APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves a sexual harassment claim by a student against a school district. The plaintiff was a student at a high school located in the defendant school district. In her senior year, the plaintiff enrolled in a class taught by the defendant teacher. Several times during class, the teacher made inappropriate comments to the plaintiff. The plaintiff reported the teacher’s behavior, an investigation was conducted, and ultimately the teacher received a letter of reprimand. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against the teacher, the school district, and other school district employees in their official capacities. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the school district and its employees, and it denied summary judgment to the teacher. The plaintiff student now appeals the grant of summary judgment in favor of the school district and its employees. We affirm, concluding that the student’s claims essentially alleged civil rights violations and, therefore, these defendants are immune from suit under the GTLA.

A Van Buren County jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph A. Hale, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range I offender to seventeen years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because he was justified in using deadly force and because he committed the killing in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation; and (2) the trial court erred when it instructed the jury, precluding it from considering voluntary manslaughter. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves the termination of parental rights. The mother has a history of criminal activity and past incarcerations, including one for facilitation of murder, and is currently incarcerated. Between incarcerations, the mother lived with her boyfriend, the father of the two youngest of the mother’s five children. The mother’s boyfriend is incarcerated for raping and sexually abusing the mother’s two oldest daughters. With both the mother and her boyfriend incarcerated, the mother’s sister obtained custody of the children and filed this petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights, finding several grounds for termination and that termination was in the best interest of the children. The mother appeals, arguing that the termination order did not satisfy the statutory requirements, that the trial court erred in finding that grounds for termination exist, and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is not in the best interest of the children. We find that the trial court’s order, while less than optimal, satisfies the requirements of the statute as to one ground for termination. As to that ground, clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s finding, as well as the finding that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Therefore, we affirm.

A Dyer County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Devon Wiggins, of two counts of selling one-half gram or more of cocaine within a drug-free school zone, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty-five years for each conviction to be served concurrently with each other but consecutively to prior sentences. The trial court also ordered the appellant to pay a five-thousand-dollar fine for each conviction. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) Tennessee Code Annotated section 39- 17-432 (2005) violates due process and resulted in his receiving an excessive sentence; (2) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (3) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a bifurcated trial; (4) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on the sale of a counterfeit substance; (5) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on facilitation as a lesser included offense; (6) the trial court erred by not recusing itself; (7) the prosecutor’s closing statement was improper; and (8) the cumulative effect of the errors warrants a reversal of his convictions. Based upon the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Mother appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her parental rights based on persistence of conditions. We affirm.

This appeal involves the Tennessee Uninsured Motorist Act. The plaintiffs owned a body shop that was insured under a garage owner’s policy. The policy limited its uninsured motorist coverage to vehicles that were owned by the plaintiffs and listed on the policy. While driving to an auto parts store in a customer’s car, one of the plaintiffs was hit by an uninsured motorist and sustained physical injuries. The plaintiffs then submitted claims to the insurance company that issued the garage owner’s policy, and also to his customer’s insurance company, seeking recovery under the uninsured motorist provisions of both policies. After the claims were denied, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the uninsured motorist. The insurance company that issued the plaintiffs the garage owner’s policy filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no coverage because the policy did not cover the plaintiffs while operating a non-owned vehicle. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. As a permissive operator, the injured plaintiff was covered under his customer’s uninsured motorist policy. The customer’s insurance company settled with the plaintiffs, obtained an assignment of their rights against the insurance company that issued them the garage owner’s policy, and then intervened as a third party plaintiff. The intervening plaintiff now appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the insurer under the garage owner’s policy, arguing that the Uninsured Motorist Act prohibits such a limitation. We affirm, finding that the statute does not prohibit the limitation.

A Grundy County jury convicted the Defendant, Tammy Garner, of theft of property valued at less than $500. The trial court sentenced her to serve one month in jail, followed by nine months on probation, and to pay $500 in restitution. On appeal, the Defendant claims that: (1) the evidence presented was insufficient to support her conviction; and (2) the trial court erroneously sentenced her. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff, who paid for legal representation for his brother, sued the attorney for breach of contract, fraud, theft by deception and conversion. The trial court found that the suit had been commenced after the statute of limitations had run. The plaintiff appealed, claiming that his motion for default judgment should have been granted, the statute of limitations had not run, and the judge should have recused himself. We affirm the trial court in all respects.

This appeal arises out of the enrollment of a foreign judgment issued by the New Jersey District Court against defendants residing in Tennessee. Appellants contend that the New Jersey District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that the trial court, therefore, erred by enrolling the judgment against them. Finding that Appellants consented to jurisdiction in the New Jersey District Court, we affirm.

This is a direct appeal of a trial court judgment that modified a hearing panel’s order suspending an attorney from the practice of law for sixty days. The trial court did not disagree with the hearing panel’s findings regarding the attorney’s misconduct but determined that the punishment was too harsh and, instead, ordered a public censure. After an independent review of the record, we conclude that the hearing panel’s findings that the attorney commingled his personal funds with client funds, paid personal bills out of his trust account, failed to maintain proper trust account records, and failed to timely respond to Board inquiries were supported by substantial and material evidence and that this conduct violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. These violations, coupled with the aggravating factor that in 1998, the attorney was publicly reprimanded for commingling his personal funds with trust account funds and for paying personal expenses from his trust account, warrant the sanctions imposed by the hearing panel which require that the attorney be suspended from the practice of law for sixty days, that his trust account be monitored for a period of one year following reinstatement of his law license, that he submit trust account bank statements and ledger sheets every thirty days during this one-year period, and that he pay all costs of the proceeding. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment to the extent that it modifies the sanctions imposed by the hearing panel.

The plaintiff filed suit against a nursing home after her husband allegedly suffered a broken hip while he was a resident there. The nursing home filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the plaintiff could not prove the elements of her claim. The trial court concluded that the plaintiff’s claims were for medical malpractice rather than ordinary negligence, but the court found that under either theory summary judgment was appropriate. We agree with the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff’s claims sound in medical malpractice, but we find that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. Therefore, we reverse and remand this case for further proceedings.

The defendant, Justin Vaulx, appeals from the judgment of the Madison County Circuit Court removing him from community corrections and ordering him to serve his sentence in confinement.  Following our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the applicable law, we determine no error exists in the court’s revocation of the defendant’s community corrections sentence, and thus affirm the court’s judgment.

Plaintiff’s attorney appeals the trial court’s order summarily finding him in direct contempt of court. We vacate the trial court’s order, remand, and order the matter transferred to another judge for further proceedings.

This workers compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers Compensation Appeals Panel fo the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated ' 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee alleged that he sustained injuries to both knees as a result of an accident at work. The trial court found that he had sustained an injury, but did not have permanent impairment or disability as a result of the injury. Employee appeals, contending that the evidence demonstrates that he sustained permanent disability. He also contends that the trial court erred by ordering that he was not entitled to future medical treatment for he knees. Employer contends that the trial court erred by finding that Employee sustained a compensable injury. We affirm the trial courts finding that Employee did not sustain a permanent disability, but conclude that the portion of the judgment concerning future medical treatment was premature, and modify the judgment accordingly.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’  Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 506-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Employee sought permanent disability benefits for separate injuries, one to his neck and left shoulder and the other to his right knee. His authorized treating physician initially opined that he had sustained permanent impairment as a result of his work injuries. However, on cross-examination, the doctor stated that he was unaware that Employee had been receiving treatment for neck and shoulder symptoms for more than ten years prior to the work injury. He testified that, if true, such information would change his opinion. He also testified that a comparison of pre- and post-injury MRI’s of the right knee left him unable to opine with reasonable medical certainty concerning that injury. A second doctor,  who later performed surgery on the knee, opined that Employee had a work-related injury. The trial court found that Employee had failed to sustain his burden of proof. Employee has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. We affirm the judgment as to the alleged neck and shoulder injury and reverse as to the knee injury.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding that the phrase “taking up residence,” as used in the parties’ marital dissolution agreement, equated to cohabitation, and in finding that Wife did not cohabitate with an unrelated male in violation of such agreement. We are also asked to determine whether the trial court erred in finding no material change of circumstances warranting a modification of Husband’s alimony obligation, and in denying Husband’s motions to re-open and supplement proof and for a new trial, based on newly-discovered evidence. We affirm.

Defendant has appealed from a traffic court violation conviction based on documentary evidence created by a camera at a street intersection. The Trial Court affirmed the City Court conviction and defendant has appealed to this Court raising several issues. Upon review of the record and consideration of the evidence, we affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The defendant, Michael E. Stewart, appeals as of right from his convictions by a Polk County jury of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder in the perpetration of kidnapping, kidnapping, a Class C felony, and tampering with evidence, a Class C felony. The murder convictions were merged, and the defendant was sentenced to life and to eight years for the two Class C felonies, which are to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the life sentence, for an effective sentence of life plus eight years. The defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the felony murder and kidnapping convictions and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the defendant was taken into custody on outstanding warrants from other charges. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Walter Roby, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, a Class E felony. For his conviction, the defendant was sentenced as a Range II offender to three years incarceration. On appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Christopher Tyus, was convicted by a Madison County jury of one count of theft over $1000. He was subsequently sentenced to three years and six months as a Range I standard offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Aaron Duchesne, was found guilty of theft of property valued between $10,000 and $60,000, a Class C felony. At the conclusion of Defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to ten years, and ordered Defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to any sentences that might be imposed in case numbers 06-05119 and 06-04963 which were pending in Shelby County at the time of the sentencing hearing. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; (2) the trial court failed to perform its function as thirteenth juror; and (3) the trial court erred in its sentencing determinations concerning the length of his sentence and in imposing consecutive sentencing. After a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s theft conviction and the length of his sentence. We reverse the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

This appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) (2008). While serving as a police officer, an employee developed coronary artery disease and made a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The trial court granted an award of permanent and total disability. The City appealed, contending that the trial court erred (1) by holding that the employee's claim not to be barred by a prior settlement agreement, (2) by permitting hearsay testimony to be admitted as parol evidence, and (3) by calculating the rate of compensation based on when the coronary artery disease became disabling, rather than on the condition addressed by the prior settlement. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellant, George Anthony Braddock, was indicted for first degree premeditated murder for the death of his wife. Appellant was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We determine that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for first degree murder. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Louis Mayes (hereinafter “Mayes”), was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder. The only issue Mayes presents for our review is whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction. He specifically contends that two witnesses were accomplices as a matter of law and that his conviction was based on their  testimony.  Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’  Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee
Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee alleged that he sustained a compensable neck
injury. His employer denied the claim. The trial court found for the employee and
awarded 40% permanent partial disability (“PPD”). The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury occurred at work. In addition, the employer asserts that the trial court erred by directing a written inquiry concerning causation to be sent to the treating physician and by considering the response to that inquiry. We affirm the judgment.