APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

In this action for damages for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident, the jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs. Defendant has appealed and on appeal raises the issues of whether there was sufficient and competent proof to support plaintiff’s claim for medical expenses; whether the Court erred in allowing plaintiff's treating physician to offer an opinion on permanent impairment, and he questioned whether the jury verdict was contrary to the "weight of evidence". On appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, Edith Staggs, brought this action, claiming that she fell, injuring her hip, as a result of a slippery floor while working at Hardee's. Her employer's insurance company, Travelers Indemnity Co., claims that she fell as a result of a seizure. The trial court awarded benefits to Ms. Staggs, and found her to be a credible witness. Travelers Indemnity Co. appeals, arguing that the trial court ruled incorrectly when it determined that Ms. Staggs was a credible witness and that she sustained a compensable injury.  We affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Petitioner, Jeffrey W. Haithcote, filed a motion to reopen his post-conviction petition, arguing that (1) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the State failed to keep a record of his preliminary hearing; (3) the State breached the plea bargain to which the Defendant agreed; (4) newly discovered evidence is available in the form of tapes, witness statements, and transcripts; (5) his motion to withdraw his guilty plea was not heard; (6) the State improperly used his prior convictions to impeach him and enhance his sentence; (7) his convictions violated the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States Constitution; and (8) the State failed to make certain transcripts available to him. The trial court summarily denied the motion. Following our review, we dismiss the appeal.

In this Estate, the Executor sued a legatee for a debt owing the Deceased. The parties settled that action by an Order stating that the indebtedness owed to the Decedent by the legatee at the time of death would be treated as an advancement to the legatee in the distribution of the Estate. In the final accounting by the Special Master, the Master found that the legatee defendant owed the Estate $45,942.64. This finding was concurred in by the Trial Court and, on appeal, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The Court’s decision in this case alters summary judgment practice in Tennessee by dramatically changing the moving party’s burden of production. From henceforth, parties seeking a summary judgment in Tennessee’s courts will no longer be able to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of a claim or defense asserted by the nonmoving party. This change in direction goes far beyond what is required to determine whether the summary judgment in this case was or was not appropriate. The Court’s decision will undermine, rather than enhance, the utility of summary judgment proceedings as opportunities to weed out frivolous lawsuits and to avoid the time and expense of unnecessary trials.
 

Travis and Stephanie Goodman (“Buyers”) filed a lawsuit for monetary damages or rescission of a residential deed due to defects in a septic system. Buyers sued under the theories of breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. Buyers argue that they did not plead a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 66-5-208 (2004) of the Tennessee Residential Property Disclosures Act; however, the trial court treated the case as one under the Act. The jury returned a verdict for Seller. Reviewing the record de novo, we hold that the theories of breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation were pleaded and supported by the proof. These causes of action should have been charged to the jury. We also hold that the parties litigated the issue of intentional misrepresentation and that the trial court charged the jury on this issue. In addition we hold that material evidence supports the jury’s verdict for Seller under theories of intentional or willful misrepresentation of the condition of the subject property under the statute or common law. Accordingly, we affirm in part, vacate in part and remand with instructions.

The pro se petitioner, Donald Clark, appeals the dismissal of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction or, in the alternative, affirm the post-conviction court’s summary dismissal of the motion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Because the petitioner did not comply with the statutory requirements for seeking discretionary review of the dismissal of his motion, this court has no jurisdiction in the case. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the chancery court erred in finding that the West Tennessee State Penitentiary Disciplinary Board acted within its jurisdiction and did not act illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently and substantially complied with its policies and procedures in dismissing Appellant’s claims that: (1) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy No. 502.01(VI)(E)(4)(a) by failing to dismiss one of the charges against Appellant; (2) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(c)(6) and (VI)(E)(3)(d)(1)-(4) by failing to call Officer Hankins; (3) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(e) by failing to independently assess and verify the reliability of the confidential informant; (4) the Board deviated from TDOC policy 502.01(VI)(E)(3)(i)(1) by finding Appellant guilty of possession of a controlled substance  without any evidence; and (5) the Board deviated from TDOC Policy (VI)(E)(3)(k)(5) by failing to provide detailed reasons for its decisions and failing to summarize the evidence which led to the Board finding Appellant guilty. We affirm.

Plaintiffs sued natural gas companies under the Tennessee Trade Practices Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-101, et seq., alleging that the natural gas companies conspired unlawfully to increase the wholesale price of natural gas. The trial court granted the natural gas companies’ motion to dismiss on the basis of federal preemption. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Karen Crespo and Freddie Crespo filed this medical malpractice action in August 2007, alleging negligence preceding the birth of their daughter, Laura Crespo, in December 2001. The defendants – OB/GYN physician Carol McCullough, OB/GYN nurse Jerilyn H. Boles, Tennessee Women’s Care, P.C., and Women’s Health Alliance, P.C. – moved for dismissal, claiming the suit is barred by this state’s three-year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims, Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116(a) (2000), as interpreted by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). The plaintiffs allege that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to their case. The State of Tennessee intervened to defend the statute’s constitutionality. The trial court dismissed the case, but stated in its order that “Plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments are important [and] worthy of review” and “would be best addressed by the appellate courts.” The plaintiffs appeal. We hold that Calaway’s interpretation of § 29-26-116(a) – extending the statute of repose to minors – effectively overturned a body of law that the plaintiffs had reasonably relied upon, and that the sudden reversal of those precedents, without any opportunity for the plaintiffs to pursue their vested claims, worked a violation of these plaintiffs’ due process and equal protection rights. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Kentrail Sterling, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s summary dismissal of his “Amended and Supplemental Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, and/or Petition for Writ of Error Coram Nobis, and/or Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus,” as well as his “Additional Amended and Supplemental Petition to Reopen Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.” The lower court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that: (1) it was outside the statute of limitations for both post-conviction and error coram nobis relief; (2) the issues raised had been previously determined or were waived; and (3) the convictions were not void. On appeal, the petitioner asserts that the lower court erred in dismissing his “petition for post-conviction relief without an evidentiary hearing” because “due process claims nessetates [sic] setting aside the statute of limitations.”  Following review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

This case involves a parental termination proceeding where Father originally consented to termination of his parental rights, but now appeals on the ground that his surrender was procedurally deficient and made under duress. Father also alleges that the trial court erred when it failed to grant him leave to conduct discovery on opposing counsel and when the trial court failed to recuse itself. On appeal we find no error; the trial court properly granted Mother’s petition to terminate parental rights, Father failed to present any proof that he was under duress when he consented to the motion to terminate or that he was entitled to depose opposing counsel, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s motion for recusal. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Marvin Anthony Matthews, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the lower court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The defendant, Mario Bateman, a.k.a. Mario Woods, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The defendant appeals his conviction and argues that the trial court erred by (1) admitting the victim’s dying declarations in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, (2) permitting the prosecution to inquire into a witness’s prior felony convictions on direct examination, and (3) allowing a witness to read his entire statement to police on redirect examination. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Taft Arkey Murphy, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court for Davidson County of possession with intent to sell three hundred or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, a Class A felony; possession with intent to sell twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, a Class A felony; sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine in a school zone, a Class A felony; two counts of sale of twenty-six or more grams of cocaine, a Class B felony; and possession of a handgun by a felon, a Class E felony. He was sentenced to eighteen years for each Class A felony, nine years for each Class B felony, and two years for the Class E felony, to be served concurrently. The defendant appeals and contends: (1) that the evidence is insufficient to convict him of possessing a handgun as a felon, and (2) that he was improperly prejudiced by testimony that the defendant had a murder charge. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Mario Ward, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of criminal attempt to commit voluntary manslaughter, a Class D felony, and aggravated assault, a Class C felony, and was subsequently sentenced to concurrent six-year sentences as a Range II offender. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of whether the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions.  Following review of the record, we affirm the judgments of conviction as entered.

The Defendant, Shane Kent Rogers, pled guilty to one count of violating a motor vehicle habitual offender order, a Class E felony, and one count of vandalism over five-hundred dollars, also a Class E felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a multiple offender to two concurrent three-year sentences to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it did not grant him alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights of V.N. (“Mother”), T.W., and any unknown father to the minor child K.B.N. (“the Child”). T.W. signed a Waiver of Interest and Notice waiving any rights he may have to the Child. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered an order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence of grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Child under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1-113(g)(1), (g)(2), and (g)(3), and that it was in the best interest of the Child for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to this Court. We affirm.

The petitioner, Anwar Proby, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. On appeal, the petitioner characterizes his petition as a motion to reopen and argues that it was timely filed because it was filed within one year of our supreme court’s holding in State v. Gomez, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007) (“Gomez II), which the petitioner claims announced a new rule of law that is entitled to retroactive application. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Review of the record indicates that the petition in this case was not a motion to reopen but, rather, the first petition for post-conviction relief filed in this case. Because the petitioner has failed to establish that the petition was timely filed or that a recognized exception to the rule applies, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

This litigation arises out of the renovation of and addition to a 100-year old house. While suit was pending, the plaintiff, Billy S. Walls dba B.S. Walls Construction (“Contractor”) failed to respond to interrogatories with respect to requested information regarding experts. He likewise did not respond to a motion to compel responses to the interrogatories and an order of the court compelling responses. As a consequence of Contractor’s inaction, the trial court refused to allow his two expert witnesses to testify. At trial, Contractor objected to the testimony of an expert tendered by the defendants, Jeffrey S. Conner and Tresia Conner (“Homeowners”). The trial court overruled the objection. Contractor argues in this court that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to allow his experts to testify and when it held that Homeowners’ expert was qualified to testify. We affirm.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The juvenile court terminated Mother’s parental rights to her eight children based on persistence of conditions and upon finding that she is incompetent to adequately provide for their care and supervision. Father’s parental rights were terminated based on persistence of conditions. Both Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law.  On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee’s expert and lay testimony established that his injuries arose out of and in the scope of his employment. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant, Denver L. Brown, III, was convicted in the Sullivan County Criminal Court on his guilty plea to aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. As part of the plea agreement, the defendant accepted a sentence of eight years with the understanding that the offense of which he was convicted was statutorily ineligible for probation, but he reserved the right to have the manner of service of the sentence determined by the trial court and sought community corrections. The trial court imposed incarceration. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in determining that he was statutorily ineligible for community corrections and that he should have received a community corrections sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Roland R. Smith, was convicted of four counts of statutory rape and three counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Subsequently, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that the sentence imposed violates the dictates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon our review, we conclude that the petition for post-conviction relief was filed outside the statute of limitations; therefore, the appeal is dismissed.