APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, James Earl McGriggs, was convicted of aggravated rape, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and aggravated robbery and was sentenced, respectively, to twenty-five years, ten years, three years, and eight years. The trial court ordered that the aggravated rape sentence be served consecutively to the aggravated kidnapping sentence, with all other to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions. Following our review, we affirm  the judgments.

The employee filed a workers' compensation complaint against his employer for hearing loss and tinnitus, injuries which he claimed had occurred gradually over his nearly four years of working as a truck driver. Shortly before trial, the employee voluntarily dismissed his tinnitus claim but proceeded with his hearing loss claim. The trial court awarded the employee compensation for permanent partial hearing loss and the Employer appealed. Upon referral, the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, sitting in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3), affirms.

A Sullivan County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Donald Edward Lynch, of two counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and six counts of rape of a child. He challenges his convictions, arguing that the video recording used in his conviction was discovered through an illegal search and seizure. He also challenges the legal sufficiency of the convicting evidence. We discern error in the judgments for Counts eight through 10 of rape of a child and remand for correction of clerical error. In all other respects, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a personal injury suit arising out of an automobile accident. Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s dismissal of her punitive damages claim, as well as its exclusion of evidence regarding Defendant’s underage consumption of alcohol prior to the accident and leaving the scene of the accident. Because Plaintiff has failed to show a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Defendant’s intoxication, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s punitive damages claim. Because liability has been stipulated in this matter, and the punitive damages claim properly dismissed, we find Defendant’s underage consumption of alcohol and leaving the scene of the accident irrelevant. Thus, we affirm the exclusion of such evidence.

This case involves the validity of transfers of property and money from a mother to her daughter and son-in-law. The trial court determined that there was a confidential relationship between the mother and her daughter and that the defendants failed to overcome the presumption of undue influence. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

Defendant landowners appeal the trial court’s judgment finding that they had dedicated a roadway to public use by implication, and ordering the parties to widen the roadway and move utility lines. We dismiss for lack of a final judgment.

The petitioner, George Hampton, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate and prepare the case for trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

We accepted the following question of law certified by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee: Does Tennessee law recognize an exception to the economic loss doctrine under which recovery in tort is possible for damage to the defective product itself when the defect renders the product unreasonably dangerous and causes the damage by means of a sudden, calamitous event? We answer this question in the negative.

The petitioner, Joe Tyree, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner submitted a guilty plea to one count of violation of the sex offender registry. On appeal, he contends that: defense counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel; his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered; and the post-conviction court failed to comply with the statute that requires the court to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to each issue. After careful review, we conclude no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Wadie Holifield, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief by the Tipton County Circuit Court. The petitioner was convicted of one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to eighteen years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he raises the single issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to: 1) investigate his mental health and his claim of impotence as possible defenses; 2) ensure an untainted jury by requesting “the Rule” prior to voir dire; 3) effectively preclude introduction or properly cross-examine a witness following testimony about the petitioner’s prior drug habit; and 4) effectively advise the petitioner. As an initial argument, the State contends that the petitioner has waived review based upon an untimely notice of appeal. We agree that the notice was not timely filed, but, in the interest of justice, we elect to review the petitioner’s issue. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the denial of relief.

Petitioner sought to withdraw a waiver he had signed as a prisoner. On a summary judgment motion by defendants, the Trial Court held that if the waiver was withdrawn, petitioner would serve more time and granted the motion. On appeal, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant physician in this medical malpractice action. We dismiss the appeal for failure to appeal a final judgment.

The defendant, Marktrail Lee, was convicted of aggravated child abuse and aggravated child abuse by neglect. The trial court merged the two convictions and sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to twenty-three years at 100 percent. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Lamar Ross, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as it relates to the petitioner’s convictions on two counts of aggravated rape, which were merged into a single judgment of conviction by the trial court and modified on direct appeal. On appeal from the judgment of the post-conviction court, the petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective and that he was thereby prejudiced. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the circumstances under which the identity of a confidential informant must be disclosed pre-trial to a criminal defendant. Defendants Brandon Keith Ostein and Teresa Gale Foxx were arrested and charged with drug offenses after police officers executed a search warrant at Foxx’s apartment. The affidavit in support of the search warrant referred to information provided by a confidential informant. Ostein and Foxx filed  motions for disclosure of the informant’s identity. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the confidential informant was a material witness and ordered disclosure. The State sought and obtained an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court. Ostein and Foxx sought permission to appeal, which we granted. Upon our close review of the limited record before us, we hold that Ostein and Foxx have failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the confidential informant is a material witness or otherwise important to their defense. The trial court ordered disclosure based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, resulting in reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Darnell Hubbard, of the first-degree premeditated murder of his wife, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior acts of violence against the victim. He also challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence relating to an ex parte order of protection that the victim obtained against him and other statements the victim made to her son and police. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements from the victim in violation of the appellant’s confrontation rights. However, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the appellant’s guilt, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s conviction.

 This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work for Employer. Employer denied the claim. At trial, an evaluating physician opined that the condition was work-related but admitted that he had no specific knowledge of the tasks performed by Employee in the course of his job. Employer sought to exclude the testimony of the physician, contending that it was based upon speculation. The trial court admitted the testimony, found the condition to be compensable, and awarded benefits. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by admitting the physician’s testimony, that the evidence preponderates against the judgment, and by not applying the missing witness rule as to the treating physician, who did not testify. Further, Liberty Mutual contends that there is no evidence in the record that it was Employer’s insurer at the time of this injury. We dismiss the complaint against Liberty Mutual and otherwise affirm the judgment.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained a hernia in the course of and arising from his employment. Employer denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of Employer. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. Because Employee has not filed a transcript or statement of the evidence, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding and affirm the judgment.

The Petitioner, Robert Cummins, appeals the denial of habeas corpus relief by the Circuit Court for Bledsoe County. The Petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder, a Class A felony, and received a thirty-year sentence as a Range II, multiple offender to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in dismissing the petition. He claims that an illegal sentence is a proper ground to allege in a habeas corpus petition, that his guilty plea was unknowingly and involuntarily entered, that his sentence is illegal because it does not conform to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-35-112(a)(1) (2006) and 40-35-501(i)(1), (2)(B) (2006), and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel should have known the sentence was illegal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Derrick Futch, was convicted of two counts of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery, Class D felonies, and one count of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery, a Class E felony. The defendant was sentenced to three years for each conviction of obtaining a controlled substance by forgery and two years for his conviction of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by forgery. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in consolidating the three offenses for trial; (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing the state to impeach the defendant’s testimony with evidence of a prior conviction; (3) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; and (4) whether the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors violated due process and the defendant’s right to a fair jury trial. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Andrew Campbell, pled guilty in eight cases, which were consolidated for this appeal, to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; five counts of theft under $1000, a Class D felony; ten counts of automobile burglary, a Class E felony; and fourteen counts of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting the length and alignment of his sentences. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. As such, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a compensable work-related injury and that Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was not barred by the oneyear statute of limitations. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to dismiss the counterclaim filed against the plaintiff. Prior to the trial of the case, the plaintiff filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions contending the filing of defendant’s counterclaim violated Rule 11. Thereafter, the case went to trial on the plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s counterclaim. At the close of the proof, the defendant voluntarily dismissed its counterclaims. After the trial was concluded, the trial court held that the defendant and its attorneys violated Rule 11 because the evidence presented at trial revealed that the counterclaim had no basis in fact or law and they failed to dismiss the counterclaim when the motion for sanctions was filed. We have determined the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by evaluating the issue with the wisdom of hindsight instead of examining the circumstances existing at the time the counterclaim was signed by the attorneys, and for imposing sanctions for failing to voluntarily dismiss the counterclaim, because Rule 11 does not impose a duty to review or reevaluate a pleading once filed or to take affirmative steps thereafter to dismiss a previously filed pleading. Therefore, we reverse the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.

The Petitioner, David Wayne Smart, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition alleged that the trial court unconstitutionally merged the provision requiring a minimum life sentence for first degree murder and the provision prohibiting instructions on possible penalties to the jury. The Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Luther Mowery, was convicted of failure to obey a traffic signal and ordered to pay court costs. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, a claim with which the State agrees. Following our review, we, likewise, agree and, accordingly, reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.