APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Jonathan Louis Barnett, was convicted of statutory rape, a Class E felony; coercion of a witness, a Class D felony; and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class E felony. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the defendant pled guilty to violating the sexual offender registry laws, a Class E felony, in exchange for concurrent sentencing on all of his convictions. The trial court sentenced the defendant to two years for each of the Class E felonies and four years for the Class D felony. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently with one another but consecutively to a sentence imposed in an unrelated case. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of statutory rape, coercion of a witness, and attempted sexual exploitation of a minor. Following our review, we reverse and dismiss the defendant's conviction of coercion of a witness. We affirm the judgments of the trial court relating to the defendant's other convictions.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged a compensable injury to his right shoulder and a compensable mental injury. His employer denied that the alleged mental injury was compensable. The trial court found both injuries to be compensable and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. On appeal, the employer contends that the trial court erred by awarding benefits for the mental injury and by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. The employee contends that the trial court erred by accepting the impairment rating of the Medical Impairment Rating Registry physician and in the trial court’s application of the concurrent injury rule. We conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee sustained a compensable mental injury and modify the judgment accordingly.

In April 2004, Appellant, David L. Baker, pled guilty in Jackson County to one count of aggravated assault. Pursuant to the plea agreement, appellant was ordered to serve four years on probation. Appellant's probation officer filed a probation violation warrant alleging that appellant had violated Rules 1 and 4 of the probation order. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked appellant's probation based upon a violation of Rule 10 of the probation order. Appellant appealed to this Court arguing that his right to due process had been violated because he did not receive sufficient notice of the Rule 10 violation to support the revocation of his probation. We have reviewed the record on appeal and must agree with appellant. The trial court based the revocation upon a violation which was not alleged in the probation violation warrant and appellant had neither written nor actual notice of the allegation of this violation. Therefore, we reverse the revocation of appellant's probation and remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

The petitioner, Jimmy Gray, stands convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and is serving a sentence of eighty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On September 14, 2009, the petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition as filed outside the statute of limitations. On appeal, the petitioner claims that (1) due process requires tolling of the statute of limitations; (2) he filed his petition within one year of discovering new evidence; and (3) the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record on appeal, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Norman Eugene Banks, was indicted for initiation of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class B felony, in count one of the indictment, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor, in count two. Following a bench trial, the trial court as trier of fact found defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of attempt to initiate of a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine, a Class C felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court sentenced defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to eight years for his Class C felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor conviction, to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of eight years. On appeal, defendant argues that (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment based on his assertion that the language in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-435 is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the statutory presumption created in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-435 is unconstitutional; (3) the offense of attempt to initiate a process intended to result in the manufacture of methamphetamine is not a recognizable offense in Tennessee; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to support defendant's conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, James Edgar Leverette, stands convicted of theft of property over $500, a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced him as a career offender to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the value of the property was under $500. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Stoneybrook Golf Course, LLC, purchased approximately 190 acres of land ("the Property")_ on part of which was located a golf course _ with plans to develop the vacant land surrounding the course. Before purchasing the property, Stoneybrook met with the mayor and other officials of the City of Columbia and received their verbal assurances of strong support for the annexation of the 190 acres into the City and the re-zoning of the area to permit the building of condominiums. After Stoneybrook purchased the property, the city council of Columbia refused to go forward with the annexation and re-zoning until a comprehensive land use plan could be completed against which to evaluate the proposed rezoning. Stoneybrook filed this action against the City, claiming, in essence, that the City's refusal to act promptly in accord with the verbal "commitment" constitutes an unconstitutional moratorium and, alternatively, that the City is estopped from refusing to rezone the property. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the pleadings. Stoneybrook appeals. We affirm.

The defendant, David Nelson McCoy, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and received a negotiated sentence of ten years, as a Range I standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of a sentence of continuous confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

At a bench trial, the court permitted the Williams to take a non-suit as to the estate of Mr. Hollingsworth.The trial court found Laurel Valley in violation of the court's orders and awarded the Williams damages of $194,915.60. Laurel Valley appeals. We affirm.

As a result of a guilty plea, the Robertson County Circuit Court, sentenced Appellant, Taj O'Chancey Young, to an effective sentence of four years. The sentence was ordered to be served on community corrections. Appellant was placed under the supervision of a case officer on March 20, 2009. On June 29, 2009, the case officer filed a violation warrant. A second amended violation warrant was filed on August 28, 2009, asserting additional grounds. After a hearing on the warrants, the trial court revoked Appellant's community corrections sentence and ordered Appellant to serve the remainder of his sentence in incarceration. Appellant has appealed the revocation of his community corrections sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the community corrections sentence. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the trial court.

After a bench trial, the court found that, in September 2005, the principals "settled up" their affairs and that thereafter Leedy wrongfully took an excess of $131,489.99, for which the court gave the Agency a judgment. The court declined to award the Agency approximately $70,000 that it claimed Leedy had taken before September 2005 in excess of what he had earned. Leedy appeals, challenging the trial court's denial of a continuance, among other things, including the award to the Agency. Jones and the Agency challenge the trial court's refusal to award judgment against Leedy for the monies taken before September 2005. We affirm.

Appellant William Robert Wilson, was arrested for driving under the influence ("DUI") after being observed driving erratically by a deputy with the Putnam County Sheriff's Office. The Putnam County Grand Jury indicted appellant for one count of DUI; one count of DUI, third offense; one count of driving on a revoked license; and one count of violation of the implied consent law. Following a jury trial and his waiver of proof regarding DUI, third offense, appellant was convicted of DUI and driving on a revoked license and entered a plea to DUI, third offense. The trial court sentenced appellant to eleven months and 1 twenty-nine days for DUI, third offense and five months and twenty-nine days for driving on a revoked license. These sentences were ordered to be served concurrently with service of 130 days in confinement and the remainder in a community-based alternative program. Appellant appeals arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for DUI; (2) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to dismiss his case because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop; (3) the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for continuance; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appellant's request for a jury instruction on the State's duty to preserve evidence. We have reviewed the record on appeal and have found no basis for reversal. Therefore, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Orlando Knox, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner entered best interest pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of burglary, a Class B felony; two counts of vandalism, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of theft, a Class A misdemeanor. The agreement prescribed an eight-year sentence, which was to be suspended following service of six months. On appeal, the petitioner contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he contends that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to adequately investigate the case and prepare for trial. Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The defendant, Jeffrey Lee Arnold, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, but reserved a certified question for appeal. The question presented is whether law enforcement officers who entered the defendant's house and discovered the marijuana forming the basis for the charge in this cause, had the right to enter under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the marijuana was lawfully seized from the defendant, and we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The defendant, Tarrence Parham, stands convicted of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II multiple offender to an effective sentence of twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges (1) the trial court's admission of his prior conviction of reckless homicide for impeachment purposes and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence. Following our review of the parties' briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as modified to reflect that the defendant's conviction for reckless aggravated assault is merged into his conviction for attempted second degree murder.

In this divorce case, the trial court granted the parties a divorce on stipulated grounds and, pursuant to their agreement, divided the bulk of their property. The parties litigated the issue of how the proceeds from the sale of a piece of improved real estate should be distributed. Following a hearing, at which each of the parties testified, the court awarded Delmer Coleman Wyatt ("Husband") $6,500, the stipulated pre-marital value of the unimproved lot, based upon Husband's ownership of the lot before the parties' marriage. It then divided the remaining net proceeds from the sale of the improved property, i.e., $111,376.37, equally between Husband and his wife, Barbara Ann Wyatt ("Wife"). Husband appeals. We affirm.

This is an action to enforce a Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions for a subdivision. The trial court found the defendant homeowners erected a fence without having obtained proper approval from the Architectural Control Committee, that the fence was in violation of restrictive covenants, and that the fence must be removed. We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's findings that defendants failed to obtain the necessary approval to construct the fence and that the fence is in violation of restrictive covenants; thus, we affirm.

The defendant, Jennifer LeeAnn Nowlin, pled guilty to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated burglary, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range II multiple offender to eight years for aggravated burglary concurrent with six years for the conspiracy charge, to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that her sentence is excessive. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur in the result, but I respectfully disagree with the conclusion that the petitioner is presumed to have the same knowledge as his attorney regarding the photograph and the timing of its discovery. I do not believe that such a presumption applies to all facts that an attorney uncovers during representation.

Plaintiff brought this action, charging defendant utility breached its contract with plaintiff to construct a line and deliver electricity to his property. Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the trial judge held that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties and defendant was not obligated to construct a line to deliver electricity to plaintiff's dwelling. On appeal, we affirm.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Tracy Thomas Hepburn, was convicted of twenty-four counts of burglary, a Class D felony, three counts of attempted burglary, a Class E felony, fourteen counts of misdemeanor vandalism, six counts of vandalism, a Class E felony, two counts of vandalism, a Class D felony, ten counts of misdemeanor theft, one count of theft, a Class E felony, and two counts of theft, a Class D felony, in case nos. 02-0844, 02-0875, 02-0876, 02-0888, and 02-0291. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to ten years for each Class D felony conviction, five years for each Class E felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for each Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court imposed a combination of concurrent and consecutive sentencing for an effective sentence of one hundred years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Duane Michael Coleman, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is a medical malpractice case. The jury returned a verdict, finding that the Appellee/Doctor deviated from the standard of care, but that his deviation was not the legal cause of the injury. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict, erred in ruling on her objections to Appellee's experts and the impeachment of her experts, that she was prejudiced by the language used on the verdict form, and that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Appellee to make a powerpoint presentation during opening statements and closing arguments. Finding no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the termination of parental rights with regard to a child, Nathan T., who came into protective custody of the Department of Children's Services ("DCS") on November 7, 2006. DCS initiated a proceeding to secure temporary custody of Nathan following receipt of a referral that he had been left by his mother, Megan T., ("Mother") with two elderly women in a house with no heat and where the women were using drugs; This Court has a policy of protecting the identity of children in parental termination cases by initializing their last name. could not be found.2 By order entered January 24, 2007, Nathan was adjudicated dependent and neglected and custody awarded to DCS; he was subsequently placed in a foster home, where he has remained throughout these proceedings.