APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Michael Deshay Peoples, Jr., was charged with one count of first degree felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. __ 39-13-403(b), -402(b), -304(b)(1). One count of aggravated robbery was "nol prossed" by the State prior to the defendant's trial. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of all four remaining offenses as charged. In this direct appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court erred when it allowed testimony regarding the count of aggravated robbery that was "nol prossed" prior to the defendant's trial. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff has appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action. Because the plaintiff did not file a timely notice of appeal from the order of dismissal, we dismiss the appeal.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Harlen Roy Lamont Zirker, of two counts of rape of a child and four counts of aggravated sexual battery, for which he was sentenced to a total, effective sentence of seventy-two years to be served at 100%. The petitioner appealed, and this Court affirmed his convictions and sentence. State v. Harlen Roy L. Zirker, aka Anthony Lamont Zirker, No. M2003-02546-CCA-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1122646 at *1, *16 (Tenn. Crim. App. May 12, 2005), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 31, 2005). Subsequently the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief and two amended petitions thereafter, which he then voluntarily dismissed. Shortly after the dismissal, the petitioner filed a second petition for post-conviction relief, which the post conviction court summarily dismissed because it was the petitioner's second such petition and because it was untimely. The petitioner now appeals the summary dismissal of his second petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Anthony DeWayne Hood, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Union County Criminal Court for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court denied his right to a fair trial when it responded in the jury's presence to the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal that the burden had been met, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and improper character evidence, (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct because the State misstated the evidence during opening statement and closing argument and commented on the credibility of a witness, and (5) his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor and denied alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it stated in the jury's presence that the State's burden of proof had been met. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Evetta Mai McGee, pled guilty to rape, and the trial court sentenced her to eleven years. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it enhanced her sentence beyond the statutory minimum without explanation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, Patrick Joseph Rigger, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his general sessions court guilty-pleaded convictions of misdemeanor evading arrest and misdemeanor possession of a weapon. Although the postconviction court determined that the Knox County General Sessions Court's procedure of communicating to defendants en masse the litany of constitutional rights prior to accepting pleas of guilty did not satisfy the rigors of due process principles, the post-conviction court denied relief to the petitioner. The petitioner appeals and claims that the lower court erred in failing to find that his guilty pleas were involuntary, unknowing, and/or unintelligent. He also claims that the warrant alleging his illegal possession of a weapon inadequately charged an offense and that his actual innocence of that charge entitled him to post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the post-conviction court's order, we affirm.

The Defendants, Nelson Aguilar Gomez and Florinda Lopez, were charged with: Count One, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child abuse; Count Two, first degree felony murder during the perpetration of aggravated child neglect; Counts Three and Four, aggravated child abuse occurring on or about March 3, 2007; and Count Five, aggravated child abuse occurring in February 2007. Aggravated child abuse is a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-15-402(b). The defendants were tried jointly before a jury. Defendant Gomez was convicted of both counts of felony murder, Count One merging into Count Two, and sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. He was also convicted of all three counts of aggravated child abuse and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each conviction. The trial court ordered him to serve his Count Three and Count Four aggravated child abuse sentences concurrently with each other and his life sentence, and ordered him to serve his Count Five aggravated child abuse sentence consecutively to his other sentences, for a total effective sentence of life plus twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. On her felony murder charges, Defendant Lopez was convicted of two counts of the lesser-included offense of facilitation of first degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-11-403, -13-204(a). Count One was merged into Count Two. Defendant Lopez was also convicted of aggravated child abuse under Counts Three and Four. She was acquitted of aggravated child abuse as charged in Count Five. She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for her facilitation of first degree murder conviction and sentenced as a violent offender to twenty-five years for each of her two aggravated child abuse convictions. The trial court ordered her to serve these sentences concurrently, for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, Defendant Gomez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of certain prior bad acts, in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him and that the trial court therefore erred in failing to grant his motion for a judgment of acquittal; and (3) the trial court erred in ordering consecutive sentencing. Defendant Lopez contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her pre-trial motion to include non-citizens on the jury; (2) the trial court erred in preventing her from introducing an entire statement she made to police after the State impeached her using part of that statement; (3) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Defendant Gomez's prior bad acts; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence for each of her convictions. After our review, we reverse and dismiss Defendant Gomez's Count Five conviction of aggravated child abuse. In all other respects, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Perry County grand jury indicted the Petitioner, Darrell John Penner, for two counts of rape of a child. The Petitioner pled guilty to aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years at 100% in the Department of Correction. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The postconviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The Defendant, Dawn Fox Newhouse, pleaded guilty to theft of services over $10,000, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-105(4). She was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and six months and was placed on probation. The trial court subsequently found that the Defendant violated her probation and sentenced her to serve 180 days in the Robertson County Jail. The trial court later modified its order and allowed the Defendant to serve her 180 days on weekends. Several months later, the Board of Probation and Parole alleged that the Defendant violated her probation again by incurring a new arrest. After a hearing, the trial court found that the Defendant violated her probation a second time and ordered that she serve the remainder of her sentence in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by revoking her probation. After a review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking the Defendant's probation. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronald A. Barker, appeals from the habeas corpus court's summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The Petitioner, Chris Jones, appeals his denial of post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of sale of cocaine in an amount more than .5 grams, a Class B felony, and one count of sale of cocaine in an amount less than .5 grams, a Class C felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner received sentences of 12 years for each of the Class B felonies and 6 years for the Class C felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a ten-year sentence imposed in a separate case. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his guilty plea hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Patrick M. Lonie, was charged by presentment with twelve counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor and ten counts of aggravated sexual battery. In an open plea, he pled guilty to four counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. Following a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I offender to one term of eleven years and three terms of ten years, with two of the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35- 115 to the Tennessee Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1990, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17-1001, et seq., and that, as a result, he should not have received consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court and remand for entry of corrected judgments to reflect the conviction offenses as especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor.

The appellant, William Comfort, pled guilty in the Warren County Circuit Court to attempted aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's imposition of an eight-year sentence and the denial of alternative sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joe Clark Mitchell, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We find the State's motion has merit. Accordingly, the motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This appeal involves a dispute between adjacent landowners over boundary lines with respect to a fence and ownership of property constituting a substantial portion of a concrete driveway to one neighbor's house. Glynda Shealy ("Plaintiff") sued Chuong C. Williams and Nickie Ann Dunker ("Defendants") for trespass and malicious encroachment, claiming that Defendants' concrete driveway and backyard fence encroached upon Plaintiff's adjoining properties. In response, both Defendants asserted a defense of adverse possession. Upon conclusion of a bench trial, the trial court found, inter alia, that the concrete driveway intruded on Plaintiff's property but that Defendant Dunker had a prescriptive easement in a gravel driveway for ingress and egress. Additionally, the trial court ordered Defendant Dunker to remove her backyard fence to the legally established boundary lines and awarded Plaintiff $50 in nominal damages. After the trial court dismissed Defendant Williams from this lawsuit, Defendant Dunker filed a motion to amend her answer to add a defensive claim of easement by prescription. The trial court granted the motion. Plaintiff appealed. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of Father/Appellant's petition to change the primary residential parent or in the alternative to increase his parenting time. Because Father did not demonstrate that a material change of circumstances has occurred, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

The Defendant, Billy Earl McIllwain, Jr., was convicted by a Gibson County jury of one count of first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of possession of a deadly weapon with the intent to employ it in the commission of an offense. He received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus six years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant's only challenge is to the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The employee, Paul Douthit, sustained a compensable injury to his left knee, which resulted in an anatomical impairment of 2% of the leg. He was able to return to his prior employment, and his claim was settled for 3% permanent partial disability to the leg, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-241(d)(1)(A). He subsequently had a second injury. A committee composed of his peers determined that both injuries were preventable, which led to his termination for violation of a company rule. He filed this petition for reconsideration in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 241(d)(1)(B)(ii). The trial court found that Mr. Douthit’s termination was not the result of intentional misconduct, that his conduct did not rise to the level of ordinary negligence, and that he was eligible for reconsideration. The trial court awarded an additional 9% permanent partial disability to the leg. The employer, Griffin Industries, has appealed, contending that “intentional misconduct” is an incorrect standard, that the findings of the peer committee are not reviewable, and that the trial court, therefore, erred in reconsidering the settlement. We agree that the “intentional misconduct” standard is not in conformity with existing case law, but affirm the trial court’s determination that the employee was eligible to seek reconsideration.

This appeal involves the registration of a foreign order. In 1991, the parents of a minor child were divorced in Texas, and the father was ordered to pay child support. Soon thereafter, the mother moved with the child to Kentucky and began receiving public assistance on behalf of the child. Because the mother was receiving public assistance, the father's child support obligation was assigned to the Commonwealth of Kentucky. In 2006, the father moved to Tennessee. Thereafter, Kentucky registered the Texas child support order in Tennessee and sought to enforce it. The father contested the registration of the child support order. The trial court rejected the father's challenges and ordered that the child support order be registered for enforcement in Tennessee. The father now appeals. We affirm.

A Warren County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Margle Ward, 1 of facilitation of theft of property over $1,000, a Class E felony. He was sentenced as a multiple offender to a four-year term of imprisonment and assessed $1,332.50 in fines. On appeal, Margle claims (1) the insufficiency of the evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude a statement he made to Jeff Panter; (3) the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude the testimony of Jason Ward; and (4) his sentence was excessive. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

After a plant closure, employee sought reconsideration of a prior workers’ compensation settlement for right shoulder and elbow injuries in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6- 241(a)(2) (2008). Employer denied that he was entitled to reconsideration of the elbow injury because it was a separate injury to a scheduled member. Id. § 50-6-241(a)(1). The trial court found that the two injuries were concurrent and that employee was entitled to receive reconsideration as to both. It further found that employee had proven three of the four factors set out in Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a) (2008) by clear and convincing evidence and was therefore not limited by the six times impairment cap. The trial court awarded 57.5% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, employer contends that the trial court erred by finding the injuries to be concurrent and by finding that employee had satisfied the requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We affirm the holding that the injuries were concurrent but find that employee did not satisfy his burden of proof under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-242(a). We modify the judgment accordingly.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions. The evidence at trial established that the Defendant lived across the street and two houses down from the victims’ burglarized home. A partially smoked cigarette was found inside the victims’ home, and subsequent DNA testing established that the Defendant’s DNA was present on the cigarette. Detective Grooms described the cigarette as not being crumpled and stated that the cigarette looked as if it had been partially smoked and then forgotten inside the house. Detective Grooms rejected the idea that the cigarette was tracked into the house from the street and stated that the cigarette appeared to have been placed in the house by the perpetrator. When asked on crossexamination whether a cigarette could stick to a person’s shoe, Detective Grooms stated that he has never had a cigarette stick to his shoe. When officers attempted to apprehend the Defendant at his house, the Defendant, who was sitting on his front porch, ran from the officers. The Defendant was found ten minutes later. Given the presence of the Defendant’s DNA on the cigarette, the condition and location of the cigarette, and the Defendant’s flight to avoid contact with law enforcement, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The aforementioned evidence, coupled with Detective Grooms’s testimony, excludes every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt.

A Cocke County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, David Lynn Sisk, of aggravated burglary, theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and theft of property valued at more than $10,000 but less than $60,000. The trial court determined that the defendant was a career offender and imposed a total effective sentence of 27 years' incarceration. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, claims that the indictments charging theft are multiplicitous, argues that the trial court erred in its jury charge, and contends that the trial court erroneously declared him a career offender. Because the evidence was insufficient to support the defendant's convictions, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and dismiss the charges in this case. To facilitate any further appellate review, we also conclude that the theft indictments were impermissibly multiplicitous, necessitating the dismissal of the defendant's conviction of theft of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $10,000, and that the trial court erroneously classified the defendant as a career offender.

Parents appeal the trial court's termination of their parental rights. Because we find that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that it had made reasonable efforts to address the problems preventing the reunification of the children with their parents, we reverse.

Petitioner, Walter Himes, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his post-conviction petition in which Petitioner alleged that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel, and that his guilty pleas were not voluntarily or knowingly entered. After a thorough review we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.