APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur in the decision to vacate the judgment of the Trial Court. I agree that Tenn. R. Civ. P. 4.01(3) controls the outcome of this appeal. I further agree that the issue in this case is whether Plaintiffs intentionally caused the delay in the prompt service of the summons. I further agree that the record before us shows that Plaintiffs did make at least some attempts to serve Defendant. This being so, I agree that Defendant did not meet her burden of showing that Plaintiffs intentionally delayed service of the summons.

This case was precipitated when defendants blocked plaintiffs' use of an existing driveway. Plaintiffs brought this action for a declaratory judgment and following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs had a prescriptive easement to use the driveway and that defendants would be required to restore the driveway as well as the excavations damaging plaintiffs' lots. On appeal, we affirm.

Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that a gravel drive running through their property is a private easement rather than a public road. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the drive is a public road. Finding this case inappropriate for summary judgment, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for a trial on the merits.

Carter County -Robert G. Crabtree, Jr., and Bonnie K. Hakey (collectively "the plaintiffs") filed suit against Jennifer L. Lund ("the defendant") seeking compensation for personal injuries and property damage arising out of a April 22, 2005, multiple-vehicle accident in Carter County. With her answer, the defendant coupled a motion to dismiss under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02 "on the basis of insufficiency of process and insufficiency of service of process." Following a hearing, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' suit with prejudice finding "that the plaintiffs have not provided to the Court any valid reason for the delay in obtaining prompt service of process upon the defendant." Plaintiffs appeal. We (1) vacate the trial court's judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' complaint and (2) remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises out of a primary care physician's alleged negligent and tortious treatment of a longtime patient. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the physician, questioning the credibility of the patient's allegations and holding in part that the physician's alleged conduct could not support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. We reverse and remand.

Petitioner John Anthony Bailey filed the present petition for post-conviction relief in 2009 seeking relief from convictions entered in 1995 and 1996. Petitioner acknowledged that his petition was not filed within the one year statute of limitations; however, he asserted that due process required tolling of the statute of limitations. The post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm.

The pro se petitioner, Steven Ray Kennedy, appeals the post-conviction court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the court should have given him fifteen days to file an amended petition that conformed to the statutory requirements or appointed counsel to assist in presenting his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition by the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Dexter F. Johnson, appeals from the post-conviction court's order denying his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court's order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Doyle Benton, pled guilty and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to three years' confinement for criminal conspiracy to sell schedule II cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, a Class D felony; to five years' confinement for sale and delivery of schedule II cocaine in an amount less than 0.5 grams, a Class C felony; and to three years' confinement for sale and delivery of schedule III narcotics, a Class D felony; all to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of five years' confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends that his sentences are excessive in length and that the trial court erred by denying his request for probation. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

I agree with so much of the majority opinion as affirms the trial court’s judgment against Allstate Building System, LLC. I cannot agree, however, with the majority’s decision (1) to reverse the judgment in favor of 84 Lumber Company against R. Bryan Smith and (2) to grant summary judgment to Mr. Smith.

This appeal involves an inmate's petition for writ of certiorari, which he filed after he was convicted by the prison disciplinary board of participating In security threat group activity. after reviewing the record, the trial court dismissed his petition. We affirm.

The personal representative of a decedent's estate filed This action to rescind twelve deeds, all of which were executed by the decedent's attorney-In-fact without the decedent's knowledge and for which the decedent received no consideration, or alternatively for damages. the attorney-In-fact conveyed the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter. the personal representative alleges that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty In making the transfers. the trial court agreed, and rescinded the conveyances for property still owned by the attorney-In-fact and awarded monetary damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of property subsequently conveyed to innocent third parties. the attorney-In-fact appeals claiming, inter alia, the personal representative lacks standing to bring a claim on behalf of the estate involving real property, that the action is barred by the statute of limitations, and that the trial court erred In finding that the durable power of attorney did not authorize him to transfer the property. We have determined the personal representative has standing to maintain This action and the action was timely filed. We affirm the trial court's finding that the attorney-In-fact breached his fiduciary duty by conveying the property to himself, his mother, and his daughter for no consideration to the decedent. We also affirm the rescission of the deeds to property the attorney-In-fact still owns and the award of damages against the attorney-In-fact for the value of the real property that has since been conveyed to innocent third parties.

Employee had been absent from work on paid sick leave for an extended period of time when employer conducted an investigation and learned that he was working as a real estate agent. An administrative law judge conducted a hearing and recommended termination. The Board unanimously upheld the ALJ's findings and terminated employee. The chancery court affirmed. We affirm.

The Defendant, Mark Hines, was found guilty by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of criminal attempt to commit second degree murder. See T.C.A. __ 39-13-210(a)(1), 39-12- 101(a)(2), -(3) (2006). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years' confinement in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court erred by permitting the State to introduce prejudicial demonstrative evidence to the jury, (3) the trial court erred by admitting testimonial hearsay into evidence, (4) the trial court erred by giving incorrect and incomplete jury instructions, and (5) he was improperly sentenced. We affirm the conviction, but we reverse the sentence and remand the case for resentencing.

The Petitioner, Alfred Eugene Bradley, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, raising numerous claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition, finding that trial counsel was not ineffective, and the Petitioner timely appealed. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce action, the trial court awarded Dawn Lyn Tousignant Gordon ("Wife") 59% of the marital estate, or approximately $231,100. It also ordered Robert Frank Gordon ("Husband") to pay Wife "permanent spousal support" of $2,200 per month. Husband appeals and challenges both the division of marital property and the court's award of alimony in futuro. We modify the trial court's division of marital property and its award of alimony. As modified, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Howard J. Atkins, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that there was no newly discovered evidence and that his petition was untimely pursuant to the statute of limitations and in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. After careful review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

Father appeals the denial of his Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60 motion to void an order appointing a parenting coordinator. We find that the appeal is now moot.

Plaintiff, a nurse practitioner formerly employed by a staffing service and supplied to a hospital emergency department, sued the hospital for retaliatory discharge under Tennessee common law and the Tennessee Public Protection Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-1-304. The hospital moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

This appeal arises from a trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action against a real estate appraiser for fraudulent misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A husband and wife alleged that the appraiser, who was hired by the bank financing the husband and wife's home construction, recklessly overestimated the value of their proposed construction and that they reasonably relied on the appraisal value to their detriment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that an appraisal is an opinion that cannot form the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We hold that an opinion can form the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We further hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as to the husband and wife's claims against the appraiser. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The trial court found Husband guilty of two counts of criminal contempt for violation of a court order. Husband appeals the findings of contempt on the ground that he did not receive proper notice. The trial court dismissed a third count of criminal contempt without prejudice and allowed Wife to re-file her claim so as to provide Husband with proper notice. We affirm the court's two findings of contempt and reverse its dismissal of the third count of contempt, finding that Husband was given sufficient notice. We remand the matter to the court for a determination of whether Husband violated the order.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Jonathan Doran Tears, was convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony (Count 1); two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony (Counts 2-3); unlawful possession of a weapon, a Class E felony (Count 4); possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class D felony (Count 5); and employment of a firearm during the commission of a felony, a Class C felony (Count 6). The trial court merged Counts 2 and 3 with Count 1, and the trial court merged Counts 4 and 5 with Count 6. The trial court then sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender and ordered the Defendant to serve 15 years for the attempted second degree murder conviction and a consecutive 10 years for the employment of a firearm during the commission of a felony conviction, for a total effective sentence of 25 years. The trial court also ordered these sentences to be served consecutively to a sentence imposed in a separate case. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of attempted second degree murder and possession and employment of a firearm during the commission of a felony and that (2) the trial court erred in sentencing him. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action against a real estate appraiser for fraudulent misrepresentation and for violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A husband and wife alleged that the appraiser, who was hired by the bank financing the husband and wife's home construction, recklessly overestimated the value of their proposed construction and that they reasonably relied on the appraisal value to their detriment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that an appraisal is an opinion that cannot form the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We hold that an opinion can form the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. We further hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment as to the husband and wife's claims against the appraiser. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Petitioner, David Carl Duncan, appeals as of right from the Davidson County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for first degree murder. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.