APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Petitioners' Writ of Certiorari was dismissed as being moot because petitioners had moved outside defendants' jurisdiction. On appeal, we affirm and remand with instructions.

This appeal involves a challenge to an antenuptial agreement. Following the death of her husband, the decedent's wife filed a petition in the Chancery Court for Marshall County to have her husband's will and two codicils admitted to probate in solemn form. She later discovered that a third codicil that would have dramatically increased her share of the estate had not been properly revoked. When the trial court rebuffed her efforts to have the third codicil admitted to probate, she filed a petition to dissent from the will and to seek an elective share of the estate and one year's support. The decedent's daughters opposed the petitions based on an antenuptial agreement the wife had entered into with the decedent, and the wife challenged the enforceability of the antenuptial agreement. Following a bench trial, the court set aside the antenuptial agreement after finding that the decedent's wife did not enter into the agreement knowledgeably and without duress. The decedent's daughters appealed. We have determined that the antenuptial agreement is enforceable.

This appeal involves a dispute stemming from an effort to probate a will and two codicils in solemn form. The testator’s widow filed a petition to probate these instruments in solemn form in the Chancery Court for Marshall County. Prior to the entry of an order admitting the will and two codicils to probate, the widow discovered that a third codicil she believed to have been destroyed had, in fact, not been destroyed by her late husband or in his presence and that her late husband’s lawyer had made a copy of this codicil before destroying it himself. Accordingly, she filed a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to admit the third codicil to the probate in solemn form along with the will and the other two codicils. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form without mentioning the declaratory judgment petition. The testator’s daughters moved to dismiss the declaratory judgment petition, and the testator’s widow filed a motion for postjudgment relief from the order admitting the will and the first two codicils to probate in solemn form.  Following a series of hearings, the trial court dismissed the declaratory judgment petition and denied the motion for post-judgment relief. The testator’s widow appealed. We have determined that the order admitting the will and the first two codicils must be vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings regarding the third codicil.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. After a bifurcated hearing on the issue of causation, the trial court found plaintiff’s cirrhosis of liver condition was not caused by his exposure to methyl ethyl ketone (MEK) and methyl ethyl toluene (MET) and dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff’s appeal challenges the ruling upon the ground the trial court failed to properly weigh the expert testimony and also upon the ground the trial court applied an incorrect standard of law to the case. We find the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion of the trial court and affirm the judgment in all respects.

AT&T sued the Commissioner of Revenue of Tennessee to recover sales tax paid on central office equipment for the years 1995 and 1996 asserting that the equipment qualifies for exemption as industrial machinery. Determining that the outcome of the case was controlled by AT&T v. Johnson, 2002 WL 3124708 (Tenn.Ct.App.2002), the Chancellor held that the industrial machinery exemption was not applicable. We affirm the judgment of the Chancellor.

The defendant was convicted following a jury trial in Knox County for arson and aggravated burglary, as charged. The trial court sentenced the defendant six (6) months confinement and five (5) years and (6) months on probation to be followed by a second six (6) year sentence to be served entirely on probation. The defendant argues three (3) issues on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions; (2) the trial court erred in allowing testimony at trial contrary to the defendant's motion in limine which was granted by the trial court; and (3) the defendant's sentence was imposed contrary to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ----, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004) and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). After a careful review of the record, we affirm the defendant's convictions and remand for resentencing.

We granted review in this workers' compensation case to determine whether the trial court erred in awarding benefits to an employee injured while attending an employer-sponsored company picnic. After reviewing the evidence and applicable authority, we conclude that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of her employment and therefore is not compensable under the workers' compensation law. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment.

Appellant is a defendant in a delinquent tax suit by Williamson County for business personal property taxes for the year 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff because the defendant had not utilized his available administrative remedies, and Defendant appealed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Claims Commission. Student of the University of Memphis was struck by two vehicles while crossing the street from the University-owned parking lot to the University campus. Student and husband filed suit in the Claims Commission against the University and the State, claiming that Defendants negligently created or maintained dangerous conditions on state controlled real property. The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The Claims Commission granted the motion. We affirm the judgment of the Claims Commission in all respects.

Plaintiff/Appellant, a computer distribution company, sued Defendant/Appellee, a temporary employment service, for damages resulting from a temporary employee’s allegedly negligent act.  The trial court found in favor of the Defendant/Appellee on the grounds that Plaintiff/Appellant had not met its burden of proof to show negligence. We affirm on the grounds that the temporary employee was the loaned servant of the Plaintiff/Appellant and, as such, Defendant/Appellee is not liable for the negligent act of the temporary employee.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. In this case the employee, who had worked third shift for the employer, sustained extensive injuries from a one-car accident about twenty minutes after leaving the workplace. The employee contended that her exposure to the chemical toluene at work caused fatigue and drowsiness which led to her accident. The trial court found that the accident did not arise out of her employment and dismissed the case. For the reasons set out in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Gay N. Yarbro, was convicted by a jury of introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender to eight years in the Department of Correction for this offense, to be served consecutively to a sentence for
a prior conviction. Additionally, the trial court revoked the Defendant’s community corrections sentence for the prior conviction and ordered him to serve the original sentence in confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for introducing a controlled substance into a penal institution and further challenges the length of his sentence for that offense. The Defendant also challenges the trial court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence on the prior conviction. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the instant conviction, and further affirm the trial court’s order of revocation.

The petitioner, Antonio Gibson, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Tabatha R. White, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming that (1) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on circumstantial evidence and (2) that she received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel because her attorney failed to object to hearsay testimony, failed to request a circumstantial evidence instruction, failed to file pretrial motions requesting that the State reveal any plea bargain agreements it had made with the State's witnesses, and denied her the right to testify. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Joseph Gunter, was convicted by a Fentress County jury of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to concurrent terms of life without parole and twenty years, respectively. On appeal, he contends that the jury was exposed to extraneous prejudicial information about his case; the trial court erred in various of its evidentiary rulings and made improper commentary on the evidence; the State deprived him of potentially exculpatory evidence by failing to perform scientific testing on physical evidence recovered from the crime scene and by withholding new evidence discovered after the trial; and the cumulative effect of the various errors resulted in the denial of his right to a fair trial. The State argues, inter alia, that the defendant's appeal should be dismissed because his motion for a new trial was untimely. We agree with the State, and, accordingly, dismiss the appeal.

The petitioner, James Ray Bartlett, appeals from the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. In this appeal as of right, the petitioner asserts that the judgments of conviction for aggravated assault and four counts of theft are void because the sentences are illegal. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This appeal is before us following the reopening of Petitioner's post-conviction petition for the limited purpose of determining whether Petitioner is mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death penalty pursuant to our supreme court's decision in Van Tran v. State, 66 S.W.3d 790 (Tenn. 2001) and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242 (2002). The post-conviction court ultimately determined that Petitioner had failed to prove that he was mentally retarded and that the weight of the proof was that he was not mentally retarded. Accordingly, the court denied Petitioner's request for a new trial and denied and dismissed the petition for post-conviction relief. In this appeal as of right, this court must determine the following issues: (1) whether Petitioner proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he is mentally retarded; (2) whether Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203, as interpreted by the supreme court in Howell v. State, 151 S.W.3d 450 (Tenn. 2004), is constitutional in light of the principles outlined in Atkins v. Virginia; and (3) whether the absence of mental retardation is an element of capital murder requiring the State to bear the burden of proof and requiring submission of the issue to a jury. After review of the record and the applicable law, we find no errors of law requiring reversal. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of post-conviction relief.

The Appellant, Jimmy M. Millican, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Millican argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

This is an appeal as of right from a conviction on a jury verdict of aggravated robbery, and an appeal by the State from the sentencing decision. The Defendant originally received an enhanced sentence of eighteen years as a Range II, multiple offender, but his sentence was subsequently reduced to fifteen years by the trial court based upon Blakely v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004). On appeal, the Defendant argues there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction for aggravated robbery. The State appeals the modified sentence, arguing the trial court erred in reducing the Defendant's sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the conviction, but remand for re-sentencing in accordance with this opinion.

This matter is before the Court upon the State’s motion to affirm the judgment of the trial court by opinion pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner is appealing the trial court's denial of habeas corpus relief. A review of the record reveals that the Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The Petitioner, Nicholas Sanders, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Defendant, Lonnie Lee Owens, was convicted by a jury of second degree murder, abuse of a corpse, and theft over $10,000. The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to twenty-five years for the murder, one year for the abuse of a corpse, and four years for the theft. The trial court ordered these sentences to be served consecutively in the Department of Correction for an effective term of thirty years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the length of his sentence for the murder and also challenges the trial court's order that his sentences be served consecutively. We reduce the Defendant's sentence for the second degree murder conviction to twenty-four years. We further reverse the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences.

The trial court determined Plaintiffs had standing to bring this malpractice action against their attorney and that they properly filed the action within the statute of limitations under the discovery rule. The trial court apportioned fault between Plaintiffs, Defendant, and nonparty Shelby County.  The court awarded Plaintiffs damages for costs incurred, but did not award damages for lost property value. We affirm the trial court’s determination that Plaintiffs had standing and brought their action within the limitations period. We reverse the trial court’s finding regarding causation, and hold Plaintiffs were at least 50% at fault in this case. Judgment for Plaintiffs is reversed.

The Appellant, Lonnie M. Maclin, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, reckless aggravated assault, and two counts of aggravated assault.  As a result of these convictions, Maclin received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Maclin raises three issues for our review: (1) whether the indictment was invalid for failure to provide “adequate notice of the offenses charged in the indictment, or the court erred in the instruction to the jury”; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction for felony murder; and (3) whether his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping violates State v. Anthony, 817 S.W.2d 299 (Tenn. 1991). After review of the record, we affirm the judgments of
conviction.

Appellant filed suit against the county alleging violations of the Tennessee Human Rights Act, and the case was dismissed for failure to prosecute. Approximately three years later, Appellant filed a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion for relief from the order of dismissal. The trial court denied the motion, and Appellant appeals. We affirm.