APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the defendant’s
conviction of second degree murder should be upheld despite the absence of any proof that the defendant knowingly inflicted the lethal wound. The majority agrees that the evidence did not establish a knowing killing, the elemental and factual foundation for second degree murder. Indeed, the majority agrees that the trial court should not have instructed the jury on second degree murder as a lesser included offense of first degree felony murder. Despite these conclusions, the majority relies upon the mens rea regime for felony murder to impart culpability to the defendant for second degree murder.

Counsel for plaintiff in damage suit appeals award of sanctions imposed pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 against her. Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion the award is affirmed.

The appellant, Joe Michael Turner, was convicted by a Knox County Criminal Court Jury of two counts of aggravated rape, one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, three counts of aggravated kidnapping, and one count of aggravated assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of one hundred years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court should have merged the kidnapping convictions. Therefore, the judgments of conviction for the especially aggravated kidnapping and the aggravated kidnappings are vacated and the case is remanded for entry of a judgment of especially aggravated kidnapping that includes the merged aggravated kidnapping convictions. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

The Defendant, Joshua Lynn Parker, was convicted by a Cocke County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and attempted rape, a Class C felony. See T.C.A.__ 39-13-210 (1997) (amended 2006) (second degree murder); 39-12-101 (2006) (criminal attempt); 39-13-503 (2006) (rape). The defendant was sentenced to serve thirty-five years years at 100 percent for second degree murder conviction and eight years at thirty-five percent for attempted rape conviction. The sentences were imposed to run consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the admission of hearsay statements by the victim violated his Confrontation Clause rights; and (3) testimony regarding his service on the "can crew," a work group of jail inmates, prejudiced him at his trial. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted by a jury of the first degree murders of Renee Jordan, Jerry Hopper, and David Gordon, and the attempted first degree murders of James Goff and Larry Taylor, as well as leaving the scene of an accident. The jury sentenced the defendant to death for each of the first degree murders. The trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for each of the attempted murders, to be served consecutively, and to thirty days for the misdemeanor. On appeal, we hold (1) the trial court erred in ruling pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 615 that persons attending the guilt/innocence phase of the trial could not testify at the sentencing hearing; (2) the trial court's ruling regarding witness sequestration did not violate the defendant's right to a public trial; (3) the trial court erred in allowing an expert to incorporate hearsay testimony within his opinion without a limiting instruction; (4) the trial court did not err in permitting a victim's fianc_e to offer victim impact testimony; (5) the prosecution engaged in improper argument during the sentencing hearing; (6) the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury on the felony murder aggravating circumstance; (7) the various aggravating factors charged were not duplicative; (8) each of the death sentences satisfies our statutory mandatory review; and (9) the cumulative errors in this case do not entitle the defendant to relief. As to the remaining issues raised by the defendant, we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals's conclusions and attach as an appendix to this opinion the relevant portions of that court's decision. The defendant's convictions and sentences are affirmed.

Mr. Fletcher, who was injured in an automobile accident involving an uninsured motorist, sued the insurance company after it denied uninsured motorist benefits under his towing policy. Insurance company filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the towing policy did not provide uninsured motorist coverage for Mr. Fletcher's accident because it involved a non-covered auto. After a hearing on the motion, the trial court granted summary judgment to the insurance company. Mr. and Mrs. Fletcher appeal. We affirm.

A few years after the parties divorced, the mother filed a Petition for Full Custody of the children and child support. Following long delays, the trial court gave the mother custody of the remaining minor child and ordered child support for the child from the father from the date of the hearing forward. The mother appealed, insisting that retroactive child support should be granted to the date of filing the petition. We hold the child support should be granted from the date of the filing of the Petition and remand for a determination of that back child support.

The Defendant-Appellant, Timothy Delando Metcalf, pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Sullivan County to burglary, a Class E felony, and theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and appeals the denial of his request for an alternative sentence. Metcalf received a sentence of one year in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the burglary conviction and a suspended sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for the theft conviction. In this appeal, Metcalf claims the trial court should have also granted probation for the burglary conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted appeal in this case to determine the trial court's scope of review of the parties' arbitration award. After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the parties entered into binding arbitration governed by the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act ("TUAA") and reaffirm our holding in Pugh's Lawn Landscape Co., Inc v. Jaycon Development Corp., No. W2008-01366-SC-R11-CV, S.W.3d , (Tenn. 2010), that the judicial review of an arbitration award is confined to the grounds enumerated in the TUAA. The provision in the parties' arbitration agreement modifying the trial court's scope of review therefore is invalid, and the invalidity of this provision is a mutual mistake justifying rescission of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Because our holding necessitates additional proceedings on remand, we further hold that parenting issues may not be submitted to binding arbitration in Tennessee because such arbitration eliminates the trial court's determination of the children's best interests. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves service of a garnishment. In the underlying action, the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the defendant debtor. At the time, the judgment debtor was an independent insurance agent located in Tennessee. In a discovery response, the debtor stated that he worked for a Missouri insurance company, but he listed his Tennessee office as his work address. The plaintiff issued a garnishment to the Missouri insurance company as the garnishee, and had it served at the Tennessee address, where it was accepted by a front-desk employee. The employee gave the garnishment to the debtor. Therefore, the garnishee did not receive the garnishment and did not respond. The trial court issued a conditional judgment and scheduled a hearing for the garnishee to appear and show cause why the conditional judgment should not be made final. After the hearing, the trial court found that the employees at the Tennessee insurance office were not agents of the garnishee Missouri company, and that service of the garnishment was not effective. The trial court therefore vacated the conditional judgment. The plaintiff-garnishor now appeals. We affirm and agree with the trial court that service of the garnishment was not effective.

We granted appeal in this case to address whether parties may modify by agreement the scope of judicial review of an arbitrator's award. We hold that judicial review of arbitration awards is governed by the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act ("TUAA"). As such, the provision in the parties' arbitration agreement purporting to expand the scope of the judicial review beyond that set forth in the TUAA is invalid. We further hold that the failure of this provision constitutes a mutual mistake requiring rescission of the parties' arbitration agreement. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court's judgment confirming the arbitrator's award, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb.1 On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of postconviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the postconviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.

This appeal concerns a post-judgment motion. The petitioner is an inmate in the custody of the respondent department of correction. The petitioner inmate filed a complaint for declaratory judgment regarding the department of correction's denial of his request for a parole hearing. The department answered the complaint, and no action was taken on the case by either party in the two years that followed. The trial court entered a case management order, requiring the petitioner inmate to set a date for a final hearing within a given time. After the petitioner inmate failed to do so, the trial court dismissed the petitioner's complaint without prejudice. Nearly a year later, the petitioner filed a motion for summary judgment. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the motion because it was filed after the order of dismissal became final. The petitioner appeals. We affirm.

The Petitioner, Leonard Edward Smith, appeals as of right from the May 21, 2004 and March 2, 2007 orders of the Hamblen County Circuit Court denying his initial and amended petitions for post-conviction relief challenging his 1985 conviction and life sentence for the first degree felony murder of John Pierce, his 1989 conviction for the first degree felony murder of Novella Webb, and his 1995 sentence of death for the murder of Novella Webb.1 On appeal, the Petitioner claims that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because defense counsel provided ineffective assistance in both the trial and appellate proceedings related to these convictions and sentences and because multiple other constitutional violations call into question the validity of these convictions and sentences. After a careful and laborious review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief relative to the Petitioner's conviction and life sentence for the murder of John Pierce and the Petitioner's conviction for the murder of Novella Webb, but we reverse the denial of postconviction relief relative to the Petitioner's death sentence for the Webb murder and remand for a new sentencing hearing in that case. We do so based upon the conclusion that the postconviction court erred in denying the Petitioner's claim that his trial attorneys provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in their investigation and presentation of available evidence in support of their motion to recuse the 1995 resentencing judge.

Plaintiffs purchased property insurance from defendants. The insured building was destroyed by a fire and plaintiffs received the full coverage limit. Nonetheless, plaintiffs sued defendants claiming that the building was under-insured and that they relied on the defendants' negligent advice. A jury trial occurred and after the close of plaintiffs' proof, defendants moved for a directed verdict on all issues. The trial court granted defendants' motion and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint. Plaintiffs appeal. We find that a directed verdict is inappropriate because plaintiffs presented sufficient facts for a jury to decide liability. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for a full trial.

This appeal involves a petition for writ of certiorari filed by a prisoner seeking review of a disciplinary conviction. The respondents did not oppose the issuance of the writ, and a certified copy of the record of the disciplinary proceedings was filed with the trial court. The respondents filed a motion for judgment on the record. After review of the parties' briefs and the administrative record, the trial court granted the respondents' motion for judgment on the record. The petitioner inmate appeals. We affirm.

The defendant appeals his conviction for aggravated rape and his sentence as a repeat violent offender. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the defendant's conviction and that the trial court did not err in relying on a certified judgment of another state's court to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is a repeat violent offender pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-120. We conclude, however, that the State failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in section 40-35-120(i)(2) and that the defendant's sentence as a repeat violent offender therefore constitutes plain error. We affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

I concur in part II of the majority opinion, holding that the reporting of an illegal activity is not an essential element of an employee’s claim of retaliatory discharge for refusing to participate in an illegal activity, and, as I explain subsequently, I ultimately concur in the judgment denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Nonetheless, I write separately to dissent from the majority’s decision in part I to dispense with the framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), at the summary judgment stage in all employment discrimination and retaliation cases.

The petitioner, Jeremy Trent Keeton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He originally agreed to plead guilty to the sale of a Schedule II drug (methamphetamine), a Class C felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to twelve years, to be served concurrently with each other but consecutive to two other cases for a total effective sentence of thirty-nine years. On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in ruling that he had failed to demonstrate that trial counsel was ineffective and in ruling that his guilty plea was entered voluntarily. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The employee brought an action for common law retaliatory discharge against his employer for refusal to participate in an allegedly illegal activity. The employer moved for summary judgment, presenting evidence of a legitimate reason for the employee's discharge pursuant to the framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The employer also argued that summary judgment was warranted pursuant to Collins v. AmSouth Bank, 241 S.W.3d 879 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007), because the undisputed facts showed that the employee did not report the alleged illegality. The trial court granted summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable at the summary judgment stage because it is incompatible with Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence. We also hold that an employee alleging retaliatory discharge for refusal to participate in an illegal activity need not report the illegality. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

The defendants have appealed from a judgment declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of certain real property and awarding the plaintiffs a judgment for the negligent cutting of timber. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The Defendant, Christopher Metcalf, pled guilty to initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine and agreed to a nine-year sentence, with the trial court to determine the manner of service. At sentencing, the defendant requested an alternative sentence, but the trial court ordered the defendant to serve his entire sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred when it denied his request for an alternative sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals because genuine issues of material fact exist precluding summary judgment for the employer. I write separately to reiterate my belief, set forth in my partial concurrence and dissent in Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., Inc., No. M2007-02530-SC-R11-CV, — S.W.3d — (Tenn. 2010), that the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), need not be abrogated because it is compatible with the summary judgment procedures as set forth in the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure and Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). As the facts of this case illustrate, the McDonnell Douglas framework applied along with Hannan at the summary judgment phase enables an orderly evaluation of the evidence.

The defendants have appealed from a judgment declaring the plaintiffs to be the owners of certain real property and awarding the plaintiffs a judgment for the negligent cutting of timber. Because the defendants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.

The employer discharged the employee three days after he rejected an offer to settle his workers' compensation claim, and the employee brought a retaliatory discharge action against the employer. The trial court granted the employer summary judgment, which the Court of Appeals reversed. We hold that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.