APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Sullivan County Circuit Court Jury convicted the appellant of one count of delivering psilocin, a Schedule I drug, within 1,000 feet of a school, a Class A felony; one count of delivering psilocin, a Class B felony; and two counts of casual exchange, a Class A misdemeanor. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged each casual exchange conviction into a conviction for delivering psilocin and sentenced the appellant to an effective fifteen years in confinement. On appeal, the appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the felony convictions; that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to cross-examine the confidential informant (CI) about her prior convictions; that the trial court erred by refusing to allow him to question the CI and her husband about their prior drug use; that the trial court should have instructed the jury on entrapment; that cumulative errors warrant a new trial; and that his effective fifteen-year sentence is disproportionate to the crimes. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the trial court committed reversible error regarding the appellant’s cross-examination of the CI. Therefore, the appellant’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

The defendant’s probation was revoked after a full evidentiary hearing, and he was ordered to serve his sentence in incarceration. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. Upon review, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment accordingly.

Petitioner, Michael Small, was convicted of aggravated robbery and received a sentence of 20 years, to be served consecutively to his sentences for three prior aggravated robbery convictions. Petitioner appealed his sentence, and this court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. State v. Michael Small, No. W2010-00470-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Mar. 28, 2011), perm. app. denied (Tenn., July 15, 2011). A summary of the facts underlying Petitioner’s convictions in this case can be found in that opinion. Petitioner now appeals the trial court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective. Having reviewed the record before us, we affirm the judgment of trial court.

E. Ron Pickard and Linda Pickard have filed a timely Tenn. R. App. P. 39 petition requesting this Court to revisit its opinion filed in this case on December 17, 2013. This petition is premised on the Pickards’ erroneous conclusion that the focal point of the Court’s analysis was their April 6, 2009 petition for a declaratory order, to the exclusion of their January 16, 2009 petition for a declaratory order.

The defendant, Timothy Aaron Baxter, appeals from his Madison County Circuit Court jury conviction of Class E felony failure to appear, see T.C.A. § 39-16-609, the result of which was a six-year sentence to be served in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the admission of hearsay evidence, the use of prior convictions to impeach the defendant as a witness, and the failure to suppress his pretrial statements recorded in a transcript of an earlier court appearance. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Cortino A. Harris, stands convicted for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license, violation of the financial responsibility law, and violation of the registration law. He was sentenced to a term of six months in the county jail for the convictions, and the sentence was ordered to be served consecutively to a term imposed in a separate case. On appeal, the defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the convicting evidence with regard to the conviction for driving on a cancelled, suspended, or revoked license. Following review of the record and arguments, we affirm the convictions as imposed.

The defendant, Samuel Blake Maness, was convicted of robbery, aggravated burglary, and assault and is currently serving an effective twelve-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, he contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) consecutive sentences were improperly imposed. Following review of the argument and record, we affirm the convictions and sentences.

Defendant, Dwayne B. Harris, appeals from the trial court’s order revoking Defendant’s sentences of probation following a hearing in which violation of conditions of probation were admitted to by Defendant through his attorney. While acknowledging on appeal that violations of probation conditions had been admitted, Defendant asserts the trial court still erred by revoking probation and ordering him to serve his sentences in incarceration. The State argues the appeal should be dismissed because the notice of appeal was filed seven days late. Defendant admits the notice of appeal was late but requests this court to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal. Under the circumstances, we decline to do so. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed.

This appeal involves the purchase of property at a tax sale. MERS filed suit against Purchaser to invalidate his purchase of property because it had not received notice of the sale even though it was listed as a beneficiary or nominee on the deed of trust. Purchaser claimed that MERS was not entitled to notice because MERS did not have an interest in the property. Purchaser also alleged that MERS failed to properly commence its lawsuit because it did not remit the proper funds pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 67-5-2504(c). The trial court refused to set aside the tax sale, holding that the applicable notice requirements were met and that Purchaser was the holder of legal title to the property. MERS appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this medical malpractice action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a neurosurgeon, negligently penetrated her spinal cord with a surgical instrument while performing a cervical fusion at two levels of her neck leading to partial paralysis and other neurological problems. She was ultimately diagnosed with a condition called Brown Sequard Syndrome. The issues were tried before a jury; however, several of the claims were dismissed on directed verdict. The remaining claims went to the jury which rendered a verdict on behalf of the defendant-neurosurgeon. The plaintiff raises numerous issues on appeal, the substance of which may be divided into three categories. First, she contends error associated with the directed verdict, the verdict form, and the jury instructions. In this regard she contends, inter alia, that the trial court erred in directing a verdict as to res ipsa loquitur because she presented the testimony of three expert witnesses of the defendant’s specific acts of negligence. The plaintiff also contends the court erred by dismissing all but three of her claims upon a directed verdict. Second, the plaintiff argues she was denied a fair trial due to inappropriate argument and misconduct. Third, she argues a host of errors secondary to evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

This action involves the proper adjudication of the parties’ interests in certain marital retirement assets post divorce. The sole issue raised is whether the trial court properly retained jurisdiction over the retirement assets pursuant to a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”). Based on prior precedent, we find that the trial court did properly retain jurisdiction, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s decision in this case.

The defendant, convicted of aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, and sentenced to concurrent terms of ten and six years respectively, appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the evidence of identification was sufficient as to both convictions and, as to the aggravated burglary, holding that the victim had not given his “effective consent” to the entry of the residence. We granted the application for permission to appeal to determine whether the evidence, circumstantial or direct, was sufficient to establish both convictions. Because the jury had the prerogative to reject the alibi testimony offered by the defendant, the identification evidence was sufficient as to both offenses. The aggravated robbery conviction is, therefore, affirmed. As to the aggravated burglary, however, the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction because there was no evidence that the Defendant engaged in an act of “deception,” as defined by statute, in the context of “effective consent.” The aggravated burglary conviction is, therefore, reversed and the charge dismissed. We remand for a new trial on the lesser included offenses of aggravated criminal trespass and criminal trespass.

This is a property boundary dispute. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and found that Defendant did not acquire disputed property bordering the western edge of Plaintiff’s property and the eastern edge of Defendant’s property by adverse possession. The trial court also found that Defendant did not demonstrate laches. We affirm.

The Defendant, Ronnie Peter Wilson, III, was convicted by a jury of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, a Class C felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-12-103, -12-107, -13-402. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective twenty-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A bail bondsman filed suit against an attorney over title to several pieces of land.  The suit went to trial before a jury, but the parties settled before a verdict was announced.  The attorney subsequently sued the bail bondsman’s attorneys for malicious prosecution and other torts.  The defendant attorneys filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the parties’ agreement to settle the underlying case negated one of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim, “a final and favorable termination” of the underlying suit in favor of the defendant.  The motion also argued that the complaint did not sufficiently allege the elements of the other causes of action.  The trial court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff attorney had failed to state a claim for relief under any of the causes of action.  We affirm the trial court.

The Defendant, Tamika Michelle Claybourne, challenges the trial court’s denial of alternative sentencing.  After a review of the record and the applicable authorities, we discern no error in the trial court’s determinations and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A woman driving a passenger vehicle was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a tractor trailer. The woman and her husband filed a complaint alleging negligence and loss of consortium against the other driver and against the owner of the tractor trailer. The Plaintiffs did not comply with the deadlines set out in the Scheduling Order and, as a result, they were precluded from introducing medical testimony or records in support of their claims. On the day set for trial, the Plaintiffs told the court they were not prepared to try their case and wanted to go home. The trial court dismissed the case without prejudice, with the option of filing a new complaint within a year, and the Plaintiffs appealed. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and, accordingly, affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The defendant was found by the trial court to be in violation of the terms of his community corrections sentence and ordered to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to incarceration rather than to rehabilitation. After reviewing the record and the arguments of the parties, we discern no abuse of discretion. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

This case involves litigation between two business entities: Dominion Enterprises, f/k/a Trader Publishing Company (“Dominion”), the former employer of six of the seven individual defendants, and Dataium, LLC (“Dataium”), a company subsequently formed by those defendants. Dominion filed a complaint against the defendants, alleging numerous causes of action, including breach of covenants not to compete, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty of loyalty, breach of a non-solicitation agreement, and civil conspiracy. The trial court found that Dataium and two of the individual defendants were liable for breach of contract but dismissed Dominion’s other claims.  Dominion appeals.  We affirm.

Winston Payne brought this action against his former employer, CSX Transportation, Inc., under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”), alleging that CSX negligently exposed him to asbestos, diesel fumes, and radioactive materials in the workplace causing his injuries. The jury returned a verdict finding (1) that CSX negligently caused Payne’s injuries; (2) that CSX violated the Locomotive Inspection Act or safety regulations regarding exposure to asbestos, diesel fumes, and radioactive materials; and (3) that Payne’s contributory negligence caused 62% of the harm he suffered. The jury found that “adequate compensation” for Payne’s injuries was $8.6 million. After the jury returned its verdict, the trial court, sua sponte, instructed the jury, for the first time, that, under FELA, its finding that CSX violated a statute or regulation enacted for the safety of its employees meant that plaintiff would recover 100% of the damages found by the jury. The court sent the jury back for further deliberations. It shortly returned with an amended verdict of “$3.2 million @ 100%.” Six months after the court entered judgment on the $3.2 million verdict, it granted CSX’s motion for a new trial, citing “instructional and evidentiary errors.” The case was then assigned to another trial judge, who thereafter granted CSX’s motion for summary judgment as to the entirety of the plaintiff’s complaint. The second judge ruled that the causation testimony of all of plaintiff’s expert witnesses was inadmissible. We hold that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, sua sponte, on a purely legal issue, i.e., that the jury’s finding of negligence per se under FELA precluded apportionment of any fault to the plaintiff based upon contributory negligence, an instruction given after the jury had returned a verdict that was complete, consistent, and based on the instructions earlier provided to it by the trial court. We further hold that, contrary to the trial court’s statements, the court did not make any prejudicial evidentiary rulings in conducting the trial, and that its jury instructions, read as a whole, were clear, correct, and complete. Consequently, the trial court erred in granting a new trial. We remand to the trial court. We direct the first trial judge to review the evidence as thirteenth juror and determine whether the jury verdict in the amount of $8.6 million is against the clear weight of the evidence. If it is not, the trial judge is directed to enter judgment on that verdict. If, on the other hand, the trial judge finds that the larger verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence, the court is directed to enter a final judgment on the jury’s verdict of $3.2 million. The trial court’s grant of summary judgment is rendered moot by our judgment. However, in the event the Supreme Court determines that our judgment is in error, we hold that the grant of summary judgment was not appropriate.

A Shelby County Grand Jury returned an indictment against Defendant, James Johnson a.k.a. Guy Bonner, charging him with aggravated burglary, theft of property more than $500 but less than $1,000, and resisting arrest. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated burglary, theft of property less than $500, and resisting arrest. The trial court imposed a sentence of 11 months, 29 days each for the theft conviction and the resisting arrest conviction and fifteen years as a persistent offender for aggravated burglary. The trial court ordered the sentences to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the sentences in unrelated cases. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that the State failed to give proper notice of its intent to seek enhanced punishment. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm defendant’s convictions for aggravated burglary, theft over $500, and resisting arrest. However, we remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment showing a sentence of six months, concurrent with the sentences for aggravated burglary and theft over $500, for the Class B misdemeanor of resisting arrest.

The Petitioner, Tom Perry Bell, filed a petition for post-conviction relief attacking his guilty-pleaded conviction for burglary and resulting eight-year sentence. The post-conviction court denied relief following an evidentiary hearing, finding that the Petitioner had failed to prove his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In this appeal as of right, the Petitioner contends that trial counsel was ineffective at sentencing principally by failing to discover or challenge several errors in the presentence investigation report regarding his criminal history. After our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is a post-divorce case. Jimmy Glenn Fields (“Husband”) appeals the trial court’s order (1) denying his motion for a reduction in alimony and (2) granting the counter-motion of Rene Annette Fields (“Wife”) for an increase in alimony. Following a bench trial, the court held that Husband had failed to demonstrate his inability to return to work as a material change in circumstances justifying a decrease in his court-ordered alimony obligation of $1,100 a month. Rather, the court found that the proof demonstrated that Husband had the ability to pay, and that Wife had a need for, increased support. The court increased Husband’s obligation to $2,000 per month. We affirm.

I do not take issue with any of the law as set forth in the majority’s opinion. I concur in the majority’s decision to affirm the Trial Court’s denial of the Appellant’s request to reduce the amount of the alimony. I do, however, respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming the Trial Court’s decision to increase the amount of the alimony.

Appellant, Cassie Chapman, was indicted by the Sullivan County Grand Jury for two counts of theft over $1,000 and one count of aggravated burglary. She pled guilty to the charges and agreed to a three-year sentence for one count of theft, a two-year sentence for the second count of theft, and a three-year sentence for aggravated burglary. The plea agreement specified that one two-year sentence for theft and the sentence for aggravated burglary would run concurrently with each other but consecutively to the three-year sentence for aggravated burglary would run consecutively to the theft sentences. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court denied alternative sentencing on the theft sentences. Appellant appeals. After a review of the record, we determine that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant to incarceration. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.