APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We agreed to hear this extraordinary appeal in order to decide whether the proper venue for a case involving the breach of a construction contract is in the county named in the forum selection clause of the contract, or in the county where the realty is located upon which the construction took place. We hold that the forum selection clause determines the proper venue, because the underlying action cannot fairly be characterized as an action for injury to real property and is, thus, a transitory action.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services concedes that it did not prove the grounds for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. We likewise find that procedural errors were committed by the trial court. Accordingly, the trial court's decision is vacated.

The Dickson County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Victoria Spicer, for one count of theft of property worth more than $500 but less than $1,000 and one count of criminal trespass. At the conclusion of the State's proof, the State conceded that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for criminal trespass. At the end of trial, the jury convicted Appellant for one count of facilitation of theft, for property worth $500 or less. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six months in the county jail. On appeal, Appellant argues that her conviction cannot stand because theft of property worth $500 or less is a misdemeanor and the crime of facilitation under the statute applies only to felonies. The State concedes that facilitation of a misdemeanor is not a crime under the Tennessee statutory scheme. After a review of the record and the statute, we conclude that facilitation of a misdemeanor is not a crime under the statutes of Tennessee. Therefore, Appellant's conviction must be reversed and dismissed.

The Petitioner, Timothy Ray Gentry, pled guilty to multiple theft, forgery, and drug offenses and received a total effective sentence of eighteen years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his counsel was ineffective and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily made. The Petitioner acknowledged that his petition was untimely but asserted that due process required the statute of limitations be tolled. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. We reverse the ruling of the post-conviction court and remand for a hearing to determine whether due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations.

The Defendant, Joseph W. Denton, pleaded guilty to one count of forgery and one count of impersonation of a licensed professional, both Class E felonies. Under the terms of the plea agreement, he received concurrent terms of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant's request for judicial diversion. He challenges that ruling on appeal. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the Putnam County Circuit Court.

Plaintiff brought this action against defendant for an unpaid debt. Both parties moved for summary judgment and the trial court granted plaintiff's summary judgment and denied defendant's summary judgment. On appeal, we affirm the trial court's decision.

Plaintiff insurer of insured brought this action as a subrogee of the insureds, who had been paid under plaintiff's policy for a fire loss to their home. The insureds had employed a roofer to replace their roof, whose subcontractor caused the fire which destroyed the home. Plaintiff brought this action to recover from defendant roofer who filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial court ruled defendant could not be held liable in tort for the negligent acts of his subcontractor under the facts of this case, and plaintiff could not recover under the theory of contract, because plaintiff could not show that the loss was caused by the contractual services or foreseeable. On appeal, we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate, because under contract law the defendant had a non-delegable duty to see that the work he was contractually obligated to perform was done in a careful, skillful and workmanlike manner. The case is remanded with instructions to proceed in accordance with this Opinion.

The defendant, Brandon Williamson, appeals the revocation of his community corrections sentence, claiming that the trial court erred by ordering him to serve his original sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The pro se petitioner, Luis D. Vidales Romero, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Following our review, we affirm the habeas court's dismissal of the petition.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Defendant, Patrick Wayne Tripp, of rape of a child, a Class A felony; aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony; aggravated child neglect, a Class A felony; sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony; and attempted incest, a Class D felony. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant raises four issues: (a) whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal; (b) whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support his convictions; (c) whether the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the offense of rape of a child; and (d) whether the trial court erred when it sentenced the Defendant. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the evidence supports the Defendant's convictions, the trial court properly instructed the jury, and the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The pro se petitioner, Teresa Rita Day, appeals the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief. Because the petition was untimely and the petitioner has not shown any reason that the statute of limitations should be tolled, we affirm the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of the petition as time-barred.

The Defendant, Terry O'Neil Greene, was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of an intoxicant, second offense. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the results of his breath-alcohol test. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Tamabe Trinise Leke, was convicted by a Madison County jury of disorderly conduct, a Class C misdemeanor, and resisting arrest, a Class B misdemeanor. She was sentenced to thirty days for disorderly conduct and to six months for resisting arrest. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, Leke challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this divorce case, Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court's division of marital property and denial of her request for alimony. Finding that the trial court correctly valued the dental practice and properly awarded same to Husband/Appellant, we affirm that portion of the trial court's order. However, because the trial court did not specifically determine whether certain debt was separate or marital debt, and, consequently, did not allocate that debt, we vacate the trial court's division of marital property, and remand for a determination of the nature of the marital debt, and division of same. Because the trial court did not meet the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i), we vacate the trial court's denial of alimony, and remand for further proceedings concerning Wife/Appellant's need for alimony, and Husband/Appellee's ability to pay same. Affirmed in part; vacated in part, and remanded.

Appellant, Julius W. Weaver, was indicted by a Rhea County Grand Jury on three counts of aggravated sexual battery. On count one of the indictment, he was convicted of the lesser included offense of Class B misdemeanor assault. The jury found him not guilty on counts two and three. The trial court sentenced Appellant to six months incarceration. He now appeals the length and manner of service of his sentence. We affirm.

The defendant, Angela Milhorn, appeals the denial of her request for judicial diversion, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by placing undue emphasis on the circumstances of her offense while ignoring positive factors in favor of diversion. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Eldridge Hill, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his conviction for especially aggravated robbery. In his appeal, he claims that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to make a motion for judgment of acquittal regarding the especially aggravated robbery charge and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to challenge the sufficiency of the conviction on appeal based on his claim that the victim's shooting did not occur prior to or contemporaneously with the robbery. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Kevin L. Holt, injured in an automobile accident in Arkansas, was first taken by ambulance to an Arkansas hospital and then transported to the Regional Medical Center in Memphis, where he incurred $33,823.02 in expenses. Shelby County Health Care Corporation, the operator of the Regional Medical Center, filed affidavits for a lien as prescribed by statute. Thereafter, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, which had medical coverage for Holt with limits of $5,000, paid $1,290 for ambulance services and $3,710 to the Arkansas hospital. Shelby County Health Care Corporation sued Nationwide for impairment of its lien, seeking as recovery the entire amount due for its medical services to Holt. The trial court awarded $5,000 in damages. The Court of Appeals revised the amount of the judgment to $33,823.02. Because we have determined that liens under the Hospital Lien Act do not attach to medical payment benefits paid pursuant to an insurance policy, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is dismissed.

This is a fraud claim between ex-spouses. While the petitioner mother and the respondent were dating, the mother became pregnant, and she told the respondent that the child was his. Consequently, she and the respondent married, and the child was born during the marriage. Years later, the parties divorced, and the respondent paid child support to the mother. After several years, the respondent obtained a DNA test, which revealed that he is not the child's biological father. After he told the mother of the test results, she filed a petition requesting a court-ordered paternity test and modification of the parenting plan. The respondent filed a counter-petition, alleging negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation by the mother for falsely representing that he was the child's biological father. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded the respondent compensatory damages for past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums paid for the child, compensatory damages for emotional distress, and attorney fees. The mother now appeals. We conclude that under Tennessee statutes, the respondent cannot recover the past child support, medical expenses, and insurance premiums, as this would be a retroactive modification of a valid child support order. We find that the remaining damages for emotional distress cannot be awarded for the tort of fraud and misrepresentation, because such damages are non-pecuniary. Therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

Bethany (Bumgarner) Schroedel ("Mother") and Timothy Adam Bumgarner ("Father") are the divorced parents of one minor child ("the Child"). In October of 2007, Mother filed a petition alleging, among other things, that Father was refusing to allow Mother her visitation with the Child. Mother's petition sought, in part, to modify the parenting plan to name Mother as the Child's primary residential parent. After a trial, the Trial Court entered an order on June 29, 2009 finding and holding that a change of circumstances existed that affected the Child's well-being in a meaningful way, but not one sufficient to justify a change in primary residential custody. The trial court's June 29, 2009 order did modify the parenting plan to allow Mother greater visitation. Mother appeals to this Court raising an issue regarding the trial court's refusal to change primary residential custody, and an issuec regarding the trial court's finding her in contempt. We affirm the trial court's order as to the parenting plan, vacate the trial court's order finding Mother in contempt, and remand for further proceedings in compliance with this Opinion.

I concur in the results, but I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that trial
counsel’s decision not to have the Petitioner’s mental condition evaluated, particularly as it related to sentencing, was a reasonable strategic decision in the prosecution of the Petitioner. Given the facts, I believe it was incumbent upon counsel to obtain an evaluation.

The petitioner, Michael Wayne Maples, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping on the basis of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On appeal, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in the investigation and presentation of evidence concerning his mental health. Discerning no error, we affirm the order of the post-conviction court.

Julie-Cristie (Barone) Neal ("Step-Daughter") brought an action to quiet title to a nearly three hundred acre farm in Cumberland County, Tennessee, against Veronica Monde Barone ("Ex-Wife") and Anthony F. Barone ("Father"). She primarily asserts that she has acquired adverse possession rights in the entire farm pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103. The disputed property was also the subject of prior litigation in a circuit court proceeding involving the enforcement of a foreign judgment and fraudulent conveyance claims against Father by Ex-Wife as a judgment creditor. In the present action Ex-Wife moved for summary judgment on several theories including the assertion that filing a lien lis pendens barred Step-Daughter's adverse possession claim. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment on all grounds. Ex-Wife filed a motion asking the trial court for permission to submit an application for interlocutory appeal on one issue raised on summary judgment _ whether the lien lis pendens tolled the seven-year adverse possession statute found in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 28-2-103 during the circuit court proceeding. The trial court granted that motion and we likewise granted the application for interlocutory appeal on the asserted issue. We reverse the trial court's judgment on the sole issue presented to us.

The plaintiff, APAC_Atlantic, Inc. ("APAC"), filed this lawsuit against the defendant, Samuel Robert Morton d/b/a Morton Construction, for breach of contract. APAC moved for a default judgment after Mr. Morton failed to answer APAC's complaint within the allowable time limit established by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.01. The trial court entered a default judgment, awarding APAC $106,776.20 in damages. Thereafter, Mr. Morton filed a motion to have the default judgment set aside under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 55.02. After a hearing, the trial court determined that Mr. Morton was not entitled to relief from the final judgment. Mr. Morton appealed. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to be named the minor child's primary residential parent or, in the alternative, to increase his parenting time. The trial court denied Father's petition, and also denied Father an award of attorney's fees and costs under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-103(c). Finding that Father failed to meet his burden to show a material change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a change in the child's primary residential parent and/or the child's residential schedule, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying attorney's fees and costs, we affirm.