APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Antoinette Feaster, was convicted of one count of possession with intent to deliver over twenty-six grams of cocaine, a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 39-17- 417(i)(5). She was sentenced, as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, she contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress the cocaine underlying her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in allowing a witness, who was not listed on the defendant's indictment or in discovery material, to testify; (3) the trial court erred in failing to require the State to elect a single offense to be presented to the jury; (4) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict her; (5) the trial court erred in charging the jury; (6) the trial court erred in declining to allow the jury to consider the search at issue in this case; and (7) the trial court erred in denying the defendant a community corrections sentence. After our review, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress due to an unlawful initial stop. We accordingly reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Brandon Forbes, pled guilty in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of theft of property valued at over $1,000 with an agreed total effective sentence of six years as a Range I, standard offender, leaving the manner of service to the discretion of the trial court. Following the denial of alternative sentencing, the Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that his guilty pleas were involuntary due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. After the appointment of counsel and an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tennessee Regulatory Authority - The City of Chattanooga has appealed the decision by the Tennessee Regulatory Authority establishing a rate for the appellee, Tennessee American Water Company. The Tennessee American Water Company filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the issues before this Court are moot. We hold the issues on appeal are moot and in our discretion decline to consider the issues as an exception to the mootness doctrine. The appeal is dismissed.

I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion’s dismissal of this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. I believe the record contains final orders addressing all issues in the trial court, and I do not believe the failure to place all of the orders in a single judgment document bars our reviewing the restitution issue in this appeal.

After the parties were divorced for two years, the father sought to reduce his child support obligation and change the custody of the child which had been agreed upon at the time of the divorce. The trial court heard evidence and modified the visitation schedule, but vested the mother with primary custody all based on Tenn. Code Ann. _36-6-101(a)(2)(C). He also increased the child support obligation of the father, and the father has appealed. We affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Billy R. Summey, for alternative counts of sale or delivery of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant pled guilty to the indictment and received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the Defendant also reserved a certified question of law that is dispositive of his case challenging the legality of the tape-recorded drug transaction that occurred in his home, without a warrant, between himself and an informant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Monroe County grand jury indicted the Defendant, Billy R. Summey, for alternative counts of sale or delivery of more than one-half ounce but less than ten pounds of marijuana, a Class E felony. Following the denial of his motion to suppress, the Defendant pled guilty to the indictment and received a sentence of two years as a Range I, standard offender to be served on probation. Pursuant to the guilty plea, the Defendant also reserved a certified question of law that is dispositive of his case challenging the legality of the tape-recorded drug transaction that occurred in his home, without a warrant, between himself and an informant. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(i). In this appeal as of right, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Michael D. Hurst, has appealed the Blount County Circuit Court's September 4, 2009 revocation of his community corrections placement which resulted in his serving the balance of his 2004 eight-year, guilty pleaded sentence for drug possession. The State has moved the court to summarily affirm the circuit court's revocation order pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the record supports the State's motion, we affirm the order of the circuit court.

In December 2006, the Shelby County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Eric Cathey, for one count of felony first degree murder, one count of aggravated child abuse, and one count of aggravated child neglect. These charges were the result of the death of appellant's two-month-old daughter. At the conclusion of a jury trial, the jury found appellant guilty of all three counts. The trial court held a sentencing hearing and merged the aggravated child neglect conviction into the aggravated child abuse conviction. The trial court imposed a sentence of life with parole for the felony first degree murder and twenty years for the aggravated child abuse. The trial court ordered that these sentences be served concurrently. Appellant now appeals his convictions and sentence arguing that: (1) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the State's use of its peremptory challenges at jury selection; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred in allowing certain photographs into evidence; and (4) the trial court erred by imposing an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that appellant's issues do not require reversal. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Deonray J. Fisk, was found guilty of three counts of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, three counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, a Class E felony. The Trial Court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eleven years for each attempted murder conviction, six years for each aggravated assault conviction, and two years for the weapons conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences for attempted murder consecutively. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences for aggravated assault concurrently with each other and with Defendant's sentence for attempted second degree murder in count one of the indictment. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence for his weapons conviction consecutively with his conviction for attempted second degree murder in count one and concurrently with the other sentences for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining the length and manner of service of his sentences. After a thorough review, we affirm the trial court's judgments. We conclude, however, that double jeopardy principles require that Defendant's aggravated assault convictions in counts 4, 5, and 6 of the indictment be merged with Defendant's convictions of attempted second degree murder in counts 1, 2, and 3, and we remand for the entry of corrected judgments consistent with this opinion. Defendant's effective sentence of thirty-five years remains unchanged.

A homeowner and a contractor agreed to use mediation to resolve their disagreement over the contractor's bill for home renovations. The mediation resulted in an agreement, signed by both parties and their attorneys, which provided that the homeowner would pay the contractor $14,000 and that the parties would release each other from any and all claims. The homeowner paid $11,000, but refused to pay the rest. The contractor sued for the deficiency and filed a motion for summary judgment. The homeowner argued that she did not owe the money because the mediation procedure was unfair and because it did not comply with the requirements of Supreme Court Rule 31. The trial court granted summary judgment to the contractor and ordered the homeowner to pay him $3,000. We affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Joseph Daniel Drew, appeals the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of probation on his 12-year effective sentence for guilty-pleaded convictions of robbery and attempted aggravated robbery. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ladonte Smith, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of one count of first degree murder and two counts of attempted first degree murder stemming from a drive-by shooting that occurred at a market. State v. Ladonte Montez Smith, M1997-00087-CCA-R3- CD, 1999 WL 1210813, at *1-5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Dec. 17, 1999), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Oct. 9, 2000). He received a sentence of life with the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction and seventeen years for each conviction for attempted first degree murder, to run consecutively to the life sentence. Petitioner subsequently filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief, alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court held a hearing on the petition, after which the petition was denied. Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review, we conclude that petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Husband appeals trial court's finding of substantial and material change in circumstances and modification of alimony awarded Wife in the parties' divorce. Finding no error, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Berkeley Park Homeowners Association, Inc., and Southern Traditions Partners, LLC (collectively referred to as "Berkeley Park") filed a motion for contempt against John Tabor and Tabor Construction, Inc. (collectively called "Tabor"), seeking 1 to enforce a 2006 mediated settlement agreement governing the construction of a house being built by Tabor in Southern Traditions' development known as Berkeley Park Subdivision. Berkeley Park alleged that Tabor was in violation of numerous provisions of the mediated agreement, while Tabor contended that the parties had reached another agreement in 2007 that superseded the earlier agreement. Following a bench trial, the court held that there was no superseding agreement and that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed Tabor had violated the provisions of the mediated agreement. The court entered judgment in favor of Berkeley Park, awarding it damages of $34,042.11, including attorney's fees. Tabor appeals. We affirm.

Petitioner, Sarrah Hewlett, appeals the trial court's dismissal of her petition for postconviction relief because it is time-barred. On appeal, Petitioner argues that due process considerations require the tolling of the one-year statute of limitations for filing a postconviction petition. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, the defendant, Hugo Mendez, pled guilty in 2007, to vehicular homicide by intoxication, a Class B felony, and to leaving the scene of an accident causing death, a Class E felony. The agreement provided for sentences of eight years and one year for the respective convictions, to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. Nonetheless, the record indicates that the defendant remained incarcerated in the Shelby County Jail. Approximately two years later, the defendant filed a pro se petition requesting that he be allowed to serve the balance of the sentence on probation. The trial court issued an order summarily denying the petition without conducting a hearing. On appeal, the defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in denying his request for probation and also challenges findings which he alleges were set forth in the order. Following review of the record before us, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Husband appeals the trial court's order under Rule 35 requiring the parties in this divorce action to undergo a mental examination and the court's alleged reliance on that examination. He also appeals the trial court's finding that the home titled solely to husband had transmuted to marital property. We affirm the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jonathan Davis, appeals from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court's summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The habeas corpus court found that the petitioner failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The parties were previously before this Court in an appeal by reason of an easement claim by the plaintiff. This Court ruled that plaintiff had an easement, and we remanded the case to the trial court and defendants filed a motion to determine the extent of the easement. A trial ensued and the trial judge ordered defendants to remove a gate and a fence which impaired plaintiff's use of her easement. On appeal, we affirm the judgment of the trial court, as modified.

The petitioner, Jevon Bryant, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that: counsel was ineffective; the trial court erred in denying his request to wear his wedding ring at trial; the prosecution made improper comments during voir dire; his prior felony should not have been stipulated for admission; his relatives were improperly banned from the courtroom; and his right to the Confrontation Clause was violated. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Terry Byington, was convicted of DUI, fourth offense, and was sentenced to three years in the Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender for this Class E felony, with a minimum of 150 days to be served day for day. On direct appeal, this Court held that he waived all issues presented except for the sentencing issue and a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, because the motion for new trial was not timely filed, and was therefor a nullify. See State v. Terry Lynn Byington, No. E2003-02316-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 1606993, (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville, July 19, 1004) perm. app. denied. (Tenn. Dec. 28, 2004). Subsequently, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief and, pursuant to T.C.A. _ 40-30-113, a delayed appeal was ordered by the post-conviction court. Upon delayed appeal, this Court dismissed the appeal because the order denying the motion for new trial was not in the record. The Supreme Court granted defendant's application for permission to appeal, and subsequently vacated this Court's judgment and remanded the case to this Court "for review of the issues raised by [Defendant] in his motion for new trial." See State v. Byington, 284 S.W.3d 220, 227 (Tenn. 2009). After review of the issues presented, the briefs of the parties, and the entire record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

These consolidates lawsuits involve claims by Linda Smith, Melinda Mischlich, Jennifer Hayles, and Fernando Hayles ("Plaintiffs") surrounding two homes purchased by plaintiffs located in a subdivision developed by Harry Lane or an affiliated limited liability company. The trial court granted rescission of the contracts and awarded plaintiffs their attorney fees. The trial court stated that the amount of attorney fees would be determined at a future hearing. Prior to the hearing on the amount of attorney fees to be awarded, several defendants filed a notice of appeal. We dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

This is a breach of contract case. The trial court entered a final judgment in favor of the plaintiff but did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52.01 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the trial court failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 52.01, we vacate and remand.