APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Thomas Earl Bradshaw, pled guilty to one count of aggravated burglary and one count of especially aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him as a multiple offender to an effective sentence of thirty-six years imprisonment. The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his pleas. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, James O. McCarson, Jr., was convicted of one count of stalking, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for stalking; and (2) the trial court erred when it denied him judicial diversion. Finding that there exists no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce and child custody case. The husband and the wife were married in February 1998.  Throughout the marriage, they lived together with the husband’s mother. The parties’ relationship began to deteriorate soon after the wedding. The wife felt that the husband and his mother were controlling and oppressive, while the husband felt that the wife was unfit. One child was born of the marriage. In October 2000, the wife filed the instant petition for divorce. After a nine-day trial, the trial court granted a divorce to the wife on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, and designated the wife as the primary residential parent of the parties’ child. The trial court also awarded the wife a portion of her attorney’s fees and discretionary costs. From that decision, the husband now appeals. We vacate a portion of the award of costs, and affirm as to the remaining issues, finding that the evidence preponderates in favor of the trial court’s opinion in all other respects. The cause is remanded for reconsideration of a portion of the award of costs for expert fees.

The Opinion filed by this Court on August 24, 2005, is hereby withdrawn, and a revised Opinion is being filed concurrently herewith.

The Petitioner, Ricky Northern, appeals the lower court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgment of conviction void. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal.

The Petitioner, Darwin Theus, appeals the trial court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court's denial of relief pursuant to Rule 20, Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Petitioner has failed to allege any ground that would render the judgments of conviction void. Accordingly, we grant the State's motion and affirm the judgment of the lower court.

The Appellant, Roger Alan Lawson, appeals the sentencing decision of the Sullivan County Criminal Court following the revocation of his suspended sentences. While on supervised probation, a violation warrant was issued alleging that Lawson had failed to obey the law by driving on a revoked license. After a revocation hearing, Lawson was found to be in violation of his probation, and his original effective eight-year sentence to the Department of Correction was reinstated. On appeal, Lawson argues that the trial court abused its discretion by ordering confinement of the eight-year sentence instead of reinstating his probation. After review, we find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Madison County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Michael Bills, of one count of possession with the intent to sell one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and one count of possession with the intent to deliver one-half gram or more of cocaine, a Class B felony, and the trial court merged the defendant’s convictions and sentenced him as a Range II, multiple offender to sixteen years in the Department of Correction. The defendant appeals, claiming the evidence is insufficient. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a workers' compensation appeal referred to and heard by the Special Workers'  Compensation Appeals Panel of the Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in awarding the plaintiff a 25% permanent partial disability rating to both arms for bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and right trigger thumb and ring finger. We disagree and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine the validity of a consent judgment entered by the chancery court granting a divorce to the parties. At trial, the parties voluntarily submitted their case to mediation. At the conclusion of the mediation, the mediator dictated the settlement terms onto a tape recorder, and the parties acknowledged onto the tape recorder that these terms were the understanding of the parties. The chancery court found that this acknowledgment was a modification of the mediation agreement and that the parties entered into a settlement agreement. On appeal, the husband asserts that the chancery court erred finding a settlement agreement because the mediation agreement specifically required that the parties would not be bound unless a written, executed settlement agreement was entered into by the parties. Second, the husband contends that, even if an oral settlement agreement was effective against the parties in this case, he had properly repudiated the agreement to his wife and the chancery court before the chancery court entered its judgment. In addition, both parties have requested attorney’s fees on appeal. We reverse and remand for further proceedings and decline to award attorney’s fees to either party.

Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, two counts of aggravated kidnapping, a Class B felony, and one count of sexual battery, a Class E felony. The trial court merged Defendant’s two convictions for aggravated kidnapping into his conviction for especially aggravating kidnapping. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range II, multiple offender, to thirty-six years for his especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and four years for his sexual battery conviction. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of forty years. Defendant does not challenge the imposition of consecutive sentencing. In his appeal, Defendant argues (1) that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion for a continuance; (3) that the trial court erred in classifying Defendant as a Range II multiple offender; and (4) that the trial erred in its application of enhancement factors.  After a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping and sexual battery. However, we remand the case to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

The Appellant, Michael Burnette, was convicted by a Roane County jury of aggravated robbery and sentenced to ten years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Burnette raises two issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction; and (2) whether his sentence is excessive. After review, the judgment of conviction and resulting sentence are affirmed

The petitioner, John C. Johnson, filed a petition for post-conviction relief and a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. The petition for writ of error coram nobis was dismissed without a full evidentiary hearing. In this consolidated appeal, the petitioner challenges the post-conviction court’s rulings on both petitions.¹ Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the dismissal of the petition for a writ of error coram nobis. However, we reverse the denial of post-conviction relief and remand for a new trial.

The defendant, Michael Forrest Bandy, appeals his convictions of first degree felony murder and aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. The sole issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence.  Upon review, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions and affirm the same.

I adhere to my longstanding view that a “preponderance of the evidence” standard and a
“clear and convincing evidence” standard are incompatible with each other and cannot be reconciled either in the trial court or in appellate courts. The effort to make these standards compatible, as asserted in Ray v. Ray, 83 S.W.2d 726 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001), and its progeny are in my view incorrect for reasons stated at length in Estate of Acuff v. O’Linger, 56 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) and In re Z.J.S. and M.J.P., No. M2002-02235-COA-R3-JV, filed June 3, 2003 (Tenn.Ct.App.2003-Cain, concurring).

Joan Oates (“Plaintiff”) was employed by the Chattanooga Publishing Company (“Defendant”) for approximately twenty-three years. In January of 2004, Plaintiff was observed on Defendant’s security camera making obscene gestures with her middle finger toward the camera and then covering the security camera with a cup for a period of time. Defendant terminated Plaintiff’s employment. Plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging that she was terminated because of a disability.  Plaintiff also claimed that she was subjected to a hostile work environment and malicious harassment while employed by Defendant. Plaintiff also sued for intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded plaintiff sixty (60) percent permanent, partial vocational disability to the right leg. On appeal, the employer contends that the employee's injury did not arise out of his employment and is therefore not compensable. The employer alternatively argues that the trial court's permanent, partial vocational disability award is excessive. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal involves the parental rights of the biological parents of seven minor children. After the children had been removed from their biological parents’ custody for approximately one year, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services filed a petition in the Circuit Court for Perry County seeking to terminate the parental rights of the biological parents. The trial court conducted a bench trial and then entered an order terminating the biological parents’ parental rights because the conditions that caused the children to be removed from the parents’ custody continued to persist and because the parents had committed severe child abuse. Both parents appealed. We have determined that the record contains substantial and material evidence supporting the trial court’s conclusions that the biological parents’ conduct provides substantive grounds for terminating their parental rights and that the termination of the biological parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interests.

The defendant, Steve Allen Click, was convicted of three counts of aggravated rape and one count of evading arrest. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of forty years for each aggravated rape and a concurrent sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for evading arrest. The effective sentence is, therefore, 120 years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts (1) that the trial court erred by failing to merge two of the aggravated rape convictions; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions for aggravated rape; (3) that the prosecutor's closing argument was improper; and (4) that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentences. The judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The trial court determined a material change of circumstances had occurred which warranted modification of the parties’ child visitation scheduled. Father appeals. We affirm.

Defendant, Courtney Means, was convicted of three aggravated robberies and sentenced to twelve years in each case, with two of the sentences to be served consecutively. On appeal, he argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions; the trial court erred in allowing the hearsay statement of a deceased victim to be admitted as an excited utterance; and the court erred in sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments.

In this case we are asked to review a trial court’s decision to hold the defendant in contempt of the court’s order. After the plaintiff filed its lawsuit to recover amounts allegedly owed on certain invoices, the trial court ordered the defendant to file a sworn statement setting forth any amounts it believed it owed to the plaintiff and the “basis” for that statement. The defendant submitted the affidavit of its president who asserted that it owed nothing to the plaintiff and that plaintiff breached the parties’ contract. The defendant subsequently filed an answer denying it owed the money and filed a counter-complaint for breach of contract, tortious interference with contract, and fraud. The plaintiff filed a petition seeking to hold the defendant in contempt of the court’s order, asserting that the affidavit filed by the defendant did not set forth specific facts. The chancery court granted the motion and found the defendant in contempt of the order holding that the affidavit did not contain enough “detail” as required by the order. The defendant appealed to this Court. We reverse.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel of the Tennessee Supreme Court in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated
section 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the supreme court of findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The trial court awarded Plaintiff 54 percent permanent partial disability as a
result of sustaining a latex allergy injury. Defendant contends the evidence established that Plaintiff did not have a latex allergy condition and if she did, her last employer would be responsible for compensation under the last injurious exposure rule. We affirm the judgment.

I concur with the legal principles set forth in the majority opinion and particularly with the recognition of the importance of affording a parent an opportunity to request appointed counsel, and when appropriate, a hearing and due inquiry on the request for appointed counsel in dependent and neglect proceedings. I, however, respectfully dissent, believing the facts, particularly those demonstrating the irresponsible acts and omissions of David H. and Mary Ellen H. in seeking appointed counsel and then retaining separate counsel, are sufficient to affirm the trial court.

After a hearing, the Circuit Court declared seven children to be dependent and neglected and determined that their parents had committed severe child abuse. The parents claim on appeal that the court erred by refusing their request that counsel be appointed to represent them at the hearing.  After carefully reviewing the record, we find that the trial court failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry to determine whether or not the parents were financially able to retain their own counsel, and we accordingly vacate the order concluding that the children were dependent and neglected.