APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The father was paying child support, became disabled and filed a Petition to suspend child support payments until his disability insurance began paying. By the time of the hearing on his Petition, his disability insurance began paying a monthly amount. The Trial Judge ultimately refused to lower the child support payments, finding that the father established no variance between his income before and after his disability. The father tendered his income tax return for the year when the child support obligation was set, but the Trial Court refused to consider this evidence. On appeal, we vacate and remand.

The trial court terminated Father's parental rights upon a finding of abandonment and upon determining termination was in the best interests of the children. Father appeals. We affirm.

This case arises from the trial court's denial of Plaintiff/Appellants' motion to enforce a settlement agreement. Appellants, the surviving children of decedent, filed a wrongful death claim against the Appellee herein, the driver of a car involved in the accident that killed decedent. During negotiations, Appellee/Defendant's attorney proposed a settlement in the amount of Appellee's insurance policy limit, which Appellee's attorney misstated to be $100,000, when, in fact, the policy limit was $50,000. The trial court denied Appellants' motion to enforce the $100,000 settlement finding that the settlement was not enforceable, as it failed to contain certain material terms of the agreement. We conclude that the trial court failed to determine whether an agency relationship existed between the Appellee's attorney and the insurance company and also whether the insurance company is required to be a party to this litigation. Vacated and remanded.

Appellant, Jeffrey Thomas Pardue, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for burglary of a motor vehicle and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. A jury found aAppellant guilty of both charges. The trial court sentenced appellant to two years for burglary and three years for theft, and the sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court suspended the sentences and placed appellant on probation. Appellant was also ordered to receive alcohol treatment and pay restitution in the amount of $1,184. After the denial of a motion for new trial, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions. After a review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions for burglary of a vehicle and theft of property valued at more than $1,000. Consequently, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Petitioner, Kathy Michelle Fowler, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in one indictment for domestic assault, harassment, and aggravated criminal trespass. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to domestic assault. The remaining two charges were dismissed. Petitioner was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. Petitioner filed a petition to expunge the dismissed charges pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-32-101. After a hearing, the trial court denied the petition, concluding that the plain language of the statute excluded expungement of "cases in which the defendant has been convicted of a charge within the case." Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court. We granted the petition in order to determine if the trial court has exceeded its jurisdiction or has acted illegally. After a review of the record, we determine that based on this Court's decision in State v. Gerald Gifford, No. E2006-02500- CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 1813105 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 23, 2008), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 27, 2008), the trial court herein improperly denied the petition to expunge the dismissed charges where petitioner was indicted in a multi-count indictment, pled guilty to one count of the indictment, and the remaining charges were dismissed. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings, including granting petitioner's petition to expunge the dismissed charges of harassment and aggravated criminal trespass.

The order from which the appellant Roger Sayner seeks to appeal was entered in the trial court on August 18, 2010. A notice of appeal was filed with and received by the trial court clerk on September 21, 2010. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we lack jurisdiction of this appeal. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with costs taxed to the appellant.

The Defendant, Jim Hunter, was indicted for attempted first degree murder and domestic aggravated assault. After a jury trial, the Defendant was convicted of reckless endangerment and  reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent sentences of eight years for the reckless aggravated assault conviction and 11 months and 29 days for the reckless endangerment conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by basing his sentence on enhancement factors not determined by the jury and (2) that one of his convictions should not have been considered in determining his status as a multiple offender because of its age. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion that Rutherford County was an appropriate venue for this action and, consequently, that the Rutherford County court had subject matter jurisdiction. In particular, I disagree with the majority’s statement that “unless the plaintiff and at least one ‘material defendant’ reside in the same county and that county is where the cause of action accrued” the common county rule does not apply. Essentially, the majority holds that the venue statute does not apply, a conclusion that I believe is erroneous.

In this action to enforce a contract to purchase real estate, the trial court declared the contract enforceable, the seller had breached the contract by refusing to sell to plaintiff, and held that a third party who had a lien against the property tortiously interfered with the sale. The trial judge rescinded the quit claim deed to Tyler Lawson from Yokley and assessed costs and damages. On appeal, we reverse the trial judge and hold the contract became unenforceable because plaintiff did not comply with the conditions set forth in the contract.

The issues in this case are whether Tennessee's "common county rule" deprived the Rutherford County Circuit Court of subject matter jurisdiction and whether the court erred in assessing discretionary costs. This wrongful death action arises from a fatal vehicular accident in Normandy, Bedford County, Tennessee, in which the decedent's vehicle was stuck by a train owned by CSX Transportation, Inc. The mother of the decedent, in her individual capacity and as the personal representative of the decedent's estate, timely filed this action in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County against CSX and the conductor of the train. Over the next five years the parties conducted extensive discovery. On the first day of trial, the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice. On the motion of the defendants, the Rutherford County Circuit Court assessed $34,098.27 in discretionary costs against plaintiff. In this appeal, plaintiff contends the Rutherford County Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction as a consequence of the common county rule, and that it erred in awarding discretionary costs. We have determined that the common county rule does not apply, the Rutherford County Circuit Court had subject matter jurisdiction, and that the court did not abuse its discretion in assessing discretionary costs of $34,098.27 against plaintiff after she voluntarily dismissed this action. Accordingly, we affirm the award of discretionary costs.

Petitioners, custodians of two minor children, filed this action to terminate the mother's parental rights. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial judge found there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination, based upon willful failure to support/visit and persistent conditions. The court also found that the evidence was clear and convincing that termination was in the children's best interest. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Franklin A. Christy, appeals the trial court's order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement. In this appeal, Defendant acknowledges that the evidence showed he violated the terms of his probation. However, he argues that the trial court should have sentenced him to community corrections rather than order service

The defendant, Elliot Fullilove, was convicted of first degree (felony) murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. He was sentenced to concurrent life sentences. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he made to the police, in admitting hearsay, and in admitting a crime scene photograph. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Michael Anthony Tharpe, appeals the revocation of his probation by the Circuit Court for Carroll County. On May 11, 2009, he entered a guilty plea to theft over $500, and was sentenced to three years probation. He later committed new law violations and failed to report to his probation officer. Following a hearing on March 29, 2010, the defendant's probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve the balance of his sentence in confinement. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court.

The Defendant, Archie Hill, Jr., pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of burglary. The trial court sentenced him to seven years, with the Defendant to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in confinement and then be released to probation. Soon after the Defendant began serving his probation sentence, a violation of probation affidavit was filed against the Defendant. After a hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation sentence and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in placing into effect his original sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Appellant, Albert Lynn Norton, appeals as of right from the Blount County Circuit Court's order revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his sentences in incarceration. On appeal, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering him to serve his sentences in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Matthew Joseph Carter, was sentenced as a Range I, violent offender to twenty-three years for second degree murder, a Class A felony, and as a Range I, standard offender to eleven years each for two counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and to six years each for three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court ordered partially consecutive sentences, for an effective forty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in applying three of the nine enhancement factors, we hold that the lengths of the sentences imposed by the trial court are appropriate. We hold, though, that the imposition of consecutive sentences was in error and modify the Defendant's sentences to be served concurrently, for an effective twenty-three-year sentence.

Petitioner, Russell Lee Maze, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, Petitioner contends that (1) counsel failed to make an offer of proof regarding the testimony of Dr. Edward Yazbak; and (2) counsel failed to consult with a qualified medical expert regarding imaging evidence of the victim's neurological damage and failed to present a qualified medical expert to contradict the State's medical evidence regarding causation of the victim's brain and neurological damage. Petitioner also contends that the trial court erred in denying his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Philander Butler, pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief for being filed after the statute of limitations had expired. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition before appointing counsel and conducting a hearing to determine the merits of his petition. After review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

I write this concurring opinion because I find it very difficult to believe that the contractual rights at issue were not foreclosed upon and, thus, passed to the bank as a result of the foreclosure, in which event Defendants would be entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as the trial court found. However, as the majority correctly notes, there may be a small crack in the evidentiary chain that pertains to material facts at issue. I am not fully convinced there is a deficiency, but for purposes of summary judgment the court must be convinced that material facts are not in dispute.

Defendant, Chad Nicholas Hale, was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) per se, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days to serve 10 days by incarceration and the balance suspended and served on probation. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the results of his breath alcohol content test. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Thomas P. Isbell, was indicted for possession of oxycodone, burglary, two counts of theft over $1,000, and vandalism over $10,000. On October 21, 2008, Defendant pled guilty as charged. The sentence was left to the trial court's determination. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the two theft convictions and imposed an effective sentence of three years and six months, as a Range I standard offender, to be served by incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Purchaser of landlocked property brought action against the sellers, seeking to recover damages allegedly caused by the failure of the sellers to complete a road extension or otherwise to insure reasonable access to the property, which had been purchased for development of multi-family rental units. The trial court granted summary judgment to the sellers, finding that the right of the purchaser to proceed with the action was extinguished when the bank that provided financing for the development of the property foreclosed on the loan secured by the property and subsequently sold the property to another entity. The court concluded that the purchaser did not have standing to pursue the claims. Finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the purchaser's cause of action was included in the assets foreclosed upon, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Vicky Ann Gillig, a/k/a Vicki Gillig, a/k/a Vicky Taylor, a/k/a Vicky Little, entered best interest guilty pleas in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to the offenses of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; child abuse and neglect, a Class A misdemeanor; and contributing to the delinquency or unruliness of a minor, a Class A misdemeanor, in exchange for an effective sentence of four years. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the defendant's request for probation, the denial of which she now appeals. After review, we affirm the trial court's sentencing decision.