APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is the third appeal of this property case involving the ownership of three parcels of real property held by tenants-in-common. We dismissed the first two appeals for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the trial court's order did not constitute a final judgment. Plaintiffs/Appellants claim ownership of the disputed tract by three modes: (1) title by prescription, (2) title by adverse possession, and (3) title by payment of property taxes pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-109 and 29-2-110. Finding that Plaintiffs/Appellants have failed to meet their burden to prove ownership based upon any of the three theories, we affirm.

The defendant, James Edward Farrar, Jr., appeals from his Bedford County Circuit Court jury conviction of bribing a witness. He claims that the verdict is not supported by legally sufficient evidence and that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a compact disc containing recorded telephone calls that the State failed to properly authenticate. Because we disagree, we affirm the judgment of the trial court

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Nichlous Maxwell, was convicted of second degree murder. He was sentenced to twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal Defendant argues (1) the trial court committed reversible error by permitting the prosecutor to elicit a hearsay statement under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rules, (2) that the trial court erred in its response to jury questions regarding the instruction on criminal responsibility for the conduct of another, and (3) the trial court erred in enhancing Defendant’s sentence based on facts not found by a jury. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court as to the hearsay statements and the jury instruction and modify the judgment as to sentencing from twenty-five to twenty-three years.

This appeal is from a jury verdict against an automobile manufacturer for compensatory and punitive damages. The Circuit Court of Shelby County entered judgments against the defendant for $3,450,000 in compensatory and $48,778,000 in punitive damages for the death of the driver, and $1,100,000 in compensatory damages for the death of the front-seat passenger. The manufacturer on appeal asks this Court to reverse the judgment of liability or to grant a new trial on all issues. In the alternative, the defendant argues that the money judgments are excessive. We affirm the findings of liability for compensatory and punitive damages and we affirm the amounts awarded for compensatory damages. We also find that the amount of punitive damages awarded must be reduced to $13,800,000 to comply with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution.

This appeal involves a dispute over a real estate sales commission and a third party claim for rent due under a commercial lease agreement. The tenant and the owners of the rental property entered into a listing agreement whereby the tenant’s real estate company would broker the sale of the leased property on behalf of the owners. The property in question was two commercial lots. The tenant was able to procure a sale of one of the commercial lots, and upon close of the sale, tenant stopped paying rent to the owners on the remaining commercial lot. Tenant then brought an offer for the sale of the second lot, which the owners rejected and made a counter-offer. No deal was reached, and the owners terminated the tenant’s agency authority. Through another real estate agency, the owners sold the remaining lot. The tenant’s real estate company brought suit, seeking to collect the real estate commission. The owners sought the rent due on the unsold lot for the time remaining under the lease. The trial court found that the tenant was not entitled to a real estate commission, and that the tenant owed the owners rent, but reduced the amount due to the owner’s failure to  mitigate damages. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The defendant, Melvin Nettles, pleaded guilty to one count of sale of less than .5 grams of cocaine and was sentenced as a Range III offender in Davidson County Criminal Court to an effective 12-year term to be served in a community corrections program. On October 5, 2007, the trial court revoked the community corrections sentence and ordered the defendant to serve his sentence in the Department of Correction. From that order, the defendant appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the trial court’s denial of Defendant/Appellant’s motion to compel arbitration under an arbitration agreement contained in a nursing home admissions agreement. This is a direct appeal pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-5-319(a)(1). We vacate and remand for further proceedings with respect to the issue of authority.

Following a bench trial in the Union County Circuit Court, the defendant, Timothy A. Summers, was found guilty of one count of driving on a revoked license, second offense (Class A misdemeanor). The trial court subsequently imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days to be served. On appeal, the defendant raises the single issue of whether the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress. Specifically, he contends that the statements made by him on a videotape of the police stop, consisting of an admission that he was driving the vehicle, should have been suppressed because they were obtained as result of a custodial interrogation without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Following review, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the motion.

The petitioner, Frank Smith, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of two counts of rape and sentenced to eight years on each count, to be served concurrently. He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied his petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court

The defendant, Steven Davis, was convicted of one count of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to ten years in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Leon Flannel, was convicted by jury of one count of murder in perpetration of a theft and one count of premeditated murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment for both convictions, which were merged. The defendant now appeals, arguing that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and his conviction for murder in perpetration of a theft was unconstitutional; (2) the trial court failed to properly exercise its duty as thirteenth juror; (3) the trial court erred in failing to grant the defendant’s motion to suppress his statement to police; (4) the trial court erred in qualifying certain state witnesses as experts; (5) the trial court erred in admitting a letter into evidence without proof of chain of custody and proper authentication; (6) the trial court made improper comments regarding witness qualification and jury instruction; and (7) cumulative error in the trial proceedings requires relief. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the juvenile court’s decision to terminate her parental rights. The minor child has been in the custody of the Department of Children’s Services since he was five months old, as the juvenile court found that he was dependent and neglected. Following approximately sixteen months of services and a failed trial home visit, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights on the ground of “persistence of conditions.” We affirm.

This is a negligence action. Appellees filed a complaint against Appellant alleging that its employee negligently drove a company truck into the back of Appellees’ car. Appellant was granted partial summary judgment because a latent mechanical problem caused its truck’s brakes to fail. The trial court then held a bench trial to determine if the employee’s negligent driving was also a cause of the accident. Although it made no findings of fact, the trial court concluded that the employee was negligent, and awarded Appellee, Harry Jacocks $15,350 in damages. Appellant appeals, asserting that the evidence presented does not support the trial court’s judgment. Because we agree that the evidence was insufficient, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, David Pugh, appeals the order of the Hardeman County Circuit Court revoking his probation. The defendant entered guilty pleas, in three separate cases, to four counts of delivery of a Schedule II controlled substance (Class B felonies) and one count of possession of contraband in a penal institution (Class C felony). He was subsequently sentenced to an effective sixteen-year sentence, which was to be served on probation following service of six hundred days in jail.  Following his release to supervised probation, a violation warrant was filed in the three cases alleging numerous violations of the terms of the defendant’s probation. Following a hearing, the defendant’s probation was revoked, resulting in the reinstatement of his original sentences, which the trial court ordered to be served in confinement. On appeal, the defendant argues that the court erred in revoking his probation. Finding no abuse of discretion, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The petitioner, Michael Barnett Bills, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  He was convicted of one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to deliver, a Class B felony. He was sentenced to eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because she did not file a motion to suppress and failed to object to the introduction of a letter into evidence. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Erica Lin (“Plaintiff”) began working as a teacher for The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Defendant”) in 2002. During her employment, Plaintiff complained of actions which she believed to be discriminatory based on her race and alleged disability. Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter on April 1, 2006, informing her that her employment was being terminated effective May 26, 2006. Plaintiff eventually abandoned her race and disability discrimination claims and proceeded only on a claim for retaliatory discharge. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment claiming the undisputed material facts established that Plaintiff was terminated for poor work performance. The Trial Court granted the motion for summary judgment, and Plaintiff appeals. We conclude that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment neither negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim nor conclusively established an affirmative defense. Therefore, we vacate the order granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

This is the second appearance of the dispute between these parties in this Court. The current appeal arises from the trial court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff/Appellant Kim Brown (Mr. Brown). Upon motion by Defendant/Appellee William Shappley, M.D. (Dr. Shappley), the trial court dismissed Mr. Brown’s breach of contract action and awarded Dr. Shappley attorney’s fees in the amount of $500 pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. We affirm dismissal of Mr. Brown’s action under the doctrine of res judicata, but reverse the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions and the award of attorney’s fees.

The buyers of a home in Nashville sued the sellers for misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of contract. The proof showed the sellers did not acquire the proper permits and inspections required by the applicable building codes and that work on the plumbing, the electrical system, and the heating and air conditioning system was not performed in accordance with the codes. The sellers did not disclose the lack of permits and improper work on the statutorily required disclosure form. The chancellor found for the buyers. The sellers appealed. We affirm.

Ronald Steven Brown, the defendant, was convicted of the following offenses under four separate indictments: No. 14233, attempted first degree murder (Class A felony); No. 14232, attempted second degree murder (Class B felony) and assault (Class A misdemeanor); No. 14235, aggravated assault (Class C felony); and No. 14231, felony evading arrest (Class E felony) and DUI, first offense (Class A misdemeanor). The defendant was sentenced as a standard offender to an effective sentence of forty-three years, consecutive to a ten-year federal sentence. On appeal, the defendant alleges error in four areas: (1) The failure of the State court reporter to preserve transcripts of the pretrial motions and sentencing hearing violated his right of due process: (2) The trial court imposed an excessive sentence; (3) The trial court permitted the State to amend an indictment over his objection after the jury was sworn; and (4) He was sentenced in violation of Gomez v. Tenn., 127 S.Ct. 1209 (2007). After careful review, we conclude that the defendant is not entitled to any relief and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The defendant, Carl Junior Fritts, appeals the sentencing decision of the Rhea County Circuit Court. Following his guilty pleas to four counts of burglary (Class D felony), vandalism over $1000 (Class D felony), and evading arrest (Class E felony), the trial court imposed an eight-year sentence for each Class D felony conviction and a four-year sentence for the Class E felony. The court further ordered that all sentences be served concurrently with the exception of the vandalism conviction, which was to be served consecutively, resulting in an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred by: (1) imposing the maximum sentence within the range for each conviction, and (2) imposing partial consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err and affirm the sentences as imposed.

The defendant, Jason Glen Jacobs, pled guilty to the crime of child abuse, a Class D felony, in exchange for a three-year sentence with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. The crime occurred on September 17, 2004. Following a sentencing hearing on January 19, 2007, the trial court sentenced the defendant as a Range I offender to three years of probation.  Additionally, the defendant was sentenced to serve the first six months in confinement and was required to complete parenting classes. On appeal, he argues that he should have been sentenced to serve the entire term on probation without confinement. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Sharon Virginia Hinkley, appeals the revocation of her probation. After review, we conclude that the appellate record does not contain any documents pertaining to the conviction and sentence contested by the defendant. Therefore, we are compelled to dismiss this appeal.

This case involves the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court entered a pre-trial order requiring the defendant to produce various personal and business records and to compile a list of the assets belonging to the defendant and his businesses. The defendant failed to comply with or object to the order. At a contempt hearing, the defendant’s attorney assured the chancellor that the defendant would comply with the order if the contempt hearing was continued for two more weeks, and the chancellor continued the matter. At the next hearing, the defendant’s attorney stated that his client would not be complying with the order based on Fifth Amendment grounds. The chancellor held the defendant in civil contempt and ordered the defendant’s attorney to pay the opposing party’s attorneys’ fees. The defendant and his attorney appeal. We affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

The defendant, Delmar K. Reed, was found guilty by a jury of ten counts of harassment (Class A misdemeanor), one count of attempted aggravated burglary (Class D felony), one count of vandalism over $1000 (Class D felony), one count of vandalism under $500 (Class A misdemeanor), and one count of setting fire to personal property (Class E felony). He was sentenced to an effective sentence of nineteen years as a Range II, multiple offender. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial; and his convictions for harassment should have been merged into two convictions. After careful review, we conclude that no error exists and affirm the judgments from the trial court.

The petitioner, Cornell Poe, appeals as of right the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner alleges that his guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated burglary, one count of theft valued at over one thousand dollars, and three counts of aggravated assault were not voluntarily, knowingly and understandingly made due to the ineffective assistance of counsel and the alleged effects of the petitioner’s medication. After the appointment of counsel and a full evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court found that the petitioner failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence and denied the petition. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.