APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the appellant, Darnell Hubbard, of the first-degree premeditated murder of his wife, and he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior acts of violence against the victim. He also challenges the trial court’s admission of evidence relating to an ex parte order of protection that the victim obtained against him and other statements the victim made to her son and police. We conclude that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay statements from the victim in violation of the appellant’s confrontation rights. However, in light of the overwhelming evidence of the appellant’s guilt, the errors were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the appellant’s conviction.

 This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he developed carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his work for Employer. Employer denied the claim. At trial, an evaluating physician opined that the condition was work-related but admitted that he had no specific knowledge of the tasks performed by Employee in the course of his job. Employer sought to exclude the testimony of the physician, contending that it was based upon speculation. The trial court admitted the testimony, found the condition to be compensable, and awarded benefits. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred by admitting the physician’s testimony, that the evidence preponderates against the judgment, and by not applying the missing witness rule as to the treating physician, who did not testify. Further, Liberty Mutual contends that there is no evidence in the record that it was Employer’s insurer at the time of this injury. We dismiss the complaint against Liberty Mutual and otherwise affirm the judgment.

We granted permission to appeal in this case to address the circumstances under which the identity of a confidential informant must be disclosed pre-trial to a criminal defendant. Defendants Brandon Keith Ostein and Teresa Gale Foxx were arrested and charged with drug offenses after police officers executed a search warrant at Foxx’s apartment. The affidavit in support of the search warrant referred to information provided by a confidential informant. Ostein and Foxx filed  motions for disclosure of the informant’s identity. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that the confidential informant was a material witness and ordered disclosure. The State sought and obtained an interlocutory appeal, and the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the trial court. Ostein and Foxx sought permission to appeal, which we granted. Upon our close review of the limited record before us, we hold that Ostein and Foxx have failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the confidential informant is a material witness or otherwise important to their defense. The trial court ordered disclosure based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, resulting in reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained a hernia in the course of and arising from his employment. Employer denied liability. After a trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of Employer. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding. Because Employee has not filed a transcript or statement of the evidence, we find that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding and affirm the judgment.

The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in imposing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions against the defendant and its attorneys for failing to dismiss the counterclaim filed against the plaintiff. Prior to the trial of the case, the plaintiff filed a Rule 11 motion for sanctions contending the filing of defendant’s counterclaim violated Rule 11. Thereafter, the case went to trial on the plaintiff’s complaint and defendant’s counterclaim. At the close of the proof, the defendant voluntarily dismissed its counterclaims. After the trial was concluded, the trial court held that the defendant and its attorneys violated Rule 11 because the evidence presented at trial revealed that the counterclaim had no basis in fact or law and they failed to dismiss the counterclaim when the motion for sanctions was filed. We have determined the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard by evaluating the issue with the wisdom of hindsight instead of examining the circumstances existing at the time the counterclaim was signed by the attorneys, and for imposing sanctions for failing to voluntarily dismiss the counterclaim, because Rule 11 does not impose a duty to review or reevaluate a pleading once filed or to take affirmative steps thereafter to dismiss a previously filed pleading. Therefore, we reverse the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.

The Petitioner, David Wayne Smart, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The petition alleged that the trial court unconstitutionally merged the provision requiring a minimum life sentence for first degree murder and the provision prohibiting instructions on possible penalties to the jury. The Davidson County Criminal Court summarily dismissed the petition, finding that the Petitioner had failed to state a cognizable claim for relief. Following our review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the order summarily dismissing the petition.

The defendant, Luther Mowery, was convicted of failure to obey a traffic signal and ordered to pay court costs. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, a claim with which the State agrees. Following our review, we, likewise, agree and, accordingly, reverse the conviction and dismiss the charge.

The defendant, Stacey Wayne Creekmore, presents for review a certified question of law following his guilty plea to driving under the influence (DUI), second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 37(b)(2)(I). As a condition of his guilty plea, the defendant explicitly reserved a certified question of law challenging the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a warrantless stop. The defendant argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion, as required under both the United States and Tennessee Constitutions, to conduct an investigatory stop of his vehicle. Following review of the record, we find no error in the denial of the motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeal Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that Employee suffered a compensable work-related injury and that Employee’s workers’ compensation claim was not barred by the oneyear statute of limitations. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, David Andrew Campbell, pled guilty in eight cases, which were consolidated for this appeal, to one count of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony; five counts of theft under $1000, a Class D felony; ten counts of automobile burglary, a Class E felony; and fourteen counts of theft under $500, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eighteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending the trial court erred in setting the length and alignment of his sentences. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we conclude the trial court properly sentenced the Defendant. As such, we affirm the sentences imposed by the trial court.

Parents of two children appeal the termination of their parental rights, asserting that the grounds for termination do not exist under the facts presented. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Jimmy Townsend, appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for coram nobis relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the State’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1988, the defendant pled guilty to two counts of third degree burglary and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of five years, to be served on intensive probation. In 1989, he was transferred to regular probation. In 1990, probation violation warrants were filed, alleging that he had violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer and that he had absconded. Following a hearing, the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation and ordered him to serve his five-year sentence in the Department of Correction. We affirm the order of the trial court.

The appellant, Justin K. Boldus, appeals the Dickson County Circuit Court’s judgment affirming the Dickson County General Sessions Court’s finding him in contempt of court and sentencing him to ten days in jail. On appeal, the appellant raises various issues, including that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. We agree that the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for criminal contempt of court. Therefore, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and the case is dismissed.

In this action for workers’ compensation benefits, the deceased spouse of William W. Brown, Jr., died of lung cancer. He contended that her cancer was caused by exposure to chemicals in the workplace. The employer, Erachem Comilog, Inc., contended that the cancer was caused by cigarette smoking. The trial court found for Erachem. Husband has appealed, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s ruling.1 We affirm the judgment.

The petitioner, Dontae Lamont Brown, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The Defendant-Appellant, Eric Wayne Dunn, pleaded guilty to DUI, a Class A misdemeanor, and leaving the scene of a property damage accident, a Class C misdemeanor. For the offense of DUI, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail. For the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, he was sentenced to thirty days, which was suspended to supervised probation after he served twenty-four hours in the Dickson County Jail, and he was required to pay restitution to the victim. His sentence for the offense of leaving the scene of an accident was to be served concurrently with his DUI sentence. The Defendant-Appellant entered a conditional plea agreement and attempted to reserve certified questions of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37. In an addendum to the judgment of the conviction for DUI, he set out two certified questions of law: whether he was unlawfully seized at his residence and returned to the accident scene and whether his alleged seizure would preclude admission of the breath test. Because this addendum was not entered by the clerk until after the notice of appeal was filed in this matter, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider this appeal and, therefore, it is dismissed. We remand for entry of a corrected judgment in Count 2 to reflect the correct conviction offense of DUI (.08% or more) and a corrected judgment in Count 1 to reflect the dismissal of the offense of    DUI.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee filed a workers’ compensation action in the Chancery Court for Maury County, alleging that he developed occupational asthma as a result of exposure to a substance in his workplace. The employer denied liability. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded benefits for temporary total and permanent partial disability. The employer has appealed, contending that the trial court erred by finding that the employee sustained a compensable injury, by finding that the statutory notice requirement was satisfied, and by awarding temporary disability benefits. In the alternative, the employer asserts that the judgment is excessive. We have determined that the awards for temporary total and  permanent partial disability should be reduced.

Inmate filed a petition for certiorari, seeking a review of a decision of the prison disciplinary review board, affirmed by the Commissioner of Corrections, finding him in violation of Tennessee Department of Corrections policy. The trial court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, finding it was not filed within sixty days of the entry of the order for which review was sought. Finding no error, we affirm the action of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Marcus Deangelo Lee, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to reopen his petition for post-conviction relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court dismiss the above-captioned appeal. This Court is without jurisdiction to consider the appeal as a motion to reopen a petition for post-conviction relief. Additionally, viewing the action as an original petition for post-conviction relief, the petition is time-barred. Accordingly, the action of the lower court is affirmed pursuant to Rule 20, Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Defendant-Appellant, John Tate (“Tate”), pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a Schedule III controlled substance with intent to sell, a Class D felony, with the length and manner of service of the sentence to be determined by the trial court. The Madison County Circuit Court sentenced Tate as a Range I, standard offender; imposed two four-year sentences for each conviction to be served concurrently, which were suspended; and ordered him to serve six months in the Department of Correction before serving the remainder of his sentence on supervised probation. In his appeal, Tate argues the trial court erred by (1) denying judicial diversion, (2) sentencing him to the maximum in the range, and (3) denying full probation. Upon review, we reverse the trial court’s judgment regarding sentencing and remand the case for a resentencing hearing on all issues regarding the length and manner of sentence.

Petitioner, Ronald Edward Walker, sought habeas corpus relief for his convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery. Petitioner argued that his sentences were illegal because the trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently despite the fact that Petitioner was on bail for a burglary charge at the time he committed the offenses. While the petition for habeas corpus relief was pending, this Court issued an opinion in another one  Petitioner’s cases. See Ronald E. Walker v. Ricky Bell, Warden, No. W2006-00644-CCA-R3-HC, 2007 WL 121730 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Jan. 18, 2007) (“Walker I”). This Court  that Petitioner’s sentences for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and robbery were illegal but determined that the error was “clerical” and did “not merit habeas relief.” Id. at *4. The matter was remanded to the trial court for entry of corrected judgments. Id. The habeas corpus court in the case herein denied the petition for habeas corpus relief but granted Petitioner forty-five days to supplement the record with further documentation. Petitioner supplemented the record with additional documentation relating to his convictions. The habeas corpus court entered a “Supplemental Memorandum Opinion,” in which it determined that Petitioner was not entitled to relief because of this Court’s decision in Walker I. Petitioner now seeks an appeal of that decision. On appeal, Petitioner argues that the habeas corpus court improperly dismissed his petition and asks this Court to vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for resentencing. After a review of the record, we determine that this Court has previously ruled on Petitioner’s argument and that he is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the judgment of the habeas corpus court is affirmed.

Appellant, Donald Knight, was indicted by the Rutherford County Grand Jury for felony murder and aggravated child abuse after the death of five-month-old T.J.1 Appellant was convicted by a jury of the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter and aggravated child abuse. He was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to five years at 30% for the voluntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant received a sentence of twenty years for the aggravated child abuse conviction, to be served at 100% in incarceration. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Appellant filed a motion for new trial that was denied by the trial court. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly denied a continuance and that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. We determine that Appellant failed to show actual prejudice resulting from the denial of the continuance and that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

In this divorce action, the defendant, following the entry of the Divorce Decree, filed a Motion to Set Aside the Marital Property Settlement on the grounds that she did not agree to the same, and further was denied due process because she had no notice of a hearing resulting in the Divorce Decree. On appeal, we vacate and remand.