APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

I concur with the result reached by the Court. Based on the current appellate record, there exists a genuine factual issue regarding whether Conductor Danny Martin sounded the train’s whistle as the train approached the crossing as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 65-12-108(2) (2004).

When the trial court entered its divorce decree, husband, who was in prison in another state, was representing himself. Husband asserts that the trial court erred because it lacked personal jurisdiction over him and lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this matter. We have concluded that husband waived the personal jurisdiction issue. However, because the trial court failed to rule on husband’s pending motions before adjudicating the divorce, we vacate and remand.

This is an appeal from summary judgment granted in favor of defendant-lessee on an action to collect back rent and other expenses pursuant to a long-term commercial lease agreement with plaintiff-landlord. Lessee filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy prior to the filing of the instant action. We have concluded that the commercial lease upon which landlord relies was deemed rejected by operation of law in the bankruptcy proceedings and that landlord is therefore barred from recovering the damages it seeks. Judgment of the chancery court is affirmed.

We granted the defendant’s application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to establish the identification of marijuana, an essential element of the offense, beyond a reasonable doubt. We conclude that the evidence presented was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the substance was marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this consolidated appeal, the petitioner, Gerald Wayne Carter, challenges the circuit court’s summary dismissal of his petitions for both post-conviction relief and writ of error coram nobis. The circuit court dismissed the petitions, finding that the petitioner had filed outside the statute of limitations period. After review, we affirm the judgments of the court.

The defendant, Timmy Lee Hill, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Marshall County of three counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony; two counts of aggravated assault, a Class C felony; one count of escape, a Class E felony; and one count of evading arrest, a Class A misdemeanor. The three counts of aggravated kidnapping were merged. The defendant was sentenced as follows: one nineteen-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, with a concurrent eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentence for evading arrest; one consecutive ten-year sentence for aggravated assault on the same victim as the aggravated kidnapping, with a concurrent eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentence for assault on a second victim; and one consecutive six-year sentence for escape, for an effective sentence of thirty-five years. The defendant appeals, claiming the trial court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence for the aggravated assault. We affirm the judgments of the trial court, except we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment for the aggravated assault to reflect a ten-year sentence.

In this divorce action, Wife contends that the trial court erred in ordering the marital home sold; finding Husband’s down payment on the marital home to be separate property; failing to award her alimony; and failing to award her counsel fees. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The petitioner, Bobby Lee, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. The petitioner was convicted of attempted first degree murder and received a sixty-year Department of Correction sentence as a career offender. The State has filed a motion for the judgment of the trial court to be affirmed by memorandum opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. Finding merit in the motion, we grant the same and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jimmie Lee Hoyle, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of trial counsel and entered his guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The defendant, Mark Alton Mayfield, appeals from his convictions by a jury in the Criminal Court for Cumberland County for carjacking, aggravated robbery, and aggravated kidnapping, class B felonies. He was sentenced to ten years for each offense to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of ten years. He contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to convict for each offense; (2) the trial court improperly included language referring to the nature of conduct and the circumstances surrounding the conduct in its jury instructions; and (3) the trial court improperly sentenced the defendant to more than the minimum sentence as prohibited by Blakely v. United States, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Marcus Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree felony murder, especially aggravated robbery, and aggravated assault. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issues in this case are whether operators of whitewater rafting ventures responsible for collecting a county privilege tax imposed upon consumers participating in commercial rafting ventures in Polk County have standing to challenge the tax and if so, whether the tax is invalid because it is preempted by federal law. Upon careful review of the record and applicable law, we conclude that the operators have standing to contest the legality of the privilege tax and that the tax is preempted by federal law and is, therefore, invalid.

The petitioner, Allan Joseph Robles, appeals the Henry County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for aggravated sexual battery and resulting twelve-year sentence. On appeal, he contends that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to file a motion to suppress his confession to police. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal we are asked to reverse the trial court’s grants of summary judgment to Appellees and adopt a loss of chance theory of recovery, thus allowing Appellants to recover for Appellees’ alleged failure to timely notify them that their unborn child was afflicted with spina bifida such that they could participate in a clinical trial. Because our supreme court has expressly stated that Tennessee does not recognize a cause of action for loss of chance, we affirm.

This appeal involves a motion to dismiss for insufficient service of process. The summons issued for service on the defendant-appellee was served by the deputy sheriff on a co-defendant. The trial court granted the defendant-appellee’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.

This appeal involves a defendant who shot two persons during a robbery at the home of one of the
victims. One of the victims died. A Shelby County grand jury indicted the defendant for (1)
premeditated and intentional murder, (2) murder during the perpetration of a robbery, (3) attempted first degree murder, and (4) especially aggravated robbery. A jury found the defendant guilty on all counts. At the penalty phase of the trial, the jury found the presence of the aggravating circumstances in Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) and (7) (2006) and sentenced the defendant to death. In a separate sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for the attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery convictions and ordered these sentences to be served consecutively to each other and to the sentence of death. The defendant appealed his convictions and sentences to the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals, after concluding that the trial court’s submission of the Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(6) aggravating circumstance to the jury was harmless error, affirmed the defendant’s convictions and the sentences. State v. Banks, No. W2005-02213-CCA-R3-DD, 2007 WL 1966039 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 6, 2007).

This appeal involves a claim against a decedent’s estate for one million dollars. The probate court denied the claim on various grounds, and we affirm.

The Defendant, Larry Darnnell Pinex, was convicted of attempted aggravated rape, a Class B felony, attempted aggravated sexual battery, and attempted especially aggravated burglary, Class C felonies. He was sentenced as a Range III, persistent offender to twenty-five years for attempted aggravated rape and to twelve years for each of the remaining offenses. The twenty-five-year sentence was ordered to be served concurrently with the sentence for attempted aggravated sexual battery but consecutively to the twelve-year sentence for attempted especially aggravated burglary, for an effective sentence of thirty-seven years in the Department of Correction. He presents five issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions for attempted aggravated sexual battery and attempted especially aggravated burglary; (2) whether the rape and battery convictions violate constitutional proscriptions against double jeopardy; (3) whether the State should have been required to make an election of offenses; (4) whether his conviction for attempted especially aggravated burglary should be modified to attempted aggravated burglary based upon Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-14-404(d); and (5) whether he received an excessive sentence. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Tennessee Constitution precluded convictions for both attempted aggravated rape and attempted aggravated sexual battery because the evidence showed that the Defendant made one continuous attempt to rape the victim. Consequently, we vacate the judgment of the trial court as to the Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated sexual battery, as that offense should have been merged with the Defendant’s conviction for attempted aggravated rape. We also modify the conviction for attempted especially aggravated burglary to attempted aggravated burglary and order a sentence of ten years for that offense.

The defendant, Michael Lee Jeffcoat, pled guilty to three counts of delivery of twenty-six grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eighteen years in the Department of Correction on each count, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying him alternative sentencing, and he also argues that the eighteen-year sentences imposed by the trial court were excessive. After reviewing the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Marcus Conner, appeals from the sentencing decision of the Lincoln County Circuit Court. In June 2007, the Defendant entered guilty pleas to three counts of selling .5 grams or more of cocaine, Class B felonies, and two counts of selling less than .5 grams of cocaine, Class C felonies. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective fourteen-year sentence as a Range I, standard offender and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that a sentence of community corrections was appropriate. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that the Defendant’s dual convictions of attempted aggravated rape and attempted aggravated sexual battery implicate principles of  double jeopardy protections. My reasons are two-fold.

The Commissioner revoked appellant’s license to sell insurance and fined her $7,000.00. Appellant petitioned for review by the Trial Court, who affirmed the determination made by the Commissioner. On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Andre Davis, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced the defendant to fourteen and one-half years as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal as of right, the defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for voluntary manslaughter, that the trial court erred in admitting a non-testifying witness’s statement from a police report to impeach the defendant’s testimony, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim’s prior acts of violence and gang affiliation, that the sentence imposed by the trial court is excessive, and that these cumulative errors deprived the defendant of his right to a fair trial and due process. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case, the trial court ruled that the employee, Ms. Rene Burns, sustained a 49% permanent partial disability to the hand. The employer asserts that the trial court erred because it considered Ms. Burns’ disfigurement and alleged fear of equipment as part of the vocational disability award. Consequently, the employer contends that the trial court’s award was excessive. We agree and modify the award to 35% permanent partial disability.

In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs. Defendant has appealed and on appeal raises the issues of whether there was sufficient and competent proof to support plaintiff’s claim for medical expenses; whether the Court erred in allowing plaintiff's treating physician to offer an opinion on permanent impairment, and he questioned whether the jury verdict was contrary to the "weight of evidence". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.