APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Davidson County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, William Darnell Britton, for one count of first-degree premeditated murder. Thereafter, a jury convicted the Defendant of the lesser included offense of second-degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to eighteen years at one hundred percent in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error (1) in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine him about his inflammatory rap lyrics and videos and (2) in its jury instructions. After review, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of the Defendant’s rap lyrics/videos and that this error was not harmless. We also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on “first aggressor proof” in conjunction with the self-defense instruction and that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we reverse the Defendant’s conviction for second-degree murder and remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.

Defendant, Timothy Ronald Cunningham, appeals his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, aggravated assault while under an order of protection, reckless endangerment with a deadly weapon, and domestic assault. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of ten years of confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Anthony M. Standifer (“Defendant”) filed an application for judicial diversion and entered a guilty plea to Class C felony2 possession of a Schedule I controlled substance in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-417. On December 10, 2015, the trial court entered a probation order deferring entry of judgment pending Defendant’s successful completion of one year of supervised probation and three years of unsupervised probation. Following a June 28, 2023 probation revocation hearing, the trial court found that Defendant violated the conditions of probation. The trial court revoked probation, terminated judicial diversion, and without a sentencing hearing sentenced Defendant. The court then entered a judgment of conviction finding Defendant guilty of Class C felony “attempt poss. Sch. I controlled with intent to” and sentenced Defendant to serve three years in confinement. Upon review, we affirm the termination of judicial diversion but reverse the judgment finding Defendant guilty of attempted possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to manufacture, deliver, or sell; an offense to which Defendant did not plead guilty. We remand the case to the trial court for entry of a corrected judgment finding Defendant guilty of Class A misdemeanor possession of controlled substance and for sentencing of Defendant for that offense.

A Campbell County jury convicted Defendant, Anthony Wayne Foust, of theft of property valued at $2,500 or more, and the trial court sentenced him to twelve years of incarceration to be served as a career offender at 60 percent service. On appeal, Defendant contends that (1) the State failed to disclose evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); (2) the State failed to preserve evidence in violation State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912 (Tenn. 1999); and (3) the trial court erred in limiting Defendant’s closing argument. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father filed a petition to establish parentage of the parties’ child. At the trial on the petition, the trial court limited the evidence to events since a hearing on pendente lite parenting time that took place 47 days before the final hearing. We have determined that the trial court abused its discretion when it limited the evidence in this way. Therefore, we vacate the court’s order in its entirety and remand for a new trial.

Following their divorce, a mother informed her children’s father of her desire to move to Germany with the children. The father filed a petition opposing the move. The court found that the relocation was in the children’s best interest and modified the permanent parenting plan accordingly. On appeal, Father contends the evidence preponderates against some of the factual findings and that the court erred in weighing the statutory best-interest factors. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that relocation was in the children’s best interest, we affirm.

Defendant, Luke Jackson, appeals the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to
voluntary manslaughter, for which he is serving a fifteen-year sentence as a Range III
offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea because (1) he did not fully understand the details of his plea
agreement and (2) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts that he was
unaware that he would be sentenced outside of his range and that he entered the plea out
of fear and lack of medical treatment while incarcerated. Following our review of the entire
record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Keion Hayes, pleaded guilty in the Sumner County Criminal Court to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated robbery.  See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-211 (2018) (subsequently amended) (voluntary manslaughter); 39-13-402 (2018) (aggravated robbery).  The Defendant received an agreed-upon, eighteen-year sentence.  The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, which the trial court denied.  On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion. We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

The Defendant, Ryan Reese Leath, pleaded guilty to Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”), third offense with the trial court to sentence him.  After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after the service of six months in confinement.  The trial court ordered that the DUI sentence be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for theft of property valued over $10,000.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing.  After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Rusty L. Patterson, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of
theft of property valued $2,500 or more, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the
trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years in confinement
with sixty percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court
committed plain error by refusing to instruct the jury on attempted theft, that the evidence
is insufficient to show the value of the stolen property, and that the unavailability of the
community corrections program in Knox County violated his constitutional rights at
sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm
the judgment of the trial court.

A Claiborne County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Junior Lovin, of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial lawyers were ineffective by failing to (1) advise him on the range of punishment he could receive if convicted; (2) investigate the case and present witnesses at trial; (3) advise him so he could make an informed decision regarding a guilty plea; and (4) advise him of his right to testify, which deprived him of the ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision whether to testify. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Bobby Joe Waddle, was convicted in the Washington County Criminal
Court of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of
violence and was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to thirty years in confinement.
On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction and that the trial court erred by refusing to bifurcate his trial. Based on our
review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Terrance K. Martin, was charged in a three-count indictment with two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine.  A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years’ incarceration.  Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the State presented insufficient proof that he knowingly sold the drugs.  We affirm the judgments of the trial court. 

This appeal arises from a slip-and-fall incident at an apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee. On a rainy morning at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex, owned and operated by Mid-America Apartments, LP, Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the way back to his apartment. Mr. Trentham sustained serious injuries and filed a premises-liability lawsuit alleging that MAA had been negligent in maintaining the pedestrian bridge. Mr. Trentham asserted that his slip-and-fall was caused by a microbial growth on the bridge that MAA should have known about and should have addressed. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Trentham, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. MAA disputes the holding of the lower courts that it was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. We hold that, because the microbial growth on the pedestrian bridge amounts to a “general or continuing condition indicating the dangerous condition’s existence,” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tenn. 2004), MAA was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the bridge at the time of Mr. Trentham’s fall. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr. (“Defendant”) sought this Court’s review of his 2022
conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony
crime of violence. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307, unlawful
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a Class E felony; however, if the prior
conviction is for a felony crime of violence, the punishment is increased to a Class B felony.
At Defendant’s trial in the present case, the State introduced a certified judgment of
conviction for Defendant’s 2017 conviction for robbery, and the trial judge instructed the
jury that robbery is a crime of violence. Robbery, however, is not included in the statutory
definition of crimes of violence set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-
1301(3). Defendant was convicted and received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal,
Defendant argues, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support his
conviction because the State failed to establish that the predicate felony of robbery was a
crime of violence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that robbery is a
crime of violence despite its absence from the statutory definition of the term. We granted
Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether robbery is
encompassed within the statutory definition of “crime of violence” and to determine
whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. After
review, we agree with the lower courts that robbery can be a “crime of violence” within the
definition contained in section 39-17-1301(3). However, we conclude that whether robbery
is a “crime of violence” in a particular unlawful possession of a firearm case is a question
for a properly instructed jury, not the trial judge. Because the State did not present sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s prior robbery was
a crime of violence, we reverse, in part, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and
vacate the judgment of the trial court on Count 1. The case is remanded to the trial court
for entry of a new judgment reducing the conviction in Count 1 to a Class E felony and for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

SARAH K. CAMPBELL, J., dissenting.
Premises owners “are not insurers of their patrons’ safety.” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 764 (Tenn. 2004). That refrain has been part of Tennessee’s tort law for nearly a century. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Nichols, 118 S.W.2d 213, 217 (Tenn. 1938). Accordingly, to impose a duty on a premises owner to remedy or warn against unsafe conditions created by others, a plaintiff must establish that the premises owner had actual or constructive knowledge of the unsafe condition. Until today, constructive knowledge required proof either that (1) the unsafe condition had existed long enough for a reasonable premises owner to discover it, or (2) a similar condition had occurred in the past, making it reasonably foreseeable that it would occur again. See Blair, 130 S.W.3d at 765–66. The majority opinion creates a third category that has no footing in our existing precedents. It holds that premises owners also owe entrants a duty to protect against an unsafe condition on the property when it is “reasonably foreseeable that an unsafe condition [will] arise” on the premises “without proper maintenance.” The majority’s holding is contrary to Blair and other binding precedents, creates confusion for premises owners and lower courts, and exposes premises owners to expansive new liability. I respectfully dissent.

This appeal concerns the end of a business relationship between two brothers, Joe D. Grubb (“Joe”) and James W. Grubb (“Jim”).2 After many years of working together in the cash advance and rent-to-own businesses, Jim sued Joe in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”), asserting breach of contract, intentional interference with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable relief under the LLC dissolution statute. Joe sued Jim in turn. One of the chief issues concerned Jim’s claim to equal compensation from the brothers’ businesses based on an alleged express oral agreement with Joe. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Jim, awarding him damages based on multiple grounds. Centrally, the Trial Court found that an express oral agreement between Jim and Joe provided for equal compensation, even though Jim testified that the alleged agreement was “unspoken” and “just the way it’s been.” Joe appeals. We hold, inter alia, that notwithstanding the Trial Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations in favor of Jim, what Jim testified to did not constitute an express oral agreement or any other kind of contract as a matter of law. Jim’s alternative theories for relief are unavailing as well. We reverse.

The appellees filed suit against the appellants for defamation, defamation by implication, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. The appellants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. They also filed petitions seeking to have the case dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied in part the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to this case. It also denied the TPPA petitions, finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case. Alternatively, it found that the appellees satisfied their prima facie burden under the TPPA burden-shifting framework. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case and reverse that portion of the judgment. Finding no other error, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The court found one ground for termination: abandonment by failure to visit. Because the trial court’s order fails to resolve conflicting testimony concerning the father’s visitation with the child, we vacate the judgment and remand for specific findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Defendant, Christopher Allen Keyt, was convicted by a Monroe County jury of possession
with the intent to sell or deliver 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine (count one) and
possession of a firearm during the attempt to commit a dangerous felony (count two). The
trial court sentenced Defendant to thirteen years for count one and four years for count two,
to run consecutively. Defendant appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by denying a
motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, that the evidence was
insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred in qualifying a detective as
an expert in the methamphetamine trade in Monroe County, and that the trial court erred
by restricting Defendant’s questioning of the detective. Upon review of the entire record,
the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments
of the trial court.

In 2014, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Corderro Avant, and a codefendant, of several charges against several victims of a shooting, including one count of first degree premeditated murder; one count of attempted first degree murder resulting in serious bodily injury; nine counts of attempted first degree murder; and eleven counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. The trial court imposed an effective life sentence plus twenty-one years. The Petitioner appealed and this court affirmed the judgments. State v. Avant, No. W2018-01154-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 3072131, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 2020). Thereafter, the Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis. The trial court denied the petition after a hearing on the basis that the statute of limitations had expired. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his petition was timely and should have been granted based on newly discovered evidence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Because the order from which the appellant has filed an appeal does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The Defendant, Joseph Ray Daniels, confessed to the beating death of his five-year-old son, Joseph Clyde Daniels III, and was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, first-degree felony murder, aggravated child abuse, making a false police report, and tampering with evidence.  He subsequently received an effective sentence of life imprisonment.   In this appeal, the Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession (1) because the State failed to corroborate his extrajudicial confession under the modified trustworthiness standard outlined in State v. Bishop, 431 S.W.3d 22 (Tenn. 2014), and (2) because his post-polygraph video recorded statement was obtained by law enforcement through coercive interrogation techniques including an express promise of leniency.  The Defendant also argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude as hearsay utterances by the victim’s three-year-old brother, “Joe dead, Joe dead, Joe dead,” and the response of his aunt, “Yes baby, Joe dead;” and in failing to exclude as not relevant and unfairly prejudicial Facebook messages his wife exchanged with a paramour leading up to the victim’s death.  We affirm.

Petitioner, Jason Collins, was convicted of one count of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell, one count of possession of .5 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia. The trial court merged the two methamphetamine convictions and sentenced Petitioner to serve a total effective sentence of twenty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days in confinement. This court affirmed Petitioner’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal. Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and the post-conviction court denied the petition after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion for new trial, in failing to seek suppression of drugs and other evidence seized from his home, and in failing to conduct a “complete and accurate” investigation of a defense witness. After review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Zyqiius Quade’ Barnes, of one count of second degree murder and one count of reckless aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of seventeen years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it included a “defense of a third person” instruction in its jury charge and when it enhanced his sentence. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.