APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

We granted the State’s application to appeal in this case pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 11 to determine, in light of the 1989 Revision of the Criminal Code, whether the longhonored rule that a homicide is presumptively second degree murder should be abandoned. Because our current statutory scheme requires that each element of the charged offense be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, we hold that the second degree murder presumption is now obsolete. Additionally, we have addressed the sufficiency of the evidence without engaging the presumption, and we conclude that the evidence presented is insufficient to convict the defendant of first degree murder (premeditated) beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence is, however, sufficient to support the conclusion that the defendant knowingly killed the victim and, thereby, committed second degree murder. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction entered by the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

The plaintiff is a former University of Tennessee faculty member. He was dismissed from his position after the defendant corporate officer circulated a letter to government officials accusing him of using numerous deceptions in the procurement of a grant from the United States Department of Energy. The plaintiff's pro se defamation lawsuit named the defendant in both his individual and his corporate capacities. The trial court dismissed the claim against the defendant in his individual capacity under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(6) and certified the dismissal as final under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02 so it could be appealed. We reverse the trial court.

Respondent appeals to set aside an Order of Protection entered by the Trial Court. She argues the evidence does not support the Order. We affirm.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with the Tenn. Code Ann. Section §50-6-225 (e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The appellant, employer, argues that the trial court erred in finding that the employee sustained a permanently disabling condition while employed with the appellant and that if she did, the trial court’s award of 25% permanent partial disability to each arm is excessive and is contrary to the weight of the evidence.  The appellee, employee, argues that the trial court’s ruling was correct and should be affirmed. For the reasons discussed below, the panel has concluded that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects.

Plaintiff purchased real property at delinquent tax sale and in a declaratory judgment action the Trial Court held the sale included a mobile home located on the land. On appeal, we reverse.

The appellant, Adam Dewey Householder, pled guilty to theft over $10,000, a Class C felony. He received a four year sentence, with nine months to be served in the county jail and the remainder on supervised probation. In addition, he was ordered to pay $26,820.00 in restitution. On appeal, he argues that the trial court erred in denying judicial diversion and in ordering a sentence of split confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is an appeal from convictions on a jury verdict of criminal trespass of a habitation, especially aggravated kidnapping, misdemeanor reckless endangerment, and theft of property over $1,000. The Defendant was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days for his misdemeanor trespass and reckless endangerment convictions, two years for his theft conviction, and twenty years as a violent offender for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. All of the sentences were to be served concurrently for an effective twenty year term of incarceration in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges only his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping, asserting there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for this offense. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Steven Bradley Heflin, was originally indicted for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony. The defendant entered an open plea of guilty to reckless aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class D felony, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-102(a)(2)(B), as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant was sentenced to four years, to serve nine months with the remainder on probation. The defendant now appeals the sentence, contending that certain enhancement factors were applied in error and that one mitigating factor was improperly rejected. After review, we remand the cause to modify the sentence to three years, to serve nine months and the remainder on probation.

The plaintiffs suffered damage to personal property at a location other than as described in a policy of insurance. They failed in their attempt to recover on the policy, and filed suit against the issuing agency, claiming that the agency knew or should have known that they desired coverage not only at their business address but also at their residence. The signed application listed only their service address, and the loss occurred at their residence. Summary judgment was entered for the defendant.

The defendant, Kerry D. Hewson, appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of aggravated assault, for which he received an incarcerative sentence of six years, and reckless endangerment, for which he received a concurrent incarcerative sentence of two years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence, the lack of a jury instruction on reckless driving as a lesser included offense of reckless endangerment, and the trial court's sentencing determinations. Following our review, we affirm the convictions but modify the sentencing determinations.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with the provisions ofTennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Worker, Darrell Denney, has appealed the action of the trial court, which dismissed his cause of action, finding that his injury was entirely degenerative in nature, and was not caused by his employment, nor was it aggravated or exacerbated by his employment sufficient to cause the claim to be compensable under the terms of the Worker's Compensation law. Upon our consideration of all of the evidence, we find that the evidence preponderates in favor of a finding of an exacerbation of the Worker's underlying condition, to cause the injury to be compensable. Thus, we find that the decision of the trial court should be reversed, that the Worker is entitled to an order holding him harmless frommedical expenses incurred, that he is entitled to an award of temporary total disability fromthe date he left his employer until the date when he returned to work, and that the Worker should be compensated in a sum of 70% vocational disability apportioned to the right arm. We remand the case to the trial court for determination of remaining issues, including commutation of the award, to the extent it has not fully accrued, any offsets which may be applicable, collection of costs, and such further matters which arise in accordance with the terms of this opinion.

The defendant, Joe Shelton Berry, pled no contest to one count of rape. The trial court sentenced the defendant to eight years at 100%, but suspended service of the sentence and placed him on supervised probation. Thereafter, the trial court revoked the defendant's probation and placed his entire sentence into effect. On appeal, the defendant challenges the trial court's revocation of his probation. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Dennis Hodges, of two counts of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court merged the first count into the second count and sentenced the appellant to fifteen years as a Range III, persistent offender. In this appeal, the appellant claims (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions, (2) that the State made improper closing argument, and (3) that his sentence is excessive. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Washington County Criminal Court jury convicted the defendant, Patrick Hyder, of two counts of aggravated sexual battery, a class B felony, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years for each count to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in reassembling the jury to announce its verdict and polling the jury after it had been discharged. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a personal injury lawsuit filed by William E. Castle ("Plaintiff"), an inmate at the Brushy Mountain Correctional Complex. As a trustee, Plaintiff was allowed to work as a carpenter for the defendant State of Tennessee, Department of Correction (the "State"). Rick Cox Construction Company was a contractor building an addition to the Batley Baptist Church, and Plaintiff and other inmates assisted with this construction. Plaintiff was injured when he fell from a scaffold while working at the Batley Baptist Church. Plaintiff bought this negligence claim against the State, Rick Cox Construction Company, and Batley Baptist Church. The Trial Court granted the State's motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity. The Trial Court later granted motions for summary judgment filed by the remaining two defendants. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

City-County Federal Credit Union ("Plaintiff") filed suit in the General Sessions Court seeking over $12,000 it claimed was owed on a VISA credit card it had issued to Suzanne E. Linboe ("Defendant"). After Plaintiff was awarded a judgment by the General Sessions Court, Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss and Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The Circuit Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss and granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, awarding Plaintiff a judgment for $15,323.10. Defendant appeals, and we affirm.

Texaco Refining & Marketing, Inc. applied for reimbursement of remediation expenses pursuant to the Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Act. When Texaco's application was denied by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Underground Storage Tanks, Texaco filed this Declaratory Judgment action seeking a ruling that it was eligible for reimbursement from the storage tank fund. The Chancery Court granted Texaco's motion for summary judgment from which the Department appeals. We reverse finding Texaco was not in substantial compliance with the Act because it failed to timely report releases of petroleum, and it had no vested right to reimbursement.

The issues in this case are whether the trial court erred in granting a non-custodial parent unsupervised visitation and in limiting the number of witnesses at trial. Father, the custodial parent of the minor child, contends that the trial court's grant of unsupervised visitation to mother is not in the child's best interest and ignores evidence that mother abused the child. Father also argues that the trial court erred in refusing to hear witness testimony as to mother's abuse of the child and as to mother's mendacity. We find that the evidence supports a finding that unsupervised visitation is in the child's best interest and, therefore, the trial court's award of unsupervised visitation to mother was not an abuse of discretion. We further find that the witness testimony excluded by the trial court was cumulative, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the witnesses. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand.

The defendant, Herman Parham, was convicted of two counts of second degree murder. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of twenty-five years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction, that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on flight, and that the sentence is excessive. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Plaintiff/Appellant owner of jet ski customizing business brought defamation action against defendants alleging libel, civil conspiracy and false light invasion of privacy stemming from statements defendants made about plaintiff, which were published on an Internet news group. The trial court held that venue was proper in Warren County, Tennessee, and that the court had jurisdiction over out-of-state resident defendants. Finding that plaintiff was a public figure for purposes of libel action, that plaintiff could not prove actual malice, and that plaintiff failed to show actual damage, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

The defendant, Harvey Lillard Webb, was indicted for premeditated first degree murder. He was convicted by a jury of the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. He was sentenced to twenty years in confinement as a violent offender. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Rolando Contreras, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed.

The pro se petitioner, Jay Homer Chambers, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred by dismissing his petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing. Following our review, we reverse the summary dismissal of the petition and remand for reconsideration of the petitioner's claim that appellate counsel was ineffective.

The Trial Court refused to terminate the mother's parental rights to MEI. On appeal, we vacate the Judgment and remand for further proceedings.

The petitioner, Joseph Miles, appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The single issue presented for review is whether the petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The judgment is affirmed.