APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Maurice Nash, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Neil Thompson, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of robbery and sentenced to three years, suspended after service of six months, followed by three years of probation. He appeals, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial due to a tainted jury, (2) the trial court erred in admitting a copy of the victim’s telephone records into evidence, (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction, (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence, and (5) he is entitled to relief due to cumulative error. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Wiled McMillian,1 pled guilty in the Dyer County Circuit Court to one count of the sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine, and he received a sentence of ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the appellant challenges the ruling of the trial court. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Kevin Lawrence, was convicted of felony murder and was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel were ineffective. The post-conviction court found that the petitioner’s counsel were not ineffective and denied the petition. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Mullandric Webb, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of robbery, Class C felonies, two counts of aggravated robbery, Class B felonies, and one count of intentionally evading arrest, a Class D felony. After merger of the robbery and aggravated robbery convictions, the defendant was sentenced as a Range I offender to twelve years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction concurrently with a four year sentence for intentionally evading arrest. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement; (2) whether the evidence  sufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Appellant, Zendall Edward Campbell, was indicted by the Campbell County Grand Jury for one count of first degree murder and one count of aggravated assault. After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of second degree murder and aggravated assault. Appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty years. On appeal, Appellant complains that: (1) the trial court improperly denied Appellant the opportunity to admit the statements he gave to police immediately following the incident and after his arrest; (2) the trial court erred by failing to include reckless endangerment as a lesser included offense of aggravated assault; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for second degree murder. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court properly excluded Appellant’s statements, instructed the jury properly on the lesser included offenses of aggravated assault, and the evidence was sufficient to support the second degree murder conviction. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jerry Jerome Primm, of first degree felony murder, second-degree murder, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court merged the second degree murder conviction with the felony murder conviction and ordered the Petitioner to serve a life sentence at one hundred percent as a violent offender. For his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, the trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve a twenty-year sentence consecutive to his life sentence. On direct appeal, this Court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions and sentences. The Petitioner then filed a post-conviction petition claiming he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at his trial. The post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner now appeals claiming the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A doctor who earlier submitted an affidavit in this medical malpractice action and who also participated in the peer review process at the defendant doctor’s hospital entered an appearance as plaintiffs’ counsel. The trial court declined the defendant doctor’s request to have the physician/attorney disqualified as plaintiffs’ counsel. After considering the issue on interlocutory appeal, we reverse and find that the physician/attorney is disqualified and may not represent plaintiffs.

The defendant, David F. Henning, appeals the order of the Dyer County Circuit Court revoking his probation. The defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and received a three-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation except for ninety days to be served in the county jail. Subsequently, a probation violation warrant was filed, alleging numerous violations of the terms of the defendant’s probation. Following a hearing, his probation was revoked, and he was ordered to serve the balance of his sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court abused it discretion when it found that he had violated the terms of his probation. Finding no abuse of discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Allen Jean Stephens, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The petitioner, Jason Settles,1 pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to attempted first degree murder, aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and two counts of aggravated assault. He received a total effective sentence of 13.5 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief which the post-conviction court summarily dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which post-conviction relief could be granted. After the petition was dismissed, the petitioner filed a “Motion for Reconsideration to Re-Open Post Conviction Petition.” The post-conviction court denied the motion. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the dismissal of both his original petition and his motion to amend or reopen his postconviction petition. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment    of the post-conviction court.

On March 28, 2007, the petitioner pled guilty in the Tipton County Circuit Court to initiation of the manufacture of methamphetamine and was sentenced to twelve years to be served concurrently with a sentence imposed in Lauderdale County. On July 9, 2007, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that he had not been afforded a hearing on his request for alternative sentencing, as he was told he would have. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that  the petition was without merit. After our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

A Shelby County jury convicted the appellant, Anthony Poole, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced the appellant to twenty-four years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. This appeal followed, with the appellant arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury to disregard a hearsay statement by the victim; (2) excluding the testimony of a mental health expert; (3) giving a sequential, “acquittal-first” instruction to the jury; and (4) imposing a twenty-four-year sentence in contravention of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Upon review, we modify the appellant’s sentence to nineteen years. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Patrick Brown, was convicted of criminal attempt to commit second degree murder, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to twelve years as a Range I, standard offender. On appeal, he argues that: the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; the trial court erred in allowing the State to reopen its case in chief; and he was sentenced improperly. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

This is an appeal from the grant of a voluntary dismissal. The plaintiff homeowners’ association sued the defendants in general sessions court for dues owed. The homeowners’ association was awarded a judgment. The defendants appealed to the circuit court below, seeking a de novo hearing. For several years, the appeal remained pending with no activity. In the meantime, the defendants sold the subject property. The judgment due to the homeowners’ association was paid by the purchaser of the subject property to remove any cloud on the title. Having been paid, the homeowners’ association filed a notice of satisfaction of judgment in the circuit court. The defendants filed a motion to set aside the satisfaction of judgment. The circuit court entered an order dismissing the defendants’ appeal. The circuit court later denied the defendants’ motion to set aside the satisfaction of judgment. From that order, the defendants now appeal. We find that the circuit court order is not final and appealable. Therefore, we dismiss the defendants’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

The petitioner, Homer T. Rivers, appeals from the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea convictions on one count of delivery of a schedule II controlled substance (cocaine), a Class B felony, and one count of simple possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance (marijuana), a Class A misdemeanor. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that counsel’s ineffective assistance rendered his guilty pleas unknowing and involuntary. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The State filed this action to terminate the parental rights of both parents to their three minor children. Upon hearing the evidence, the Trial Judge terminated the parental rights of both parents on several grounds. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Derrick Sorrell, was convicted of one count of first degree premeditated murder and one count of first degree felony murder. The trial court merged the convictions, and this appeal followed. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the indictment was improper, that the trial court improperly admitted evidence, and that the trial court did not adequately instruct the jury. After careful review, we conclude no reversible error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Tony Wolfe, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder. On appeal, he argues that: 1) the trial court was prejudiced against defense counsel during the course of the trial; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by conducting trial during the evening; 3) the assistant district attorney general intentionally distracted trial counsel during the course of the trial; 4) the jury did not see all the exhibits presented during trial; 5) the assistant district attorney general manipulated the slide projector during trial; 6) the trial court erred by not allowing the defendant to remove his clothing and show his scars from injuries sustained in a 1997 shooting; and 7) the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for the jury to visit the crime scene. After careful review, we conclude that no reversible error exists and affirm the judgment from the trial court.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). An employee who sustained a workplace injury in 1997 but who did not miss any work filed suit in the Chancery Court for Rutherford County in 2006 seeking a reconsideration of the 2003 settlement of her workers' compensation claim arising out of that injury. In response to the employer's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the suit was time-barred under Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-241(a)(2) (2008) because it was not filed within four hundred weeks following her return to work, the employee insisted that the time for seeking reconsideration should begin to run from the date in 2003 that she reached maximum medical improvement, rather than from the date she returned to work in 1997. The trial court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment, and the employee appealed. We affirm the trial court based on the plain language of Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6- 241(a)(2).

The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to exclude portions of Plaintiff’s expert’s deposition testimony and awarded Defendants summary judgment. We vacate the award of summary judgment, reverse the trial court’s order excluding testimony of the expert witness, and remand for further proceedings.

The Petitioner filed a Petition styled “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus” which the trial court treated as a petition for writ of certiorari. We affirm the order of the trial court dismissing the petition, but on the basis that the petition was not supported by oath or affirmation nor does it state that it is the first application for a writ.

Mother appeals a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her three children based upon four separate grounds. Finding clear and convincing evidence to support the juvenile court’s determinations on the grounds of mental incompetence and persistence of conditions, we affirm.

In February 2006, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted the defendant, Larry Carnell Pittman, on one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and one count of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of all three counts of the indictment. The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-eight years as a Range II, violent offender for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction, nineteen years as a Range II, multiple offender for the aggravated robbery conviction, and nine years as a Range II, multiple offender for the conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery conviction. The trial court ordered that all sentences be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion to suppress evidence; (2) the trial court erred by failing to grant his motion for a  continuance; (3) the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and (4) the trial court imposed excessive sentences. After reviewing the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Johnny Justin Postles, appeals from the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief as it relates to the petitioner’s convictions for aggravated criminal trespass and assault in case assignment 04-720, and aggravated assault, aggravated burglary, and theft under $500 in case assignment 04-721. On appeal, he contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief based on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction relief.