APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Tenant appeals the trial court’s determination that (1) he breached his lease by failing to pay water bills for several years and (2) the apartment complex did not breach the lease by bringing the underlying eviction proceedings. The apartment complex also appeals the trial court’s grant of only some of its attorney’s fees. Because we conclude that there was no meeting of the minds regarding the payment for water services, we reverse the trial court’s finding of a breach of contract. We further determine that Cadence is entitled to quantum meruit relief, and we remand for a determination of the reasonable value of the utilities used by the tenant. We also vacate the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees and remand for the determination and calculation of those fees allowed.

This case involves termination of the parental rights of a biological father to his minor child. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that the statutory ground of abandonment by failure to support had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, the trial court declined to find that termination of the father’s rights was in the child’s best interest and accordingly denied the termination petition. The petitioners have appealed. Upon thorough review, we conclude that the trial court erred in its determination concerning the best interest analysis. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the termination petition, and we grant termination of the father’s parental rights.

This is an appeal from trial court proceedings in which a property owner sought to enjoin the City of Chattanooga from demolishing a condemned house. Because the property owner has since sold the property at issue to a third-party purchaser who is now renovating the property, the original property owner no longer has standing, and the issues he attempts to raise are moot. This appeal is dismissed.

I wholly concur with Judge Frierson’s well-reasoned conclusion that our de novo review of the underlying record in this case demonstrates that Mother and Stepfather have presented clear and convincing evidence that termination of Father’s parental rights is in Mia’s best interest. I write separately to address the important concerns raised by Judge Stafford in his thoughtful dissent.

Defendant, Aaron Dean Whitman, was convicted by a Blount County jury of violating the sex offender registry, for which he received a sentence of 391 days’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to stipulate to his prior convictions, for which he was required to register as a sex offender. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court erred by allowing evidence of the named offenses for which Defendant was convicted; however, we determine that the error was harmless and affirm Defendant’s conviction. 

There is much in the Majority Opinion with which I agree, including the reprehensibility of Father’s conduct toward Mother during their relationship and the inappropriate nature of his “discipline” of the Child. However, because the trial court relied heavily on witness credibility determinations in finding that the termination of Father’s parental rights was not in the Child’s best interest, I must respectfully dissent from the Majority Opinion’s decision to terminate.

Following a trial, a jury convicted Defendant, Joshua Adam Hill, on two counts of aggravated rape, one count of incest, and one count of sexual battery by an authority figure, for which he was sentenced to an effective twenty-five years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape and sexual battery by an authority figure and that the trial court committed plain error when it instructed the jury on the elements of those offenses. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Asata Lowe, appeals from the Blount County Circuit Court’s dismissal of
his Tennessee Criminal Procedure Rule 36 and Rule 36.1 motions for their failure to state
colorable claims. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in summarily
dismissing the motions because he stated colorable claims. We affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

The Juvenile Court for Jefferson County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminated the parental rights of Meliah B. (“Mother”) to her children, Tucker R., Gracelynn R., and Roland R. (“the Children”). Mother has appealed, challenging only the Juvenile Court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was in the Children’s best interest. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

Litigation arose in connection with a dispute over an option agreement to purchase property.  The parties agreed to settle the case and to allow a Tennessee-licensed real estate appraiser to set the purchase price.  The purchasers, however, moved to set aside the price set by the appraiser.  Relying on the opinions of a licensed real estate broker and a different licensed appraiser, the purchasers argued that the appraiser’s valuation deviated from the required professional standards to such an extent that it fell below the relevant standard of care.  The trial court denied the motion, concluding: (1) the purchasers could not under the settlement agreement challenge the appraisal; (2) even if they could, the real estate broker’s lack of an appraisal license rendered him per se incompetent to testify; and (3) the purchasers failed to provide a declaration from their expert licensed real estate appraiser stating that the appraisal had not been conducted in accordance with professional standards.  In response to a motion to alter or amend, the trial court judge recognized that the purchasers had, in fact, provided such a declaration, but, nevertheless, denied their motion.  The purchasers appeal.  We conclude that the purchasers can challenge the appraiser’s evaluation on the limited basis that he allegedly departed from the professional standard of care.  We also conclude the Tennessee licensed real estate broker not holding a Tennessee real estate appraiser’s license does not per se render his testimony incompetent.  We also conclude that even assuming the testimony from the real estate broker is inadmissible, the purchasers have presented evidence that the appraisal was not conducted in accordance with professional standards.  Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for the trial court to reassess the admissibility of the real estate broker’s testimony and to determine whether the appraiser violated the professional standard of care.

Appellee’s employment as a City of Memphis Firefighter was terminated based on an offensive post to Appellee’s Facebook page. After receiving notice of his termination, Appellee requested an appeal hearing with the City of Memphis Civil Service Commission. Following the hearing, the Commissioner issued a decision affirming the termination, and Appellee sought review in the trial court. The trial court reversed the Commissioner’s decision, finding that substantial and material evidence did not support the decision, and that the decision was arbitrary and capricious and made in violation of Appellee’s right to equal protection. The City of Memphis appeals. We vacate the trial court’s decision reversing the Commission’s termination of Appellee’s employment. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of an order vacating the Commissioner’s decision and ordering further proceedings in compliance with this opinion.

Alexander Vance, Petitioner, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief after this Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. See State v. Vance, 596 S.W.3d 229 (Tenn. 2020). On appeal, he argues that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received effective assistance of counsel at trial despite several alleged areas of deficient performance. After a review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This appeal concerns the discovery rule. Dr. Jason C. Eck, D.O. (“Defendant”) performed spinal surgery on Keetly Marc (“Plaintiff”). On November 10, 2020, Plaintiff’s counsel, who then was representing Plaintiff only in a workers’ compensation case, received information through discovery reflecting that Plaintiff’s surgery was performed at the wrong level. Counsel reviewed the material on November 30, 2020, and informed Plaintiff by December 4, 2020. On November 24, 2021, Plaintiff sent pre-suit notice. On March 30, 2022, Plaintiff sued Defendant in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (“the Trial Court”) alleging health care liability. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment asserting the statute of limitations. The Trial Court granted summary judgment to Defendant. Plaintiff appeals. We hold that Plaintiff cannot be charged with constructive notice based on her attorney’s November 10, 2020, receipt of the relevant information because counsel was then representing Plaintiff only in a workers’ compensation case, and a potential health care liability claim was beyond the scope of her representation. Thus, the knowledge obtained by Plaintiff’s counsel on November 10, 2020, may not be imputed to Plaintiff. Plaintiff was made aware of the relevant information at some point from November 30, 2020, through December 4, 2020, meaning her lawsuit against Defendant was timely filed. We reverse the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for this case to proceed.

Appellant filed this petition for recusal appeal after the trial court denied a motion to recuse. In light of Appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the State of Tennessee, we affirm.

A mother relocated out-of-state with her children and filed a petition to modify the existing parenting plan. The father filed a competing petition for modification. The trial court found a material change in circumstances warranting modification of the parenting plan. It crafted two modified parenting plans: one which would take effect if the mother remained out-of-state and the other which would take effect if she returned to Tennessee. The mother returned and now argues the parenting plan should not have been modified. We affirm.

The Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development (“the Department”) denied the claimant’s claim for unemployment benefits after determining that the claimant had “voluntarily quit” his job. The claimant appealed, but the Department’s appeals tribunal denied the appeal as untimely. The claimant appealed further to the Department’s office of administrative review, which affirmed the appeals tribunal’s decision. Four years later, the claimant sought judicial review of the Department’s decision by filing a civil warrant in the Davidson County General Sessions Court (“general sessions court”). The general sessions court dismissed the civil warrant upon a motion filed by the Department, and the claimant appealed to the Davidson County Circuit Court (“trial court”). The Department moved to dismiss the action based upon (1) insufficiency of service of process, (2) lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and (3) failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(1), (2), (5), and (6). The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on all grounds. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The juvenile court terminated a mother’s and a father’s parental rights. The mother challenges the juvenile court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for termination of her parental rights existed and that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The father asserts that the juvenile court erred in terminating his parental rights because his due process rights were violated. Because the juvenile court erred in allowing the father’s attorney to withdraw from representation, we vacate the court’s termination of his parental rights on all grounds and remand for a new trial. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.

This appeal presents the issue of how the legalization of hemp affects a probable cause analysis where law enforcement relied, in part, on a positive alert from a drug-sniffing canine incapable of differentiating between the smell of legal hemp and illegal marijuana. After initiating a routine traffic stop, law enforcement conducted an open-air sniff using a drug-sniffing canine. Based on the canine’s positive alert on the vehicle, combined with other facts observed by the officer, law enforcement searched the vehicle without a warrant pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The search revealed the following items inside a backpack: one ounce of marijuana, a loaded handgun, Ziploc bags, and a scale. The defendant, a passenger in the vehicle, was indicted for possession of marijuana with intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver; possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the canine sweep could not provide probable cause because the canine could not distinguish between the smell of legalized hemp and illegal marijuana. The trial court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the charges against the defendant. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed by holding that the smell of illegal marijuana provides law enforcement with probable cause to search a vehicle. Alternatively, the intermediate court held that law enforcement possessed probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances. The defendant appealed to this Court, and we granted review. First, we clarify that State v. England, 19 S.W.3d 762 (Tenn. 2000), does not provide a per se rule of probable cause based on a positive indication from a drug-sniffing dog. Rather, England provides for an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Second, we hold that a positive indication from a drug-sniffing canine may continue to contribute to a finding of probable cause when examining the totality of the circumstances, notwithstanding the legalization of hemp. After examining the totality of the circumstances in this case, we conclude that law enforcement possessed probable cause to search the vehicle. As a result, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals reinstating the indictments against the defendant and remanding for further proceedings.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right. The petitioner seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion for recusal. Discerning no error upon our review of the petition for recusal appeal, we affirm.

The issues in the former underlying action and the present controversy pertain to an easement dispute that arose from a joint driveway agreement. A final judgment in the underlying action, titled “Consent Agreement and Order” (hereinafter “the Consent Order”), was entered in July 2013, from which there was no appeal. The final judgment was also duly recorded in the office of the Washington County Register of Deeds on August 5, 2013. The only parties to the former action were the plaintiff, Bobby MacBryan Green (“Mr. Green”), and the defendant, Michael John May (“Mr. May”). In 2021, Daniel Anthony (“Mr. Anthony”) purchased the property previously owned by Mr. May. In December 2023, Mr. Green obtained and filed an order of extension with the Washington County Circuit Court to extend the judgment entered in 2013. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Green filed a motion to show cause alleging that Mr. Anthony had violated the Consent Order and personally handed the motion to Mr. Anthony. One week later, Mr. Green filed a motion for joinder of Mr. Anthony pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 19, which was also hand delivered to Mr. Anthony. Mr. Anthony’s counsel made a limited appearance opposing the relief sought on multiple grounds. Following a hearing on Mr. Green’s motions, the trial court found that Mr. Anthony was not a proper or feasible party capable of being joined in the former 2013 action. Based on this finding, the court denied Mr. Green’s motion for joinder and dismissed the show cause motion as moot. Mr. Green appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the trial court in all respects. In his brief, Mr. Anthony asks this court to award him the attorney’s fees and expenses he incurred in defending this appeal, contending that the appeal is frivolous. Finding that the appeal is devoid of merit and, therefore, frivolous, we remand this matter to the trial court to award Mr. Anthony his reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in defending this frivolous appeal.

The plaintiff in this case sued the State of Tennessee, Tennessee Department of Correction, alleging that it refused to hire her for employment solely on the basis of her disability. The complaint asserted a single claim -- for violation of the Tennessee Disability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 8-50-103, et seq. During the three years of litigation that followed, the plaintiff’s TDA claim survived a motion for summary judgment and was eventually tried before a jury over the course of five days. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff but awarded her only $10,000 for lost wages and $5,000 for compensatory damages. The plaintiff’s counsel then sought an award of attorney fees of nearly $700,000. The Department challenged the reasonableness of the fees. After a hearing, the trial court found the requested amount was excessive and reduced it, but only by twenty-five percent, awarding counsel $511,620. Due to the lack of findings regarding the factors applicable to such decisions, we vacate the award and remand for entry of an order analyzing the relevant factors.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees to wife following a long-term marriage. Upon our review of the record transmitted on appeal, and for the reasons stated herein, we vacate the trial court’s denial of alimony and attorney’s fees and remand those matters for reconsideration.

A Hancock County jury found Defendant, Michael J. Hite, guilty of driving under the influence, first offense. The trial court imposed
a sentence of eleven months, twenty-nine days, with Defendant to serve sixty days in confinement and the rest of his sentence on
probation. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of
the trial court.

The Defendant, Keith Harding Miller, was convicted by a Rhea County Circuit Court jury
of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. § 39-13-
102(A)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2019) (subsequently amended). The trial court sentenced him to
three years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the State
violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose material evidence, (2) a juror imparted
extraneous information which impacted the verdict, and (3) the trial court erred in denying
judicial diversion and in imposing incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a personal injury action arising from an automobile accident on a road encircling a Chattanooga mall. The case was heard before a jury, which concluded that the defendant was not at fault. The plaintiff appeals. Having determined that there is material evidence to support the jury’s verdict, we affirm.