APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The petitioner, Kervin Jackson, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing the post-conviction court erred in finding he received effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

The petitioner, Bradley Cox, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting the post-conviction court erred when summarily dismissing his petition as untimely because trial counsel’s misconduct tolled the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Former state senator convicted of bribery appeals the trial court’s denial of the restoration of his voting rights based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Deangelo Jackson, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated robbery, attempted second-degree murder, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. On appeal, the petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel’s failure to call material witnesses at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, David Tyrone Green, was convicted of driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2012) (amended 2013, 2015). The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve fifteen days’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the court erred in sentencing him to a greater sentence than the minimally required forty-eight hours’ confinement. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Delmontae Godwin, appeals the revocation of his judicial diversion by the Madison County Circuit Court. The defendant contends the trial court improperly revoked his diversion. After our review, we affirm the trial court’s revocation pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Rodney Jennings, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Defendant appeals, asserting: (1) the trial court improperly allowed into evidence testimony concerning the Defendant’s gang affiliation and the Defendant’s 2013 domestic assault conviction; (2) the State improperly impeached the Defendant during cross-examination; and (3) the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Defendant, Ryan Michael Ramey, was convicted by a jury of rape, a Class B felony; and theft of $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-13-503, -14-103, -14-105 (2015). The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, the Defendant contends (1) that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and (2) that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s “single photo identification” and in-court identification of the Defendant. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The primary issue in this appeal is whether a surviving spouse maintains priority to file a wrongful death action when the decedent’s child has also filed a wrongful death action in which the child alleges that the surviving spouse negligently caused the decedent’s death. The trial court dismissed the daughter’s wrongful death complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, ruling that under the circumstances presented in this case, the surviving spouse was disqualified from filing the wrongful death action. Because the wrongful death statutes do not include an exception to the spousal priority rule and because the surviving spouse did not waive his right to file the wrongful death action, we hold that the trial court properly dismissed the daughter’s wrongful death action. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause remanded to the trial court. 

Defendant, Ronald Orlando Glenn, was convicted of domestic assault following a bench trial. He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to be released on supervised probation after serving ten days, and to complete a Batterer’s Intervention Program. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Following eleven years of litigation, Appellant appeals the trial court’s award of both attorney’s fees, executor’s fees, and expenses charged to the estate. Discerning no error, we affirm.

After a jury trial, the defendant, Michael Demond Starks, was convicted of one count of second-degree murder, one count of attempted first-degree murder, four counts of attempted second-degree murder, and two counts of aggravated assault. On appeal, the defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because he was suffering from severe mental delusions. Additionally, the defendant argues the jury was improperly instructed on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter and that the trial court improperly excluded hearsay statements from a defense witness. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a divorce case that was appealed and remanded and now once again is back before us. Melody Crunk Telfer (“Wife”) filed for divorce from husband George Curtiss Telfer (“Husband”) in 2010. A final decree of divorce was entered in 2012. Husband appealed the finding that he lacked a marital interest in two of Wife’s business entities. This Court found that the appreciation in value of the entities at issue was marital property subject to equitable division. On remand, the Chancery Court for Williamson County (“the Remand Court”) valued the appreciation, divided the marital estate, and awarded Husband attorney’s fees. Husband appeals to this Court. We find, inter alia, that the approximately 84/16 division of the marital estate in favor of Wife rendered by the Remand Court is inequitable in light of the evidence and the relevant statutory factors. We vacate that portion of the Remand Court’s order and remand for a fresh division of the marital estate on a 65/35 basis in favor of Wife. We otherwise affirm the Remand Court.   

Defendant, Frederick R. Ross, Jr., appeals the trial court’s decision to revoke his probation and place his twelve-year sentence into effect. Defendant argues that the State violated his due process rights by failing to give proper notice of the alleged violations of probation and by failing to disclose the evidence to be used against him. Additionally, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by placing Defendant’s full sentence into effect. Upon review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court but remand the case for the correction of clerical errors on the judgment forms.

A jury convicted the Defendant, Joseph Langlinais, of rape of a child, aggravated sexual battery, and attempted rape of a child, and he received an effective sentence of twenty eight years in prison. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. The Defendant also challenges the admission of his recorded statement to law enforcement, alleging that the recording was inadmissible due to its poor quality, that the recording contained inadmissible evidence of the Defendant’s bad acts, and that the recording violated his right to confront witnesses. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Terry Lea Bunch, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty pleaded conviction for third offense driving under the influence (“DUI”). The pro se petition alleged a defect in the charging instrument and was summarily dismissed by the post-conviction court for failure to state a colorable claim. Petitioner argues on appeal that the post-conviction court should have allowed him the opportunity to amend his petition to include an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Michael Bell, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of aggravated rape and two counts of aggravated robbery and received an effective sentence of twenty-one years with community supervision for life. The Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty plea was not voluntarily and knowingly entered. Following a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

This case involves allegations of fraud and undue influence with respect to the estate of Brenda Vargo (the deceased). Following the deceased’s death, four surviving family members discovered that they were no longer designated as “payable-on-death” beneficiaries on several of the deceased’s bank accounts. These family members filed suit against Claude Moyers (Mr. Moyers), alleging that Mr. Moyers’s wife, Wanda Moyers (Mrs. Moyers), persuaded the deceased, “through fraud or undue influence,” to close some of her bank accounts and to name Mr. Moyers as the sole payable-on-death beneficiary on the remaining accounts. Following a bench trial, the court determined that Mrs. Moyers had a confidential relationship with the deceased; hence, creating a rebuttable presumption of undue influence. The trial court imputed the undue influence of Mrs. Moyers to Mr. Moyers. Ultimately, the trial court determined that Mr. Moyers failed to rebut the presumption of undue influence by clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, the court divested Mr. Moyers of his interest in the disputed funds. Mr. Moyers appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, the Defendant, Sidney B. Ray, entered a guilty plea to ten felonies and one misdemeanor and received an effective sentence of fourteen years, with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied the Defendant’s request for an alternative sentence and ordered his sentence to be served in confinement. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred in determining the manner of service of his sentence. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal involves various issues related to a mortgage loan transaction and loan modification efforts. The plaintiffs’ complaint, which was filed just a few days before a scheduled foreclosure, asserted multiple claims for relief, including breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of the Truth-in- Lending Act. The trial court ultimately dismissed all claims at summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion

The Petitioner, Calvin Douglas, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief and the denial of his motion to reconsider, in which he argued that the facts presented at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing supported a writ of error coram nobis on the basis of newly discovered evidence. Pursuant to an order by this court, the Petitioner was permitted to file an untimely notice of appeal. After a review of the record, we hold that this court’s order allowing the Petitioner to late-file his notice of appeal was improvidently granted. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Donald Douglas, filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a direct appeal in exchange for a sentence of eight years and that his trial counsel was ineffective. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner challenges the postconviction court’s ruling. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Marshall County Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, William Waylon Hanson, of violating an order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, failing to provide evidence of financial responsibility, and passing another vehicle in a no passing zone. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the trial court erred by granting the State’s motion in limine to prohibit the Appellant from collaterally attacking the order declaring him to be a motor vehicle habitual offender, by limiting the defense’s closing argument, and by admitting the Appellant’s driving record into evidence through an employee of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Maury County jury convicted the Defendant, Kimberly Johnson Hart, of facilitation of possession with intent to sell one-half ounce or more of marijuana and facilitation of possession with intent to sell less than two pounds of tetrahydrocannabinol, a schedule VI narcotic. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to concurrent terms of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each conviction, thirty days to be served in jail, with the remainder to be served on supervised probation. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions and that the trial court erred when it denied her request for judicial diversion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Trial Court in this custody proceeding attempted to certify as a final judgment, pursuant to Rule 54.02 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, the order entered on March 31, 2017, which resolved all issues in the proceedings below except those related to the payment of child support for the benefit of the parties’ minor child. Because the order fails to expressly determine in accordance with the rule that “there is no just reason for delay,” the order is not appealable as a certified final judgment pursuant to Rule 54.02. See Fox v. Fox, 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983). We therefore lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal and it is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a new appeal once a final judgment or appropriately certified final judgment has been entered.