APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This appeal involves the division of marital property following the dissolution of a nine-year marriage. The wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Chancery Court for Dickson County. Following a bench trial, the court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the parties' marital estate, and denied the wife's requests for spousal support and attorney's fees. The wife takes issue on this appeal with the manner in which the trial court classified, valued, and divided the parties' property. We have determined that the trial court's decision regarding the parties' marital estate must be modified with regard to the division of the increase in the value of the marital home and the increase in the value of the husband's retirement. Accordingly, we modify the judgment and affirm.

This litigation arose out of an automobile accident. The parties settled the plaintiffs' claims for $30,000; in due course, the defendants' insurance carrier paid the plaintiffs the full amount of the settlement. Sometime after the payment had been made, the defendants moved the trial court to hold the plaintiffs and their attorney in contempt because of their failure to satisfy the lien of a third party and because of their failure to pay a $500 attorney's fee ordered by the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants appeal the trial court's action, but only with respect to the court's failure to hold the plaintiffs' attorney in contempt. We affirm and hold that the defendants' appeal is frivolous in nature.

This is a medical malpractice case arising out of the postoperative treatment and care of Emit Greg Norris ("the child"), the minor child of Connie J. Norris ("the plaintiff"). At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the remaining defendants moved for a directed verdict. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had failed to present a prima facie case of acts or omissions of medical negligence that proximately caused the condition that resulted in the child's death. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

This is a suit to quiet title to real property. The issue presented is whether the trial court correctly decreed that any legal or equitable interest of Paul Richard Johnson in the real property purchased by Envision Properties, LLC was extinguished by operation of the doctrine of adverse possession. Based on the stipulated proof, we hold that there was not clear and positive proof of adverse possession sufficient to constitute an ouster of a co-tenant. Therefore, Paul Richard Johnson has an undivided one-fifth interest in the property. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

We granted appeal in this products liability action to determine whether the trial court erred in excluding as unreliable the testimony of the plaintiffs’ two expert witnesses, a mechanical engineer and a biomechanical engineer, and thereafter granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. We hold that the trial court erred in applying the nonexclusive list of reliability factors set out in McDaniel v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 955 S.W.2d 257 (Tenn. 1997). These factors are not mandated in every case in which expert evidence is offered and should not be applied unless the factor or factors provide a reasonable measure of the expert’s methodology. We further conclude that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

Petitioner, James Lester Qualls, appealed the decision of the Civil Service Commission, which had overturned the Administrative Law Judge’s decision and reinstated the Department of Corrections’ disciplinary actions against Mr. Qualls. Upon determining that the Civil Service Commission had failed to make written findings for review, the chancery court vacated the order and remanded the matter to the Civil Service Commission for findings. Mr. Qualls filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment to include an award of attorney’s fees. The chancery court granted the motion and awarded attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The Civil Service Commission and Department of Corrections filed a motion to alter or amend in chancery court and now appeal to this Court, asserting this action does not fit within 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and, alternatively, the attorney’s fees award is unreasonable. We dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Appellant, Devon Crawford, appeals the judgment of the Shelby County Criminal Court denying post-conviction relief. On appeal, Crawford argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. After review, the judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

Purchaser of a residence filed a suit against sellers and real estate agent for rescission of the contract and damages, claiming that Defendants engaged in misrepresentation by suppressing or concealing the existence of a TVA easement along the backside of the property. The Davidson County Chancery Court granted Defendants summary judgment and Plaintiff appealed. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects.

In this appeal, we are called upon to evaluate the propriety of the trial court’s decision to award a creditor a deficiency judgment against the debtor following the sale of the collateral after the debtor defaulted on the loan. The debtor filed an appeal to this Court arguing that the creditor failed to provide him with reasonable notice of the sale of the collateral and that the creditor did not conduct the sale in a commercially reasonable manner. We hold that the creditor did not provide the debtor with reasonable notice. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.

The defendant appeals his conviction for premeditated first degree murder and presents nine issues for review: (1) Sufficiency of the evidence; (2) Failure to dismiss the indictment due to prosecutorial delay; (3) Failure to suppress the defendant's statements; (4) Failure to suppress a crime scene photograph; (5) Admission of hearsay under the state of mind exception; (6) Admission of hearsay under the co-conspirator exception; (7) Admission of conduct and activities by Chuck Dixon with Cashbox magazine; (8) Admission of a tape recording and transcript of the defendant's conversations; and (9) Error in instructing the jury on aiding and abetting. After careful review, we find no reversible error and affirm the defendant's conviction.

Cumberland County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Dane Lee Duckett, of attempting to manufacture methamphetamine, simple possession of marijuana, possession of drug paraphernalia, and driving on a suspended license, and the trial court sentenced him to an effective sentence of six years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Eli J. Landry, Jr., pled guilty in the Davidson County Criminal Court to two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to concurrent sentences of thirteen years. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and intelligently entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties' briefs, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The defendant, Terry Boyd Collins, stands convicted by a Sullivan County jury of arson and presenting a fraudulent insurance claim, for which he received an effective nine-year sentence. Aggrieved of his sentence and convictions, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and claims that prosecutorial comments during closing arguments constitute reversible error, that the trial court's sentencing determination conflicted with the mandates of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and that the trial court erred when denying all forms of alternative sentencing. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the lower court.

After the trial court denied an inmate’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the inmate filed a suit against the trial judge seeking injunctive relief and damages pursuant to section 29-21-108 of the Tennessee Code. The trial court dismissed the inmate’s complaint for numerous reasons, including the judicial immunity of the trial judge. We affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint.

This is a property dispute between next-door neighbors over a gate across a driveway easement. The two neighbors shared a common driveway from the public road in front of both properties. After a clash between the two neighbors' dogs, one neighbor erected a fence on the boundary line with a gate across the other neighbor's portion of the driveway. This lawsuit followed. The trial court enjoined the defendant neighbor from placing the fence and gate over a portion of an easement that was the only existing driveway to the plaintiff's residence on the adjoining property. The trial court found that the gate was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of their property, and held that the defendants' erection of the gate constituted an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement. The defendants appealed. We affirm, finding that, although the gate may not have been an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs' right to use the easement, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's finding that it was not necessary for the defendants' use and enjoyment of the property.

The Defendant, James Yates, filed a pro se pleading seeking to have a conviction and sentence set aside as unconstitutional. The trial court treated the pleading as seeking a writ of habeas corpus and summarily denied the Defendant’s claim for relief. The Defendant now appeals as of right. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I fully concur with all aspects of the Court’s well reasoned majority opinion. Nevertheless, I wish to address the scurrilous, unfounded and unprofessional personal attacks made by Appellee against the person holding the position of and the Office of the Attorney General of the State of Tennessee.  Unfounded and unwarranted accusations such as those cast by Appellee accomplish little but to reflect adversely on the one casting. This jurist enjoys a heated exchange of differing opinions and an aggressive analysis of legal theories and principles. Moreover, I find such exchanges often productive, enabling the tribunal to get to the intellectually honest assessment of the case; however, scurrilous and unfounded personal attacks serve no legitimate purpose and have no place in the dispute resolution arena.

Petitioner, Charles Goode, appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief.  In this appeal, Petitioner argues that his counsel’s representation at trial was deficient because he failed to adequately investigate Petitioner’s case and failed to effectively cross-examine the victim.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendants appeal the refusal of the Chancellor to impose Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 11 sanctions against Plaintiff. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Jesse Teasley, appeals from the trial court's order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The petitioner has failed to establish a cognizable claim for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the State's motion is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Respectfully, I find I cannot fully concur in the opinion because, based upon the absence of a contemporaneous objection, it treats as waived the issue of the trial court’s “reading the aggravated kidnapping as a lesser-included offense out of order during the charge to the jury.”   The instructional problem alleged is one of instructional error, not instructional omission. In the case of the former, no contemporaneous objection is required, unlike when an instruction is omitted. See, e.g., State v. Johnny Wade Meeks, No. 03C01-9811-CR-00411, slip op. at 8-9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Dec. 3, 1999).

The trial court specifically found that the complaint herein was “duplicative of matters already settled and litigated by rulings of superior courts.” Nonetheless, the court decided sanctions were not appropriate due to the ambiguity created by the Special Master’s determination the case could proceed under the order limiting the cases filed by the plaintiff. The majority opinion agrees that the lawsuit’s clearance under the screening order and the Attorney General’s failure to challenge the result of that screening justify the refusal to impose sanctions. Thus, the test applied by the trial court and the majority of this court is whether the complaint complied with the screening order.

The appellant, Donald Luke Seiber, was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and two counts of sexual battery, and he received a total effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, the trial court’s jury instructions, and sentencing. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the appellant’s convictions but remand for a new sentencing hearing.

This is a petition to modify custody. When the parties divorced in 2000, the mother received primary custody of the parties' three children. After the mother sought an increase in the father's child support obligation, the father filed this petition to obtain primary custody of the children, alleging a material change in circumstances. The father later amended his petition to include allegations of physical abuse by the mother. The trial court declined to modify custody, finding the evidence insufficient to justify modification. We vacate the ruling of the trial court and remand for written findings on the abuse allegations, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-6-106(a)(8).

George R. Caldwell, Jr. and Angie R. Caldwell ("Plaintiffs" or "Mr. Caldwell" as appropriate) sued PBM Properties ("Defendant") for nuisance claiming that during Defendant's development of Blue Grass Heights Subdivision ("Blue Grass"), Defendant denuded the land altering water runoff and causing Plaintiffs' property to flood. The case was tried before a jury and the jury found that Defendant was 100% liable to Plaintiffs for a temporary flooding nuisance. The jury awarded Plaintiffs $3,820.50 in damages. Plaintiffs appeal claiming that the evidence supported a finding of permanent nuisance, the nuisance had to be abated on Defendant's property to be considered abated, and, the jury did not award the proper amount of damages. We affirm.