APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the Retailers' Sales Tax Act. The plaintiff taxpayer is a dry-cleaning business. The taxpayer did not pay Tennessee sales tax for the sale of dry-cleaning and laundering services to a formalwear rental business. After an audit, the Tennessee Department of Revenue concluded that the taxpayer's sales of these services did not qualify as "sales for resale" that were exempt from taxation under the Retailers' Sales Tax Act, and assessed unpaid sales taxes. The taxpayer filed this lawsuit challenging the assessment. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court concluded that the taxpayer's sales of dry-cleaning and laundering services qualified for the "sale for resale" exemption and abated the assessment. The Commissioner of the Department of Revenue appeals. We reverse, finding, inter alia, that the sales do not fall within the "sale for resale" exemption from taxation under the Retailers' Sales Tax Act because dry-cleaning and laundering garments does not amount to "processing" under the Act.

This is an annexation case. The defendant city decided to annex twelve square miles of land to its northwest. The territory to be annexed was divided into forty-nine subareas. Some of the subareas immediately adjoin the city's existing boundary; all are contiguous to one another. The city prepared a plan to provide services for each of the subareas. The plans of service stated that, upon annexation, the city would deliver services immediately with existing resources. The city simultaneously enacted forty-nine ordinances annexing each of the subareas. Afterward, the plaintiff residents filed the instant quo warranto lawsuit challenging the annexation, arguing inter alia that the city could not annex land that did not adjoin its existing boundary and that the plans of service were fatally deficient under the annexation statutes. After a trial, the lower court concluded that the city could annex all of the subareas and had complied with the statutory requirements for annexation. The residents appeal. We reverse the trial court's decision that the city could annex the subareas that did not immediately adjoin the city's existing boundary, affirm the decision that the city complied with the statutory requirements for annexation with respect to the remaining subareas, and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant-Appellant, Charles Haywood, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of aggravated robbery by use or display of a deadly weapon, and one count of possessing a firearm in the commission of attempted second degree murder. He entered an open guilty plea to one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, as a Range I, standard offender, and the Shelby County Criminal Court sentenced him to twelve years of confinement in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Haywood argues that his sentence is excessive. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

This appeal concerns sovereign immunity. A subdivision in the defendant county had restrictive covenants that, inter alia, required the payment of an annual assessment by all lot owners to the subdivision trustees. In the wake of delinquent taxes, pursuant to statutes, the county took title to lots in the subdivision after delinquent tax sales failed to yield sufficient bids. The county held the lots for several years, and declined to pay the trustees the annual assessments on the properties. Residents of the subdivision sued the trustees, and crossclaims against the county were asserted for the past-due assessments. The county contended that it was immune from liability for the lot assessments under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. After a trial, the trial court held that the county was entitled to sovereign immunity insofar as it had complied with the pertinent statutes on delinquent tax sales, and granted a partial judgment against the county on the assessment claims. The trustees appeal, arguing that the county was not entitled to assert sovereign immunity as a defense to the contract claims under the restrictive covenants. We agree, and affirm in part and reverse in part the decision of the trial court.

After a jury trial, Petitioner Alton Tappan was convicted of aggravated burglary and theft of property valued at $1,000 or more but less than $10,000. He was given an effective sentence of 14 years incarceration. His conviction was affirmed on appeal. He then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We conclude that appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue of the trial court's failure to charge circumstantial evidence was deficient performance and that the failure was prejudicial. We therefore remand the case to the trial court for a new trial on the theft conviction. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in all other respects.

Defendant, John Wayne Wright, presents for review a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to possession of more than 0.5 ounces of marijuana with the intent to sell, a Class E felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Defendant to concurrent sentences of two years for his felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction. Both sentences were to be suspended and Defendant placed on probation after serving forty-five days in confinement. As a condition of his guilty pleas, Defendant properly reserved two certified questions of law concerning the stop and search of his vehicle and the subsequent search of his home. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Three tenants of the Gallatin Housing Authority were indicted under the theft of services statute, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-14-104, for failing to report to the housing authority earnings that would have increased their rent. On the tenants' motion, the trial court dismissed the indictments, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Applying the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis, we hold that the definition of services in section 39-11-106(a)(35) does not include public housing. We therefore affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nader Daqqaq, was found guilty of driving under the influence ("DUI"). The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven months, twenty-nine days. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve nine months in confinement before being eligible for work release or trusty status. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Bryan Williams, was convicted of one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony; one count of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony; and one count of reckless endangerment, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to twenty-three years for the Class A felony, ten years for the Class B felony, and two years for the Class E felony. All sentences were ordered to run consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in failing to declare a mistrial following the testimony of one witness. After careful review, we affirm the judgments from the trial court.

We accepted this case to determine whether, under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-16- 503(a)(1), the proof required to convict the defendant of tampering with evidence is sufficient where the "thing" destroyed during the course of an investigation is not specifically identified. On the facts of this case, we hold that the evidence is sufficient. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal concerns the ownership of real property. The decedent acquired the subject property while he was married to the defendant surviving spouse. Years later, the decedent quitclaimed his interest in the property to his grandson. Subsequently, the decedent and the grandson disputed ownership of the property and an ancillary lawsuit ensued. Before the litigation was resolved, the decedent died and his estate was substituted as a party. The surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the grandson, asserting he caused the decedent's death. The grandson settled both lawsuits; the settlement of each involved a transfer of the subject real property. Thereafter, the executrix of the decedent's estate filed the instant lawsuit against the surviving spouse seeking a determination as to the ownership of the property. The surviving spouse counterclaimed, asserting various theories of ownership. On the estate's motion, the trial court entered an order dismissing the surviving spouse's counterclaim to the extent that it sought fee simple ownership. The surviving spouse now appeals. We dismiss the appeal, finding that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction.

The petitioner, David Bankston, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that the two-year sentence imposed for his 2007 conviction of ninth offense driving under the influence has expired. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that his sentence has, in fact, expired, or that he is otherwise entitled to habeas corpus relief, we affirm the denial of habeas corpus relief.

The defendant, Demetrie Darnell Owens, was convicted by a Marshall County jury of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a Range II offender to an effective sentence of ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves a judgment creditor's attempt to enforce a foreign judgment entered by a Mississippi court against a Tennessee corporation. The Tennessee corporation moved to dismiss, contending that service of process was improper in the Mississippi action. The trial court found that the Tennessee corporation was not properly served, and it dismissed the petition. The judgment creditor appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

This appeal arises out of a dispute between a buyer and seller of lumber. The seller filed suit against the buyer alleging a right to recover in breach of contract, quantum meruit, and/or quantum valebant for an outstanding balance owed on several shipments of lumber. The trial court determined that the buyer accepted approximately half of the disputed shipments due to its failure to timely reject the initial deliveries but was not liable for additional shipments that it timely rejected. The trial court, however, did not address whether the buyer revoked its acceptance of the initial shipments or whether the buyer was entitled to reimbursement for expenses incurred in an attempt to salvage the rejected shipments. Because the parties tried these issues by consent, the order appealed is not a final judgment and the appeal must be dismissed.

The defendant, David Henry Hammon, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of domestic assault and child abuse, both Class A misdemeanors, and was sentenced by the trial court to an effective term of eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion without considering and weighing all the appropriate factors. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's denial of judicial diversion but remand for the entry of corrected judgments to reflect that the defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of eleven months, twenty-nine days for the child abuse conviction and six months for the domestic assault conviction as stated in the trial court's sentencing order.

The defendant, Randy Clayton Norman, was convicted by a Maury County Circuit Court jury of second degree murder, a Class A felony, and sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that: (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the trial court did not perform its duty as the thirteenth juror; (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; and (4) the trial court erred in sentencing him. After review, we affirm the defendant's conviction but modify the defendant's sentence to fifteen years.

The plaintiff served as the trustee of two trusts for several years. After he was informed that his services were no longer needed, the plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to compensation in the form of trustee's fees for his service. The trial court ruled, on a motion for summary judgment, that the plaintiff had waived his right to trustee's fees and that he was equitably estopped from claiming such fees. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The Defendant, George Vincent Ware, pled guilty in the Hamilton County Criminal Court in two separate cases on September 27, 2007. In Case Number 262379, the defendant pled guilty to introduction of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, and was sentenced as a multiple offender to seven years, suspended to "intensive probation." In Case Number 262471, the defendant pled guilty to theft of property, a Class D felony; criminal impersonation, a Class B misdemeanor; and driving on a revoked or suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor. The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to three years, six months, and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively, for the convictions in Case Number 262471. The trial court ordered the sentences in Case Number 262471 to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to the sentence imposed in Case Number 262379. Thus, the defendant received a total effective sentence of ten years. Following the filing of a probation violation warrant and a finding that the defendant violated the terms of his probationary sentence, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered the defendant to serve the balance of his sentence in custody. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering the dDefendant to serve his sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

With the approval of the trial court, a divorced father of four children moved with the children from Tennessee to Arkansas. Four years later, the mother, who remained in Tennessee, fell behind in her child support payments and filed a petition for modification of child support. Father responded by filing a motion for contempt against the mother in the Arkansas court, and he entered a limited appearance in Tennessee for the purpose of transferring the entire cause to Arkansas. After a hearing, the Tennessee court declared Arkansas to be the children's home state, and it transferred all custody and visitation issues to that state, while retaining jurisdiction of child support matters. The court also denied Mother's petition for modification of child support. Mother argues on appeal that the trial court erred in relinquishing its jurisdiction over custody because the children still have a"significant connection" to Tennessee. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Gerome J. Smith, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In May 2008, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged the existence of newly discovered evidence. The trial court dismissed the petition based upon the one-year statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner contends the dismissal was an unconstitutional denial of his right to due process. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Shelby County Healthcare Corporation (“The Med”) has filed a Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition for rehearing requesting this Court to reconsider our opinion in Estate of Bell v. Shelby County Health Care Corp., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2010 WL 2539644 (Tenn. 2010). In that opinion, we found that the application of the Act of May 21, 2003, ch. 321, 2003 Tenn. Pub. Acts 650 (“2003 Act”) to the claims of the estate of Joyce Bell and her infant son, Jonathan Bell, violated Article I, Section 20 of the Tennessee Constitution. We have determined that the arguments advanced by The Med in its petition do not merit a reconsideration of our earlier opinion.

A Montgomery County jury convicted the Defendant, Mario A. Reed, of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, and theft under $500, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends: (1) the juvenile court erred when it transferred his case to the circuit court for him to be tried as an adult; (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury on aggravated rape; and (3) the trial court erred when it sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

This appeal involves the application of the one-year statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann._ 29-16-124 (2000) to a temporary regulatory taking claim. The developer of a residential subdivision in Wilson County filed suit in the Circuit Court for Wilson County against the City of Lebanon and others alleging that the city's planning commission had denied it all economically beneficial use of its property by wrongfully refusing to approve the final plans for two phases of its subdivision. The City moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the statute of limitations in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 29-16-124 had expired before the developer filed suit. The developer responded that the limitations period was tolled while it sought judicial review of the planning commission's decision. The trial court held that the developer's lawsuit was timely because the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the entry of the Court of Appeals' opinion invalidating the planning commission's action. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals granted the City's application for an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Tenn. R. App. P. 9. The Court of Appeals thereafter reversed the trial court and determined that the developer's lawsuit was not timely because the statute of limitations began to run when the planning commission declined to approve the final subdivision plans. B & B Enters. of Wilson Cnty., LLC v. City of Lebanon, No. M2008- 00572-COA-R9-CV, 2009 WL 130188 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2009). We granted the developer's application for permission to appeal and now affirm the Court of Appeals.