APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Curtis Lee Majors, on one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver less than 0.5 grams of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, a Class B felony, and one count of tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of misdemeanor possession of cocaine, a Class A misdemeanor.1 The jury also convicted the defendant of evidence tampering as charged in Count 2 of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fifteen years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence; (2) the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction regarding tampering with evidence; and (3) the trial court refused to apply one of the mitigating factors proposed by the defendant at his sentencing hearing. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Quinton Sanders, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of murder in the perpetration of a felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced to life in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to exclude evidence of the defendant’s gang affiliation; (2) whether the trial court properly found that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by the state in the exercise of peremptory challenges had not been established; and (3) whether the trial court erred in denying a motion to grant a mistrial. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Evelyn Holly, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of her petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, she argues that she received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, she argues that her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate the effects of her mental condition and medication which precluded her from meaningful participation in her own defense. Additionally, the petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to hire an expert to contradict the testimony of the medical examiner and failed to call a witness who would have exonerated her. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

The petitioner, Ronald Donnell Moore, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. In 1994, the petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. In seeking post-conviction relief on appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that his counsel was ineffective: (1) in failing to seek proper jury instruction on the burden of proof; (2) in failing to request jury instruction on the lesser-included offenses of first degree murder, in particular, the offenses of reckless homicide and criminally negligent homicide; and (3) in failing to object to the presence of a mannequin in the courtroom. After review, the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief is affirmed.

This is a slip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped on a floor mat and fell as she was entering the defendant’s store. A store security video showed that the corner of the floor mat was overturned by another customer twenty-one seconds before the plaintiff fell. At the time that the corner of the mat became furled, the assistant store manager was at the service desk several feet from the entrance. He denied seeing the overturned mat. The plaintiff sued the store, alleging negligence in allowing a dangerous condition to persist and in failing to warn the plaintiff of it. After the trial, the jury found that the defendant store was eighty percent at fault and that the plaintiff was twenty percent at fault. The defendant store filed a motion for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct based on comments by jurors to the attorneys. The store also contended that the evidence showed that it did not have actual or constructive notice that the corner of the mat had become folded over. Finally, the store maintained that no reasonable jury could find that the plaintiff was less than fifty percent at fault for her own injuries. The trial court denied the motion and the defendant appeals. We reverse, finding no material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, and dismiss the case.

Bedford County- Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Chad Hughes, pled guilty to one count of criminal responsibility for the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance, and the trial court ordered the Petitioner to serve eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief after a hearing, and the Defendant now appeals that denial. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, William Lee Smith, pled guilty in the Sullivan County Criminal Court to four counts of reckless aggravated assault and one count of driving under the influence (DUI). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the Defendant agreed to serve two years of his sentence on supervised probation; the manner of service of the remaining four years of his sentence was left to the determination of the trial court which ordered it served in incarceration. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that he should have been granted full probation or some other alternative sentence for the four-year sentence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Shawn Nicholas Ferguson, pleaded guilty in the Marshall County Circuit Court to one count of possession with intent to sell marijuana, one count of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. After merging the conviction of possession with intent to sell marijuana with the conviction of possession with intent to deliver marijuana, the trial court imposed a fully incarcerative, Range I sentence of one year and one month. The trial court imposed a concurrent 11-month and 29-day sentence for the conviction of possession of drug paraphernalia. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred by ordering a fully incarcerative sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal involves the Tennessee Uninsured Motorist Act. The plaintiffs owned a body shop that was insured under a garage owner’s policy. The policy limited its uninsured motorist coverage to vehicles that were owned by the plaintiffs and listed on the policy. While driving to an auto parts store in a customer’s car, one of the plaintiffs was hit by an uninsured motorist and sustained physical injuries. The plaintiffs then submitted claims to the insurance company that issued the garage owner’s policy, and also to his customer’s insurance company, seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of both policies. After the claims were denied, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the uninsured motorist. The insurance company that issued the plaintiffs the garage owner’s policy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no coverage because the policy did not cover the plaintiffs while operating a non-owned vehicle. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. As a permissive operator, the injured plaintiff was covered under his customer’s uninsured motorist policy. The customer’s insurance company settled with the plaintiffs, obtained an assignment of their rights against the insurance company that issued them the garage owner’s policy, and then intervened as a third party plaintiff. The intervening plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer under the garage owner’s policy, arguing that the Uninsured Motorist Act prohibits such a limitation. We affirm, finding that the statute does not prohibit the limitation.

A Van Buren County jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph A. Hale, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to seventeen years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was justified in using deadly force and because he committed the killing in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation; and (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, precluding it from considering voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jeffrey McKinnie, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The pro se petitioner, Tracy Lynn Harris, appeals from the Carroll County Circuit Court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the motion.

This is a claim filed against the State by a minor-decedent’s mother for the wrongful death of her child based on T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) (Negligent Care, Custody and Control of Person). The child was murdered while in the care of a relative after he had been removed from the mother’s home by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. The mother contended that if the caseworker assigned to her son’s case had properly investigated an earlier allegation of abuse at the home in which the child had been placed, the child would have been removed from the placement before the murder occurred. The Claims Commission held that it did not have the subject matter jurisdiction to hear the mother’s claims under T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(E) because the child was not in the care, custody, or control of the State at the time of the alleged negligence. The mother appeals. We affirm the judgment as modified.

This appeal involves a sexual harassment claim by a student against a school district. The plaintiff was a student at a high school located in the defendant school district. In her senior year, the plaintiff enrolled in a class taught by the defendant teacher. Several times during class, the teacher made inappropriate comments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff reported the teacher’s behavior, an investigation was conducted, and ultimately the teacher received a letter of reprimand. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the teacher, the school district, and other school district employees in their official capacities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and its employees, and it denied summary judgment to the teacher. The plaintiff student now appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district and its employees. We affirm, concluding that the student’s claims essentially alleged civil rights violations and, therefore, these defendants are immune from suit under the GTLA.

This case involves the termination of parental rights. The mother has a history of criminal activity and past incarcerations, including one for facilitation of murder, and is currently incarcerated. Between incarcerations, the mother lived with her boyfriend, the father of the two youngest of the mother’s five children. The mother’s boyfriend is incarcerated for raping and sexually abusing the mother’s two oldest daughters. With both the mother and her boyfriend incarcerated, the mother’s sister obtained custody of the children and filed this petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding several grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals, arguing that the termination order did not satisfy the statutory requirements, that the trial court erred in finding that grounds for termination exist, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the children. We find that the trial court’s order, while less than optimal, satisfies the requirements of the statute as to one ground for termination. As to that ground, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding, as well as the finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Devon Wiggins, of two counts of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years for each conviction to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to prior sentences. The trial court also ordered the appellant to pay a five-thousand-dollar fine for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 17-432 (2005) violates due process and resulted in his receiving an excessive sentence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bifurcated trial; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the sale of a counterfeit substance; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on facilitation as a lesser included offense; (6) the trial court erred by not recusing itself; (7) the prosecutor’s closing statement was improper; and (8) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a reversal of his convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights based on persistence of conditions. We affirm.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Defendant, Tammy Garner, of theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court sentenced her to serve one month in jail, followed by nine months on probation, and to pay $500 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) the trial court erroneously sentenced her. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff filed suit against a nursing home after her husband allegedly suffered a broken hip while he was a resident there. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her claim. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were for medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence, but the court found that under either theory summary judgment was appropriate. We agree with the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims sound in medical malpractice, but we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

The plaintiff, who paid for legal representation for his brother, sued the attorney for breach of contract, fraud, theft by deception and conversion. The trial court found that the suit had been commenced after the statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that his motion for default judgment should have been granted, the statute of limitations had not run, and the judge should have recused himself. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises out of the enrollment of a foreign judgment issued by the New Jersey District Court against defendants residing in Tennessee. Appellants contend that the New Jersey District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that the trial court, therefore, erred by enrolling the judgment against them. Finding that Appellants consented to jurisdiction in the New Jersey District Court, we affirm.

This is a direct appeal of a trial court judgment that modified a hearing panel’s order suspending an attorney from the practice of law for sixty days. The trial court did not disagree with the hearing panel’s findings regarding the attorney’s misconduct but determined that the punishment was too harsh and, instead, ordered a public censure. After an independent review of the record, we conclude that the hearing panel’s findings that the attorney commingled his personal funds with client funds, paid personal bills out of his trust account, failed to maintain proper trust account records, and failed to timely respond to Board inquiries were supported by substantial and material evidence and that this conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. These violations, coupled with the aggravating factor that in 1998, the attorney was publicly reprimanded for commingling his personal funds with trust account funds and for paying personal expenses from his trust account, warrant the sanctions imposed by the hearing panel which require that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, that his trust account be monitored for a period of one year following reinstatement of his law license, that he submit trust account bank statements and ledger sheets every thirty days during this one-year period, and that he pay all costs of the proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment to the extent that it modifies the sanctions imposed by the hearing panel.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’  Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 506-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought permanent disability benefits for separate injuries, one to his neck and left shoulder and the other to his right knee. His authorized treating physician initially opined that he had sustained permanent impairment as a result of his work injuries. However, on cross-examination, the doctor stated that he was unaware that Employee had been receiving treatment for neck and shoulder symptoms for more than ten years prior to the work injury. He testified that, if true, such information would change his opinion. He also testified that a comparison of pre- and post-injury MRI’s of the right knee left him unable to opine with reasonable medical certainty concerning that injury. A second doctor,  who later performed surgery on the knee, opined that Employee had a work-related injury. The trial court found that Employee had failed to sustain his burden of proof. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We affirm the judgment as to the alleged neck and shoulder injury and reverse as to the knee injury.

The defendant, Walter Roby, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to three years incarceration. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant has appealed from a traffic court violation conviction based on documentary evidence created by a camera at a street intersection. The Trial Court affirmed the City Court conviction and defendant has appealed to this Court raising several issues. Upon review of the record and consideration of the evidence, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.