APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Catherine May Cooper, pled guilty to one count of attempt to obtain a controlled substance by altered prescription, a Class D felony, and one count of felony failure to appear, a Class E felony. The Sullivan County Criminal Court sentenced her to two years for the Class D felony and one year for the Class E felony to be served concurrently in the Department of Correction as a Range I, standard offender. The defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred in denying her probation or alternative sentencing. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stacy Allen Melton, appeals from the Greene County Criminal Court's dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty plea to especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony, and attempted second degree murder, a Class B felony. He contends that his guilty plea was involuntary and that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the trial court.

The trial court denied the State’s petition for child support and retroactive child support for Respondent/Father’s two minor children. We reverse.

A Bradley County Criminal Court jury convicted the appellant, Lisa Durbin Howard, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment. The appellant appeals her conviction, claiming (1) that the trial court's comments to the jury during deliberations amounted to an improper "dynamite" or Allen charge; (2) that the trial court erred by excluding a defense expert's testimony; (3) that the State impermissibly excluded the only African-American from the jury pool; (4) that juror misconduct denied her the right to a fair and impartial jury; (5) that the State failed to preserve the audiotaped recording of the preliminary hearing as required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.1(a); and (6) that the trial court erred by not conducting a proper jury poll. We conclude that the appellant has waived these issues because she failed to file a timely motion for new trial. Moreover, we discern no plain error and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant Billy Joe Regel, Individually, and d/b/a/ Bartlett Prescription Shop on the grounds of laches, and Plaintiff Finova Capital Corporation appeals. We affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, James D. Black, was found guilty of aggravated perjury, a Class D felony. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to two years, all suspended but sixty days, and placed Defendant on supervised probation for four years. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion. However, I do so on the merits, as opposed to the petitioner’s failure to follow procedural requirements for habeas corpus petitions.

The appellant, Curtis Emmanuel Lane, pled guilty to simple possession of marijuana and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended upon payment of court costs and fines. Pursuant to Rule 37 (b)(2)(i) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, the appellant attempted to reserve a certified question of law to this Court on the issue of whether the evidence should have been suppressed as the result of an illegal arrest. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the appellant failed to properly reserve a certified question of law. Therefore, the appellant's issue is not properly before this Court, and this appeal is dismissed.

The petitioner pled guilty to second degree murder on November 14, 1997. The trial court sentenced the petitioner on the same day to twenty years to be served as a Range I, standard offender with a release eligibility of thirty percent. On July 27, 1999, the trial court amended the judgment stating that the petitioner’s release eligibility would be one hundred percent with credit given for time served up to fifteen percent of his sentence. The petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief on October 12, 2004. On November 15, 2004, the habeas court summarily dismissed the petitioner’s petition. The petitioner appealed this decision. We affirm the decision of the habeas court.

The petitioner, Darrell Carter, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated sexual battery. As a result, he was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-one years in the Tennessee Department of Correction to be served at one hundred percent. The petitioner subsequently sought post-conviction relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel and an alleged unknowing and involuntary guilty plea. The post-conviction court denied the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's denial of the petition.

The appellant, Stanley Phillip Chapman, was convicted by a jury in the Tipton County Circuit Court of second degree murder. He received a sentence of twenty-two years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant raises several issues for our review, including the trial court’s evidentiary rulings and sentencing. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The City of Memphis appeals from the trial court’s reversal of the Civil Service Commission’s decision to terminate a City employee/Appellee for violation of the substance abuse policy. The trial court found that the positive drug test, which provided the only substantial and material evidence for Appellee’s termination, was inadmissible as evidence for failure of the City failed to comport with 42 U.S.C. §290. We affirm.

The appellant, Jamie Brown, was convicted by a Knox County Jury of simple possession of marijuana. As a result, the trial court sentenced the appellant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant challenges the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress. Because the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The appellant, Homer Alson Maddin, III, was convicted by a jury of four counts of aggravated rape in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-502. As a result, the appellant was sentenced to an effective sentence of twenty-five years at one hundred percent. The appellant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the mental state of reckless, and that the trial court erred in applying certain enhancement factors to determine his sentence. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This Court reversed a judgment of dismissal of Plaintiff’s action and remanded the case for further proceedings. On remand, the court entered judgment for Plaintiff, as authorized by the appellate court, and also, on motion of Plaintiff, awarded attorney fees for the appeal. Defendant-Appellants appeal, asserting that the award of attorney fees was not authorized by the appellate court and, therefore, the trial court did not have authority to award same. Appellants also assert that the award of attorney fees was excessive, and Appellee asserts, in a separate issue, that the award of fees was inadequate. Both parties appeal. We affirm and remand.

The defendant, Christopher David Parsley, appeals his sentence of three years for aggravated burglary and one year for sexual battery, to be served concurrently. A split confinement sentence was imposed of seven months to serve followed by three years of supervised probation. The defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant judicial diversion or, alternatively, full probation. After review, we affirm the sentence of the trial court.

The Appellant, Jason D. Norris, appeals the sentencing decision of the Davidson County Criminal Court. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Norris pled guilty to five counts of aggravated robbery, stemming from two separate indictments, with the manner and service of the sentences to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, Norris was sentenced to eight years for each conviction, with two of the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of sixteen years. On appeal, he argues that his sentences are excessive and that the trial court erred by ordering total confinement as opposed to sentences of community corrections. Additionally, Norris argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences violates Blakely v. Washington. After review, we affirm.

This litigation arose out of an automobile accident. The parties settled the plaintiffs' claims for $30,000; in due course, the defendants' insurance carrier paid the plaintiffs the full amount of the settlement. Sometime after the payment had been made, the defendants moved the trial court to hold the plaintiffs and their attorney in contempt because of their failure to satisfy the lien of a third party and because of their failure to pay a $500 attorney's fee ordered by the trial court. The trial court denied the motion. The defendants appeal the trial court's action, but only with respect to the court's failure to hold the plaintiffs' attorney in contempt. We affirm and hold that the defendants' appeal is frivolous in nature.

Defendant, Jackie J. Porter, pled guilty to one count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, manufacture or distribute, a Class B felony, and one count of simple possession of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor. The length and manner of service of his sentences were left to the decision of the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Defendant as a Range I, standard offender, to eight years, six months for his Class B felony conviction, and eleven months, twenty-nine days for his Class A misdemeanor conviction. The trial court ordered Defendant to serve his sentences concurrently, for an effective sentence of eight years, six months.  The trial court denied Defendant’s request that he be placed on community corrections. Defendant does not challenge the validity of his guilty pleas or his sentence for his misdemeanor conviction.  In his appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in determining the length of his felony sentence and in denying Defendant’s request for alternative sentencing. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to state on the record its reasons for denying a sentence of community corrections. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and the length of the sentence, but reverse the judgment as to the manner of service of the sentence, and remand for a new sentencing hearing regarding the manner of service of the sentence.

This is a medical malpractice case arising out of the postoperative treatment and care of Emit Greg Norris ("the child"), the minor child of Connie J. Norris ("the plaintiff"). At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case-in-chief, the remaining defendants moved for a directed verdict. The trial court determined that the plaintiff had failed to present a prima facie case of acts or omissions of medical negligence that proximately caused the condition that resulted in the child's death. Accordingly, the trial court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed the plaintiff's case. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

The jury returned a verdict for the defendant doctors and medical clinic in this medical malpractice action. The plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error at several stages of the trial, including jury selection, witness’ testimony and jury instructions. Further, the plaintiff argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm the trial court.

This is a suit to quiet title to real property. The issue presented is whether the trial court correctly decreed that any legal or equitable interest of Paul Richard Johnson in the real property purchased by Envision Properties, LLC was extinguished by operation of the doctrine of adverse possession. Based on the stipulated proof, we hold that there was not clear and positive proof of adverse possession sufficient to constitute an ouster of a co-tenant. Therefore, Paul Richard Johnson has an undivided one-fifth interest in the property. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.

In this third appeal from a Williamson County divorce, the wife challenges the trial court's valuation and distribution of the marital estate and award of alimony upon remand. Both parties seek an award of attorney's fees. The husband seeks damages for frivolous appeal. We affirm the trial court's valuation and distribution and award of alimony and deny the husband's frivolous appeal damages request.

This appeal involves the division of marital property following the dissolution of a nine-year marriage. The wife filed a complaint for divorce in the Chancery Court for Dickson County. Following a bench trial, the court granted the wife a divorce on the ground of inappropriate marital conduct, divided the parties' marital estate, and denied the wife's requests for spousal support and attorney's fees. The wife takes issue on this appeal with the manner in which the trial court classified, valued, and divided the parties' property. We have determined that the trial court's decision regarding the parties' marital estate must be modified with regard to the division of the increase in the value of the marital home and the increase in the value of the husband's retirement. Accordingly, we modify the judgment and affirm.

Matthew Ballard filed this action pursuant to the federal Jones Act, seeking damages for the injuries he sustained when he fell on the deck of a barge owned and operated by his employer, Serodino, Inc. ("the defendant"). The jury returned a verdict assessing 75% of the fault to the plaintiff and 25% of the fault to the defendant. As a consequence of the jury's allocation of fault, the plaintiff was awarded $37,500, i.e., 25% of the total damages found by the jury. The plaintiff appeals, arguing that there is no material evidence to support a finding that he was 75% at fault. He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion for a directed verdict. We affirm.