APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This is a negligence case. Appellant brought suit against Appellee alleging that Appellee negligently destroyed a piece of evidence. This evidence was relevant to a separate lawsuit involving Appellant. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellee finding that Appellee did not owe a duty of care to Appellant. Finding no error, we affirm.

The State of Tennessee ex rel. Mother filed a petition to modify the parties’ parenting plan. Finding the petition unfounded, the chancery court ordered Mother to pay Father’s attorney fees. However, upon learning that Mother could not be required to pay such fees, the chancery court assessed Father’s attorney fees against the State. We reverse.

This case arises out of a business agreement between the parties. Plaintiffs executed a note to purchase a company. The note contained a stock transfer restriction. Subsequently, Plaintiffs entered into a business agreement with Defendants. The subject of that agreement is disputed in this lawsuit, but Plaintiffs contend that Defendants purchased one-half of the company and executed an indemnity agreement to indemnify Plaintiffs for one-half of the note on the purchase of the company. After operating for nearly ten years, the company failed. At trial, Plaintiffs sought to enforce the indemnity agreement, and Defendants counterclaimed to recover $73,000.00 that they paid to Plaintiffs before they allegedly executed the contract. The trial court found in Plaintiffs’ favor. Defendants now appeal claiming that the trial court made several evidentiary errors, that the contract is unenforceable because it violated the statute of frauds, that parol evidence regarding the terms of the contract was inadmissible, and that the corporation cannot continue its existence and sell stock after dissolution. We reverse the trial court’s determination based on our finding that the contract is unenforceable as a matter of public policy.

The petitioner, Ricky Lee Nelson, appeals the criminal court’s dismissal of his petition for postconviction relief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals. We conclude that the state’s motion is meritorious. Accordingly, we grant the state’s motion and affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Lorne James Clabough, was convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping (Class A felony), aggravated assault (Class C felony), two counts of aggravated assault by recklessness (Class D felony), and evading arrest (Class E felony). The trial court imposed an effective sentence of twenty years. In our initial review, the convictions and sentences were affirmed. See State v. Lorne James Clabough, No. E2005-02133-CCA-R3-CD, 2007 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 8, 2007, at Knoxville), perm. to appeal granted, case remanded (Tenn. Oct. 15, 2007). Our supreme court remanded to this court for reconsideration in light of State v. Gomez II, 239 S.W.3d 733 (Tenn. 2007). Upon review, we remand to the trial court for resentencing of the defendant for his Class A felony and both Class D felony convictions, and we affirm the remainder of the sentence.

The petitioner, Charles Green, appeals the judgment of the Gibson County Circuit Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, the petitioner argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel which caused him to enter an unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. Following our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the court denying post-conviction relief.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee suffered a significant work-related injury to his left shoulder. An attempt to repair the injury by surgery failed. Employee had sustained a previous injury to his right shoulder. After the left shoulder injury occurred, he reported symptoms of bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The trial court found him to be permanently and totally disabled. It determined that his earlier injury had caused a disability of 15% to the body as a whole. On that basis, it assigned 85% of the liability for the present injury to Employer and 15% to the Second Injury Fund. Employer has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by finding that Employee was permanently and totally disabled. Employer and the Second Injury Fund also contend that the trial court erred in its method of apportioning the
award. We affirm the finding of permanent and total disability. We agree that the method  used to apportion the award was incorrect and remand the case for additional proceedings on that issue.

A McNairy County jury convicted the Defendant-Appellant, Joseph Ray Pinson (“Pinson”), of rape of a child. The trial court sentenced Pinson to twenty years in confinement to be served at 100%. The sole issue for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. However, we lack jurisdiction to review this matter because there is no order reflecting the trial court’s ruling on Pinson’s motion for new trial. Because the record clearly shows the trial court denied Pinson relief, we remand this case for supplementation of the record with an order denying Pinson’s motion for new trial.

The defendant, Andre Perkins, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of voluntary manslaughter, a Class C felony, and one count of theft of property over $1000, a Class D felony. The trial court subsequently sentenced the defendant as a Range I, standard offender to consecutive sentences of six years and four years for the respective convictions. On appeal, the defendant asserts that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; and (2) the sentences imposed are excessive based upon the erroneous application of enhancement factors, the failure to apply mitigating factors, and the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Following review of the record, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for voluntary manslaughter, and we affirm that conviction. However, review of the record reveals that the State failed to establish the element of value with regard to the theft conviction. As such, we modify the conviction to one for theft of property less than $500, a Class A misdemeanor, and remand to the trial court for re-sentencing. With regard to the sentence for voluntary manslaughter, we conclude that the trial court erred in its application of two enhancement factors. The record does support the trial court’s refusal to apply mitigating factors and its imposition of consecutive sentencing. Nonetheless, because of the errors which occurred in sentencing, we remand the case for re-sentencing in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion.

The petitioner, Adam Betts, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and is currently serving a sentence of life imprisonment with the possibility of parole. On appeal, he argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, specifically arguing that trial counsel was ineffective in: (1) failing to investigate the case or hire an investigator, to file certain pretrial motions, and to interview witnesses prior to trial; and (2) failing to litigate the motion to suppress the petitioner’s statement. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves an arbitration agreement executed when a resident entered a nursing home. The resident’s daughter signed the arbitration agreement after telling nursing home employees that she had power of attorney. The daughter later sued the nursing home on behalf of her mother, and the nursing home sought to enforce the arbitration agreement. The daughter then claimed that she was not actually authorized to act as her mother’s attorney-in-fact. The trial court agreed and refused to enforce the arbitration agreement. On appeal, the nursing home contends that the daughter was authorized to sign the arbitration agreement on behalf of her mother due to a document which, according to the nursing home, effectively granted the daughter power of attorney. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the daughter lacked authority to execute the arbitration agreement on behalf of her mother.

The Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his petition for post conviction relief. The Appellant filed his petition outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This is a breach of contract case. Purchaser/Appellant appeals the trial court’s finding that Purchaser/Appellant is in breach of the contract for sale of real property, and entry of judgment in favor of Seller/Appellee pursuant to the default provisions of the contract. Specifically, the trial court found Purchaser/Appellant in breach on grounds of late payments, failure to list Seller/Appellee as additional insured, and failure to provide proof of termite treatment. We modify and affirm on the grounds of failure to list Seller/Appellee as an additional insured and on failure to provide termite protection contract.

The Petitioner, Giovanna A. Sturgill, appeals from the order of the trial court dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the judgment of the trial court pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal appeals. We grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Brent Walker, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of three counts of second offense driving under the influence, which the trial court merged into a single conviction; one count of reckless driving; one count of refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol concentration test while driving on a revoked license with license revoked for prior driving under the influence; and one count of driving on a revoked license. He was sentenced to an effective term of one year to be served in confinement and five months, twenty-nine days on probation. The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Tyree Robinson, of first degree premeditated murder, felony murder, and especially aggravated robbery. On his first direct appeal, this court held that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct the jury, in response to its question, that accomplices could not corroborate each other and then remanded for a new trial. After retrial, the defendant was again convicted of the above three offenses and sentenced to life imprisonment and twenty years, to be served consecutively. On appeal, the defendant argues under an umbrella challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence that: (1) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that two of the witnesses, Ilyas Morris and Mieko Saulsberry, were accomplices as a matter of law, and (2) even assuming those witnesses were not accomplices, their testimony was insufficient to corroborate the testimony of the defendant’s accomplices. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court but remand for entry of amended judgments to reflect the correct offense date.

The defendant, Willie Andrew Cole, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of first degree premeditated murder and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court as a repeat violent offender to concurrent terms of life without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction and six years for the tampering with evidence conviction, to be served consecutively to a previous life sentence for second degree murder. In a timely appeal to this court, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of his first degree murder conviction and argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of his prior bad acts, not suppressing his statement, denying his motion to relieve trial counsel, and not addressing alleged prosecutorial misconduct. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Darius Jones, was convicted of one count of first degree felony murder, four counts of aggravated robbery, three counts of attempted especially aggravated robbery, two counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to consecutive sentences of life with the possibility of parole for the felony murder, ten years for each of the aggravated robberies and attempted especially aggravated robberies, and four years for each of the attempted aggravated robberies and the aggravated burglary, for an effective sentence of life plus eighty-one years. On direct appeal, this court affirmed all of the defendant’s convictions and his life sentence for the felony murder conviction but remanded for resentencing on the remaining convictions in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). This court also ordered that the trial court revisit the issue of consecutive sentencing and place its specific findings on the record.  After being resentenced to life plus fifty-four years, the defendant appeals again, arguing the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Following our review, we conclude that the trial court did not revisit the issue of consecutive sentencing and place specific findings in the record regarding its determination. Accordingly, we remand this matter a second time for the court to do so.

The Defendant, Rickey E. Hutchings, appeals as of right from the Williamson County Circuit Court’s revocation of his 1994 probationary sentence for possession of contraband in a penal institution. On June 22, 1998, a warrant was issued against the Defendant, alleging a violation of probation based upon the Defendant’s arrest in Gulfport, Mississippi for possession of approximately one hundred pounds of marijuana with the intent to sell. The warrant was not served on the Defendant until November 27, 2007, and was thereafter amended to include additional criminal behavior. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the delay between the issuance of the probation violation warrant and his revocation hearing violated his right to a speedy revocation hearing and, therefore, that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the warrants. Because the Defendant was denied the right to a speedy probation revocation hearing, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the warrants against the Defendant are dismissed.

The Petitioner, Rodney Welch, appeals from the Gibson County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his “Petition to Alter or Amend Sentence,” in which he seeks a judicial determination that the Department of Correction has incorrectly calculated his sentence end date and that he is entitled to immediate release. He also challenges the trial court’s taxing of costs to him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Plaintiff filed this Governmental Tort Liability Act action against the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County for injuries sustained during his arrest for driving under the influence following a vehicular accident. Plaintiff contends the police officers who arrested him were negligent in failing to recognize that he was not intoxicated but in diabetic shock, in failing to recognize that he could be restrained and handcuffed while standing, instead of in the prone position, and that he sustained a spiral, comminuted fracture of the humerus while an officer was pulling his right arm behind his back in an effort to cuff his hands. Following a bench trial, the trial court found the officers were negligent in the manner in which they assessed the threat posed by Plaintiff and were negligent in the decision to handcuff him in the prone position, which caused his injuries. The trial court, therefore, held the Metropolitan Government liable for the officers’ negligence, assessed 100% of the fault to the officers, and awarded Plaintiff $140,000 in damages. On appeal, the Metropolitan Government insists it is immune from liability because the officers’ actions were not the result of negligence but, it contends, the officers’ consciously and volitionally used an excessive amount of force that constituted the intentional tort of battery. Alternatively, the Government contends, if it is liable under a negligence theory, the trial court erred by apportioning no fault to Plaintiff. We have determined the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings that Plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the officers’ negligent acts and omissions, that the Metropolitan Government is liable for the officers’ negligence, that Plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, and that Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $140,000. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court in all respects.

The defendant, Jason M. Justice, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the trial court’s admission of evidence concerning an alleged robbery of the defendant by the victim, and the trial court’s admission of text messages between the defendant’s girlfriend and another witness. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee injured his back and knees at work. While he was receiving medical treatment, Employee offered a special retirement incentive package to decrease its workforce. Employee chose to accept this plan and retired while he was still receiving medical treatment. At trial, he contended that he was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court found that he was not permanently and totally disabled. The trial court also found that Employee’s recovery was limited to one and one-half times his anatomical impairment. Employee has appealed, and on appeal, Employee asserts that the trial court erred in finding that he was not permanently and totally disabled. In the alternative, he asserts that the trial court erred in applying the one and one-half times “cap.” We affirm the judgment.

The defendant, Marvin Senathan Hall, Jr., was convicted by a Tipton County Circuit Court jury of reckless aggravated assault, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and felon in possession of a handgun and sentenced as a multiple offender to four years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his prior felony conviction to be presented to the jury when he offered to stipulate to such, and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.