APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Robert Lee Archibald, Jr., was charged with one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver twenty-six grams or more of cocaine within 1000 feet of a school, one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. He filed a motion to suppress the evidence against him, arguing that the search warrant authorizing the search was defective. The Davidson County Criminal Court granted his motion. The State now appeals that grant. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated child abuse and felony murder in the perpetration of aggravated child abuse. The defendant appealed the felony murder conviction, and the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed his conviction. We granted permission to appeal and address the issue of whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury on the  lesser-included offenses of felony murder, which include second degree murder, reckless  homicide, and criminally negligent homicide. We conclude that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury as to these lesser-included offenses, and accordingly, we reverse the felony  murder conviction and remand the case for a new trial on the felony murder count.

Appellant, Nathaniel Richardson, pled guilty to second degree murder in Shelby County and received a twenty-year sentence. At the guilty plea hearing, Appellant reserved the following certified questions of law for appeal pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure:
1) Whether the trial court erred by denying [Appellant’s] motion to suppress all the evidence taken from the trunk of the car that was seized by the police on September 13, 2004? Whether the seizure of the car from the parking lot where [Appellant] worked in the absence of a search warrant violated the U.S. Const. amend. IV and amend. XIV and Art. 1 § 7 and § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution and in violation of Rule 41 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure; thereby[ ] requiring that the evidence taken from the trunk be suppressed? A search warrant was later signed on September 15, 2004[,] and the vehicle was searched. 2) Whether the trial court erred by determining that [Appellant] was legally competent to stand trial. We determine that the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress where officers had probable cause to seize Appellant’s car. We decline to address Appellant’s remaining arguments regarding his statements to police, detention by police, and validity of the search warrant as they were not presented in the certified questions presented. Further, we determine that the issue regarding Appellant’s competency is not dispositive and, therefore, not a proper certified question. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal arises out of an auto accident. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant appeals, arguing that the plaintiff’s evidence was insufficient to prove causation. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter judgment in favor of the defendant.

The petitioner, Arthur W. Stamey, III, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. In this appeal, he contends that the coram nobis court erred by permitting two witnesses to testify for the State and by concluding that those witnesses were more credible than the petitioner. He also claims that the court erred by concluding that a letter of recantation written by the victim did not constitute newly discovered evidence. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s order dismissing Petitioners’ petition for termination of parental rights and for adoption upon determining that the petition was invalid as a matter of law where it was jointly filed by the child’s maternal great-aunt and her daughter, the child’s aunt. The trial court awarded Father sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We reverse the award of sanctions to Father and dismiss the remainder of the appeal on the grounds
of mootness.

The defendant, Michael Hugo Brooks, was convicted by a Hardin County jury of DUI, third offense, and was sentenced by the trial court to 11 months, 29 days, with 120 days to serve in the county jail followed by probation. The sole issue the defendant raises in this appeal is whether the trial court committed plain error by denying his motion to suppress. Based on our review, we conclude that he has not shown the existence of plain error in the trial court’s ruling. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Justin Michael Scott, pled guilty in the Knox County Criminal Court to vehicular assault and driving on a revoked license. He received a total effective sentence of three years, to be suspended after service of six months in the Knox County Jail. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court’s failure to grant a sentence of full probation. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant, Kristen A. Wilson, entered a plea of guilty to driving under the influence per se. Defendant was sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days, which sentence was suspended after service of forty-eight hours in confinement. As part of the negotiated plea agreement, the parties purported to reserve a certified question of law pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(I) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. After review, we conclude that Defendant has failed to comply with the strict requirements of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) and dismiss the appeal.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The
plaintiff, Gloria Kazeleski, was involved in an automobile accident, and sought workers’ compensation benefits from defendant Dixie Motors, Inc. Dixie Motors contended that she was not its employee, but an independent contractor. The trial court ruled that she was an employee, and awarded benefits, including 100% permanent disability of the left arm. The defendant has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that plaintiff was its employee. We conclude that she was an independent contractor, and reverse the judgment.

Petitioner, Jason Lee White, appeals the post-conviction court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner pled guilty in September of 1996 to two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of attempted aggravated robbery. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-three and one-half years. On May 19, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner filed a supplemental petition for post-conviction relief on September 8, 2008. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition on September 24, 2008, holding that "Blakely violations do not apply retroactively to cases on collateral appeal." Petitioner then filed a "Motion/petition to Vacate Final Order and Judgment" on April 20, 2009, and a notice of appeal on May 11, 2009. We determine that the petition for post-conviction relief was properly dismissed because it was time-barred and Petitioner failed to show that the statute of limitations should be tolled. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Lia Bonds, was convicted of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender, to twenty years. Defendant’s conviction was affirmed on appeal. State v. Lia Bonds, No. W2006-01943-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 WL 3254711 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Nov. 2, 2007). This Court, however, vacated Defendant’s sentence because she was improperly sentenced under the 2005 amendments to the 1989 Sentencing Act. On remand, Defendant waived her ex post facto rights to be sentenced under the 1989 Sentencing Act, and the trial court sentenced Defendant under the 2005 amendments to twenty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining the length of her sentence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Kevin McDougle, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, in case no. 06-04210. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to twelve years. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentence in case no. 06-04210 consecutively to his effective sentence of thirty-two years in case nos. 06-04209 and 07-01739, for an effective sentence of forty-four years. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during the crossexamination of a witness for the defense; (2) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentencing; and (3) the imposition of consecutive sentencing violates his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Following the warrantless search of his residence and adjoining property, the Defendant, Monty Blackwell, was charged by presentment from the Grainger County grand jury with manufacture of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia related to the manufacture of marijuana, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, theft of property valued at over one thousand dollars, and theft of property valued at over five hundred dollars. The Defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence seized as a result of the warrantless entry onto his property. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the motion and suppressed the evidence. In this appeal as of right, the State contends that the trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress. Following our review, we affirm the judgment ofthe trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed an action in Chancery Court. He later filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit and immediately refiled his action in Circuit Court. An order dismissing the Chancery Court action was filed several days later. The employer moved to dismiss the Circuit Court action, noting that the Chancery Court action was still pending at the time the Circuit Court action was filed. The Circuit Court granted the motion. Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41. We affirm the judgment.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of violating the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor, and was found guilty of driving under the influence (seventh offense), a Class E felony. The trial court found that Defendant violated the implied consent law and revoked his driver’s license for one year. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years to be served on probation after serving one hundred and sixty days in confinement. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Specifically, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that he was driving on a public road at the time of the incident or a finding that he was driving under the influence of alcohol. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Edgar Allgood, was indicted in count one of the indictment for possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell and in count two for possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver. Following a jury trial, Defendant was found not guilty of the charged offenses. The jury found Defendant guilty in count one of the indictment of the lesser included offense of facilitation of possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class C felony, and in count two of the lesser included offense of facilitation of attempted possession of more than 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, persistent offender, to concurrent sentences of twelve years for each conviction, for an effective sentence of twelve years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the trial court’s sentencing determinations. After a thorough review, we conclude as plain error that Defendant’s dual convictions violate double jeopardy principles. Accordingly, we merge Defendant’s conviction of facilitation of attempted possession of cocaine with intent to deliver into his conviction of facilitation of possession of cocaine with intent to sell. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as to Defendant’s conviction of facilitation of possession of cocaine with intent to sell and his sentence of twelve years. We remand solely for the correction and entry of an appropriate judgment consistent with this opinion.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Larry Edward Moore, Jr., was convicted of carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range III, career offender, to thirty years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and also argues that the trial court erred (1) in not redacting certain statements from Defendant’s statement to the police which was introduced as an exhibit at trial; (2) in limiting Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim about her use of drugs and whether she had received any compensation from the Victim’s Compensation Fund; and (3) in denying Defendant’s motion for a mistrial. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Maurice Jones, entered an open plea agreement to one count of Class E felony sexual battery in the Shelby County Criminal Court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of two years, all suspended to probation but sixty days to be served in the county workhouse. As a special condition of his probationary sentence, the trial court ordered that the defendant is not allowed unsupervised contact with any minor child under eighteen years of age, including his own children. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court exceeded its authority in denying him unsupervised contact with his minor children. Following review of the record, we conclude that the special condition is overbroad as written. Accordingly, the case the remanded to the trial court for imposition of a more defined and less limiting condition.

The petitioner, Dennis Jarrett, proceeding pro se, appeals the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In two separate cases, the petitioner was convicted of two counts of driving after being declared a habitual motor vehicle offender, felony reckless endangerment, felony evading arrest, possession of drug paraphernalia, violation of the implied consent law, failure to appear, and violation of the open container law. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief. Specifically, he contends that he was denied his right to the effective assistance of counsel based upon: (1) trial counsel’s failure to properly challenge that the traffic stop was based on reasonable suspicion in Case No. C07-351; (2) trial counsel’s failure to object to inadmissible hearsay in Case No. 07-385; (2) the judge’s application of enhancement factors not found by the jury; and (3) the cumulative effect of trial counsel’s errors. Following review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Property manager CMA sued homeowner’s association Fairway Village when Fairway Village failed to pay money owed to CMA for management fees and property repairs. Fairway Village counter-claimed against CMA and cross-claimed against CMA President Willingham, claiming that both had defrauded Fairway Village. Following protracted litigation, the chancery court dismissed Fairway Village’s claims against CMA and Willingham, finding that it had failed to carry its burden of proof. The chancery court awarded CMA a judgment for fees and repairs, as well as a reduced attorney fee, but it denied CMA’s request for prejudgment interest. We affirm the chancery court’s finding that CMA owed no fiduciary duty to Fairway Village, its exclusion of accountant Hood’s testimony, and its award of attorney fees to CMA. We find that the chancery court’s
judgment was not against the weight of the evidence, and we reverse its denial of prejudgment interest. We award CMA its attorney fees on appeal. This case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of prejudgment interest and appellate attorney fees owed to CMA.

Defendants appeal the trial court’s order denying their motion for attorney’s fees due under the terms of the parties’ contract. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner, Courtney Anderson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of post-conviction relief, contending that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel’s failure to include a copy of the presentence report, a transcript of the plea submission hearing, and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the record on appeal. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.