APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant has appealed from a default judgment granting the plaintiff possession of his 1995 Lincoln Towncar. Because the defendant did not file his notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Petitioner, Ronald A. Henry, filed a post-conviction petition asking the court to set aside his convictions for burglary, theft, vandalism, and possession of burglary tools or to grant a delayed appeal. Petitioner claims that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel failed to adequately defend against video evidence that depicts petitioner committing the crime; failed to preserve his right to appeal; and failed to file an Anders brief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Lester Mitchell Lawson, III ("Plaintiff") filed this wrongful discharge lawsuit against his former employer, Anthony Adams ("Defendant"). Plaintiff claims he was illegally discharged for refusing to remain silent about and refusing to participate in illegal activities. Plaintiff brought both common law and statutory claims. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims after finding that the undisputed material facts established that plaintiff failed to report the alleged illegal activity to an entity other than the person engaging in the claimed illegal activity. We affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendant on plaintiff's common law and statutory claims that he was discharged for refusing to remain silent about illegal activities. We vacate the trial court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's common law and statutory claims that he was discharged for refusing to participate in illegal activities.

Appellant was convicted of "sexual misconduct" in New York in 1988, and was compelled to register as a sex offender in Tennessee in 2008. Upon his registration, the TBI classified appellant as a violent sexual offender, determining that his New York conviction was analogous to rape, a violent sexual offense. appellant contacted the TBI seeking removal from the registry, but his request was denied. He then filed an administrative appeal in the chancery court, but his classification as a violent sexual offender was upheld. We find that the elements of "sexual misconduct" under N.Y. Penal Law _ 130.20 are analogous to the elements of rape as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-503, and therefore, that appellant was properly classified as a violent sexual offender within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-202(28). The judgment of the chancery court is affirmed.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The Department of Children's Services ("DCS") obtained custody of the child at issue under the terms of a protective custody order entered shortly after the child's birth. The juvenile court cited the mother's history with DCS and her history of mental illness as the primary reasons supporting removal. DCS developed two permanency plans with the mother designed to address her mental illness and equip her with the parental skills necessary to care for the child. The mother, however, did not carry out her responsibilities under the plans, take her medication as prescribed, or consistently attend critical mental health ppointments. DCS accordingly petitioned to terminate the mother's parental rights on multiple grounds. After a hearing that the mother did not attend, the court terminated her parental rights on the grounds of abandonment by willful failure to provide financial support, substantial noncompliance with the responsibilities of the permanency plans, and persistence of the conditions that required the child's removal. The mother appeals, arguing that DCS did not make reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child and did not clearly and convincingly prove grounds for termination. We disagree and affirm the decision of the trial court.

This action arises from the alleged harassment of plaintiff by defendant, Harrah's Entertainment, Inc., while attempting to collect on a dishonored check. Plaintiff cashed a check for $500 at Harrah's Metropolis Casino in October 2001. The check was dishonored by plaintiff's bank on the first attempt, but cleared on the second attempt on December 8, 2001. Apparently neither party knew the check had cleared in December, and in January 2002, plaintiff claims he received threatening phone calls and letters to collect on the check. After receiving a threat of criminal prosecution, plaintiff and his wife drove to the casino and paid $525.00 to settle the debt; however, the casino could not produce the original check, only a photocopy. Upon further investigation, plaintiff discovered the check had cleared in December. Plaintiff then filed this action against Harrah's Entertainment, Inc. in the General Sessions Court for Davidson County. After a default judgment was entered, Harrah's filed a petition for writ of certoriari in the Circuit Court asserting that it was not the proper defendant and insufficient service of process. The circuit court granted the petition and set aside the default judgment. Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint asserting claims for negligence, gross negligence, outrageous conduct, and violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Following a bench trial, the court found that Harrah's was the proper defendant and ruled in favor of plaintiff on his claims for negligence, the TCPA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and awarded plaintiff damages of $5,962.95, which was trebled under the TCPA for a total award of $17,888.85. The court also awarded plaintiff his attorney's fees. Harrah's appeals claiming it was not the proper defendant and it was not properly served. It also challenges the findings of negligence, violation of the TCPA, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the damages awarded. We have determined that Harrah's waived the issue of insufficient service of process and it is estopped to assert that it is not the proper defendant. We affirm the trial court's findings regarding negligence, violation of the TCPA, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. We find that the trial court erred by including the $5,962.95 award for emotional distress within the amount trebled under the TCPA. Therefore, we remand for the trial court to recalculate the damages awarded under the TCPA and for a determination of the reasonable and necessary attorney's fees plaintiff incurred on appeal.

I fully concur in the decision of the court. I believe it may be useful to further explain my position in this matter.

I respectfully dissent. A basic principle of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“the Act”) is its remedial purpose. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-116 (2008); Trosper 1 v. Armstrong Wood Prods., Inc., 273 S.W.3d 598, 609 n.5 (Tenn. 2008). For years, this Court has interpreted this statutory mandate to favor the employee under circumstances where there is “reasonable doubt” surrounding the compensability of a work-related claim. In my view, the claimant, in this instance, is entitled to the benefit of the doubt. Moreover, the “street risk doctrine,” inaptly named, should serve as an alternative basis for the establishment of the causal relationship necessary to sustain the propriety of this claim.

After being denied parole at her first parole hearing, Petitioner, an inmate incarcerated at the Tennessee Prison for Women, filed this Petition for Common Law Writ of Certiorari to challenge the decision by the Board of Probation and Parole to defer reconsideration of parol for six years. Finding that the deferral of parol eligibility for six years was not arbitrary and did not violate Tennessee law, the trial court dismissed Petitioner's Writ of Certiorari. We affirm.

This is an appeal from the grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant/Appellee. Plaintiff/Appellant filed suit on the basis of Defendant/Appellee's alleged underpayment of fees earned pursuant to a contract between the parties. The trial court found that the contract was not ambiguous as to the applicable fee schedule and that Plaintiff/Appellant's interpretation was incorrect as a matter of law. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Ronnie Edward Sexton, pled guilty to burglary, a Class E felony, two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and theft of property valued at less than 500 dollars, a Class A misdemeanor, with sentencing left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to two years for the burglary conviction, six years for each aggravated assault conviction, and 11 months and 29 days for the misdemeanor theft conviction. The trial court also found the defendant qualified as a dangerous offender and ordered consecutive service of one of the aggravated assault convictions, for a total effective sentence of 12 years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in its imposition of sentence. The defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal. Because we discern no reason to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal involves the workers' compensation liability of an employer for the unsolved fatal shooting of an employee on the employer's premises. The employee's surviving spouse filed suit in the Chancery Court for Davidson County seeking death benefits under Tennessee's Workers' Compensation Law. Following a bench trial, the trial court denied the widow's claim for workers' compensation benefits. The court concluded that the employee's death was the result of a neutral assault and that the "street risk" doctrine was inapplicable because the employer's premises were not open to the public. On appeal, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel declined to presume that neutral assaults on an employer's premises were compensable and affirmed the trial court's judgment. We granted the surviving spouse's petition for full court review. Like the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, we decline to engraft a non-statutory presumption favoring compensability in cases involving neutral assaults on the employer's premises. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel and the trial court.

This action arises out of a vehicular accident in which the plaintiff sustained serious personal injury. A complaint was filed on behalf of the pro se plaintiff; however, the complaint was not signed by the plaintiff or a licensed attorney as required by Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. The plaintiff subsequently retained counsel, but the plaintiff's attorney failed to make a written appearance until months later. Moreover, neither the attorney nor the plaintiff signed the complaint to cure the signature deficiency until after the case was dismissed and the statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff then filed a Rule 60.02 Motion for Relief from Judgment or Order based on Excusable Neglect. That motion was denied and this appeal followed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's Rule 60.02 motion; therefore, we affirm.

The Defendant, Mitchell Darnell Eads, was sentenced as a persistent offender to fourteen years' confinement for possession of contraband in a penal facility, a Class C felony, and to six years' confinement for felony escape, a Class E felony, to be served concurrently to each other and consecutively to the defendant's sentences for six prior convictions. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering his sentences to be served consecutively to his prior sentences. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Suit was filed for breach of contract. Plaintiff sought summary judgment, which was denied. A trial on the merits followed and the trial court ruled for the defendant. Plaintiff appeals, seeking review of the denial of summary judgment. Since there was a trial on the merits, we cannot review the denial of the summary judgment in this case. We affirm the trial court.

This appeal involves a dispute regarding unpaid spousal support from Social Security benefits. Mr. Fryer filed a petition against numerous defendants, seeking spousal support owed to him from his deceased wife's Social Security benefits. Serving in the capacity of conservator, the decedent's daughter received her mother's monthly Social Security benefits. After a bench trial, the court determined that the conservator was liable to Mr. Fryer for the unpaid spousal support and entered a judgment against the conservator and Travelers Casualty and Surety Bond. Additionally, the trial court, sua sponte, applied the statute of limitations to reduce the amount of the award to Mr. Fryer. This appeal ensued. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

This appeal involves in personam jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant. Plaintiff, a Tennessee mortgage company, filed suit against the appellee herein, a Rhode Island mortgage company, after plaintiff allegedly suffered injury from a breach of contract on the part of appellee, stemming from plaintiff's purchase of a loan from appellee in the secondary mortgage market. In the posture of plaintiff, appellee filed a third-party complaint against the Massachusetts lawyer and firm, the appellants herein, who had underwritten the loan that appellee ultimately sold to the Tennessee plaintiff. The lawyer and firm filed a motion in the Tennessee court to dismiss the third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court found that Tennessee had personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendant law firm and lawyer, and denied their motion to dismiss. The lawyer and firm appeal. Finding that there are not sufficient contacts with Tennessee, we reverse the trial court's finding of personal jurisdiction, and remand for further proceedings.

The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment with respect to multiple claims brought by a prospective seller of real property against the prospective buyers. We have concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendants on the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim. In all other respects, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.

The petitioner, James Ivy, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, the petitioner contends that he is entitled to coram nobis relief on the basis that his 1996 guilty-pleaded conviction of burglary and his 2000 guilty-pleaded convictions of burglary and vandalism were not voluntarily entered. Because the writ of error coram nobis is not available to a guilty-pleading petitioner and because the petition in this case is time-barred, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Plaintiff, while delivering pizza to customers in the By-Lo grocery store, slipped and fell. She filed suit against By-Lo, claiming negligence. By-Lo moved for summary judgment and after a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of By-Lo and dismissed the suit. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This appeal involves a defendant who bound up two victims, doused them with kerosene, and then set them on fire because one of the victims had refused to loan him ten dollars to buy beer. One of the victims lost his life in the ensuing fire. A McMinn County grand jury indicted the defendant for first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, and aggravated arson. A jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the jury, finding the existence of the aggravating circumstances in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-204(i)(5) and (14) (Supp. 1999), sentenced the defendant to death for the murder of the victim who died in the fire. Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences of twenty-five years for attempted first degree murder and twenty years for aggravated arson. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the defendant's convictions but reduced his twenty-five year sentence for attempted first degree murder to twenty years because the trial court had considered improper enhancing factors. The Court of Criminal Appeals also determined that the trial court had erred by excluding mitigating evidence offered by the defendant during the sentencing phase of the trial but that this error was harmless. After conducting its own comparative proportionality review, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the defendant's sentence of death was proportionate to punishments imposed in similar cases. State v. Hester, No. E2006-01904-CCA-R3-DD, 2009 WL 275760 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 5, 2009). We hold as follows: (1) the manner in which the district attorney general gave notice of the State's intention to pursue the death penalty was not improper; (2) the defendant was not denied his right of self-representation; (3) the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request for a continuance filed eight days before the trial; (4) the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case that the process used to select the jury venire deprived him of his right to select a jury from a fair cross-section of the community; (5) the defendant failed to make the necessary pretrial objections to raise an argument that the jury selection procedures violated Tenn. Code Ann. _ 22-2-304(e) (1994) and has failed to demonstrate any prejudice that he suffered from any violations thereof; (6) the trial court did not err by denying the defendant's request to retain an expert statistician; (7) even assuming two of McMinn County's jury commissioners were not statutorily qualified for their positions, Mr. Hester suffered no resulting prejudice; (8) the trial court did not commit reversible error with regard to its decisions relating to the admission or exclusion of evidence; (9) the trial court did not improperly comment on the evidence; (10) the trial court's instruction on reasonable doubt was not erroneous; (11) the trial court did not err when it replaced a juror during the sentencing phase of the trial; (12) the record contains sufficient evidence of premeditation; (13) the defendant's due process rights were not infringed by the denial of compulsory process, the trial judge's failure to recuse himself sua sponte, or the manner in which the trial court considered his motion for new trial; (14) the defendant is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction and sentence because of the cumulative effect of errors during the entire proceeding; and (15) the defendant's multiple challenges to Tennessee's death penalty statutes and the procedures and the protocol for carrying out the death penalty are without merit. Finally, in accordance with our obligation under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13-206 (2006), we have thoroughly reviewed the record and have determined: (1) that the defendant's sentence of death was not imposed in an arbitrary fashion; (2) that the evidence fully supports the jury's finding of the existence of the aggravating circumstances in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-13- 204(i)(5) and (14); (3) that the evidence supports the jury's finding that these aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances presented by the defendant; and (4) that the defendant's death sentence, taking into consideration the nature of the offense and the defendant himself, is neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. We have also independently determined that the defendant should receive two twentyyear sentences for his convictions for attempted first degree murder and aggravated arson and that these sentences should be served consecutively with each other and with the defendant's death sentence. In all other respects, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, as modified by this opinion, is affirmed.

Aggrieved of the Shelby County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions of first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and facilitation of first degree murder, the petitioner, Mario Johnson, appeals and claims that his convictions were infirm due to the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm, however, the order of the criminal court.

I concur with nearly all of the majority opinion, but disagree with one aspect of it.  However, I would reach the same result with different reasoning, and so file this separate concurrence.