APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Stacey Wayne Creekmore, presents for review a certified question of law following his guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(I). As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless stop. The defendant argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, as required under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial of the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Inmate filed a petition for certiorari, seeking a review of a decision of the prison disciplinary review board, affirmed by the Commissioner of Corrections, finding him in violation of Tennessee Department of Corrections policy. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding it was not filed within sixty days of the entry of the order for which review was sought. Finding no error, we affirm the action of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the above-captioned appeal. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal as a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, viewing the action as an original petition for post-conviction relief, the petition is time-barred. Accordingly, the action of the lower court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Parents of two children appeal the termination of their parental rights, asserting that the grounds for termination do not exist under the facts presented. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Townsend, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1988, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of third degree burglary and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years, to be served on intensive probation. In 1989, he was transferred to regular probation. In 1990, probation violation warrants were filed, alleging that he had violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer and that he had absconded. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his five-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the order of the trial court.

The appellant, Justin K. Boldus, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the Dickson County General Sessions Court’s finding him in contempt of court and sentencing him to ten days in jail. On appeal, the appellant raises various issues, including that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We agree that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt of court. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is dismissed.

The petitioner, Dontae Lamont Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In this action for workers’ compensation benefits, the deceased spouse of William W. Brown, Jr., died of lung cancer. He contended that her cancer was caused by exposure to chemicals in the workplace. The employer, Erachem Comilog, Inc., contended that the cancer was caused by cigarette smoking. The trial court found for Erachem. Husband has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling.1 We affirm the judgment.

The Defendant-Appellant, Eric Wayne Dunn, pleaded guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and leaving the scene of a property damage accident, a Class C misdemeanor. For the offense of DUI, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail. For the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, he was sentenced to thirty days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail, and he was required to pay restitution to the victim. His sentence for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident was to be served concurrently with his DUI sentence. The Defendant-Appellant entered a conditional plea agreement and attempted to reserve certified questions of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. In an addendum to the judgment of the conviction for DUI, he set out two certified questions of law: whether he was unlawfully seized at his residence and returned to the accident scene and whether his alleged seizure would preclude admission of the breath test. Because this addendum was not entered by the clerk until after the notice of appeal was filed in this matter, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal and, therefore, it is dismissed. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2 to reflect the correct conviction offense of DUI (.08% or more) and a corrected judgment in Count 1 to reflect the dismissal of the offense of    DUI.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers’ compensation action in the Chancery Court for Maury County, alleging that he developed occupational asthma as a result of exposure to a substance in his workplace. The employer denied liability. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded benefits for temporary total and permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury, by finding that the statutory notice requirement was satisfied, and by awarding temporary disability benefits. In the alternative, the employer asserts that the judgment is excessive. We have determined that the awards for temporary total and  permanent partial disability should be reduced.

This appeal involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her son based on the ground of abandonment by willful failure to visit. Mother appeals, claiming that the trial court should have dismissed the termination petition because the petitioners lacked standing, or alternatively, because the petition failed to contain a notice provision required by Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 9A. Mother also claims that the trial court looked to the wrong four-month period when determining whether she failed to visit and erred in finding that her failure to visit was willful. She also claims that termination was not in her son’s best interest. Finally, Mother claims that her due process rights were violated in various ways. We affirm.

The defendant, Halbert B. Dodd, II, was indicted on two counts of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon and two counts of aggravated assault. The defendant applied for pretrial diversion and the prosecutor denied the defendant’s application. The trial court granted the defendant’s writ of certiorari and determined that the prosecutor had not abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion. The defendant’s motion for an interlocutory appeal was granted. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecutor had not abused his discretion in denying pretrial diversion and that the prosecutor’s abuse of discretion was evidenced by his: (1) characterization of the defendant’s past behavior as a “history of criminal behavior”; (2) failure to consider evidence which tended to show that the defendant was amenable to correction; (3) reliance on the defendant’s failure to admit guilt; and (4) failure to consider all factors favorable to diversion. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the order of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority that upholds the determination of the trial court that the defendant’s May 11, 2005, statement was admissible. While I recognize the difficulty of securing an attorney qualified to represent the defendant in this first degree felony murder case, I believe that the nearly two-month gap between his arrest and his confession to the offenses compels our concluding that the confession was inadmissible.

I concur in the result reached by the majority; however, I depart slightly from the majority’s chosen pathway to those results. Specifically, I would hold that the issues raised on appeal were precluded by the absence of a timely motion for new trial rather than by their absence from such a motion.

The defendant, Jeffrey D. Allen, was convicted by a Crockett County jury of first degree felony murder, criminally negligent homicide, facilitation of attempted first degree murder, and attempted especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, he argues that the sequestered jury was improperly separated and that the trial court erred by not suppressing his statement to police, ruling a witness unavailable, admitting prior bad act evidence, and allowing improper opinion evidence. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of a corrected judgment form to reflect that the defendant received a life sentence for his first degree murder conviction.

In this workers’ compensation action, the employee alleged that he sustained injuries to his back and neck. He reported two separate injuries, about a month apart, that occurred in different counties. The employer accepted the back injury as compensable, but denied the neck injury. The trial court found both the back and neck injuries to be compensable, that the claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and that venue was proper in the county of the first injury. The employer has appealed, alleging the trial court’ findings were in error.1 We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Frank Dodson, entered a guilty plea in the Franklin County Circuit Court to possession of cocaine, a Class C felony. At sentencing, the trial court imposed a Range I sentence of four years to be served on probation following the service of one hundred eighty days in the Franklin County Jail. In this appeal as of right, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying him full probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Oliver J. Higgins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petition for post-conviction relief fails as it is barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

A Bradley County jury convicted the defendant, Scott Lee Myers, of second degree murder. The defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by improperly qualifying two police officers as expert witnesses and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Paul Neil Laurent, was convicted by a judge of aggravated kidnapping, attempted aggravated sexual battery, aggravated sexual battery, two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure, and one count of attempted child neglect for which he received an effective sentence of seventeen years. State v. Paul Neil Laurent, No. M2005-00289-CCA-R3-CD, 2006 WL 468700 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 27, 2006), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2006). Petitioner filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which he argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition after a hearing. After a review of the record, we determine that Petitioner has failed to establish that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, John Tate (“Tate”), pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class D felony, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The Madison County Circuit Court sentenced Tate as a Range I, standard offender; imposed two four-year sentences for each conviction to be served concurrently, which were suspended; and ordered him to serve six months in the Department of Correction before serving the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation. In his appeal, Tate argues the trial court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) sentencing him to the maximum in the range, and (3) denying full probation. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing and remand the case for a resentencing hearing on all issues regarding the length and manner of sentence.

Petitioner, Ronald Edward Walker, sought habeas corpus relief for his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery. Petitioner argued that his sentences were illegal because the trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently despite the fact that Petitioner was on bail for a burglary charge at the time he committed the offenses. While the petition for habeas corpus relief was pending, this Court issued an opinion in another one  Petitioner’s cases. See Ronald E. Walker v. Ricky Bell, Warden, No. W2006-00644-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 121730 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 18, 2007) (“Walker I”). This Court  that Petitioner’s sentences for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery were illegal but determined that the error was “clerical” and did “not merit habeas relief.” Id. at *4. The matter was remanded to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. Id. The habeas corpus court in the case herein denied the petition for habeas corpus relief but granted Petitioner forty-five days to supplement the record with further documentation. Petitioner supplemented the record with additional documentation relating to his convictions. The habeas corpus court entered a “Supplemental Memorandum Opinion,” in which it determined that Petitioner was not entitled to relief because of this Court’s decision in Walker I. Petitioner now seeks an appeal of that decision. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court improperly dismissed his petition and asks this Court to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for resentencing. After a review of the record, we determine that this Court has previously ruled on Petitioner’s argument and that he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Appellant, Donald Knight, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for felony murder and aggravated child abuse after the death of five-month-old T.J.1 Appellant was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years at 30% for the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant received a sentence of twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, to be served at 100% in incarceration. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Appellant filed a motion for new trial that was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly denied a continuance and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. We determine that Appellant failed to show actual prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.