APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, James Paris Johnson, appeals his convictions by a jury in the Campbell County Criminal Court for aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and public intoxication, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in prison for the aggravated assault and to thirty days' incarceration for the public intoxication, to be served concurrently. The Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated assault, (2) the trial court erred by sentencing him as a Range III, persistent offender; and (3) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We hold that the trial court erred by sentencing the Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender. We affirm the Defendant's convictions, but we remand the case for resentencing for the aggravated assault conviction.

Cecilia and Charles Owensby had a homeowners insurance policy issued by State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm"). After their house burned down, the Owensbys filed a claim pursuant to the policy. State Farm eventually denied the claim, asserting that Cecilia Owensby had made four material misrepresentations when applying for the insurance and that each of these misrepresentations increased State Farm's risk of loss. The plaintiffs asserted that any inaccurate information contained on the application was the fault of the insurance agent who filled out the application on Cecilia Owensby's behalf. The plaintiffs sued both State Farm and Darius Miller ("Miller"), the insurance agent. State Farm and Miller filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Trial Court granted. The plaintiffs appeal the grant of summary judgment. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court and, as modified, affirm the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.

A Lincoln County jury convicted the Petitioner, Tony E.Cannon, Jr., of attempted second degree murder, aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment, and the trial court imposed an effective sentence of twelve years. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner's convictions and sentence. State v. Tony E. Cannon, Jr., No. M2007-00557- CCA-R3-CD, 2008 WL 2448341, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, June 18, 2008), no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner contends the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issues on appeal pertain to a nonconforming, grandfathered billboard that was destroyed by a natural disaster in 1998. The original billboard, which was erected prior to the enactment of the Billboard Regulation and Control Act, Tenn. Code Ann. _ 54-21-101, et seq., was allowed to remain as a nonconforming, grandfathered device. After the nonconforming billboard was destroyed by a natural disaster, TDOT authorized Appellants to rebuild the billboard provided that it was rebuilt to the original size "using like materials" pursuant to Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 1680-2-3-.04(2) (1998). The original billboard stood on two wooden posts and had a metal facing. When Appellants rebuilt the billboard by erecting it on a steel monopole instead of two wooden poles, TDOT filed a Notice of Charges stating the new billboard failed to comply with the regulation because it was not rebuilt with "like materials." Following a hearing, the administrative judge concluded that the billboard was in violation of the regulation, which decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of TDOT and the chancery court. Appellants contend on appeal that the billboard is in compliance with the regulation and that the removal of the billboard constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. We affirm the finding that the billboard was not in compliance with the regulation as it was not rebuilt using "like materials."

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Bobby Reed Aldridge, pled guilty to one count of attempted second degree murder and one count of theft over $1000, and the trial court sentenced him to fourteen years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to a three-year sentence the Defendant received in a collateral proceeding for violating his probation. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Petitioner now appeals. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Oscar C. Wells, was convicted of first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. The petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief. The petitioner now appeals, and, following careful review, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Appellant, Brandy Lea Birdwell, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury in January of 2008 for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery for her involvement in a shooting at a liquor store. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the charges. She was sentenced to life in prison for the first degree murder conviction and twenty years for the especially aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently. Appellant filed an untimely motion for new trial which was denied by the trial court after a hearing. Subsequently, Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. This Court waived the timely filing of the notice of appeal. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for both convictions. After a thorough review of the record, we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Defendant-Appellant, Havin Hameed, was indicted in the Davidson County Criminal Court for two counts of aggravated child abuse and two counts of aggravated child neglect, Class A felonies, that were associated with leg and wrist fractures sustained by Hameed's tenmonth- old daughter from September 1, 2004, to October 1, 2004. Prior to Hameed's indictment, the Davidson County Juvenile Court made a factual finding in a dependent and neglect hearing that there was no clear and convincing evidence that Hameed perpetrated the aforementioned injuries against her daughter. Hameed filed a motion to dismiss the indictment in criminal court, which was denied. The criminal court granted permission for an interlocutory appeal and this court subsequently granted Hameed's application to appeal under Rule 9 of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure. On appeal, Hameed argues that the criminal court erred in failing to dismiss her indictment based on the doctrines of collateral estoppel, res judicata, and double jeopardy after identical allegations between the same parties were dismissed following a trial in juvenile court. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the Davidson County Criminal Court denying Hameed's motion to dismiss her indictment.

On March 6, 2009, the Warren County Grand Jury indicted Appellant, Aulton Cody Barnes, for indecent exposure. On May 28, 2009, Petitioner entered an open plea to the charge. On September 22, 2009, the trial court entered a judgment sentencing Petitioner to six months with thirty days to be served in incarceration and the remainder to be served on probation. Appellant appeals his sentence arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant him full probation or, in the alternative, grant him judicial diversion. We have reviewed the record presented on appeal and conclude that the trial court did not err. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this capital case, the defendant, Joel Richard Schmeiderer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder in connection with the strangling death of a fellow inmate. The jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder based on two aggravating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a second continuance; 2) whether this denial of a continuance violated the defendant's constitutional right to present mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase; 3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence and argue a non-statutory aggravating circumstance during the sentencing phase; 4) whether the prosecutor's closing argument during the sentencing phase constituted plain error mandating reversal; and 5) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that none of the errors alleged by the defendant warrant relief. With respect to issues not herein specifically addressed, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Relevant portions of that opinion are published hereafter as an appendix. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

The petitioner, Robert Allen Crawford, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief and claims that his convictions of first degree murder, criminally negligent homicide, aggravated burglary, aggravated assault, and reckless endangerment were the results of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing on the petitioner's timely petition for post-conviction relief, the criminal court denied relief. Upon our review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the order of the criminal court.

This is an administrative appeal arising from the suspension of a doctor's medical license by the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners. The appellant's medical license was suspended by the Board following its finding that he violated four provisions of the Tennessee Medical Practice Act, three state regulations, and one provision of the United States Code. The violations related to his use of chelation therapy and intravenous hydrogen peroxide therapy, and his use of methadone to treat patients. Following the Board's decision, the appellant filed a petition for judicial review before the chancery court. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the Board. The appellant raises numerous issues on appeal, inter alia, that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious and that the Board's decision was not supported by substantial and material evidence. We reverse the finding that Dr. Rich was in violation of subsections (1), (4) and (12) of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-214(b) because the Board did not articulate the applicable standard of care, as required by Tenn. Code Ann._ 63-6-214(g), to demonstrate his violations of that standard. We affirm the chancery court on all other issues including the findings that Dr. Rich violated of subsection (14) of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 63-6-214(b), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0880-2-.14(6)(c), Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs._ 0880-2-.14(6)(e)(3)(ii) and 21 U.S.C.A _ 823(g)(1). Due to our reversal of the Board's finding on three of the seven charges against Dr. Rich, we remand this action for the reconsideration of the sanctions against him.

The petitioner, Robert Clay Priest, who pleaded guilty in the Blount County Circuit Court to multiple offenses and was sentenced to 29 years' confinement, appeals from that court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he claims that he was mentally incompetent to enter into a plea agreement, that the trial court failed to ask him to enter a guilty plea, and that the post-conviction court erroneously excluded his expert witness. We discern no error and affirm the order of the circuit court.

The Defendant, Charles Reginald Underwood, Jr., pled guilty to three counts of third offense driving on a revoked or suspended license, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seat belt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and speeding, a Class C misdemeanor. See T.C.A. __ 55-50- 504 (Supp. 2009); 55-9-603(2008); 55-8-302 (2008). The defendant also entered a best interest guily plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), to facilitation of a false report of child abuse, a Class A misdemeanor. T.C.A. _ 37-1-413 (2005). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of three years, eleven months, and twenty-five days, to be served on split confinement involving six months of jail service followed by probation conditioned upon community corrections participation. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in imposing confinement and in denying his motion to reduce his sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this capital case, the defendant, Joel Richard Schmeiderer, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder in connection with the strangling death of a fellow inmate. The jury imposed a sentence of death for the murder based on two aggravating circumstances. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. On automatic appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(a)(1), we designated the following issues for oral argument: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a second continuance; 2) whether this denial of a continuance violated the defendant's constitutional right to present mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase; 3) whether the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce into evidence and argue a non-statutory aggravating circumstance during the sentencing phase; 4) whether the prosecutor's closing argument during the sentencing phase constituted plain error mandating reversal; and 5) whether the sentence of death is disproportionate or invalid under the mandatory review of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1). Having carefully reviewed the record and relevant legal authority, we conclude that none of the errors alleged by the defendant warrant relief. With respect to issues not herein specifically addressed, we affirm the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Relevant portions of that opinion are published hereafter as an appendix. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Brothers Ako Hassan Nejad and Aso Hassan Nejad were found guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder, a Class A felony, and each received a twenty-five-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender. Ako Nejad was also found guilty of attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony, and received an additional consecutive sentence of twelve years. On appeal, the defendants claim that: the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions; their indictments were insufficient; a mistrial should have been declared after a witness testified that one of the brothers was a gang member; certain inculpatory evidence was improperly admitted; newly discovered evidence discredits the State's theory of motive; and their sentences were excessive. We reject each of these claims and affirm their convictions and sentences.

In this declaratory judgment action, plaintiffs asked the trial court to declare null and void certain restrictive covenants in their employment contracts with defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the action and enforce the arbitration agreement contained in the employment contract between the parties. The trial court refused to order arbitration and ruled that in the interest of judicial economy, the Court should decide the issues raised in the declaratory judgment action. On appeal, we reverse the trial court's refusal to order arbitration and remand, directing the Court to stay the proceeding and order the parties to arbitrate the issues arising from the contracts of employment.

The defendant, James Edward Farrar, Jr., appeals the revocation of his probation, alleging that the State presented insufficient evidence to establish that he violated the terms of his probationary sentence. We reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Anthony DeWayne Hood, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Union County Criminal Court for sexual battery by an authority figure, a Class C felony, for which he was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, (2) the trial court denied his right to a fair trial when it responded in the jury's presence to the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal that the burden had been met, (3) the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and improper character evidence, (4) there was prosecutorial misconduct because the State misstated the evidence during opening statement and closing argument and commented on the credibility of a witness, and (5) his sentence is excessive because the trial court misapplied an enhancement factor and denied alternative sentencing. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error when it stated in the jury's presence that the State's burden of proof had been met. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Evetta Mai McGee, pled guilty to rape, and the trial court sentenced her to eleven years. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred when it enhanced her sentence beyond the statutory minimum without explanation. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The petitioner, Patrick Joseph Rigger, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court's denial of post-conviction relief from his general sessions court guilty-pleaded convictions of misdemeanor evading arrest and misdemeanor possession of a weapon. Although the postconviction court determined that the Knox County General Sessions Court's procedure of communicating to defendants en masse the litany of constitutional rights prior to accepting pleas of guilty did not satisfy the rigors of due process principles, the post-conviction court denied relief to the petitioner. The petitioner appeals and claims that the lower court erred in failing to find that his guilty pleas were involuntary, unknowing, and/or unintelligent. He also claims that the warrant alleging his illegal possession of a weapon inadequately charged an offense and that his actual innocence of that charge entitled him to post-conviction relief. Because the record supports the post-conviction court's order, we affirm.