APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, James Ray Bullard, pled guilty to evading arrest, a Class E felony, and four counts of theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-16-603, 39-14- 103, 39-14-105(1) (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years, six months’ incarceration for the evading arrest conviction and to eleven months, twenty-nine days’ incarceration for each of the theft convictions, with all sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence of confinement. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In summary, we conclude that the two judgments of conviction violate the principles of double jeopardy, and the sentence, as currently structured, violates the express provisions of the misdemeanor sentencing statute. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed, but the case is remanded to the trial court for merger of the two convictions into a single offense for DUI and for imposition of a sentence compliant with our statutory guidelines. Costs are adjudged one-half to the State and one-half to the Defendant, for which execution may issue if necessary.

The Petitioner, Robert T. Henry, appeals the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief from his 1978 conviction for robbery. He claims his conviction is void because the law applicable at the time of his conviction has since been repealed and current law renders his indeterminate sentence illegal. The State has moved the court to affirm the trial court by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The State’s motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Before filing this personal injury action arising from an automobile accident, the plaintiff filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Although the plaintiff’s personal injury action accrued prior to his filing for bankruptcy, he omitted the potential claim from a schedule of assets in the bankruptcy petition. The plaintiff received a discharge in bankruptcy, and, shortly thereafter, filed the instant action. After the defendants moved for summary judgment, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint in order to add the bankruptcy Trustee as a party. The trial court did not rule on the plaintiff’s motion to amend, and instead granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff lacked standing and was judicially estopped from pursuing his personal injury claim. On appeal, we conclude that the trial court erred when it failed to rule on the plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint prior to adjudicating the defendants’ summary judgment motion.

This is the second appeal of an action to partition 74 acres. Plaintiff is a widow who owns a one-half interest in the land as a tenant in common with Defendants, Plaintiff’s stepson and his wife. Plaintiff filed this action in 2008 to partition the property by sale. Defendants opposed a sale and sought partition in kind. The trial court ordered the property sold upon findings that a partition in kind was impractical and that the two tracts were more valuable if sold together. Defendants appealed, and we affirmed with instructions that the property be sold on remand. Before the sale, a survey was conducted which revealed that Defendants’ home, located on a one-acre tract owned separately by Defendants, encroached on the property held by the parties as tenants in common. In order to resolve the encroachment issue, the trial court ordered Plaintiff to quitclaim a mere 0.168 acres to Defendants and ordered Defendants to quitclaim a like-sized portion of the property of equal value to Plaintiff. Although this remedy was favorable to Defendants, they nonetheless appealed, claiming the trial court had no legal authority to order them to quitclaim any property to Plaintiff. We have determined the trial court is authorized to partition a portion of the property in kind, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-27-104, and to order that the remaining property be partitioned by sale. Thus, we affirm.

A Warren County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Lawrence David Ralph, Jr., of violating a habitual traffic offender order; reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon; driving on a revoked license, fifth offense; evading arrest; and reckless driving. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective eight-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for reckless endangerment and that his sentence is excessive. We conclude that the appeal must be dismissed because we lack jurisdiction in the case.

A Williamson County jury convicted the Defendant, Ronnie Wayne Blair, of Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”), first offense. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, all of which was suspended after the service of four days. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the arresting officer by preventing use of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) manual and that the trial court improperly commented on the evidence. The State counters that this appeal should be dismissed because the Defendant failed to timely file his notice of appeal. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the interests of justice require waiver of the Defendant’s untimely filing of his notice of appeal. However, upon our consideration of the merits of the Defendant’s issues, we conclude the Defendant is not entitled to relief. The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.

The petitioner, Larry J. Noel, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, raising the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether his pretrial transfer of custody to the Department of Correction subjected him to double jeopardy and violated his due process rights; (2) whether he was incompetent to stand trial due to a stroke he suffered less than a month prior to trial; (3) whether he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial and on appeal; and (4) whether the post-conviction court erred by denying his motion for a continuance due to the unavailability of witnesses. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Appellant, Stephano L. Weilacker, was indicted by the Montgomery County Grand Jury for aggravated robbery and especially aggravated kidnapping for his role in the robbery of Triangle Kwik Stop in Montgomery County, Tennessee. At the conclusion of a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of both offenses. Appellant was sentenced by the trial court to ten years for aggravated robbery and twenty years for especially aggravated kidnapping, to be served concurrently. The sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to an elevenyear sentence for aggravated robbery in another case. Appellant filed a motion for extension of time in which to file a motion for new trial more than thirty days after the entry of the judgments. The trial court granted the motion. Appellant filed a motion for new trial. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; that the trial court failed to properly charge the jury with lesser included offenses; and that the trial court improperly ordered consecutive sentencing. After a review of the record as a whole, we determine that the trial court improperly ruled on an untimely motion for new trial. Therefore, Appellant has waived all issues on appeal with the exception of sufficiency of the evidence, sentencing, and issues that would result in the dismissal of the prosecution. Because the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and the trial court properly sentenced Appellant, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This case is before the Court upon the entire record, including the order of referral to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, and the Panel's Memorandum Opinion setting forth its findings of fact and conclusions of law, which are incorporated herein by reference. Whereupon, it appeals to the Court that the Memorandum Opinion of the Panel should be accepted and approved; and It is, therefore, ordered that the Panel's findings of fact and conclusions of law are adopted and affirmed, and the decision of the Panel is made the judgment of the Court. Costs of this appeal are adjudged against the Employer, Lear Corporation, and its sureties, for which execution may issue if necessary.

The primary issue presented in this appeal is whether an employee, who was injured when a tornado struck the tractor-trailer rig he was driving for his employer, has a compensable workers’ compensation claim. The central dispute between the parties is whether the claim arose out of the employment relationship. After careful review, we conclude that the employee was injured when he was subjected to a hazard not common to the general public but peculiar to the nature of his employment and to the conditions under which his employment was required to be performed. Accordingly, the injury arose out of his employment. The trial court’s judgment holding the employee’s claim to be compensable and its award of benefits is affirmed.

The Defendant, Benjamin Randolph Hubard, pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI), first offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and violation of the implied consent law. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant to 11 months and 29 days with 100 percent service of his sentence. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to pay a $350 fine, complete DUI school, and to perform 24 hours of community service in the form of litter removal. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in setting the length of his sentence and (2) that the trial court erred in ordering the additional penalties. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court erred in ordering the Defendant to complete DUI school and to perform 24 hours of community service. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The case is remanded.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court held that the employee sustained a compensable injury to his neck. The trial court found that the employee had a 30% impairment as a result of the injury and awarded 75% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer had two policies of workers’ compensation insurance in effect on the date of the injury. The trial court held each insurer liable for one-half of the benefits paid to the employee. One of the insurers has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury and that it erred in its apportionment of liability. We affirm¹ the judgment.

The appellant, Dennis Neil Bizzoco, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication, reckless homicide, vehicular assault, and driving under the influence (DUI). He received a total effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request for alternative sentencing and the denial of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 motion. Additionally, the appellant argues that his convictions for DUI, vehicular homicide by intoxication, and vehicular assault violate double jeopardy. We conclude that the appellant’s double jeopardy claim has merit; therefore, we vacate his conviction for DUI. However, we affirm the appellant’s remaining convictions and sentences.

The mother has filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial court’s decision regarding the father’s child support obligation. Because the mother did not file her notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in the perpetration of rape. In the penalty phase of the trial, the jury imposed a sentence of death, finding three aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the defendant was previously convicted of one or more violent felonies; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (3) the murder was committed during the defendant’s escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the conviction, but reversed the death sentence, holding that the trial court’s limitation on the mitigating evidence during the penalty phase required a new sentencing hearing. This Court affirmed. A second jury sentenced the defendant to death, concluding that the single aggravating circumstance, that the defendant had previously been convicted of one or more violent felonies, outweighed the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. This Court reversed, holding that because the trial court had erroneously admitted detailed evidence of the defendant’s prior violent felony offense, a third sentencing hearing was required. The jury again imposed a sentence of death, concluding that two statutory aggravating factors, that the defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to the person and that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a robbery, had been established beyond a reasonable doubt, and further determining that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the evidence of the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. This sentence was affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon careful review of the entire record, we hold as follows: (1) the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated by the disqualification of a prospective juror; (2) the prosecutor’s closing argument did not result in the use of non-statutory aggravating factors in the jury’s weighing process warranting reversal of the death sentence; (3) the admission of photographs of the body did not constitute error; (4) the trial court’s instructions on parole did not violate the defendant’s right to due process of law and heightened reliability; (5) the mandatory criteria of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1) are satisfied; and (6) the reduction of the amount of compensation sought by appellate defense counsel by a judge on the Court of Criminal Appeals did not require his disqualification from participating in this case. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.

A Chester County jury convicted the defendant, Dawn Kathleen Davidson, of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-three years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court erred by denying her motion for a bill of particulars; (2) the trial court erred by preventing her attorney from fully cross-examining the state’s witnesses; and (3) her sentence was excessive because the trial court incorrectly applied an enhancement factor and erroneously failed to apply any mitigation factors. Following our review, we conclude that the defendant waived all issues other than sentencing. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from a judgment dismissing an inmate’s petition for writ of certiorari challenging a disciplinary decision. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Nesha Newsome¹, filed in the Shelby County Criminal Court a petition for post-conviction relief from her convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, and robbery. The Petitioner contended that her trial counsel were ineffective by failing to object to the trial court’s definition of “aiding” in response to the jury’s question regarding the criminal responsibility jury instruction, failing to argue that her convictions violated due process, and failing to have the Petitioner undergo a pretrial mental evaluation. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner now appeals. In addition to the foregoing issues, the Petitioner also asserts that the supreme court’s denial of funding for a forensic psychologist violated her federal and state due process rights. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Issac Scott, appeals the post-conviction court’s denying his petition for postconviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the post-conviction court’s denial of funding for him to hire a forensic pathologist violated his constitutional rights. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal arises out of an action to hold UT Medical Group, Inc. vicariously liable for the alleged negligence of its employees. In 1997, the original plaintiff filed an amended complaint for medical malpractice and wrongful death which specifically named two doctors as employees of the defendant who negligently caused the death of a patient. As trial approached, a substitute plaintiff attempted to add new allegations concerning the negligence of a third doctor. The trial court denied the motion to amend and later granted a motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning  the alleged negligence of the third doctor as beyond the scope of the 1997 amended complaint. The plaintiff consequently was unable to offer expert testimony at trial to prove an employee of the defendant negligently caused the patient’s death, and the trial court granted judgment in favor of the defendant. We affirm.

Buyer of real property brought suit against seller for intentional misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of express warranty. The trial court determined that the buyer’s reliance upon the seller’s representations was reasonable. On appeal, the seller argues that the evidence does not support the trial court’s decision and that the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony offered by the seller. Because we have determined that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony in question, we reverse and remand.

The petitioner, Torian Dillard, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief for failure to prosecute, arguing that the court abused its discretion by not appointing new counsel after the petitioner’s appointed counsel was allowed to withdraw and by requiring the petitioner to proceed with his petition pro se. Following our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition.

Unlike the majority, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Mr. Akers’ two expert witnesses from giving their opinions on whether Mr. Goodall’s reliance on Mr. Akers’ representations was reasonable. Furthermore, even if the exclusion of this testimony was error, I find it to be harmless error. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

The defendant, Travis King, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.