APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves an order entered by an Alabama court in 1996 regarding child custody and support. The trial court modified the order to require the father to pay future and retroactive child support. We vacate the portion of the order dealing with modification, because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify the order, and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Bobby Gene Walker, Jr., appeals his conviction for second offense DUI. The defendant claims there was insufficient evidence presented to the jury to sustain a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. After complete review, we affirm the judgment from the trial court.

The defendant, Doyle Winslow Smith, was convicted of three counts of rape of a child, all Class A felonies, and one count of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to twenty-two years on each Class A felony conviction and ten years on the Class B felony conviction. The sentences ran concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-two years. The defendant presents eight issues on appeal. He contends that: the evidence was insufficient; he was denied access to certain exculpatory evidence; the trial court had proper authority to appoint a special master to review evidence; the State failed to provide him with constitutionally sufficient particularization prior to trial as to the time of the alleged offenses; he received ineffective assistance of counsel; the trial court erred in instructing the jury; he was sentenced improperly; and the cumulative errors committed warrant reversal. After careful review, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

This appeal involves a dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff transportation company has its principal place of business in Tennessee. It provided transportation services and financing to the defendant foreign corporation. The defendant eventually defaulted on payments due to the plaintiff. After negotiations by telephone, fax, and email, the parties agreed to a payment plan to bring the defendant’s account current. They executed a letter agreement confirming the arrangement. Subsequently, the Tennessee plaintiff realized that a substantial amount of the services it had rendered to the defendant foreign corporation were inadvertently not included in the letter agreement. The Tennessee plaintiff filed a lawsuit in Tennessee against the foreign corporation, seeking rescission or reformation of the agreement. The defendant foreign corporation filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the defendant foreign corporation had not purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Tennessee and did not have sufficient contacts with Tennessee to be subjected to jurisdiction in this state. We affirm, finding that the circumstances do not support the exercise of either general or specific jurisdiction

This is a divorce case. The parties were married in 2004, had one child in early 2005, and separated in late 2005. The wife filed a complaint for divorce soon after, and the husband counterclaimed for divorce. During the separation, the wife was the primary residential parent. The wife took various prescription medicines for several conditions, and had previously been addicted to pain medication. At the time of trial, the husband was cohabiting with a young woman whom he began dating when she was seventeen years old. During a substantial portion of the husband’s scheduled parenting time, the parties’ minor child was in the care of either the husband’s parents or the husband’s paramour. At trial, the wife testified as to the amount of her annual income, but proffered no documentary proof or other evidence. The trial court designated the wife as the primary residential parent, reduced the husband’s residential parenting time, and used the amount of income to which the wife testified to set the husband’s child support obligation. The husband appeals. He argues that the trial court erred in designating the wife as the primary residential parent, in reducing his residential parenting time, and in failing to impute to the wife the income level set forth in the child support guidelines. We affirm.

The Defendant, Maurice Currie, was convicted of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to deliver and received an eight-and-one-half-year sentence. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to suppress the drugs discovered during the search of his residence and car. He contends that the search warrant that the officers executed at his residence was invalid because the reliability of the informant was based upon information received from another officer, not named in the warrant. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting, and then failing to set aside, its Order of Judgment against Appellant. Appellant contends that he did not receive notice that his case was set for trial, as the court clerk failed to enter his address into the computer system, although it was provided in his Answer. In his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Appellant sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01. However, in his brief, Appellant argues that the Judgment should be set aside pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 55.02, 60.01, and 60.02. Because Appellant did not raise Rule 55.02 before the trial court, and because a default judgment was not issued against Appellant, Rule 55.02 relief is inappropriate. Moreover, although Appellant raised Rule 60.01 before the trial court, the error alleged by Appellant is not a “clerical error” within the meaning of Rule 60.01. Finally, Appellant did not seek Rule 60.02 relief by motion, as required by the Rule, nor did he raise Rule 60.02 before the trial court . Thus, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. Additionally, we decline to find Appellant’s appeal frivolous or to require Appellee to pay the costs associated with this appeal.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in granting, and then failing to set aside, its Order of Judgment against Appellant. Appellant contends that he did not receive notice that his case was set for trial, as the court clerk failed to enter his address into the computer system, although it was provided in his Answer. In his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, Appellant sought relief pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01. However, in his brief, Appellant argues that the Judgment should be set aside pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 55.02, 60.01, and 60.02. Because Appellant did not raise Rule 55.02 before the trial court, and because a default judgment was not issued against Appellant, Rule 55.02 relief is inappropriate. Moreover, although Appellant raised Rule 60.01 before the trial court, the error alleged by Appellant is not a “clerical error” within the meaning of Rule 60.01. Finally, Appellant did not seek Rule 60.02 relief by motion, as required by the Rule, nor did he raise Rule 60.02 before the trial court . Thus, we affirm the decision of the circuit court. Additionally, we decline to find Appellant’s appeal frivolous or to require Appellee to pay the costs associated with this appeal.

This appeal involves child support in the form of funds to be deposited into a savings account. The parties had two children and divorced. The mother was the primary residential parent. The father was ordered to pay some child support, below the guideline amount, directly to the mother. In addition, he was ordered to open and fund a savings account to be used to pay the children’s uninsured medical expenses. The order also stated that, once the children reached majority, any amounts left in the savings account were to be disbursed to the children. The father never opened or funded the savings account. The mother sought an award for the amounts that were supposed to have been deposited in the savings account. The trial court granted such an award in favor of the mother, and the father appeals. He argues that the amount that he was ordered to deposit into a savings account for uninsured medical expenses could not have been considered child support because the unused funds were to be disbursed to the children after they reached majority. He also argues that child support payments he made after the children reached majority should have been credited against any arrearage related to the savings account. We affirm, finding that the amounts ordered to have been placed in the savings account were part of the father’s child support obligation, and that the trial court did not err in declining to grant the father credit against the award based on child support paid after the children reached majority.

A Williamson County jury found the Defendant, Darwin L. Bible, guilty of theft of property valued at less than $500; subsequently, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with 120 days to be served in jail and the balance to be served on probation. The Defendant appeals, claiming: (1) the State presented insufficient evidence that he committed theft of property valued at less than $500; and (2) the trial court erroneously sentenced him. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the conviction but modify the jail sentence to sixty days of periodic confinement.

The petitioner, Bobby Johnson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief by the Circuit Court for Madison County from his convictions for (1) attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; (2) aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; (3) aggravated assault, a Class C felony; (4) burglary of a vehicle, a Class E felony; (5) theft of property valued less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor; and (6) harassment, a Class A misdemeanor. He received a sentence of fifteen years for attempted first degree murder, two six-year sentences for aggravated burglary and aggravated assault, a sentence of two years for burglary of a vehicle, and two eleven-month-twenty-nine-day sentences for the misdemeanors. The sentences were imposed concurrently for an effective sentence of fifteen years, and all sentences run consecutively to a prior out-of-state felony sentence. He contends that (1) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel when (a) trial counsel did not obtain the victim’s medical records before the petitioner pleaded guilty and (b) trial counsel did not interview two potential alibi witnesses, and (2) trial counsel’s deficient performance induced the petitioner to enter involuntary guilty pleas. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, John Willis Webb, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Rutherford County for driving on a revoked license, a Class B misdemeanor. He was sentenced to six months in the county workhouse, the suspension of his driving privileges for one year, and a fine of $200. On appeal, he claims the evidence was insufficient to convict him of driving on a revoked license. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Jason L. Hoback, was convicted in the Franklin County Circuit Court of driving on a revoked license, third offense, a Class A misdemeanor, and a violation of the seatbelt law, a Class C misdemeanor. He was subsequently sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with five months to be served in the county jail, for the driving on a revoked license conviction and was fined for the seatbelt violation. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Following review, the judgments of conviction are affirmed.

The petitioner, Leroy Brimmer, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for first degree premeditated murder, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This dispute concerns the extent to which Appellant/Unnamed Defendant insurance carrier is liable for damages under Plaintiff/Claimant’s uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance coverage where Defendant’s motor vehicle insurance carrier became insolvent during the pendency of the appeal of the matter. The trial court held Appellant insurance carrier was liable for the judgment rendered in Plaintiff’s favor up to the amount of Plaintiff’s uninsured motorist coverage. We affirm.

Appellant, Richard Lee Nickens, pled guilty to four counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, three counts of theft of property valued at over $500, possession of drug paraphernalia, trespass, three counts of burglary of a building, and two counts of theft of property valued at over $1,000 in exchange for an effective sentence of fourteen years. The trial court denied any form of alternative sentencing. Appellant appeals this denial. We determine that the trial court properly denied alternative sentencing.

A bystander in a parking lot was injured by a ricocheting bullet fired by a police officer. The officer and a fellow officer had been confronted in the parking lot by an armed assailant who fired his handgun at or towards the officers. The bystander, contending that one of the officers was negligent when he fired his weapon in self-defense, sued the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act. The trial judge dismissed the case on summary judgment. We find that the police officer acted reasonably under the circumstances confronting him, and we therefore affirm the trial judge.

The petitioner, Gerald Pendleton, was convicted of first degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, and perjury and sentenced to life imprisonment for the felony murder conviction and twenty years each for the aggravated child abuse and aggravated child neglect convictions, with all sentences to be served concurrently. He was also sentenced to eleven months, twenty-nine days for the perjury conviction, to be served consecutively to the aggravated child neglect conviction. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the court denied. On appeal, the petitioner contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Luis Angel Cruz, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury on one count of aggravated child abuse based on injuries he caused to his five-month-old daughter, who was diagnosed with shaken baby syndrome. Following a jury trial, he was convicted of the lesser-included offense of reckless aggravated assault, a Class D felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range I offender to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, arguing there was insufficient proof to show that he was aware he risked injuring the child by shaking her. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Huey Strader, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Corrections, filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari in Davidson County Chancery Court, seeking review of the decision of the Board of Probation and Paroles revoking his parole, alleging that the Board acted arbitrarily and illegally by relying on hearsay evidence and on a confidential witness statement, in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and rules applicable to parole revocation proceedings. The trial court denied relief. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the Chancery Court.

The petitioner, Troy Lee Weston, appeals the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s dismissal pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Upon review of the record and the applicable authorities, we conclude the petitioner has failed to comply with the procedural requirements for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Shelby County Sheriff’s Department terminated the employment of Deputy Mark Lowe for violations of Department policies with respect to personal conduct, adherence to law, truthfulness, consorting with persons of bad or criminal reputation, and compliance with regulations regarding its code of ethics. The Civil Service Merit Board found Deputy Lowe guilty of the charges, but determined the punishment was excessive and modified it to a three-month suspension without pay followed by a one-year probationary period. Upon review, the chancery court affirmed the decision of the Civil Service Merit Board. The Sheriff’s Department appeals. We vacate the order of the chancery court for lack of jurisdiction and dismiss.

Mother appeals the Circuit Court’s finding her in criminal contempt for violation of a court order and the Circuit Court’s total suspension of contact between her and the child. Finding the criminal contempt to be proper, we affirm. Finding the total suspension of mother’s visitation was not the least drastic measure available, we reverse and remand for the court to determine whether the prior visitation schedule should be revised.

This is a post-divorce case where Father petitioned for modification of the child custody order based on alleged material change in circumstances. The Williamson County Circuit Court partially granted the petition finding a material change in circumstances, but that a change in custody from Mother to Father was in the best interest of only one of the children, leaving custody of the other child with Mother. Both Father and Mother assert error by the trial court. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand this case for further proceedings.

This case comes to us as an intra-family dispute over the validity of a nonagenarian’s inter vivos gifts and will devises. After this Court held that there was a presumption that Defendants had unduly influenced the decedent, the trial court found upon remand that the Defendants had overcome this presumption and, therefore, upheld the will conveyances and inter vivos gifts to the Defendants. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that Defendants rebutted this presumption of undue influence, we affirm the trial court’s determinations.