APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal arises out of a lawsuit filed against the attorneys and insurance company involved in the settlement of a personal injury claim. The trial court dismissed the claims of the plaintiffs/appellants, Mattie and Edmond Lindsey, for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Lindseys did not appeal the original dismissal of their claims but instead moved to set aside the court's judgment nearly one year later. The trial court declined to set aside its judgment and granted a motion for sanctions against the Lindseys. We affirm the trial court's denial of the Lindseys' motion to set aside, vacate its award of sanctions, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This appeal involves a custody dispute between a father and maternal grandparents. The father and grandparents initially filed a joint petition to remove custody from the children’s mother. When the father later filed a separate amended petition for custody on his own, the grandparents argued that he should be precluded from seeking custody due to a previous mediation agreement. The father argued that he was entitled to assert his superior parental right to custody against the grandparents. The trial court found the mediation agreement enforceable and did not consider the father’s petition for custody. The father appeals. We vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings.

Husband appeals the trial court's award of transitional alimony, alimony in futuro, and alimony in solido to Wife. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Uvautai Brooks, of one count of aggravated robbery and three counts of facilitation of aggravated robbery. The trial court sentenced the petitioner, as a Standard Range I Offender, to serve an effective ten-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petitioner’s claim, and the petitioner appeals the decision of the court. After reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Travis A. Bledsoe, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the defendant, Joey Lee Goins, of facilitation of second degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. The defendant appeals, claiming that the trial court erred in excluding statements of certain witnesses. The defendant also appeals the court's failure to sequester the jury in light of the media coverage of the trial. Lastly, the defendant argues that the court erred in imposing the defendant's sentences consecutively to each other and to his unrelated federal sentence of life without parole. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

.A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Rashad G. Robinson, of possession of contraband in a penal institution, a Class C felony, two counts of misdemeanor assault, Class A misdemeanors, and vandalism under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the defendant to six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction for the felony conviction and eleven months, twenty-nine days in the county jail for each of the misdemeanor convictions. The court ordered the defendant to serve the sentences consecutively to each other and to case number 07-372. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court’s jury instructions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Cumberland County jury convicted the petitioner, Dorman O'Neal Elmore, Jr., of five counts of rape, Class B felonies. The trial court sentenced the petitioner to an effective sentence of twenty-two years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The petitioner pursued a delayed appeal pursuant to the Post-Conviction Procedure Act, and this court affirmed his convictions and sentences. In his post-conviction petition, the petitioner alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the petitioner argues that trial counsel's failure to file various pre-trial motions, to properly prepare and investigate the case, and to investigate the victim's background constituted deficient performance and prejudiced the defense. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This case involves the question of whether Appellee entities are partnerships under Tennessee law. Appellant appeals the trial court’s order, which found that Appellee entities were not  partnerships. Finding no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Charles Mandel Moss, alias Charles Mandell, alias Pookie Doo, was convicted of violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, a Class E felony; possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant was sentenced to serve four years for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, eleven months and twenty-nine days each for possession of marijuana and evading arrest, and thirty days each for violation of the open container law and violation of the seatbelt law. The court imposed partially consecutive sentences that resulted in an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days. The Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the convicting evidence is insufficient to support the conviction for violation of the motor vehicle habitual offenders act, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting evidence related to the Defendant's previous arrests. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Ricky Frith, was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony, and was sentenced by the trial court as a career offender to six years in the Department of Correction. The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In June 2005, a Shelby County jury convicted the petitioner, Timothy Hutson, of first degree murder, and he received a life sentence. The petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Specifically, the petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to provide timely information about a plea agreement, failed to develop a working relationship with the petitioner, and advised the petitioner to wear jail clothes rather than civilian clothes during the trial. The post-conviction court denied relief. Following our review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

The Defendant-Appellant, Darius L. Brown, entered eleven guilty pleas in five different cases in the Sullivan County Criminal Court. He received an effective nine-year sentence at thirty percent pursuant to his plea agreement, with the manner of service of his sentence to be determined by the trial court. On appeal, Brown argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an alternative sentence. Upon review, we affirm the trial court's judgments.

The pro se petitioner, Tony Scott Walker, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process considerations should toll the statute of limitations and that he is entitled to error coram nobis relief on the basis of his discovery that one of the State's witnesses may have fabricated or falsified evidence at his trial. Following our review, we affirm the dismissal of the petition.

The owners of a piece of commercial property brought an unlawful detainer action against a lessee who had stopped paying rent. The trial court issued a judgment of $33,450 against the lessee for past-due rent, followed by a writ of ejectment. After the lessee moved from the property, the owners sued to collect the rent due on the five-year lease and for damages to the property. The lessee argued that irregularities in the execution of the lease rendered it unenforceable. The trial court determined that the lease was enforceable and that the lessee could be held personally liable for a judgment in the amount of $326,716.74. We find that the parties did not reach the meeting of the minds that is necessary to form an enforceable contract, and we accordingly reverse.

The defendant, James Carlos Ward, appeals from his Davidson County Criminal Court jury convictions of two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, see T.C.A. _ 39-13-305, and two counts of aggravated robbery, see id. _ 39-13-402. The defendant received an effective sentence of 45 years to serve in the Department of Correction as a Range II offender. On appeal, the defendant claims:(1) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's pretrial motion to suppress a victim's identification of the defendant; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support two verdicts of guilty of aggravated robbery and two verdicts of guilty of especially aggravated kidnapping; (3) the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions violate principles of due process; (4) the trial court erred on principles of double jeopardy in imposing two convictions of aggravated robbery; and(5) the trial court erred in finding the defendant to be a Range II offender, in imposing excessive sentences, and in consecutively aligning some of the sentences. Following our review, we modify one conviction of aggravated robbery to aggravated assault, affirm the remainder of the convictions, and remand for resentencing.

This is the second appeal in a divorce action. Husband appeals the division of marital property and the award of alimony in solido to Wife. In the 2005 Final Decree of Divorce, the trial court determined that the husband's shares of stock in the family business, which his parents gifted to him, were his separate property; however, the appreciation of that stock during the marriage, $1.7 million, was held to be marital property. The court awarded the wife 37.5 percent of the marital estate and alimony in futuro of $1,500 per month for the first year and $2,500 per month thereafter. This court affirmed the division of marital property but modified the award of alimony, holding that she was entitled to eight years of rehabilitative alimony but not alimony in futuro. The Supreme Court held that the appreciation of the husband's stock was his separate property, not marital property, and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider the division of the marital estate and to reconsider the award of alimony due to the substantial reduction of the marital estate. On remand, the trial court awarded the wife 64 percent of the substantially reduced marital estate and granted her alimony in solido in the amount of $478,000. In this second appeal by the husband, we affirm the division of marital property, finding it is not inequitable under the circumstances, and we affirm the award of alimony in solido to Wife, finding that the award was based on the relevant factors in Tenn. Code Ann. _ 36-5-121(i).

The Petitioner, Phedreck T. Davis, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief challenging his convictions for first degree murder, attempted second degree murder, and assault, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment plus fifteen years. See State v. Phedrek T. Davis, No. M2006-00198-CCA-R3-CD, Davidson County, slip op. (Tenn. Crim. App. July 19, 2007), aff'd, 266S.W.3d 896 (Tenn. 2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2790 (2009). He claims that newly discovered evidence proves that the State solicited damaging perjury during his initial trial, thereby violating his constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed his claim as having been previously determined. See T.C.A. _ 40-30-106(f). We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Andre Alexander Smith, was tried before a jury on an indictment charging one count of first degree felony murder. He was found guilty of one count of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in upholding the State's use of peremptory challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986); (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him of voluntary manslaughter; and (3) the trial court erred in overruling his objection to certain portions of the State's closing argument. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Wife appeals the entry of an order of protection against her. Because the order of protection has expired, the appeal is moot, and therefore, is dismissed.

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of  findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee fell from a platform at work. The injury was accepted by his employer as compensable. After a period of medical treatment, the authorized physicians released the employee to return to work with no permanent impairment or restrictions. The employee sought medical treatment on his own. Ultimately, he had surgery on his back and neck. He filed suit against his employer. Employee had two previous workers’ compensation awards. Several months later, he amended his complaint to add the Second Injury Fund as a defendant. After a trial on the merits, the trial court found that the employee had sustained a compensable injury which resulted in an 85% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The court apportioned the award according to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-208(b). It then dismissed all claims against the Second Injury Fund, based upon the statute of limitations. It awarded some medical expenses claimed by the employee, but denied others. On appeal, the employee asserts that the trial court erred by dismissing the claim against the Fund, by incorrectly determining the percentage of disability represented by his earlier settlements, and by declining to award all requested medical expenses. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment.

The Defendant, Ket T. Voun, a Cambodian native, was convicted, upon his guilty pleas, of aggravated robbery and facilitation of second degree murder. Following a sentencing hearing, the Davidson County Criminal Court ordered him to serve his eight-year sentence for facilitation of second degree murder in total confinement. He now appeals, arguing that, due to his likely deportation for these crimes, a probationary sentence was warranted. After a review of the record, we affirm the sentencing decision of the trial court.

Anne Dowd and Ferrell Ervin filed a motion to intervene and to stay the distribution of the estate of Cleo M. Snapp, claiming they were heirs of the estate. Ms. Dowd asserted that she was the non-marital child of Thomas Ervin, a brother of Ms. Snapp, and Mr. Ervin asserted that his father, Ben Ervin, was the non-marital child of Thomas Ervin. The executrix of the estate responded by filing a motion to deny their claims. After a hearing, the trial court granted the executrix's motion to deny the claims because they were untimely. We affirm.

The petitioner, Author Ray Turner, claims that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for writ for habeas corpus relief. The petition claims that his sentence is illegal because his release eligibility of 30 percent violates statutory law requiring that he served 100 percent of his sentence as a "multiple rapist." See T.C.A. _ 39-13-523 (Supp.1994). We agree that the defendant's aggravated rape sentences are illegal and that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing his claim. We remand to the Morgan County Circuit Court for appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine the proper remedy.

This case in on appeal for the second time after remand for determination of the defendant's request for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The defendant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's award. After reviewing the record, we reverse in part and affirm in part the trial court's judgment.