those findings. We affirm the judgment.

Employee filed a complaint for workers’ compensation benefits against her former employer alleging that her work for her former employer advanced pre-existing arthritis in both knees and required her to have joint replacement surgery on her right knee. The employer denied her claim, contending that her condition was unrelated to her employment. The trial court found that she had sustained a compensable aggravation of her arthritis and that she had not had a meaningful return to work. It awarded 78% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the body as a whole. The employer appealed,¹ contending that the trial court erred by finding the award was not subject to the one and one-half times impairment cap found in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). We agree with employer that employee is entitled to an award of one and one-half times her impairment rating and decrease the award to 39% PPD to the body as a whole. We affirm the judgment as modified.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Derrick D. Crutcher, of simple possession of cocaine, in this case a Class E felony, see T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a), (e) (2006), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, see id. § 39-17- 425(a)(1). In this appeal as of right, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Because the evidence is sufficient, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Robert J. Montville, appeals the Hickman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for simple assault and reckless driving and his resulting effective sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served as twenty-four hours in jail and the remainder on supervised probation. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint alleging medical malpractice against numerous healthcare providers on May 26, 2009. They alleged that they had given the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-121(a) prior to April 8, 2009 to the defendants. The defendants filed several motions, including motions for summary judgment, stating that plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-26-121. The record establishes that plaintiffs did not give the requisite notice, "at least 60 days before the filing of their Complaint". In response to the motions for summary judgment the Trial Court excused compliance with the code section and defendants appealed. On appeal, we reverse the holding of the Trial Court on the grounds that non-compliance with the code section could only be excused upon the showing of extraordinary cause.

The defendant, Bobby Hughlett, appeals from the trial court’s denial of any form of alternative sentencing, including probation. The defendant entered pleas of nolo contendere to attempted aggravated robbery and robbery, both Class C felonies. The defendant was given an agreed sentence of ten years for each count, to run concurrently, as a persistentoffender, with a 45% release eligibility date. The defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying him an alternative sentence, including probation, and erred in finding the defendant was on probation at the time of committing these offenses. After review, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

In September of 2009, Judy Dotson McConnell and Jerry Dotson (“Plaintiffs”) sued Pat Fuller, John Fuller, and Lela Dotson Gravett (“Defendants”) alleging, in relevant part, that the Last Will and Testament of Clarence E. Dotson, which was offered for probate in May of 2003, was a fraudulent will. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted alleging that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiffs’ claim. After a hearing, the Trial Court entered its order on February 16, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was not filed within the statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs failed to “allege facts which would bring into play fraudulent concealment,” which would have tolled the statute of limitations. The Trial Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We affirm.

The appellant, Deborah N. Cotter, was convicted by a jury in the Hamblen County Criminal Court of aggravated robbery and was sentenced to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, she argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction, particularly because no witness identified her in court as the robber. She also contends that the trial court erred in arriving at her sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Bryant C. Overton, of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted first degree murder, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of sixty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in part, but we reverse them in part based upon a sentencing error.

A woman who failed to have her paternity determined while her putative father was living filed a complaint seeking to establish her right to inherit a part of his estate. Tennessee Code Annotated §31-2-105 requires paternity to be established by clear and convincing evidence if paternity is sought to be established after the putative father’s death. Prior to the trial, the woman moved the chancery court to order the deceased’s family to provide her with DNA samples in an effort to prove the deceased was her father. The trial court denied this motion, finding the rules of civil procedure do not require nonparties to provide DNA samples. Following a bench trial, the court concluded the woman failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased was her father. The woman appealed. We affirm the trial court in all respects because, first, nothing in the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the deceased’s family members to provide DNA samples to assist the woman in proving she was the deceased’s daughter. Second, the positive and negative evidence rule does not apply to the testimony in this case because there was no conflicting testimony by eyewitnesses to the woman’s conception. Third, the missing evidence and missing witness rule applies to jury trials, whereas this trial was a bench trial, and there was no evidence that the purportedly missing evidence or missing witnesses were under the estate’s control.

Former cohabitant brought this partition action with respect to real and personal property. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in dividing the real property and a mobile home, in finding the motor vehicles to be jointly-owned property, and in dividing the proceeds of a savings account equally between the parties. We have concluded that the trial court erred in dividing the savings account, which is titled in the defendant’s name alone. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

A Maury County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Charles E. Lowe-Kelley, of two counts of first degree premeditated murder, two counts of first degree felony murder, and nine counts of attempted first degree murder. At sentencing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for each first degree premeditated murder conviction, merged the first degree felony murder convictions into the first degree premeditated murder convictions, and imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years’ incarceration for each attempted first degree murder conviction to be served concurrently with the life sentences. On appeal, in addition to contesting the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion for a continuance, (2) allowing a juror to remain on the jury who expressed an opinion about the case, (3) admitting evidence without establishing a proper chain of custody, (4) admitting a taperecorded conversation between the defendant and a separately-tried co-defendant, and (5) imposing consecutive sentences. Because the defendant failed to file a timely motion for new trial, all issues except the sufficiency of the evidence and sentencing are waived. Furthermore, the untimely motion for new trial rendered the notice of appeal untimely. In the interest of justice, however, we waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal and review the remaining issues. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the trial court’s denial of: (1) an oral motion for a continuance supported by her doctor’s affidavit; and (2) a motion to add, as necessary parties, two mortgagees of real estate alleged to be marital property. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Petitioner, Alvin T. McGee, filed for post-conviction relief from his convictions for attempted burglary and vandalism between $500 and $1000, alleging that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The appellant, Mitzi Rollins, pled guilty in the Moore County Circuit Court to one count of initiating a false report under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16-502. The plea agreement provided that she would be sentenced to two years and ten months, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. After a hearing, the trial court denied the appellant’s request for alternative sentencing, citing her lengthy criminal history and the repeated unsuccessful attempts to use less restrictive sentencing. The appellant contends the trial court erred by ordering her to serve her sentence in confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.