APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court, in determining whether death benefits for a widow having no dependent children could be commuted to a lump sum payment, held that commutation of periodic payments is not appropriate in the case of a sole surviving spouse due to limitations placed on death benefits under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-210(e)(4) and (8). The widow contends the trial court erred in denying lump sum commutation in that Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-229(a) allows lump sum commutation of workers’ compensation and that the Tennessee Supreme Court has previously awarded a lump sum payment of death benefits to a surviving spouse. This Panel, finding that Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 50-6-210 and 50-6-229 should be read in pari materia, concludes that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.

This workers' compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tennessee Code Annotated § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting to the Supreme Court of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court found that the employee demonstrated a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice of his injury to the employer and that the employer was not prejudiced by the delay in notice. The trial court fixed the employee's vocational impairment rating at forty percent. The employer contends that the trial court erred in finding that the employee had a reasonable excuse for failing to give timely notice and that the employer was not prejudiced. The employer also contends that the trial court's award to the employee was excessive in light of the record. We find no error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is petition to modify custody. The mother and father of the minor child were never
married. In April 2002, when the child was seven years old, the trial court entered a consent order designating the mother as the primary residential parent of the child and giving the father residential time. During the summer of 2002, the parties became embroiled in a dispute over which school and in what grade the minor child should be enrolled for the upcoming school year. Against the father’s wishes, the mother took the child out of the third grade at a public school and enrolled her in the second grade at a private school. The father filed a petition for contempt, and the trial court ordered the mother to return the child to her class at the public school pending a final resolution of the father’s petition. The mother did not do so. The father then sought a change in custody. The trial court granted the father temporary custody pending a final resolution. The father retained temporary primary custody for the remainder of the school year. The trial court then held a hearing on the father’s request to be permanently designated primary residential parent. After a hearing, the trial court restored the mother as primary residential parent, determining that the circumstances did not warrant a change in designation as primary residential parent. The father now appeals. We affirm the trial court’s finding that the father did not show sufficient change in circumstances to remove mother as primary residential parent.
 

The Defendant, Danny Ray Applegate, pled guilty to three counts of the sale of methamphetamine and one count of possession of more than 100 grams of methamphetamine with the intent to sell. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of eleven years in prison. The Defendant appeals, contending: (1) that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence upon him; and (2) the trial court erred when it failed to sentence him to a community corrections sentence. After thoroughly reviewing the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the Defendant’s sentence.

This workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-225(e)(3) for hearing and reporting of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court awarded benefits of thirty-six percent permanent partial disability, finding that the employee had given timely notice of a gradual, work-related injury. The employer contends that the trial court erred in the following: (1) finding both a gradual injury and that the notice requirement under Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-201 was satisfied; and (2) finding that the injury was work-related in light of the medical evidence. The employee counters by claiming that the appeal is frivolous. We hold that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed on both issues, and that the appeal is not frivolous.

The Defendant, Chad Allen Conyers, pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter. The trial court deferred entry of a judgment of conviction and placed the Defendant on judicial diversion for fifteen (15) years. The Defendant was subsequently charged with violating the terms of his probation. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court revoked the Defendant's probation. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to four years, split confinement. The Defendant now appeals both the revocation of his probation and the manner of service of his sentence. Finding that the trial court abused its discretion in revoking the Defendant's probation, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and order that the Defendant's probation be reinstated.

The issue for jury resolution was whether Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company refused in bad faith to settle a damage suit against Johnson by Moore within his policy limits of $25,000, and exposed him to a final judgment of nearly $200,000.00. Johnson’s defense entirely focused on his asserted non-liability, not withstanding that Moore’s medical expenses exceeded $75,000, and his injuries were serious and permanently disabling, thus reasonably indicating that if Johnson was found to be negligent, the percentage of his fault necessarily would have to be minimal in light of his insurance limits. An unidentified van forced Johnson to crash head-on into Moore, and the jury allocated 50% of Moore’s damages to Johnson and 50% to the van. After this allocation was affirmed on appeal, Johnson sued Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company, claiming that Moore’s claim could have been settled for his policy limits. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company presents a host of issues, beginning with the refusal of the court to direct a verdict, and continuing with complaints of the trial judge commenting on the evidence and refusing corrective jury instructions. The judgment is reversed for the latter two reasons. 

The appellant, Jason Allen Needel, pled guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to aggravated burglary, theft over $1000, and theft under $500. He received a total effective sentence of fourteen years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the imposition of consecutive sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I concur with the majority’s decision affirming the trial court’s denial of Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for directed verdict, but I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision reversing the jury’s verdict based on the jury charge and comments to the jury. I would affirm the jury verdict in favor of the Plaintiff, Robert Steven Johnson.

Convicted of aggravated robbery and sentenced as a career offender to a prison term of 30 years, the defendant, Michael Antonio Jones, appeals and challenges both the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the propriety of the sentence. Discerning no error, we affirm the Marshall County Circuit Court's judgment.

The appellant, Terrance D. Nichols, was convicted by a jury in the Shelby County Criminal Court of premeditated first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that “reflection” in the context of the instruction on premeditation means “careful consideration,” and (2) the trial court committed plain error by permitting the State to engage in improper and prejudicial argument in its summation to the jury. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the  judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Brandon Patrick, was convicted of one count of violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offenders Act, one count of felony evading arrest with risk of death, and two counts of felony reckless endangerment. The trial court later merged the two counts of reckless endangerment into one count. The trial court held a sentencing hearing on November 7, 2002. The defendant received the maximum sentences as a career offender of six (6) years for violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act, twelve (12) years for Class D felony evading arrest with the risk of death, and six (6) years for reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon. The trial court ordered the defendant to serve the six-year sentences for violation of the Habitual Motor Vehicle Offender Act and the reckless endangerment sentence concurrently. The trial court then ordered that the six (6) year sentences be served consecutively to the twelve (12) year sentence for Class D felony evading arrest for an effective sentence of eighteen (18) years as a career offender to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) that the evidence was legally insufficient to support a verdict of guilty; (2) his dual convictions for Class D felony evading arrest and felony reckless endangerment violated the principles of double jeopardy; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on applicable lesser-included offenses; and (4) the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We conclude: (1) that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions; (2) the dual convictions for Class D felony evading arrest and felony reckless endangerment violate principles of double jeopardy and must be merged; (3) it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt when the trial court failed to instruct on the lesser-included offenses; and (4) consecutive sentencing was proper in the defendant's case. We reverse and remand the judgments of the trial court.

The Appellant, John Haws Burrell, proceeding pro se, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Because the petition fails to raise a cognizable claim for habeas relief, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The attorney for the petitioner was held in contempt for failing to appear as ordered and failing to advise the Juvenile Court of a Chancery action. We hold the evidence does not support a finding of criminal contempt.

This is a zoning case involving a free-standing sign. The plaintiff seeks to replace it with another sign which does not conform to a new sign ordinance. The plaintiff seeks the protection of the grandfather statute. The Chancellor held that the grandfather statute did not apply. We affirm.

A Marshall County jury convicted the Defendant, Calvin Louis Hill, of carjacking, theft of property valued over $1000.00, and three counts of forgery. The trial court sentenced the Defendant, as a Range II offender, to an effective sentence of eighteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions for carjacking and forgery; and (2) his sentence was excessive. Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant was convicted of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to an effective sentence of thirty years. The defendant now appeals his conviction contending that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction; (2) the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion for continuance. The defendant also seeks review of sentencing issues in light of Blakely. After review, we conclude there is no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court as to convictions and sentencing.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Luis Castanon, was charged with and convicted of four counts of aggravated rape and one count of aggravated burglary. He was sentenced to twenty years for each of the aggravated rape offenses and three years for aggravated burglary. Three of the aggravated rape sentences were ordered to be served consecutively to each other, with the remaining aggravated rape sentence and the aggravated burglary sentence to be served concurrently, for an effective sentence of sixty years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the jury's verdict and that the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences was improper.  We conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the Defendant's convictions and hold that the imposition of consecutive sentencing was appropriate. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This is a Rule 9, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to suppress drug evidence seized from his home during a search executed pursuant to a warrant. The defendant, Delawrence Williams, is charged with possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver based on the drug evidence recovered from his home and with aggravated assault based on a domestic violence episode involving his girlfriend that preceded the issuance of the search warrant. At the suppression hearing, he argued that the officer’s affidavit in support of the warrant failed to establish probable cause because it did not contain sufficient facts to show that the defendant’s girlfriend, who was the source for the officer’s knowledge, satisfied the two-pronged test, as set forth in State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430 (Tenn. 1989), for information supplied by a criminal informant. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the affidavit sufficiently demonstrated the basis for the informant’s knowledge and the reliability of her information. Following our review, we affirm the order of the trial court denying the motion to suppress.

Defendant, Latwan R. Coleman, pled guilty to possession of over 0.5 grams of cocaine with intent to sell, a Class B felony, in case number 2003-A-265, and to sale of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine, a Class C felony, in case number 2003-A-280. The plea agreement contained a recommended sentence of nine years for the Class B felony conviction and a sentence of three years for the Class C felony conviction. Defendant's request for community corrections was left for the trial court to determine. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied Defendant's request for a community corrections sentence, and ordered Defendant to serve the recommended sentences in confinement. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently for an effective sentence of nine years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request that he be sentenced to community corrections rather than incarceration. After a review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bobby L. Ingram, appeals the Greene County Criminal Court's summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. Because the criminal court correctly ruled that the statute of limitation barred the petition, that court's order is affirmed.

The defendant, Shelborne Mason, was convicted for the sale and/or delivery of .5 grams or more of cocaine, a Class B felony. The trial court imposed a sentence of thirty years. In this appeal, the defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I agree with both Judge Inman’s and Judge Lee’s Opinions that Tennessee Farmers
Mutual Insurance Company was not entitled to a directed verdict in this case.

Following the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to suppress, the defendant pled guilty to possession with the intent to deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, cocaine, in an amount greater than .5 grams, a Class B felony, in exchange for a sentence of eight years as a standard Range I offender in the Department of Correction. The defendant sought to reserve a certified question of law regarding the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. The issue before us is whether the trial court erred in its determination that probable cause existed for the defendant to be stopped. After a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Michael Wright, filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, which was subsequently amended by appointed counsel. Following an evidentiary hearing, the petition was denied. On appeal, Appellant argues that he was entitled to post-conviction relief on his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. After careful review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.