APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The employer in this workers’ compensation action has appealed from a judgment of the Circuit Court of Henry County finding that the employee suffered a work-related back injury. The trial court awarded the employee benefits based on 30% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer contends on appeal that the medical proof, which does not include any medical testimony, is insufficient to establish a causal connection between the employee’s injury and her employment. The dispositive question before this Court is whether the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s finding that the employee’s injury arose out of her employment. We conclude that the record and applicable law support the trial court’s decision to award benefits. We further hold that a local rule of the 24th Judicial District which prohibits the taking of medical depositions in workers’ compensation cases absent leave of court is invalid. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

This action stems from a petition for child support and a subsequent petition to modify child support.  In this appeal, the appellant has presented numerous issues for review. However, this Court finds one issue dispositive of the case: whether the trial court complied with Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58 when it entered its order establishing child support and its subsequent order modifying child support. We dismiss this appeal and remand for entry of both orders pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 58.

The Defendant, Albert James Saavedra, was indicted on one count of first degree murder and one count of attempted first degree murder. He was convicted for the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and for the indicted offense of attempted first degree murder. The trial court reduced the conviction for attempted first degree murder to attempted second degree murder, finding that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the Defendant acted with premeditation. The trial court also sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fourteen years in the Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, contending that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for attempted second degree murder; (2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser-included offense of attempted first degree murder; (3) the trial court erred when it took his motion for judgment of acquittal under advisement and when it denied this motion with respect to attempted second degree murder; and (4) the trial court erred when it denied his Rule 33(f) motion. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Robertson County Grand Jury indicted Mark Allen with one count of exhibition of materials harmful to a minor, one count of especially aggravated sexual exploitation, and one count of rape of a child. Michelle Allen was indicted with three counts of rape of a child. Following a jury trial, Mr. Allen was convicted of all three counts, and Mrs. Allen was convicted for two counts of rape of a child. The third count was dismissed. The trial court sentenced Mr. Allen to an effective sentence of twenty-four years and Mrs. Allen to an effective sentence of twenty-one years. The defendants appeal the judgments of the trial court. They argue that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions and that the trial court erred in sentencing them. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Waymon Perry Russell, filed a petition in the Hardeman County Circuit Court seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner alleged that the trial court imposed concurrent sentences when consecutive sentencing was mandatory. The habeas corpus court dismissed the petition without appointing counsel or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The petitioner challenges the dismissal. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the
habeas corpus court.

The State of Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“the State”) filed a Petition for Temporary Custody of N.T.B. (“the Child”) in July of 2002, alleging, among other things, that the Child was abused and/or dependent and neglected. The Juvenile Court held that the Child was a dependent and neglected child within the meaning of the law and awarded temporary custody of the Child to the State. Reba Johnson (“Mother”) and Michael Blevins (“Father”) appealed the Juvenile Court order to the Circuit Court (“Trial Court”), and the case was tried. After trial, the Trial Court found and held, inter alia, that the Child was a dependent and neglected child within the meaning of the law and that the Child had suffered severe abuse pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(21)(A) while in the care of his parents. Mother and Father appeal. We affirm.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, William Rhea Jackson, of robbery, rape, aggravated burglary, attempted rape, aggravated kidnapping, and misdemeanor theft. This Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals, contending that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the circuit court erred when it dismissed the appellant’s class action suit based on lack of standing and primary jurisdiction. On appeal, the appellant asserts that she had standing to bring her suit and that the circuit court should not have declined to exercise jurisdiction based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. We affirm.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Petitioner, Gerald E. Johnson, pled guilty to one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver under 0.5 grams of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to seven years as a Range II, multiple offender. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court dismissed after a hearing. The Petitioner appeals, contending that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable law, we conclude that there exists no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The trial court held that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by sending notice to a mortgagee of an impending tax sale of the mortgaged property by regular mail. We reverse.

The defendant, Jermeil Tarter, was convicted of one count of sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school, one count of delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school, and one count of possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine within one thousand feet of a school. The trial court initially merged the convictions for delivery and possession of cocaine into the conviction for the sale of cocaine and then later dismissed the convictions for delivery of cocaine and possession of cocaine. The trial court imposed a Range I sentence of twenty years in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions, that the trial court erred by permitting the surveillance tape to be admitted into evidence, and that the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to vouch for the truthfulness of the state's witnesses. The state challenges on appeal the trial court's ruling dismissing the conviction for possession of cocaine. The convictions and sentence are affirmed. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the convictions for delivery and possession of cocaine is reversed. The judgment of conviction for sale of more than .5 grams of cocaine is modified to show that the convictions for delivery of more than .5 grams of cocaine and possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine have been merged into one judgment.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, Joseph Bryan Adair, was convicted of driving at a speed of 69 miles per hour in a 50 miles per hour speed zone, a Class C misdemeanor. The Defendant now appeals, contending that his traffic citation was invalid because it was not signed by the State Trooper who issued the ticket. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the second civil action between these parties. In both civil actions, Mr. Federico brought suit against Aladdin Industries for breach of a written employment agreement. In the first action, Federico only sought recovery of a bonus. In this second action Federico seeks to recover the value of a so-called “phantom unit” equity plan provided for in the employment agreement. Both claims were based on the same employment agreement. Aladdin filed a motion for summary judgment contending res judicata barred this second action. The trial court granted Aladdin’s motion, and we affirm.

The defendant, Charles Humphries, was convicted of first degree premeditated murder and aggravated assault (a Class C felony) and received Range II consecutive sentences of life imprisonment and ten years. On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to establish
the element of premeditation and the imposition of consecutive sentences. Upon thorough review, we affirm the convictions and sentences of the Shelby County Criminal Court.

The majority affirms the Defendant Whited’s conviction for aggravated assault concluding that “a rational jury could easily infer that [seventeen-month-old] Tristian was in reasonable fear of imminent bodily injury . . . .” For the reasons discussed below, I respectfully dissent.

The Defendants were convicted of second degree murder and reckless endangerment. Defendant Whited was also convicted of three counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, both Defendants argue that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence of certain activity they engaged in after the crimes were committed, and that the evidence is insufficient to support their convictions.  Defendant Whited argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress the statement he gave to the police. Both Defendants also challenge the trial court’s sentencing determination.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments in all respects.

The Petitioner, Corvack Shaw, appeals the lower court’s denial of his motion requesting relief  from an invalid sentence. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to establish his entitlement to relief from an unconstitutional or invalid sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

This is a premises liability case arising from Plaintiff/Guests’ fall over a landscaping wall while walking down Defendants/Homeowners’ walkway after dark. The trial court granted summary judgment to Defendants/Homeowners. Finding that there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the lighting conditions created a dangerous condition on the Defendants/Homeowners’ property, and that McIntyre requires a comparison of the respective negligence of the parties, we reverse and remand.

The defendant, Marshall Ward Howell, entered a plea of guilty to sale of a controlled substance. The trial court imposed a sentence of eight years to be served in a community corrections program after service of a period of incarceration. Five months after his conviction, the community corrections sentence was revoked and the defendant was ordered to serve the remainder of his term in the Department of Correction. In this appeal, the single issue presented for review is whether revocation was proper. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The defendant, Christa G. Pike, appeals her conviction for attempted first degree premeditated murder, a Class A felony. The defendant contends she was acting in defense of a third party, an inmate, and that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. Finding no error at trial, we affirm the conviction.

Respectfully, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the prosecutor’s rejection of pretrial diversion rests upon sold legal bases. To be sure, the prosecutor carefully considered and discussed all criteria relevant to his pretrial diversion determination. Thus, my departure from the majority is not grounded upon any shortcomings in the prosecutor’s effort; rather, I conclude that despite his thorough response to the petition, he ultimately relied upon grounds that do not legally support the denial of diversion.

Defendant, James N. Harrell, seeks interlocutory review of the Warren County Circuit Court’s affirmance of the State’s denial of his application for pretrial diversion. Defendant is charged with vehicular homicide by recklessness, four counts of reckless aggravated assault, underage possession and consumption of alcohol, and underage driving while impaired. After unsuccessfully requesting pretrial diversion, Defendant appealed to the trial court, who determined that the district attorney general had not abused his discretion when denying Defendant’s request. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I agree with the results reached by the trial court – including the award of attorney’s fees – as affirmed by the majority opinion. I write separately to express my disagreement with the appellant’s belief and the majority’s belief that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the custodial arrangement. I recognize that the trial court did not find a change in circumstances warranting a change in the identity of the primary residential parent. However, I believe the trial court did find that the circumstances regarding the child’s custodial arrangement had changed so as to “affect[] the child’s well-being in a meaningful way,” Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tenn. 2002); and that it then proceeded to (1) modify the existing parenting plan by transferring decision-making authority regarding the educational/extracurricular activities of the child from the father to the mother and (2) grant the mother the right to obtain a second opinion as to medical matters.

I concur with that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the judgments of conviction for the offenses of evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, reckless driving, and driving on a revoked license. I disagree with the conclusion that the two convictions of vandalism must be reversed and dismissed. Accordingly, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.

The petitioner, Deanna Whitman, pleaded guilty to four counts of selling a schedule II drug within 1,000 feet of a school, for which she received an effective 16-year sentence to be served as a Range I offender at 100 percent. The petitioner sought post-conviction relief alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore unknowingly pleaded guilty to the instant crimes. At the conclusion of an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition finding that the petitioner had received effective representation and had entered her pleas knowingly. Aggrieved of this ruling, the petitioner now appeals, and after a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.