APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The appellant, Karim El-Amin, pled guilty in the Washington County Criminal Court to two counts of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value more than five hundred dollars but less than one thousand dollars, a Class E felony, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card involving a value equal to or less than five hundred dollars, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the appellant was to receive an effective four-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his request of alternative sentencing. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Joseph Brown, appeals as of right from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his guilty plea to one count of facilitation of first degree murder and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping. The Petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered into. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The sellers of a mobile home park appeal the trial court’s decision to rescind two real estate sales contracts and refund the purchasers their down payment. The purchasers asserted claims for fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud in the inducement, and breach of fiduciary duty, all of which arose from alleged misrepresentations by the sellers regarding the condition and income potential of the property at issue. Following a lengthy and convoluted procedural history, including a jury trial, the granting of a new trial, and several waves of amended pleadings, the parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The sellers asserted various defenses including, inter alia, that the purchasers’ claims were time barred. Finding that the sellers fraudulently induced the purchasers into buying the property, and that the statute of limitations had been tolled due to the sellers’ concealment of material facts, the trial court denied the sellers’ motion, granted summary judgment to the purchasers. For relief, the trial court rescinded the sales contracts and awarded the purchasers a refund of their down payments. We affirm.

Employee sustained a compensable injury to her lower back. Employer initially provided medical treatment, but Employer’s insurer subsequently declined to provide additional medical treatment. Employee sought treatment on her own. Her treating physician found that she retained a 15% permanent impairment as a result of her injury. An examining physician for Employer opined that she had no impairment. A physician was selected through the Medical Impairment Registry (“MIR”) process. That physician also stated that Employee had no permanent impairment. The trial court found that Employee rebutted the presumption of correctness of the MIR physician’s rating by clear and convincing evidence pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-204(d)(5) and awarded 20% permanent partial disability. Both sides appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jason Lee White, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing his “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.” The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of  Criminal Appeals. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Jonathan Londono, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, facilitation of felony murder, facilitation of especially aggravated robbery and facilitation of aggravated robbery. He was sentenced to an effective sentence of forty-nine years. Appellant was resentenced after an unsuccessful appeal to this Court, an unsuccessful appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court, a remand from the United States Supreme Court to the Tennessee Supreme Court, and a remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court to the trial court for resentencing. As a result, Appellant’s sentence was enhanced based upon one enhancing factor, that he had a previous history of criminal convictions and criminal behavior. The trial court sentenced Appellant to an effective sentence of forty-nine years. Appellant appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred in basing the application of the enhancing factor on convictions that occurred in the time between the commission of the offenses in question and the imposition of his sentence for the offenses in question. We determine that based upon prior case law in this State the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Arlie Ray Thomas, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to challenge the affidavits supporting the arrest and search warrants, and that counsel failed to properly interview a witness. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to show that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Amado Rubio Tavera, has filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the Davidson County Criminal Court’s order denying his motion to expunge. The indictment charged Tavera with one count of vehicular assault and one count of aggravated assault. For the charge of vehicular assault, Tavera pled guilty to the lesser included offense of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State entered a nolle prosequi for the charge of aggravated assault. Tavera subsequently filed a motion to expunge the charge of aggravated assault from all public records. He now appeals the denial of this motion. Upon review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Fallon Lynn Tallent, was convicted in Wilson County of two counts of premeditated murder and sentenced to two, consecutive life terms. The convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, and the supreme court denied permission to appeal. State v. Fallon L. Tallent, No. M2005-00183-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 47090 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Jan. 10, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. May 1, 2006). Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. It was denied without a hearing. Petitioner appealed to this Court. On appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the post-conviction court and remanded the case for appointment of counsel. Fallon Lynn Tallent v. State, No. M2007-01336-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 762486, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Mar. 24, 2008). On remand, counsel was appointed, and an amended petition for post-conviction relief was filed. After a hearing on the petition, the post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition. Petitioner has appealed the denial of post-conviction relief. After  a thorough review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to show that she received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Defendant, Ashley Mai Cook, was convicted of conspiracy to commit first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony, and first degree premeditated murder. She received consecutive sentences of twenty years as a Range I offender for conspiracy to commit first degree murder and life imprisonment for first degree murder. On appeal, she contends that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions; that the trial court erred in denying her motion for expert services; that the trial court erred in not charging the jury that Megan Jones was an accomplice; and that her sentence was excessive. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the  judgments of the trial court.

This matter is before the court for a second time. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County initiated suit to compel two developers to complete an unfinished portion of a road in a planned unit development or to recover damages equal to the cost of completing the road if it completed the road itself. The trial court dismissed the action, finding that the amended complaint did not provide a legal basis for requiring either developer to complete the road. On appeal this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for the court to consider the appropriate allocation of responsibility for construction of the road between the two developers. While the appeal was pending, the Metropolitan Government acquired the land and subsequently completed the unfinished portion of the road. On remand, the trial court assessed costs of constructing the road to the developers equally, but assessed the land-acquisition costs entirely to one developer. The Metropolitan Government appeals. Finding no error in the trial court’s allocation of responsibility, we affirm.

The Sequatchie County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, John Anthony Partin, for one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and one count of violation of the implied consent law. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence collected as a result of his interaction with the law enforcement officer. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Subsequently, Appellant pled guilty to one count of DUI, first offense and reserved a certified question of law for appeal to this Court. After a review of the record on appeal, we conclude that Appellant did not properly reserve his certified question. Therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal, and the appeal is dismissed.

Plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from defendant developer, but the purchase contract required plaintiffs to use defendant construction company to build their home. Before the home was completed, defendant construction company defaulted on paying materialmen and suppliers and abandoned the project. Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that developer knew, or should have know, that the construction company was incapable of performing the required construction services, and that the developer owed plaintiff a fiduciary duty to provide a contractor who could perform the work in a good, workmanlike manner. They further alleged a breach of contract, in violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. A default judgment was entered against the construction company, and the developer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which the Trial Court ultimately granted against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This appeal involves child support in a Title IV-D proceeding. In the parents’ divorce trial, the father was not present, so income was imputed to him, and he was ordered to pay child support. In post-divorce proceedings, the State filed contempt petitions on behalf of the mother, alleging that the father was in arrears on his child support obligation. Orders were entered holding the father in contempt and ordering payments on the arrearage. The father filed a motion for modification of his child support obligation, asserting that his income was substantially less than the amount imputed to him, and that he had an additional minor dependent for whom he was required to pay child support. The trial judge denied the father’s motion to modify his child support and sentenced him to jail for contempt. The father appeals the criminal contempt conviction and asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to modify his child support obligation. We vacate the criminal contempt finding and reverse the denial of the father’s motion to reduce his child support obligation.

The trial court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss in a medical malpractice action initially filed prior to the effective date of the notice and certificate of good faith provisions subsequently codified at Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-26-121 and 29-26-122, and nonsuited and re-commenced after the effective date of the provisions despite Plaintiff’s failure to fulfill the statutory requisites. We granted permission to appeal pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We reverse and remand for dismissal.

The Petitioner, Conal Decker, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis or writ of habeas corpus challenging judgments in cases from 1994 and 1998 which were used to enhance the federal sentence he is currently serving. He claims in the cases he is challenging that he was never provided counsel or that his waiver of counsel was improper. The coram nobis court dismissed the petition. The State filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the coram nobis court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. After review, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed. Accordingly, the State’s motion is granted and the judgment of the coram nobis court is affirmed.

Aggrieved of his convictions of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the petitioner, Charles Lamb, filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. In this appeal, he challenges the denial of his bid for post-conviction relief. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner Andrew Thomas appeals as of right the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying his petition for post-conviction relief. A Shelby County jury found Petitioner guilty of felony murder based on the killing of James Day during an attempt to perpetrate a robbery. The jury found that Petitioner had previously been convicted of one or more felonies for which the statutory elements involved the use of violence to the person. See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2). The jury further found that this aggravating circumstance outweighed mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury then sentenced Petitioner to death. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the Tennessee Supreme Court. See State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361 (Tenn. 2005). On January 3, 2006, Petitioner filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On November 13, 2006, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis and an amended petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing in October 2007. On August 4, 2008, the post-conviction court entered an order denying Petitioner postconviction relief. On appeal to this Court, Petitioner presents a number of claims that can be characterized in the following categories: (1) Petitioner’s trial counsel were ineffective; (2) Petitioner’s appellate counsel were ineffective; (3) Petitioner is entitled to a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; and (4) Tennessee’s death penalty statutory scheme is unconstitutional. Following a thorough and exhaustive review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Monroe County jury convicted Petitioner of second degree murder. State v. Darrell Fritts, No. 132, 1992 WL 236152, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Sept. 25, 1992), perm. app. dismissed, (Tenn. Feb. 1, 1993). Petitioner was unsuccessful on appeal. Id. at *10. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief that was denied. Darrell Fritts v. State, No. 03C01-9803-CR-00116, 1999 WL 604430, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Aug. 12, 1999). On appeal, this Court upheld the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed two petitions for writ of habeas corpus relief in the Monroe County Court. The first writ was dismissed because it was filed in Monroe County as opposed to the Johnson County Court which is the closest court in distance. With regard to the second writ, the State filed a motion to dismiss based upon the fact that the issues had already been determined by this Court on appeal from the denial of the post-conviction petition and that ineffective assistance of counsel at trial is not a cognizable issue for habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court granted the motion. Petitioner appeals the dismissal of both writs. The appeals have been consolidated in this Court. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the dismissal of the writs was correct. Therefore, we affirm the dismissals by the habeas corpus court.

The Defendant, Jeremy Stephen Parks, pled guilty to sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class D felony. See T.C.A. § 39-17-1003 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to four years’ confinement, with six months to be served in the Blount County Jail and the remainder to be served on supervised probation with multiple special conditions. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred during sentencing by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) imposing the maximum sentence in the range and ordering confinement, and (3) imposing unreasonable terms of probation. We affirm the conviction and the length of the Defendant’s sentence, but we modify the special conditions of probation.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Michael W. Poe, was convicted of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202, -15-402(b). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to consecutive terms of life in prison for his first degree felony murder conviction and twenty-five years as a violent offender for his aggravated child abuse conviction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial after one juror made a comment to another juror about the trial; (3) the trial court erred in failing to ask the other jurors whether they heard the comment at issue; (4) the trial court erred when it failed to remove or disable the televisions and radios from the jurors’ motel rooms; (5) the trial court erred when it applied two inapplicable enhancement factors and failed to consider one mitigating factor; (6) the trial court erred when it imposed consecutive sentences; (7) the trial court did not award the proper amount of jail credit; and (8) the trial court erred when it failed to dismiss the indictment. After our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an interlocutory appeal from a class certification. The named plaintiffs, former owners of preferred stock in Equity Inns, Inc., filed a class action against the company’s former directors. Their amended complaint asserted breaches of the fiduciary duties allegedly owed to the preferred shareholders during the negotiation and approval of a merger. The trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification with respect to “[a]ll holders of Equity Inns preferred stock as of June 21, 2007.” We vacate and remand for further consideration.

This appeal involves a failed real estate transaction. Real estate brokers and Raymond Morrow (“Seller”) entered into an agreement to show an unlisted property. Seller did not own the property, but he claimed to have the property under contract with the owner. After the brokers showed the property to Morgan Development and Del Morgan (“Buyers”), Buyers and Seller entered into an agreement for the sale of the property. The transaction was never completed because Seller could not deliver marketable title. Buyers initiated a lawsuit against the brokers along with Seller and the owners of the property, alleging negligent business representation and fraud. The brokers moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment and dismissed Buyers’ suit against the brokers because the purchase agreement included a disclaimer. Buyers appeal. We affirm.

Citing decreased income, Husband filed a petition to modify alimony and child support, and Wife filed a contempt petition against Husband. The trial court reduced both Husband’s alimony and child support obligations, it refused to hold Husband in contempt, and it declined to award Wife her attorney fees and court costs. We reverse the trial court’s modification of Husband’s alimony obligation and we reinstate the provisions of the Consent Order with regard to alimony; we affirm the trial court’s finding of a significant variance, but we remand for a modification of Husband’s child support obligation consistent with this opinion; we affirm the trial court’s finding regarding contempt; we award Wife her reasonable attorney fees and court costs expended in defending Husband’s petition to modify and in filing her petition for contempt, and we remand for a determination of such fees; and finally, we decline to award attorney fees on appeal.

The trial court awarded Defendant summary judgment on the basis that Defendant had negated the element of damages in this personal injury action. We reverse and remand for further  proceedings.