APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this action brought under Tennessee’s False Claims Act, the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to set aside its offer of judgment and strike the relator’s notice of acceptance. The relator subsequently abandoned the case, and the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. We affirm the results reached by the trial court.

The petitioner, Harvey L. Webb, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Madison County jury convicted the defendant, Reggie Carnell James, of one count of first degree murder and one count of tampering with evidence. The trial court sentenced the defendant to life in prison for the murder conviction and ten years as a Range II, multiple offender, for the evidence tampering conviction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence produced at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Michael H. Palmer, appeals the dismissal of his pro se petitions for post-conviction relief in the Criminal Court for Sullivan County. He claims to have entered guilty pleas to reckless endangerment and telephone harassment and to have entered a nolo contendere plea to assault. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing the petitions without appointing counsel and in refusing to rescind the order dismissing the post-conviction petitions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis. Having determined that the trial court properly denied the petition, this Court hereby affirms the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves a contract dispute arising out of the Lennox Lewis/Mike Tyson prize fight in Memphis, Tennessee. The defendant/appellee investment firm agreed to provide financing to guarantee minimum ticket sales for the prize fight. If ticket sales for the fight were below the minimum requirement, the investment firm would pay the difference, but if ticket sales exceeded the minimum, the investment firm would profit. The investment firm solicited the plaintiff/appellant sub-investor and other sub-investors to provide back-up financing, so that the investment firm would not bear the entire risk of loss in the event that minimum ticket sales were not met. The plaintiff sub-investor would also participate in the profits if ticket sales exceeded the minimum. Under the alleged agreement between the investment firm and the sub-investor, the sub-investor was to post a letter of credit in order to obtain his interest in the potential profits and liabilities. As the ticket sales were ongoing, the plaintiff sub-investor arranged for the required letter of credit to be issued, but needed information from the investment firm in order to get it issued. The investment firm did not provide the information to the sub-investor. Meanwhile, the ongoing ticket sales reached (and ultimately exceeded) the minimum requirement. At that point, the investment firm no longer faced a risk of loss and told the plaintiff sub-investor that it no longer needed sub-investors and would not go through with the agreement. The sub-investor never posted a letter of credit and the investment firm did not pay the sub-investor a percentage of the profits. The sub-investor then filed the instant lawsuit against the investment firm, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendant investment firm filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court found that there was no enforceable contract because the sub-investor never posted the letter of credit, and dismissed the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because they were derivative of the breach of contract claim. Accordingly, the trial court granted the investment firm’s motion for summary judgment. The sub-investor now appeals. We reverse the trial court’s holding that there was no enforceable contract between the investment firm and the sub-investor, finding that the investment firm had an implied duty to cooperate in the sub-investor’s performance of its contractual promise. Finding an enforceable contract, we also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded appellee Sharon Clark’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits and held appellant Sprint PCS liable rather than Clark’s successor employer, appellee Convergys. The trial court also assessed discretionary costs against Sprint. Sprint contends that the trial court erred in (1) holding it rather than Convergys liable for Clark’s claim; (2) relying on medical depositions taken while Sprint was not a party; and (3) assessing discretionary costs against it. After our review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s judgment against Sprint and order judgment against Convergys. We remand
this matter for the reassessment of discretionary costs.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee was an LPN for a nursing home. She was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome in 2003. She was terminated, for reasons unrelated to her work injury, in 2005. She began working in a similar job for a second nursing home. In September 2006, she had surgery to treat her condition. She sued the earlier employer, but not the latter employer, seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court applied the “last day worked” rule, and found that the injury occurred while she worked for the second employer. The lawsuit was dismissed. The employee has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its determination of the date of her injury. We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Curtis Palmer, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he argues that his trial counsel was ineffective as follows: (1) counsel admitted the petitioner’s guilt during the trial without the petitioner’s consent; (2) counsel failed to adequately investigate possible grounds for a speedy trial; (3) counsel failed to challenge invalid indictments; and (4) counsel failed to properly litigate the suppression of evidence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, the judgment of the post-conviction court denying post-conviction
relief is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jerome Bond, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. Following his convictions for first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, the petitioner was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and twenty-five years. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call an alibi witness at trial. Following review of the record, the denial of post-conviction relief is affirmed.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court awarded benefits for a 70% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole for the combination of a lower back injury and a mental injury. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred in awarding benefits for the mental injury and by relying upon the evaluating physician’s impairment rating for the lower back injury. In the alternative, the employer contends that the award is excessive and that the trial court erred by finding that the employee did not have a meaningful return to work. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.1

In this workers’ compensation case, the employee sustained a compensable shoulder injury. She alleged that she sustained an additional injury to her back as a result of medical treatment for the shoulder injury. Her employer denied that claim. A settlement of both claims was approved by the Department of Labor. The settlement agreement stated that the back injury was being settled on a disputed claim basis, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-206(b). The employee returned to work for her employer for approximately three years. She was unable to satisfy her production quota and was eventually terminated for that reason. She sought reconsideration of both claims in the trial court. The trial court held that reconsideration of the back injury claim was barred by the terms of the settlement. It denied reconsideration of the shoulder injury claim because her
termination was for “misconduct.” Employee has appealed, contending that the trial court erred.1 We affirm the judgment.

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court’s award to the wife of permanent alimony. In addition, he contends the trial court erred in requiring him to pay the wife’s monthly health insurance premiums and to maintain an existing life insurance policy on his life with the wife designated as the beneficiary. We affirm.

In 2001, a Hardeman County jury convicted the Petitioner, Melvin L. Cofer, of one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”), third offense, one count of aggravated vehicular homicide, and one count of vehicular homicide. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to a twenty-one year effective sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in which he alleged that his indictment was fatally defective. The habeas corpus court summarily denied the petition. On appeal, he contends that the habeas corpus court erred when it summarily dismissed his petition and failed to appoint him counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for the appointment of counsel and for a hearing on the issue of the sufficiency of the indictment for aggravated vehicular homicide.

The Defendant, Alisha J. Glisson, was convicted of felony murder, aggravated robbery, and three counts of attempted aggravated robbery. She was sentenced to an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, the Defendant presents a single issue for our review: whether the proof is sufficient to support her conviction for felony murder. She argues that the State failed to show that she was criminally responsible for the death of the victim and, alternatively, failed to sufficiently corroborate the testimony of the accomplices. After a review of the evidence in the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this workers’ compensation action, the trial court found the employee had sustained an
occupational disease as the result of environmental conditions at a hazardous waste storage facility on the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Reservation. The employer has appealed on the ground that no specific irritant or contaminant was identified as having caused the employee’s illness and that the trial court was precluded from finding the employee sustained a compensable occupational disease because he suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease prior to his employment with Bechtel Jacobs Co., LLC. After review of the record, 1 we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial with co-defendant Maurice Nash, Defendant, Spencer Louis Lark, Jr., was found guilty of two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and one count of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to six years for each aggravated assault conviction, and two years for his felony reckless endangerment conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently for an effective sentence of six years. Defendant does not appeal the length or manner of service of his sentences. In his appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiffs/Appellees bring this case pursuant to the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and a negligent bailment theory. They allege that auto service center made poor cosmetic repairs to interior of their car and that exterior of the car was damaged while at the service center. Finding no violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act and that Defendant/Appellant failed to overcome presumption of negligent bailment, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

The defendant, Edward Leon Davis, was convicted by a jury of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (cocaine) weighing more than .5 grams, a Class B felony. For his conviction, the defendant received a sentence of ten years. On appeal, the defendant raises the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s motion for a mistrial; (2) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and (4) whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant probation or alternative sentencing.

The defendant, Scotty Lee Johnson, appeals from the revocation of his probation. In this appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by ordering incarceration. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee, Byron Smallen, alleged that he had sustained a gradual hearing loss as a result of exposure to noise in the workplace. Ownership of his employer had changed approximately one year prior to his last day worked. The trial court awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the hearing of both ears, and assigned liability to the new owner of the business, International Muffler. That party has appealed, contending that the trial court incorrectly applied the last injurious exposure rule. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the judgment.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Anthony L. Williams, of first degree premeditated murder, felony aggravated assault, and felony reckless endangerment. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve a life sentence for his first-degree murder conviction, a four-year sentence for his aggravated assault conviction, and a two-year sentence for his felony reckless endangerment conviction. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for first degree premeditated murder; (2) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense; and (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on defense of others. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the relevant authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Brandon D. Thomas, was convicted by a jury of misdemeanor evading arrest. He was sentenced to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days in the Warren County Jail. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on resisting arrest as a lesser-included offense of misdemeanor evading arrest. We conclude that this contention lacks merit, and we accordingly affirm.

The Defendant, Archie Ray Moore, was convicted of selling .5 grams or more of a substance containing cocaine. The trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to nineteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; and (2) the trial court erred in denying him community corrections and in setting the length of his sentence. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a factual dispute about whether defendant signed a lease as a tenant and is liable under the terms of the lease. The Trial Court held defendant liable for damages under the lease. We affirm.