APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant pled guilty to theft of property in excess of $60,000, and the trial court sentenced her to ten years in prison and ordered her to pay $162,603 in restitution. The Defendant appeals, claiming that the restitution amount is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A terminated Nashville Electric Service employee filed a complaint with the Human Rights Commission of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. NES filed a declaratory judgment action claiming the Metropolitan Charter prevented the Human Rights Commission from investigating the complaint. The chancery court agreed with NES. We affirm.

This is a petition to modify alimony. In the parties’ divorce decree, the husband was ordered to pay the wife alimony in futuro based in part on the wife’s chronic, incurable health condition. About six years later, the husband filed this petition to reduce or terminate his alimony obligation, arguing that (1) the wife’s health condition had not declined as was originally anticipated, and (2) his income had decreased and the wife’s income had increased. The trial court denied the husband’s petition, concluding that a material change in circumstances had not occurred. The husband now appeals.  We affirm, concluding that the trial court did not err in finding that the husband did not prove a material change in circumstances and in denying his petition to modify his alimony obligation.

Appellant, Alex Porter, was found guilty by a McMinn County jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. After the denial of a motion for new trial, Appellant seeks the resolution of the following issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; (2) whether the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated; and (3) whether the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Valerie Ware and Mary White at trial. After a review of the evidence, we determine that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction, that the accomplice testimony was sufficiently corroborated, and that the trial court did not err by excluding the testimony of Valerie Ware. However, we determine that the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of Mary White but conclude that the error was harmless. Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Rosenda Renya, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, he argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present a motion to suppress the evidence seized following a traffic stop. After careful review, we affirm the judgment from the  post-conviction court.

Aggrieved by the denial of his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief from his 2005 Davidson County Criminal Court convictions for felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and second degree murder, the petitioner, Ronnie Charleston, appeals. In this appeal, he contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a purchase option in a lease of a tract of land in Shelby County, Tennessee. Executed in 1950, the lease had an initial term of 50 years and six months. In 1953, the Lessee exercised its option to renew, allowing possession for an additional 50 years through 2050. In 2001, the Lessee attempted to exercise its option to purchase the leased property. Lessor then sought a declaratory judgment determining the validity of the purchase option, and if valid, the value to be paid for the Lessor’s interest in the property. The trial court found that the Lessee properly exercised the purchase option and that the value of the Lessor’s interest should be based upon the property as unencumbered by the remaining 50-year lease term. We affirm the trial court’s finding regarding the purchase option, but reverse its determination of the value of the Lessor's interest in the property.  Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

The petitioner, Willie L. Watkins, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-plea convictions of three counts of sale of one-half gram or less of cocaine and resulting eight-year sentence. The petitioner contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel and that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into the guilty pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner had entered a plea of delinquent to firing a weapon within the city limits and illegal possession of a firearm in Juvenile Court, and subsequently sought relief in a Post-Conviction Petition in the Trial Court. The Trial Court dismissed the Petition on the grounds that petitioner was not in custody of the Department of Children’s Services at the time he filed the Petition for Relief. On appeal, we affirm.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jason Glenn Baggett (hereinafter “Baggett”), was convicted by an Obion County Circuit Court jury of forgery and criminal simulation and sentenced to concurrent  sentences of six years, as a career offender, in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Baggett argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Sevier County jury acquitted the Defendant, Lee Stanley Albright, of driving under the influence, second offense, but it found that the Defendant violated the implied consent law. The trial court revoked the Defendant’s driver’s license for two years. In this appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the use of a criminal indictment to initiate proceedings against the Defendant for a violation of the implied consent law was improper; (2) the trial by jury of the violation of implied consent charge was improper; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s finding of a violation of the implied consent law. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The petitioner, James Carter, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis, arguing that due process requires that the statute of limitations for filing the petition be tolled. The State has filed a motion requesting that we affirm the summary dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner filed his petition well outside the one-year statute of limitations and has not shown any reason that the limitations period should be tolled, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred: (1) in modifying the Parties’ Final Decree of Divorce absent proof of a material change in circumstances affecting the best interest of the Parties’ child; (2) in making temporary modifications to the Final Decree of divorce absent clear and convincing proof that the child was being harmed or would be harmed in the situation that existed when the modifications were made; and (3) in finding that Father’s motives for relocating were vindictive, and in its concerns about Father’s willingness to comply with future court orders or to provide for the child. We affirm.

A Davidson County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Demond Lamont Adkins, of aggravated assault and carjacking. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of 15 years at 60 percent for aggravated assault and 22 years at 45 percent for carjacking. In this appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and discerning no error, we affirm.

Upon his pleas of guilty, the Defendant, Eric Cruthird, was convicted of three counts of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell, each conviction being a Class B felony. Pursuant to his plea agreement, the Defendant received an eight-year sentence for each conviction, with one of said sentences to be served consecutively to the other two, for an effective sentence of sixteen years. In accordance with the plea agreement, the manner of service of the sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing and ordered that the sentences be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The appellant, Mohamed Iman, pled guilty in the Bedford County Circuit Court to possession of a Schedule I drug with intent to deliver with the sentence length and manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Prior to being sentenced, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which was denied by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the appellant to ten years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) referring to the wrong standard in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and accepting an unknowing plea; (2) accepting the plea agreement when it failed to establish venue for the crime; (3) not personally and directly addressing the appellant during the guilty plea hearing; (4) refusing to give the appellant a community corrections sentence; and (5) failing to certify the interpreter. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court found that the employee suffered a 70% vocational disability to the body as a whole as the result of an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Since the employee was over sixty at the time of the injury, the trial court limited his award to 260 weeks pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-207(4)(A)(I). The trial court concluded that the employer’s liability was likewise capped at 260 weeks, and, since the employer had already paid 152 weeks of compensation to the employee for previous injuries, the court allocated 108 weeks of the 260-week award to the employer, and the remaining 152 weeks to the Second Injury Fund. The Second Injury Fund appeals, arguing that the employer’s liability is not capped at 260 weeks, but rather remains 400 weeks. We hold that the trial court erred in capping the employer’s liability at 260 weeks, rather than 400 weeks. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand this issue for entry of an order consistent with this opinion.

The defendant, Jeremy Lance Przybysz, submitted a best interest guilty plea pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160 (1970), to attempt to commit aggravated sexual battery, a Class C felony. The parties agreed to an eight-year sentence as a Range II offender with the manner of service to be determined by the court. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the defendant to serve eight years in confinement. Claiming the trial court erroneously denied alternative sentencing, the defendant appeals. We affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The petitioner, James Glenn Collins, Jr., appeals the Lake County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals because the petition fails to state a cognizable claim for relief. Upon our review of the petition and the applicable authorities, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the probate court erred when it granted Appellee’s motion for a directed verdict. The probate court found that Appellants, in their proof in chief, did not satisfactorily make out a prima facie case of the Antenuptial Agreement’s validity under the statutes and appellate opinions of Tennessee as Appellants failed to establish that there was a satisfactory disclosure of Mr. Roberts’ assets. On appeal, Appellants contend that the motion for a directed verdict was improperly granted as reasonable minds could conclude that the Antenuptial Agreement was presented to, read, and understood by Appellee at execution and that the Antenuptial Agreement constituted a full and fair disclosure as required by Tennessee law. Although Appellants have urged an incorrect standard of review, we find, after a de novo review of the evidence, that Appellants made out a prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. We reverse and remand to the probate court for further proceedings.

The defendant, Daryl Dewitt Godwin, pled guilty to theft of property over $60,000, a Class B felony, and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jessie Hodges, was convicted of robbery and sentenced as a persistent offender to twelve years in incarceration. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Jessie Nelson Hodges, No. W2001-00871-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 927603, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, May 3, 2002), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Nov. 4, 2002). Petitioner unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. Jessie Hodges v. State, No. W2005-01852-CCA-R3-PC, 2006 WL 211829, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 25, 2006), perm. app. denied (Tenn. May 30, 2006). Subsequently, Petitioner sought habeas corpus relief in the Davidson County Chancery Court. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition. Petitioner appeals. We determine that the habeas corpus court properly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, James Bumpus, appeals the trial court’s ruling that his sternal non-union following open-heart surgery was a noncompensable injury because it was caused by over fifty years of heavy smoking and a chronic cough rather than work-related activities. Mr. Bumpus also appeals the trial court’s ruling that work-related activities did not cause an actual advancement or progression of his pre-existing condition. We find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s ruling, and affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Kenneth Williams, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to second degree murder and received a sentence of thirty years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner timely appealed. The sole issue for review on appeal is whether the post-conviction court erred in finding that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.