APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Christopher Hatcher, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, attempted first degree murder, and reckless endangerment. He argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court denying the petition.

The defendant urges this court to reverse his conviction for aggravated robbery based upon his argument that the proof is insufficient to support the element that the robbery was either accomplished with a deadly weapon or by the display of something the victim might have reasonably believed to be a deadly weapon. After analyzing the defendant’s actions in isolation before and after disarming the victim, the majority concludes that the evidence is insufficient to support this element of aggravated robbery and modifies the conviction to robbery. For the following reasons, I respectfully dissent from this conclusion.

The Defendant, Mark Anthony Foulk, was convicted by a jury of: one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; one count of vandalism in the amount of $500 or less and one count of driving under the influence, both Class A misdemeanors; one count of speeding and one count of failure to obey a traffic control device, both Class C misdemeanors. He was sentenced to an effective term of eighteen years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish his identity as the perpetrator of the vandalism, aggravated burglary, or aggravated robbery, and was otherwise insufficient to prove the elements of aggravated robbery; (2) the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the elements of aggravated burglary; (3) he was effectively denied his right to a jury trial; (4) the court improperly instructed the jury that a certain State’s witness, Detective Dale Quillen, was an expert on gunshot wounds and stippling; (5) the court improperly enhanced his sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery; and (6) the court improperly ordered consecutive sentences. We agree with the Defendant that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of aggravated robbery, and accordingly modify this conviction to the lesser included offense of robbery. We also conclude that the trial court improperly enhanced the Defendant’s sentences and failed to make the required findings to impose consecutive sentences.  We conclude that the Defendant’s other points of error lack merit. The case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing.

Appellant pled guilty in the Wilson County Criminal Court to one count of vehicular homicide, one count of vehicular assault, and one count of leaving the scene of the accident. In exchange for the guilty pleas, Appellant received sentences of three years, two years, and one year, respectively. The trial court held a sentencing hearing to determine the manner of service of the sentence. The trial court ordered Appellant to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day, followed by ten years of probation. Appellant seeks review of the sentence on appeal. We determine that the trial court erroneously deprived Appellant of good conduct credits by ordering him to serve eight months of the sentence day-for-day. Consequently, we reverse that portion of the sentence and remand to the trial court for entry of an order deleting the requirement that the sentence be served day-for-day. The remainder of the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner was originally indicted on multiple sex offenses and felony failure to appear. A Morgan County jury found the petitioner, Alden Joe Daniel, Jr., guilty of felony failure to appear but deadlocked as to his eight other sex offense charges. Before a retrial on the sex offenses and before a judgment of conviction was entered on the felony failure to appear conviction, the petitioner pled guilty to multiple counts, and the parties agreed that the judgment of conviction arising from the jury trial would reflect that the petitioner was convicted of misdemeanor failure to appear rather than felony failure to appear. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief claiming that his convictions were void because he had been convicted by a jury of a felony but the trial court agreed to allow that conviction to be reduced to a misdemeanor. Further, he asserted that the reduction of this charge from a felony to a misdemeanor was a material element of the plea agreement, and he sought habeas corpus relief from all of his judgments. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The petitioner, R. L. Williams, appeals from the denial of his 2007 petition for post-conviction relief, which challenged his 2003 rape convictions. He asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel failed to effectively challenge the DNA evidence, which he posits was the only convicting evidence because the testimony of the victim was unreliable. Holding that he has failed to establish that his counsel was ineffective, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Mickey Jeffries, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by his failure to adequately communicate a plea agreement to him. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The employee sought workers' compensation for a knee injury suffered in a fall. While acknowledging compensability for the claim, the employer sought to cap the award at 1.5 times the disability rating. See Tenn. Code Ann. _ 50-6-241(d)(1)(A) (2008). The trial court held that the employee was terminated due to her injury rather than her misconduct but applied the 1.5 cap on the award. The evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's factual findings, but its application of the cap was in error. The judgment of the trial court is reversed in part and the cause is remanded.

The Defendant, Eddrick Devon Pewitte,1 was convicted by a Gibson County jury of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the State presented evidence insufficient to convict him; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the admission of certain statements he made to police; (3) the State violated a discovery order; and (4) the trial court misapplied enhancement factors in sentencing him. We conclude that the Defendant’s first three points of error lack merit. We also conclude, however, that the trial court erred in the application of certain enhancement factors. We remand for resentencing.

The Defendant, Darrell Franklin, was convicted of one count of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twelve years in the Department of Correction. In this direct appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in admitting certain testimony over his hearsay objection and in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the State presented evidence insufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction; (3) he received an excessive sentence; and (4) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process and trial by jury. We conclude that the State presented evidence sufficient to support the Defendant’s conviction and that the trial court did not err in sentencing him. We also conclude, however, that the trial committed plain error by admitting certain testimony in violation of the Defendant’s right to confront the witnesses against him. We accordingly vacate his conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

Petitioner, David Cantrell, appeals from the Morgan County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petitioner failed to comply with the procedure defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

The defendant, Randall A. Myers, appeals the sentence imposed by the Blount County Circuit Court following his open guilty plea to two counts of filing a false report, Class D felonies, and one count of theft of property under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. After hearing the evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of four years, three years, and eleven months and twenty-nine days. The court further ordered the sentences to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the two felony sentences are excessive; (2) the court erred in denying an alternative sentence; and (3) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we affirm the sentences as imposed.

We granted an appeal pursuant to Rule 9, Tenn. R. App. P., to determine the extent of discovery that would be allowed of an infection control nurse who had investigated the infectious rates at the hospital, because the investigation was prompted by the hospital’s Quality Control Committee. Defendants argued that the investigation was confidential and privileged, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 63-6-219. The Trial Court allowed discovery and we affirm, setting forth parameters of the discovery.

Plaintiff alleged that she was robbed at knife-point on Wal-Mart’s parking lot, and Wal-Mart was negligent in failing to provide security to protect her from the robbery. Wal-Mart filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and the Trial Judge ruled due to the paucity of crimes in the parking lot, Wal-Mart owed no duty to the plaintiff to provide security where the crime allegedly occurred. Plaintiff has appealed and we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

In this action, plaintiff charged that defendant had placed him on a “secret, government maintained ‘indicated’ perpetrator list”, without affording him due process of law. The Trial Judge, responding to a Motion to Dismiss, held that plaintiff’s action was not “ripe” for determination and dismissed
the action. On appeal, we affirm.

In this appeal, we determine the extent of Employee’s disability as a result of her June 24, 2004, work-related back injury. Prior to this work-related injury, Employee had been treated intermittently for back problems since 1995. The trial court determined that the June 24 injury caused only a temporary aggravation of Employee’s pre-existing condition and that this aggravation had resolved itself by September 7, 2004. On appeal, the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel agreed that Employee sustained only a temporary aggravation of her pre-existing condition.  However, a majority of the Appeals Panel determined that Employee’s temporary aggravation had not reached maximum recovery until November 2, 2005, and thus, Employer should be responsible for Employee’s disability benefits and medical expenses until that time. Upon review of the record, we hold that the record does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, we reverse the Appeals Panel and reinstate the trial court’s judgment.

This is a divorce case. The parties had a long-term marriage and enjoyed a high standard of living. The parties then filed for divorce. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court adopted the wife’s proposal for the distribution of marital property and ordered the husband to pay the wife substantial alimony in futuro and attorney’s fees. The husband now challenges the distribution of marital property as well as the award of alimony and attorney’s fees. Regarding the distribution of the marital estate, the husband argues that the trial court overvalued his law practice, undervalued the wife’s counseling business, and failed to give the husband credit for several tax liabilities that he assumed. He further argues that the trial court awarded the wife an excessive amount of alimony and attorney’s fees. We affirm in part as modified, determining that the facts as found by the trial court were supported by a preponderance of the evidence, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in the distribution of marital property and award of alimony. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees.

Appellant nursing home appeals the trial court’s award of a portion of the damages it sought from Appellee, the son of one of its residents. The Appellee had previously signed a guaranty to cover expenses that his mother could not meet on her own. At the initial hearing, Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof concerning damages, and the trial court re-opened the proof on its own motion to allow Appellant more time to produce the missing evidence. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in so doing, and that, in the absence of the new proof, Appellant failed to carry its burden, we reverse.

Following a jury trial, the Defendant, Bobby Joe Rollins, was convicted of aggravated robbery. For this Class D felony, he was sentenced to twenty-eight years in the Department of Correction as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial is insufficient to support his conviction and that his sentence is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine: (1) whether there existed sufficient evidence to support the circuit court’s finding Appellant guilty of indirect criminal contempt; (2) whether the circuit court erred in finding Appellant “willfully attempt[ed] to circumvent the requirements of the Act and Injunction Order of the Court[;]” and (3) whether the circuit court erred in fining Appellant for fifty contemptuous acts when the exact number of such acts is uncertain. We affirm.

I concur with the Court’s conclusion that Mr. Cloyd’s scapholunate dissociation with radiolunate osteoarthritis is a compensable workers’ compensation injury. Mr. Cloyd had the burden of  proving that his work-related activities caused his disabling condition. This required him to  present expert evidence of causation. Glisson v. Mohom Int’l, Inc./Campbell Ray, 185 S.W.3d 348, 354 (Tenn. 2006) (holding that except for the most obvious cases, employees must present expert medical evidence to establish that their injury was caused by their work-related activities). This evidence was provided by Dr. William Kennedy.

This is the second appeal in an annexation case involving two municipalities. The plaintiff smaller municipality passed an ordinance annexing adjoining property. The annexation was to be effective ninety days later. The annexed property also adjoined the defendant larger municipality. After the passage of the plaintiff’s annexation ordinance, but before its effective date, the defendant municipality passed an ordinance annexing the same property. The plaintiff then filed a declaratory judgment action, asking the court to find that the defendant’s annexation was invalid because it attempted to annex property that the plaintiff had already annexed. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the plaintiff municipality appealed. In the first appeal, we reversed and the case was remanded to the trial court. The defendant then filed a second motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that its greater population gave it annexation priority over the plaintiff under Tennessee Code Annotated § 6-51-110. The trial court denied the defendant’s motion, finding that the plaintiff’s annexation of the disputed property took place upon the passage of the ordinance after its final reading, not the effective date of the ordinance. Consequently, it found, the statute giving annexation priority to the larger municipality was not applicable because the defendant larger municipality did not initiate annexation proceedings until after the plaintiff had already annexed the property. The defendant now appeals. We reverse, finding that the effective date of the annexation, not the date of final passage, is the operative date by which a municipality with a larger population must initiate annexation proceedings in order to take advantage of its statutory priority.

This case addresses the allocation of funds received by a county from the Tennessee Valley Authority. The Tennessee Valley Authority is exempted from state taxation, but makes payments to the county in lieu of taxes. Historically, the county has earmarked these funds for education and has allocated a portion of them to the special school districts within the county. In 2003, however, the county decided to phase out the allocation of funds to the special school districts. Subsequently, the plaintiffs in this action, parents of children in a special school district located in the county, sued the county, arguing that the county’s decision to stop sending funds to the special school district violated several statutory provisions. The trial court granted summary judgment to the county. The plaintiffs now appeal. We affirm, concluding that the case is controlled by the decision in Oak Ridge City Schools v. Anderson County, 677 S.W.2d 468 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984), and that the county is entitled to summary judgment.

This is a premises liability case against the county. The plaintiff attended a football game at a county high school. She fell on the steps leading to the bleachers in the football stadium and suffered back injuries. She claimed that the step on which she fell was dented prior to her fall, and that this caused her fall. The plaintiff filed this action against the school district, alleging that it was negligent in failing to correct a dangerous condition or in failing to warn her about the dangerous condition on the school district’s property. The school district filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding the school district’s actual or constructive notice of the defective condition. Alternatively, it claimed that the school district was immune from suit under the GTLA. The trial court agreed with the school district and granted summary judgment based on both grounds. The plaintiff now appeals. We reverse and remand, concluding that the plaintiff submitted sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether the school district had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous or defective condition, and that the school district is not immune from suit under the GTLA.