APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Charles Clevenger, appeals from his Knox County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated robbery, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the trial court erred by ruling that the State would be permitted to utilize his prior convictions to impeach his testimony, that the testimony of a State witness violated the Confrontation Clause, and that the trial court erred by ordering the 30-year sentence imposed in this case to be served consecutively to the 30-year sentence imposed in an unrelated case. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A widow filed a complaint seeking a determination of the proper owner of a tract of real property held in her husband’s name. The widow lived on the property for over twenty years after her husband died.  She believed she was the proper owner until she became interested in selling the property and learned her name was not on the deed. The trial court ruled the widow acquired the property by common law adverse possession, and one of the husband’s heirs-at-law appealed. The husband’s great nephew asserted the widow had permission to remain on the property, and, therefore, could not obtain title through adverse possession. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. The widow possessed and used the property openly and exclusively for over twenty years, thereby putting the world on notice that she claimed ownership of the property.

The Petitioner, David Wayne Britt, appeals the Hardeman County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The State has filed a motion requesting that this Court affirm the trial court’s judgment pursuant to Rule 20 of the Rules of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Following our review, we grant the State’s motion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Christopher Neal Noon, appeals the Sevier County Circuit Court’s order revoking his probation for convictions for the sale of a Schedule II controlled substance and theft of property valued at less than $500 and ordering his effective three-year sentence into execution. The Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The defendant, Charles Edgar Ledford, appeals from the Monroe County Criminal Court to challenge via certified questions of law his guilty-pleaded convictions of two counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1003, a Class D felony; child neglect, see id. § 39-15-402(a), a Class E felony; two counts of aggravated sexual battery, see id. § 39-13-504, a Class B felony; and two counts of rape of a child, see id. § 39-13-522, a Class A felony. The defendant received an effective sentence of 56 years to be served in the Department of Correction. The certified questions relate to law enforcement officers’ discovery and seizure of child pornography materials in the defendant’s house, which had been condemned for demolition by the City of Sweetwater. Upon our review, we hold that the certified questions are not dispositive of some of the convictions, and we dismiss the appeal relative to those convictions. As to the remainder of the convictions, including those for aggravated sexual battery and rape of a child, we hold that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in the seized materials and that the motion to suppress was properly denied. Thus, we affirm the trial court’s order with respect to these latter convictions.

In this domestic relations action, the trial court granted Wife a divorce on fault-based grounds against Husband and awarded her alimony in futuro in the amount of $3,800.00 monthly, health insurance costs, and attorney’s fees. Husband appeals the trial court’s awards of alimony and attorney’s fees, as well as the court’s valuation of his dental practice and division of marital assets. Wife raises a threshold issue of whether the trial court erred by granting a Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 motion after the time had elapsed to file a notice of appeal. We affirm the grant of the Rule 60.02 motion. We reverse the valuation of the husband’s dental practice. We remand to the trial court for revaluation of the dental practice without consideration of professional goodwill, adjustment of the equitable division of marital assets based on revaluation of the dental practice, and clarification of the amount of attorney’s fees awarded to Wife in the trial court. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

A Cocke County jury convicted petitioner, Jonathan Wesley Stephenson, of first degree premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. The jury imposed the death penalty for the murder conviction, and the trial court sentenced petitioner to twentyfive years for the conspiracy conviction. After several appeals, remands, and collateral proceedings, petitioner’s resulting sentence was the death penalty for the murder conviction and a sixty-year sentence for the conspiracy conviction. Petitioner then sought postconviction relief. Following an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner now appeals the denial of relief, alleging multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the record, we discern no error and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The issues in this case involve the proper use and alleged interference with an easement created by express grant. The trial court concluded that the holders of the easement could use the easement for recreational purposes and that the servient landowner had interfered with the use of the easement by planting trees and placing boulders within the easement. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiffs, eight Shelby County registered voters, filed an action for declaratory judgment challenging the constitutionality of the 2012 Senate Reapportionment Act on the ground that it divides more counties than necessary in contravention of Article II, Section 6, of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and subsequently granted the Defendants’ motions to dismiss. The facts are not disputed and we hold that, as a matter of law, the Act is not unconstitutional. We affirm judgment in favor of Defendants.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, William James Watt, of three counts of rape of a child and three counts of aggravated sexual battery.  The trial court sentenced the Defendant, a Range I, standard offender, to twenty-five years at 100 percent for each of the rape of a child convictions and to ten years at 100 percent for each of the aggravated battery convictions.  The court ordered the Defendant to serve some of the sentences consecutively, for a total effective sentence of thirty-five years, at 100 percent.  On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain two of his convictions for rape of a child and one of his convictions for aggravated sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for substitution of counsel and to continue his trial; and (3) his sentence is excessive.  After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Jerome Maurice Teats (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of aggravated robbery and four counts of especially aggravated kidnapping.  The trial court subsequently imposed an effective sentence of fifty years’ incarceration.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant raises the following issues:  (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the district attorney general’s office; (3) his convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping must be reversed on due process and double jeopardy grounds; (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on criminal responsibility; (5) the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions; (6) cumulative error; and (7) his sentence is excessive.  Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority.  First, I believe the trial court’s ruling regarding the admissibility of the Defendant’s statements is insufficient for us to conduct a proper review of the suppression issue.  Second, I believe that the Defendant was entitled to a jury instruction regarding kidnapping pursuant to  State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), and that the failure to give the instruction constitutes reversible error.

This is a divorce action. Wife appeals the trial court’s judgment naming Husband primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and classifying real property as Husband’s separate property. Wife also asserts the trial court erred in dividing the parties’ property notwithstanding classification of the real property. We affirm the trial court’s classification and division of property. We vacate the trial court’s judgment with respect to naming Husband primary residential parent of the parties’ minor child and awarding the parties equal parenting time, and remand the matter to the trial court to engage in a comparative fitness analysis as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-6-106, and for findings as required by Rule 52 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

Appellant bonding company, Danny Blankenship Bonding Company, filed a petition for exoneration of bond in the Madison County Circuit Court case of State v. John Thomas Hummons, case number 12-162. The petition was denied by the trial court. In this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 appeal by the appellant, we reverse the ruling of the trial court and remand with instructions for the trial court to enter an appropriate order granting the petition to exonerate Appellant bonding company from the defendant’s bond.

This is an appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of Appellants’ defamation lawsuit. The trial court granted Appellees’ motions to dismiss under both Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6), and under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02, for violation of Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 45. We conclude that the trial court erred in granting the Rule 12.02 motion when the Appellants’ motion to amend their pleadings was still pending. We further conclude that the trial court’s stated reasons for granting the Rule 41.02 motion are not sufficient to justify the drastic sanction of dismissal. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand for further proceedings. Vacated and remanded.

A school administrator filed the instant lawsuit,alleging that his employment was terminated in violation of both the Open Meetings Act and his contract of employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant school board on the Open Meetings Act claims on the basis of laches, finding that the school administrator failed to bring his claim in a timely manner. The trial court also granted summary judgment as to the contract claim, finding that the school administrator could not prove damages. We reverse the trial court’s ruling with regard to the school administrator’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to the Open Meetings Act, but affirm as to the remainder of the trial court’s decision. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
 

Petitioner, Roderick Sammual Chadwick, was convicted by a jury of attempted voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault, for which he received concurrent sentences of twelve years and fifteen years, respectively, as a Range III, career offender.  Upon his guilty plea to another count in the indictment, being a felon in possession of a handgun, he received an additional six-year sentence to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence of twenty-one years.  Following an unsuccessful direct appeal, petitioner filed the instant petition for post-conviction relief.  The court denied relief after conducting an evidentiary hearing.  This appeal follows, in which petitioner claims multiple instances of ineffective assistance at trial and on direct appeal.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Homeowner appeals the trial court's order dismissing her complaint against the Deputy Circuit Court Clerk of Crockett County. The complaint alleged that the Deputy Clerk failed to properly issue a writ of possession regarding the homeowner's real property. The trial court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12.02(6) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Ernest Jackson (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of sale and delivery of less than 0.5 grams of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court merged the Defendant’s conviction for delivery of cocaine into his conviction for sale of cocaine and sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for sale and delivery of cocaine. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from the transfer of a child custody case to Texas. The lower court issued an order naming Mother primary residential parent of the parties’ child and granting Father certain visitation rights. According to Father, Mother did not allow Father visitation with the child despite the court’s order. Father filed a petition seeking to hold Mother in contempt. At a preliminary hearing on the matter, the lower court dismissed Father’s petition and ruled that all further proceedings in the matter be held in the court of appropriate jurisdiction in Texas, where Mother was supposedly living. Father appealed. After reviewing the record, we have determined that the lower court’s findings do not support its decision; we therefore vacate the order of the lower court.

Following a jury trial, appellant, Charles Edward Wagner, was found guilty of the following offenses: aggravated criminal trespass; two counts of aggravated assault; five counts of aggravated kidnapping; one count of especially aggravated kidnapping; one count of false imprisonment; and one count of kidnapping. The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days each for aggravated criminal trespass, false imprisonment, and assault; four years each for both counts of aggravated assault; ten years each on the five counts of aggravated kidnapping; nineteen years for especially aggravated kidnapping; and four years for kidnapping. Appealing his convictions and effective nineteen-year sentence, appellant raises the following issues: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) sufficiency of the convicting evidence; and (3) errors with regard to sentencing. Following our careful review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A jury convicted Ricco R. Williams (“the Defendant”) of five counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, two counts of aggravated robbery, one count of aggravated burglary, two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Defendant appealed and contended, among other issues, that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Upon our review, this Court reversed the Defendant’s two convictions of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony and remanded those counts for a new trial; modified one of the Defendant’s aggravated robbery convictions to a conviction of the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault; reversed and dismissed the Defendant’s conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; and affirmed the Defendant’s convictions of and sentences for especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated burglary, and the remaining aggravated robbery. See State v. Ricco R. Williams, No. W2011-02365-CCA-R3-CD, 2013 WL 167285, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 14, 2013) (“Williams I”). Upon the Defendant’s application for permission to appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court for consideration in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), and State v. Cecil, 409 S.W.3d 599 (Tenn. 2013). See State v. Ricco R. Williams, No. W2011-02365-SC-R11-CD (Tenn. Aug. 21, 2013). Upon our consideration of the Defendant’s especially aggravated kidnapping convictions in light of White and Cecil, we affirm the Defendant’s three convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping as to the victims A.R., K.R., and M.R. We reverse the Defendant’s two convictions of especially aggravated kidnapping as to the victims Timothy Currie and Sherita Currie and remand those charges for a new trial. Our previous holdings regarding the Defendant’s remaining convictions are unaffected by the remand and, thus, remain valid.

I respectfully write separately to express departure from the majority with respect to the absence of the White instruction in the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions wherein M.R., K.R., and A.R. were respectively named victims. I emphasize that I do not disagree with the logic underlying the majority’s conclusion that due process principles do not impact these three convictions, the victims of which were not also named victims in accompanying felonies. Rather, I disagree with the implication emanating from Anthony that due process principles constrict the use of kidnapping convictions against victims even though those victims were not victims in any accompanying felony. This vestige of the Anthony regime should be specifically overruled, but I view that as a responsibility of our supreme court.

The defendant, Brian Alan Lambright, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of four counts of aggravated child abuse, Class A felonies, which the trial court merged into two convictions and sentenced the defendant to twenty-two years on each conviction, to be served consecutively, for an effective term of forty-four years in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and the sentences imposed by the trial court.  After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Mario A. Reed, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Montgomery County.  He was convicted of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated rape, and theft under $500, and received an effective sentence of forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction.  In this appeal, he claims that he received ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.