APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Appellant Agatha Rannah Hodge was charged with fifty counts of theft and one count of burglary. She pled guilty to one count of theft of property valued between $1,000 and $10,000 and one count of burglary. The remaining charges were dismissed. She was sentenced to four years for the theft conviction and three years for the burglary conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively. The trial court ordered the Appellant to serve seven months in confinement, with the remainder to be served on probation. She subsequently pled guilty to violating the rules of her probation, and the trial court ordered her to serve her sentences in confinement. She appeals, arguing the revocation was excessive. We affirm.

In this direct appeal of a lawyer disciplinary proceeding involving eight separate complaints, we must determine whether the trial court correctly affirmed the hearing panel’s finding that attorney Michael Sneed violated numerous ethical rules and should be disbarred from the practice of law. Sneed contends that his disciplinary proceedings were procedurally unlawful because the hearing panel did not (1) conduct a prehearing conference as required by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 13.6, (2) authorize the filing of two supplemental petitions for discipline, or (3) allow him to call as witnesses disciplinary counsel or the Board of Professional Responsibility’s executive secretary. He also asserts that the evidence does not support the hearing panel’s findings of professional misconduct and that he was denied a meaningful review in the trial court because the trial court failed to properly schedule and review his appeal from the hearing panel. Finally, Sneed challenges the finding of the hearing panel and the trial court that he should be disbarred from the practice of law. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court disbarring Mr. Sneed.

The appellant, Richard H. Green, pled guilty to driving on a revoked license, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. He was sentenced to 11 months and 29 days, with 120 days to serve in jail and the remainder of his sentence to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve part of his sentence in confinement. After a through review of the evidence and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Pamela Michelle Hubanks, was convicted by the Madison County Circuit Court of one count of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor, and sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with 180 days of confinement to be served day-for-day in the county jail and the balance to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, Hubanks argues: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction; (2) the trial court erred in ordering her to serve 180 days in confinement, erred in ordering her to serve her 180 days of confinement day-for-day, and erred in denying full probation. Upon review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment but remand for entry of a corrected judgment to remove the day-for-day provision from the 180 days of confinement and to insert a service percentage of 75 percent.

Appellant, Lavon Denise Ransom, pled guilty in Bedford County to two counts of possession of cocaine for resale, two counts of possession of cocaine for delivery, and one count of selling cocaine. Several of the convictions were merged by the trial court, and Appellant received an effective ten-year sentence. She appeals the denial of alternative sentencing. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing where Appellant had an extensive criminal history, had failed to comply with conditions of sentences involving release into the community and confinement was needed to protect society by restraining a defendant who has a long history of criminal conduct, and to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the offenses. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

Appellant, Angela Ann Collins, was indicted by the Dickson County Grand Jury for driving under the influence (“DUI”) and violation of the implied consent law. She was convicted by a jury. Appellant appeals her conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court. Because we determine that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant, Stephen Gregory Spencer, pled guilty to two counts of possession of marijuana, Class E felonies, one count of possession of a handgun with the intent to go armed, a Class A misdemeanor, one count of theft of property valued at over one thousand dollars, a Class D felony, and one count of theft of property valued at over ten thousand dollars, a Class C felony. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years as a Range I, standard offender to be served in community corrections. A community corrections violation warrant issued alleging that the Defendant failed to report and continued to use illegal drugs. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentences and ordered the sentences to be served in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ordering the service of his sentences in incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This action arises from the issuance of stop work orders that prevented the plaintiffs from
completing the construction of their new residence. The plaintiffs brought this action against
the City of Clarksville and the Clarksville Building and Codes Department under the
Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA) asserting numerous and varied claims, including
claims for false statements, fraud, deception, conspiracy, discrimination, malicious
harassment, coercion, and violation of due process, and requested financial damages,
emotional damages, and punitive damages. The defendants filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6)
Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the action was a de facto appeal of the administrative
hearing on the stop work orders and that the defendants were immune under the GTLA. The
trial court granted the motion to dismiss finding that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. We affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Laura Mays, was convicted by a Hardeman County jury of theft of property between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony. She received a three-year sentence, but was subsequently placed on probation. Her probation was revoked by the trial court because of her failure to make restitution payments. In her first appeal, this court reversed the trial court’s revocation of her probation and directed the trial court to set a reasonable amount for restitution payments. On remand, the trial court again revoked Mays’ probation. Mays now appeals the revocation of her probation, claiming the trial court did not follow this court’s mandate from her first appeal. Upon review, we again reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand this matter for a determination of Mays’ ability to pay restitution.

The Defendant, Gerraldo White, was charged with one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of felony murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1), (2). He was also charged with one count of especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-403(b). Following a jury trial, he was convicted of one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of second degree murder, a Class A felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-210(c). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to fifteen years for second degree murder and fifteen years for especially aggravated robbery. It also sentenced him to life in prison for felony murder. The trial court ordered that the Defendant serve his sentences concurrently with one another, for a total effective sentence of life in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress a statement he made to police; and (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of felony murder, second degree murder or especially aggravated robbery. After our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction for first degree felony murder. We direct that the second degree murder conviction be merged into the first degree murder conviction. We modify the conviction for especially aggravated robbery to a conviction for aggravated robbery, and we remand for sentencing on the aggravated robbery conviction.

A Davidson County jury convicted Petitioner, Carlos Hardy, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years as a Range I, violent offender. State v. Carlos Hardy, No M2004-02249-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 359677, at *6 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 10, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Jul. 3, 2006). Petitioner was unsuccessful in his appeal to this Court. Id. at *15. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief raising a number of issues including an allegation that he was afforded the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in denying his petition with regard to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. We have reviewed the record on appeal and conclude that the post-conviction court did not err in denying the petition. Therefore, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The employee sought workers’ compensation benefits, contending that she had developed occupational asthma as a result of exposure to dust in the workplace. The employee offered into evidence the written report of a physician who performed an independent medical evaluation of the employee at the request of the employee’s attorney. The employer objected to the introduction of the report, contending that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235 is the exclusive method of introducing medical proof in workers’ compensation cases and that this statute permits the employer to depose the expert whose report is offered into evidence. Overruling the objection, the trial court admitted the report into evidence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 803(6) and awarded workers’ compensation benefits to the employee based on the physician’s report. The employer appealed. We conclude that the trial court erred by admitting the evaluating physician’s report into evidence and that the remaining admissible evidence is insufficient to establish either causation or permanency. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court awarding workers’ compensation benefits is vacated, and the complaint is dismissed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that she had sustained a permanent disability as a result of a work-related injury to her lower back. The trial court ruled that she had no permanent disability. She has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in accepting the testimony of the treating physician over that of the evaluating physician. We find no error, and affirm the judgment.

The employee filed suit seeking workers’ compensation benefits and provided notice to the employer of his intent to rely at trial on a physician’s report generated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-235. The employer objected to the introduction of the medical report and notified the employee of its intent to depose the physician pursuant to the same section. The employer moved to exclude the medical report when it was unable to depose the physician. The trial court denied the employer’s motion to exclude the physician’s report but granted the employer permission to seek an interlocutory appeal. We hold that the physician’s unavailability to provide the deposition requested by the employer pursuant to section 50-6-235 renders the physician’s written report inadmissible. We further hold that the physician’s report is not admissible pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 804 as an exception to the hearsay rule. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Upon petition of the Mother, the trial court entered an order modifying a Texas child support order and changing the support in accordance with the Tennessee Child Support Guidelines. The Father appealed, contending that the trial court improperly assumed jurisdiction and without authority, modified the Texas court child support order. We reverse in part as to the modification of the Texas court order, affirm in part as to the name change request, and remand.

In a negligence action arising from an automobile accident, the original trial resulted in a jury
verdict in the amount of $10,000 for the plaintiff. The plaintiff then moved for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct. After reviewing a juror’s deposition testimony, the trial court ordered a new trial. A second jury trial and verdict resulted in a $30,000 judgment for the plaintiff. Following the second judgment, the defendants timely appealed the trial court’s order for a new trial. We hold that Tenn. R. Evid. 606(b) prohibits introduction of juror testimony concerning the deliberation process that does not fall under one of the three exceptions enumerated in the rule. The order for a new trial is reversed and the lawsuit remanded for enforcement of the original judgment.

The defendant, Kenneth Ray Kilpatrick, appeals from his Wayne County Circuit Court jury conviction of simple possession of a Schedule IV controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. He claims on appeal that the evidence convicting him was legally insufficient. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Randy Ralph, appeals from his conviction by a jury in the Circuit Court for Warren County for driving an unregistered vehicle, a Class C misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve thirty days in jail and imposed a fine of $50. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him, that he should have been convicted under a different Code section, that he was improperly tried in the circuit court for a small offense, and that he should not have been sentenced to jail. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In an attempt to collect money due from her ex-husband on a judgment for back child support and spousal support, ex-wife had a writ of garnishment served upon a corporation making quarterly payments to the ex-husband under a settlement agreement. The issue on appeal is whether the January 30, 2008 garnishment notice attached payments due the ex-husband in May 2008. Because the corporation had a debt to the ex-husband at the time of the garnishment notice, although the debt was not payable until a later time, we have determined that the garnishment notice attached the May 2008 payment. Since the corporation made the May 2008 payment directly to the ex-husband, the corporation is liable to the ex-wife. We, therefore, reverse the decision of the circuit court.

This boundary dispute appeal involves an indispensable and necessary party. The plaintiff and the defendants own adjoining tracts of land in a rural area. After questions about their common boundary arose, the defendants hired a surveyor. The defendants’ surveyor
concluded that the common boundary lay further west than the plaintiff believed. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit seeking a judicial determination of the proper boundary and an award of damages for timber that the defendants had cut. After some delay, a bench trial was held. During the trial, surveyors for both parties testified that the trial court’s resolution of the boundary dispute could affect the owner of the parcel to the east of the defendants. After the trial, the trial court issued an order specifying where the boundaries of the defendants’ land should be staked out. After the boundaries were marked in accordance with the trial court’s order, the defendants filed a motion to reopen proof, arguing that the boundaries established
by the trial court encroached on land owned by the defendants’ neighbor to the east. The trial court denied the motion and rendered a final judgment. The defendants appeal. We vacate the trial court’s order, concluding that the landowner to the east of the defendant was an indispensable and necessary party and that the trial court erred in declining to join him as a
party once the proof indicated that the neighboring landowner could be affected by the resolution of the boundary dispute between the plaintiff and the defendants.

The petitioner, Lynda Beth Chandler-Camp, appeals the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of her petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that she made a prima facie showing of incompetence to toll the statute of limitations on the period for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Maurice Williams, was convicted of carjacking and aggravated robbery, both Class B felonies, and sentenced to consecutive terms of twenty-eight years and twenty-five years, respectively. On appeal, he argues that the trial court should have granted a new trial because of a variance between the allegations of the indictment and the trial proof; the proof was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and the trial court erred in application of an enhancement factor and ordering consecutive sentencing. Following review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Brothers of defendant mother brought this action to have a conservator appointed for their mother on the grounds that the mother suffered dementia, Parkinson's disease and other infirmities and was incompetent and unable to make decisions about her health and finances. Following trial, the trial court found there was clear and convincing evidence that the mother was disabled and in need of supervision, protection and assistance by means of a conservatorship due to her permanent mental incapacity. The sons were named as co-conservators of her person and estate. The attorney for the mother filed an appeal, and we affirm the Judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) for a hearing and report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Barry Wayne Johnson, sought benefits for injuries he sustained in the course and scope of his employment with Raines Brothers, Inc. The employee fell fifteen to twenty feet into an air conditioning vent shaft at a construction site, shattering the left side of his pelvis and acetabulum. Following a course of treatment, the employee returned to work and was terminated after he informed his employer that he could not perform the light-duty work assigned to him due to residual and chronic pain. The trial court awarded permanent and total disability benefits. On appeal, the employer argues that the trial court erred in awarding permanent and total disability benefits. After careful review, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.