APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Plaintiffs' action sought the removal of twelve Knox County office holders who had been appointed by the Knox County Commission in violation of the Open Meetings Act, according to plaintiffs' complaint. Another action, independent of plaintiffs' action, sought removal of the office holders on the grounds that the office holders had been appointed in violation of the Open Meetings Act. Plaintiffs were allowed to intervene in the independent case which, following trial, resulted in a finding that the Commission had violated the Open Meetings Act, and the office holders were removed from office. In this case, the trial court held that since plaintiffs had obtained the results that they sought in their action as a result of their intervention that the continuation of this action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiffs sought and were granted several amendments with their complaint seeking relief on other grounds, but the trial court denied any further relief to plaintiffs' bid. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff buyer of land, concluding that defendant seller was liable for rollback taxes pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated _ 67-5-1008(f). We affirm.

The Petitioner, Arthur L. Armstrong, was convicted in 1978 of robbery, rape, kidnapping, and two counts of crime against nature and was sentenced to two life sentences, a twentyyear term, and two indeterminate terms of not less than ten years nor more than fifteen years, all of which the trial court ordered to be served consecutively. In March 2005, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, in which he alleged newly discovered evidence, and the trial court dismissed the petition after a hearing. On appeal, he contends that the dismissal was an unconstitutional denial of his right to due process. After careful review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Defendant, Gary Lee Hunt, pled guilty to driving under the influence ("DUI"), second offense, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days, forty-five days of which he was ordered to serve in incarceration with the remainder to be served on probation. In accordance with Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37, the defendant reserved as a certified question of law the issue of whether the stop of his vehicle, which led to his indictment and guilty plea, was constitutional. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude that the stop of the defendant's vehicle was constitutional. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The defendant, Walter Jude Dec, pled guilty to 41 counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, as follows: 25 counts of possessing in excess of 100 images of a minor, a Class B felony; one count of possession between 50 and 100 images of a minor, a Class C felony; and 15 counts of possessing less than 50 images, a Class D felony. He was sentenced as a violent offender to twelve years for each of the Class B felonies and as a Range I, standard offender to six years for the Class C felony and four years for each of the Class D felonies, with all sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred in not merging the 41 counts into a single count. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

After the parties' brief marriage, the trial court awarded Wife $25,000.00 for equity allegedly accrued in the marital residence during the marriage. Finding no contributions by Wife to support a transmutation from separate to marital property, we reverse.

The defendant, Elmi Abdulahi Abdi, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to thirty years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the sentence imposed by the trial court. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, E. Louis Thomas, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of felony murder. The convictions were merged, and the appellant received a sentence of life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Husband appeals the trial court's decision that Wife's payment of taxes, insurance and association dues on houses titled jointly were contributions of separate property to the homes which, under a premarital agreement, entitled her to a credit before Husband could recover appreciation on those homes. The agreement provides for the treatment of a party's contributions of separate property to jointly held property, and we share the trial court's interpretation of those provisions. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.

The defendant, Ryan Smith, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to amend the judgment in his statutory rape case to eliminate the requirement that he register as a sex offender, arguing that the trial court misinterpreted Tennessee Code Annotated section 40- 39-202(20)(A)(ii), which defines when a statutory rape conviction triggers sex offender registry requirements. Based on our review, we agree that the trial court misinterpreted the statute and that the defendant's conviction does not require his registration as a sex offender. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order and remand for the court to amend the defendant's judgment to remove the defendant's placement on the sex offender registry.

The petitioner, Damien Tolson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his first degree premeditated murder conviction, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

Defendant, Don Birdwell, was convicted of one count of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of vandalism of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to concurrent sentences of three years, six months for his aggravated assault conviction, and two years, six months, for his vandalism conviction, for an effective sentence of three years, six months. The trial court ordered defendant to serve ninety days in confinement, after which the sentence was suspended and defendant placed on probation. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of aggravated assault and vandalism; (2) the trial court impermissibly commented on the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying defendant's request for full probation. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Vicky Benson (“Employee”) developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome in 2002, as a result of her work for New Gray Cemetery (“Employer”). Her claim was accepted. She had surgery on her right arm in 2004 and returned to work. After her return, she was terminated for reasons not related to her injury. She continued to receive conservative medical treatment from time to time. She found new employment in 2006. In September 2007, her treating physician recommended surgery for her left arm. Employer denied the claim, contending that her subsequent employer was liable for the condition and its effects. The trial court ruled that Employee’s condition had been worsened by her later employment, and dismissed the claim. On appeal, Employee contends that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. We affirm the judgment.

In June of 2008, Kelly D. McAlister ("Wife") filed a Petition to Enforce Final Decree against Robert A. McAlister ("Husband") seeking, among other things, to enforce the parties' final decree of divorce entered in June of 2000. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order on November 2, 2009 finding and holding, inter alia, that the house at issue shall be sold and the net proceeds divided by the percentages stated in the divorce decree, and that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce using a fraction with the denominator being the number of months worked by Husband when he retires and the numerator being the number of months of the seventeen year marriage with Wife to receive one- half of the calculated amount. Wife appeals to this Court. We affirm as to the division of the house, reverse as to the calculation of the pension based upon Husband's salary at the time of divorce, and order that Wife's share of Husband's pension shall be calculated upon the amount of the pension at the time Husband retires based upon the formula stated in the divorce decree.

On April 10, 2000, William D. Chapman, II ("the Deceased") was involved in a motor vehicle accident. As a result of his injuries, he was admitted to Holston Valley Hospital and Medical Center in Kingsport where he came under the care of trauma surgeons, the defendants, James V. Lewis, M.D., and George M. Testerman, Jr., M.D., as well as other physicians and medical personnel. The plaintiff, Cathy L. Chapman, brought this wrongful death action against the defendants based upon her allegation that they were guilty of medical malpractice in the treatment of her husband; she claims that their malpractice caused the death of the Deceased on April 15, 2000. Following eight days of a jury trial in July 2008, counsel for the parties made their closing arguments. During the defense's argument, counsel for the plaintiff objected when counsel for Dr. Testerman projected on a video screen what purported to be the Q. and A. trial testimony of the plaintiff's medical expert, Dr. Philip Witorsch. The trial court overruled the objection and thereafter the jury returned a verdict in favor of both defendants. Later, the trial court, acting on the plaintiff's motion, reversed itself and held that the defendants failed to lay a proper foundation for the use of the projected testimony. The court also pointed out that the defendants failed to give the plaintiff prior notice of their intention to use portions of the trial transcript in closing argument. As a consequence, the court granted the plaintiff a new trial. The defendants appeal. We reverse the trial court's grant of a new trial and reinstate the court's judgment in favor of the defendants.

The Petitioner, Barry Brown, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his convictions of three counts of aggravated robbery on the basis of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief based upon its finding that the petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to suppress his statement, in preparing for trial, and in failing to present any mitigating evidence at his sentencing hearing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Employee sued her employer under the Tennessee Human Rights Act, alleging that she was denied a promotion because of her race. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer. We reverse the summary dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

The Defendant, Michael Maples, was convicted by a Hamblen County Criminal Court jury of one count of facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years and six years, respectively, to be served concurrently in the custody of the Department of Correction. In this appeal as of right, he argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based upon the State's failure to provide exculpatory evidence pretrial. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2008, Lena Michelle Silvey Rolen ("Mother") sued Charles Martin Wilson ("Father") alleging, in part, that Father had failed to pay child support as ordered. Father responded and filed a counter-claim seeking custody. After a trial, the trial court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that Father was in contempt for willful failure to pay child support as ordered, and that no material change in circumstances had occurred to justify a change in custody. Mother was awarded a judgment against Father for the child support arrearage, among other things. Father appeals to this Court. Because the record on appeal contains no transcript and no Tenn. R. App. P. 24(c) statement of the evidence, we affirm.

The Defendant, Jonathan Louis Barnett, was convicted of statutory rape, a Class E felony; coercion of a witness, a Class D felony; and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to violating the sexual offender registry laws, a Class E felony, in exchange for concurrent sentencing on all of his convictions. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years for each of the Class E felonies and four years for the Class D felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a sentence imposed in an unrelated case. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of statutory rape, coercion of a witness, and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction of coercion of a witness. We affirm the judgments of the trial court relating to the defendant's other convictions.

This appeal involves a father's child support and alimony arrearages. The trial court found the father in contempt and sentenced him to ten days in jail, with three days suspended. The court also awarded interest on the alimony and child support arrearages. We affirm in part and reverse and vacate in part.

The Petitioner, Steven Dousay, pled guilty in Williamson County to theft over $10,000, and the trial court sentenced him to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. He filed a petition in the Williamson County Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, which the habeas corpus court dismissed. The petitioner appeals, and, after a review of the record in this case, we conclude the habeas court properly dismissed the petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we affirm its judgment.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Wendy Blair (“Employee”) sustained injuries as a result of a fall which occurred in the course of her work as a sales agent for Wyndham Vacation Ownership (“Employer”). The trial court found that she suffered permanent injuries to her neck and lower back due to the fall and that she had not made a meaningful return to work. The trial court awarded Employee 78% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) benefits to the body as a whole. Employer has appealed from that judgment. We conclude that the trial court erred in its finding that Employee did not have a meaningful return towork. Consequently, we modify the judgment to award 19.5% PPD to the body as a whole.

The father has appealed from the trial court's order naming the mother as the primary residential parent and allowing her to move to Indiana with the parties' minor child. Because the trial court's order does not resolve all the claims between the parties, we dismiss the appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Petitioner, Brandyce Lusby, appeals as of right from the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of her petition for post-conviction relief challenging her guilty plea convictions for second degree murder, attempted especially aggravated robbery, and tampering with evidence for which she received an effective sentence of forty years. The petitioner challenged the performance of trial counsel and the voluntariness of her guilty plea. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.