APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Petitioner, Joseph Ellison, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. The Petitioner contends that his guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered because “there was no factual basis for” them. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Deandrey Peterson, appeals his convictions for aggravated rape, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary, and possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and his effective thirty-year sentence. The Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b) in admitting evidence of other offenses. We affirm the Defendant’s convictions but remand the case to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing for the firearm conviction.

Mario Antoine Leggs, the Defendant, filed a motion requesting an ex parte injunction and hearing, arguing that the judgments in his case were invalid because they did not have a file stamp date. The trial court denied the Defendant’s motion because the judgments were signed by the trial court and entered on November 29, 2001. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying relief. The State contends that the Defendant does not have an appeal as of right under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 from the denial of a motion requesting injunctive relief. Additionally, the State argues that the lack of a file stamp date does not invalidate the Defendant’s judgments. After a thorough review of the facts and applicable case law, we dismiss the Defendant’s appeal.

A Bedford County jury convicted the Defendant, Steven W. Davis, of attempted rape and attempted incest. The trial court imposed an effective six-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him by misapplying an enhancement factor and by denying his request for alternative sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

After a bench trial, the trial court found the Defendant, Hugh Everret Burt, guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor for knowingly possessing less than fifty sexual images of minors. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to two years and six months, with six months to be served in jail and the remaining served through Community Corrections. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence against him is insufficient and that the trial court erred when it ordered him to serve a portion of the sentence in jail. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Doris Annette Christenberry (“Plaintiff”), pro se, appeals the April 19, 2017 judgment of the Circuit Court for Blount County (“the Trial Court”) granting summary judgment to Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., among other things. Plaintiff’s brief on appeal fails to comply in any meaningful way with Tenn. R. App. P. 27. We, therefore, find that Plaintiff has waived her issues on appeal.

This appeal presents the issue of whether a trial court may properly transfer a probate proceeding that was allegedly filed in the wrong county to the county where the decedent was residing when he passed away. The administratrix of the probate estate was appointed by the Campbell County Chancery Court upon the filing of a verified petition alleging that the decedent died in Lake City, Tennessee. A defendant in a wrongful death lawsuit, subsequently filed by the administratrix regarding the death of the decedent, filed a motion in the Campbell County Chancery Court, seeking to have the previously issued letters of administration revoked because the decedent was residing in a nursing facility in Anderson County at the time of his death. Rather than revoking the letters of administration, the Campbell County Chancery Court transferred the probate matter to Anderson County. Subsequently, the Anderson County Chancery Court denied a similar motion, stating that it had no jurisdiction to revoke letters of administration issued by the Campbell County Chancery Court. The movant has appealed. Discerning no error, we affirm the Campbell County Court’s order transferring the probate action to Anderson County.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred by dismissing the complaint with prejudice based upon collateral estoppel and res judicata. The record before us reveals that as many as ten other actions have been commenced by the same parties in state and federal courts in which Plaintiffs have repeatedly challenged the validity of Defendants’ efforts to foreclose on property in Eads, Tennessee. To commence this action, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint to Set Aside Foreclosure and Declare Foreclosure a Nullity, for Damages, and for Legal and Equitable Relief. Defendants challenged the complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss Complaint, contending that Plaintiffs waived their right to contest the foreclosure pursuant to a settlement agreement they entered into following mediation in one of the federal court proceedings. Defendants also contend that the same issues that are raised in this action were litigated in the federal courts, and that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable. The chancellor granted Defendants’ motion and dismissed this action based on collateral estoppel and res judicata. We affirm.

This appeal involves a homeowner’s lawsuit against a construction company for breach of contract and negligence. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment for the homeowner for $135,383.93 and denied a counterclaim filed by the construction company for the balance of the contract price. The construction company appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in its calculation of damages and in denying the counterclaim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

Appellant appeals the dismissal of this action on the ground of res judicata. We hold that an essential element of res judicata—that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction—is not met in this case. Here, the court that rendered the judgment relied upon lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court’s judgment of dismissal is therefore reversed.

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Kentucky State Reformatory, who brought an action against the Clerk and Master of the Davidson County, Tennessee, Chancery Court, appeals the dismissal of his suit for failure to comply with statutory provisions applicable to suits brought in Tennessee by inmates incarcerated in Tennessee facilities and for failing to pay the filing fee. Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion in not ordering that the filing fee be paid from his inmate trust account. Upon a review of the record, we determine that neither the statutes relied upon by the court in dismissing the suit nor those relied upon by the plaintiff in contesting the dismissal apply to the case at bar; we have further determined that the dismissal was proper for Plaintiff’s failure to pay the fees required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-21-401 or secure such relief from the requirement as may be available to him. Consequently, we affirm the dismissal of this action.      

An Anderson Circuit Court Jury convicted the Appellant, Melissa L. Lopez, of aggravated child neglect, and the trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to twenty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction, arguing that the State failed to prove her neglect resulted in the victim’s injuries. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Appellant, Alex Parrish, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. The State has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Lindsey W. (“Mother”) appeals the September 25, 2017 order of the Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”) terminating her parental rights to the minor child Riley W. (“the Child”) upon the grounds of substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(2) and persistent conditions pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(3). We find and hold that grounds for terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1- 113(g)(2) and (g)(3) were proven by clear and convincing evidence and that it was proven by clear and convincing evidence that the termianation was in the Child’s best interests. We, therefore, affirm the September 25, 2017 order of the Juvenile Court terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Child.

This case arose as a result of a local building inspector’s refusal to issue building permits to the owner/developer of three commercial properties because the owner/developer did not have a licensed general contractor overseeing construction. Subsequently, without submitting completed applications for the building permits or paying the required permit fees, the owner/developer appeared before the Bolivar city council to appeal the denials of the building permits. Relying on the recommendation of the city attorney, the city council determined that because the owner/developer had not filed written building permit applications or paid building permit fees, an appeal was not appropriate and refused to take any action. The owner/developer then filed a complaint for a writ of certiorari and other relief in the Chancery Court. Following the filing of the lawsuit, the owner completed the applications, paid the permit fees, and the building permits were issued. The owner/developer was later granted permission to amend his complaint to allege an inverse condemnation claim based on a regulatory taking. The defendants subsequently moved for summary judgment. The Chancery Court ultimately granted defendants summary judgment on all of the owner/developer’s initial claims. The defendants later filed a motion to dismiss as to the owner/developer’s claim for inverse condemnation. The motion to dismiss was also granted by the Chancery Court. The owner/developer appeals. For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Chancery Court is affirmed.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds of: (1) abandonment by willful failure to support; (2) persistence of the conditions that led to the children’s removal; and (3) substantial noncompliance with the requirements of the permanency plans. The trial court also found that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. On appeal, the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services concedes that the persistence of conditions ground is not applicable to Appellant. We agree and accordingly reverse the trial court’s reliance on that ground for termination. Although we also reverse the trial court’s finding of abandonment, because it is only necessary that one ground for termination be established, the trial court’s termination order is otherwise affirmed. 

The Petitioner, Brian Caswell McGrowder, appeals from the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. The Petitioner contends that due process concerns should toll the one-year statute of limitations to allow review of his underlying claims. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Petitioner, Rickey Bell, appeals from the post-conviction court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s post-conviction petition following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner asserts that he is entitled to relief because he received ineffective assistance of counsel in the proceedings leading to his convictions for one count of rape of a child, one count of aggravated sexual battery, one count of rape, and two counts of sexual battery by an authority figure. After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this divorce, the husband appeals the trial court’s award of alimony in futuro, the amount of alimony awarded, and the allocation of marital debt. Concluding that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s findings and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in applying relevant legal principles, we affirm.    

The pro se Defendant, Patric Pope, appeals from the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Lawrence County jury convicted the Defendant, Randy Timothy Jones, of DUI per se, reckless driving, violation of the seatbelt law, violation of the due care law, and failure to maintain his lane, and the trial court sentenced him to eleven months and twenty-nine days of probation after he served forty-eight hours in jail. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it did not exclude the blood alcohol report because the State did not adequately establish the proper chain of custody. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Defendant, Michael Kevin Schipp, was convicted of one count of burglary of an automobile and one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and received a total effective sentence of fifteen years. On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense with regard to his aggravated assault conviction. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Shelby County Criminal Court Jury convicted the Appellants, Ashton Buford, Devante Terrell, and Melvin Hopkins, of two counts each of first degree felony murder; one count each of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; and one count each of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the felony murder convictions, and the Appellants received effective sentences of life in confinement. On appeal, the Appellants contend that the trial court erred by deleting “killing” from portions of the jury instructions for first degree felony murder; by denying severance motions, admitting evidence of codefendants’ statements, and failing to give a limiting instruction in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); and by allowing the State to engage in improper jury voir dire and closing arguments. In addition, Appellant Buford contends that the trial court erred by failing to list the elements for the underlying felonies in the jury instructions for first degree felony murder, that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on facilitation of the charged offenses, that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated kidnapping, and that cumulative error warrants a new trial. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Bradley Cox, appeals the dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, asserting the post-conviction court erred when summarily dismissing his petition as untimely because trial counsel’s misconduct tolled the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm the post-conviction court’s dismissal of the petition pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals.

Former state senator convicted of bribery appeals the trial court’s denial of the restoration of his voting rights based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-29-204. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.