APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’  Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a Request for Assistance with the Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“Department”), seeking medical treatment and temporary disability benefits for an alleged work injury. The Department ordered that treatment be provided and benefits paid. The employer filed this civil action in the Chancery Court of Bedford County against the employee and the Second Injury Fund (“Fund”). Subsequently, the Department ordered the termination of disability benefits. The employee filed her answer and a counterclaim against the employer. The Fund filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction  because the parties had not exhausted the benefit review process. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The employee has appealed. We conclude tha

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’
Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn.Code
Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions
of law. In 2004, Employee was found to be permanently and totally disabled as a
result of a work-related injury. In January 2006, he died as a result of an overdose
of prescription medication. His widow sought workers’ compensation death benefits,
alleging that his death was the direct result of his prior work injury. Employer filed
a motion for summary judgment, contending that the medical evidence was insufficient. The trial court granted the motion. Employee’s widow has appealed. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellants, Larry Frank and Shurrod Towns, of attempted first degree premeditated murder in case number 04-01201 and first degree premeditated murder and four counts of attempted first degree premeditated murder in case number 04-01202. The trial court imposed life sentences for their murder convictions and twenty years for each attempted murder conviction, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal,1 Frank contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court improperly imposed five-hundred-dollar fines. Towns argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court should have dismissed the indictments because he was denied his right to a preliminary hearing, that the trial court should have declared a mistrial when a State witness testified that Towns had an arrest record, and that the trial court should have granted his motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court improperly fined both appellants. However,  judgments of the trial court are affirmed in all other respects.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee had chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) as a result of cigarette smoking. She was exposed to residual smoke and odors from a fire which occurred in the building she worked in. Shortly thereafter, she was hospitalized with acute breathing problems. She has been unable to return to work since that time. The trial court found that she had sustained a compensable aggravation of her pre-existing COPD, and awarded permanent total disability benefits. Her employer has appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that she had sustained a compensable injury. We affirm the judgment on that issue. However, we reverse the trial court’s award of reimbursement of  health insurance premiums paid by employee.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee in this case alleged that he had sustained gradual injuries to his shoulders and arms as a result of his employment. Three doctors testified concerning the injuries. The two treating physicians assigned 0% impairment. An evaluating physician assigned 5% impairment to each arm, and 0% impairment for the shoulder injuries. The trial court awarded 7.5% permanent partial disability (“PPD”) to the
arms, and 15% PPD to the body as a whole. The employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by using the “last day worked” rule to determine the date of injury. The employer asserts that the trial court erred by awarding permanent disability benefits for the shoulder injuries. We affirm the trial court’s finding concerning the date of injury, and reverse the award of benefits for the shoulder injuries.

The defendant, Derek Smith, pled guilty as a Range I, standard offender to aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and assault, a Class A misdemeanor. He received sentences of three years and eleven months, twenty-nine days to be served consecutively in the community corrections program.  After the defendant was charged with theft while in the community corrections program, the trial court found that the defendant violated the terms of his community corrections sentence, revoked the sentence, and imposed a new sentence of eleven years as a Range III, persistent offender. On appeal, the defendant contends the trial court erred in resentencing the defendant in a range higher than that of the original sentence. We agree, and we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for resentencing of the defendant as a Range I offender.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s order confirming an arbitration award entered in favor of Appellee. The arbitration agreement entered between Appellant and Appellee permitted either party to appeal the arbitrator’s decision directly to this Court. The agreement specified that this Court would conduct a de novo review of the arbitrator’s decision as if it had been reached by the trial court. We find that Tennessee’s arbitration statutes do not permit the parties to expand the scope of judicial review. Accordingly, we apply the standard of review specified in the statute and affirm the trial court’s order confirming the arbitration award.

The defendant, Nancy Blue, appeals as of right her jury convictions for two counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. She received sentences of twenty-five years for each rape of a child  conviction and six years for each incest conviction. 1 The rape of a child sentences were ordered to be served consecutively and the incest convictions were ordered to be served concurrently, for a  effective sentence of fifty years. The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence both in length and manner of service. Following our review, we affirm the convictions but remand for the entry of modified and corrected judgments consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Mike Brotherton, pled guilty to the offense of driving under the influence, first offense, and reserved a certified question of law regarding the validity of the traffic stop that resulted in his arrest. After careful review, we conclude that the trooper lacked reasonable  the traffic stop and dismiss the charge against the defendant.

The petitioner, Charles Orlando Fields, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief by the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. In his appeal, he contends that the indictment was void because: (1) it did not include all the essential elements for the offense for which he was convicted; (2) his sentencing range was illegal; and (3) the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to sentence him. After careful review, we conclude the petitioner has not established that he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. The judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed in accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

In 2008, the Defendant pled guilty to introduction of contraband into a penal institution, and the trial court sentenced him to serve four years and nine months in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant now appeals his sentence claiming that the trial court erroneously denied his request for alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant.

Patient sued her surgeon for malpractice and the hospital for allowing the surgeon to practice in its facilities. The trial court ruled that the hospital was not eligible for the qualified immunity provided in Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-6-219(d)(1). We reverse.

This is an action to recover a real estate commission. The defendants are the general partners of a partnership that owned a single asset, an apartment complex. In 1992, the partnership filed a reorganization petition in bankruptcy. The partnership hired the plaintiff real estate agency to sell the apartment complex while it was in bankruptcy. After a hearing to establish the value of the property, the bankruptcy court permitted the partnership to buy back the property for $9.8 million. Soon after the bankruptcy plan was confirmed, however, the partnership, through the plaintiff real estate agency, contracted to sell the property to a third party for $12.5 million. Upon discovering this, the bankruptcy court permitted the sale to the third party to take place for $12.5 million, but it ordered that the excess proceeds of the sale be placed in escrow. When the escrow funds were released, the plaintiff real estate agency did not receive its commission on the sale of the property. Consequently, the real estate agency filed this lawsuit against the general partners to recover its commission. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations and on the equitable doctrine of “unclean hands.” The trial court denied the motion and awarded the plaintiff real estate agency the commission sought plus prejudgment interest. The defendants now appeal. We affirm, finding that the lawsuit was timely filed, that the trial court did not err in declining to apply the unclean hands doctrine, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding prejudgment interest.

The petitioner, Edward P. Porter, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. The petitioner pled guilty in 1998 to possession with intent to sell over .5 grams of cocaine, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years in the Department of Correction. In 2007, the petitioner filed the instant petition, alleging that he was being restrained by an illegal sentence. The trial court summarily dismissed the petition because it was filed outside the statute of limitations and because it failed to state a cognizable claim. On appeal, the petitioner contends that the court erred in determining that the petition was time-barred, asserting that the one-year statute of limitations is not applicable and that his assertion of an illegal sentence in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 32  relief. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a statutory retaliatory discharge claim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-1-304. The trial court granted summary judgment to the employer, finding that the employee failed to establish that he had refused to participate in or remain silent about “illegal activities,” within the meaning of the statute. The employee appeals. We affirm.

The petitioner, Frank Lee Tate, appeals the Circuit Court for Fayette County’s dismissal of his pro se petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and incest, a Class C felony. He received concurrent sentences of sixty years for aggravated rape and fifteen years for incest. The trial court dismissed his petition without appointing counsel and without holding a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner lists over thirty claims. We affirm the dismissal of the petition for post-conviction relief.

The Defendant, Richard F. Stroud, was indicted on one count of driving under the influence, first offense, a Class A misdemeanor. After a motion to suppress was heard and denied, the Defendant entered a guilty plea. In the negotiated plea agreement, the parties purported to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). After review, we conclude that the Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2). The appeal is dismissed.

Personal injury plaintiffs filed suit against defendant motorist, who died prior to the filing of the suit, for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. By special appearance, the deceased tortfeasor’s estate filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs had not properly instituted the action against the decedent in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-5-103 prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, but granted the estate a direct appeal to this Court. Finding error in the judgment below, we reverse and remand the case.

The defendant, Jeffrey Scott, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; and conspiracy to commit robbery and attempted robbery, both Class D felonies. He was sentenced by the trial court to concurrent terms of ten years for the aggravated robbery convictions, three years for the conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery conviction, and two years each for the conspiracy to commit robbery and attempted robbery convictions. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and argues that the trial court erred indenying his motion to suppress his statement to police and in limiting defense counsel’s cross-examination of a witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Solon Atwell Brown, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was timely filed or that a recognized exception to the rule applies, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment from the post-conviction court.

This appeal involves a dispute over the interpretation of a buy-out provision. One of the four physicians in a medical practice retired and requested a repurchase of his stock. The physicians had previously adopted a formula for the valuation of stock in such situations, but when it came time to apply the agreement, they could not agree as to the meaning of several phrases within the agreement. The trial court heard testimony regarding the parties’ intentions as to the agreement and testimony from two accountants regarding their interpretations of the agreement. After interpreting the various phrases of the agreement, the trial court valued the physician’s stock and awarded prejudgment interest at the rate of ten percent since the date of the physician’s retirement. We reverse the trial court’s ruling as to the meaning of the agreement and affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified.

The appellant, Wiled McMillian,1 pled guilty in the Dyer County Circuit Court to one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, and he received a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the appellant challenges the ruling of the trial court. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin Lawrence, was convicted of felony murder and was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court found that the petitioner’s counsel were not ineffective and denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.