APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Herbert B. Ward, was convicted by a Blount County Circuit Court jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, and domestic assault. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-305; 39-13-304; 39-13-111. He received a seventeen-year sentence for especially aggravated kidnapping, a nine-year sentence for aggravated kidnapping, and an eleven-month, twenty-nine-day sentence for domestic assault, all to be served concurrently for an effective seventeen-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated kidnapping of his wife and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for especially aggravated kidnapping of his eleven-year-old daughter. The State contends that with regard to the kidnapping convictions, the trial court did not instruct the jury in accord with State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012), but that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We vacate the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction and dismiss the charge. We reverse the aggravated kidnapping conviction and remand for a new trial. We affirm the domestic assault conviction.

Defendant, Frederick Herron, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for one count of rape of a child. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced by the trial court to serve 25 years at 100%. Defendant appeals his conviction and asserts that: 1) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to admit into evidence a video recording of the victim’s forensic interview; 2) the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that the State could ask Defendant about prior arrests and an unnamed prior felony conviction if Defendant chose to testify; 3) the State failed to ensure a unanimous verdict by electing an offense that occurred on an unspecified date, and the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for the offense; 4) the trial court should have granted a mistrial after a State’s witness testified about Defendant’s alleged prior DUI conviction; 5) the trial court abused its discretion by excluding a letter written by the victim to her sister; and 6) the cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors deprived Defendant of a fair trial. Having carefully reviewed the parties’ briefs and the record before us, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, David Easton Jones, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his post-conviction petition.  After review of the entire record we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In keeping with the directions provided in State v. James Allen Pollard, No. M2011-00332-SC-R11-CD, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1011 (Tenn. Dec. 20, 2013), the majority takes a reasonable (and what I feel may be the preferred) action suggested by the Tennessee Supreme Court and elects to simply remand this case due to the trial court’s failure to discuss some of the seven legally-relevant factors (listed in State v. Electroplating, Inc., 990 S.W.2d 211, 229 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998)) during its sentencing soliloquy. Like the majority, I too believe that trial courts should endeavor to address each and every criterion discussed in Electroplating during their judicial diversion decisions, and I urge them to do so in order to avoid having their cases remanded. In this case, however, I would address the trial court’s omission by simply choosing the other option provided by our supreme court in Pollard: “conduct[ing] a de novo review to determine whether there is an adequate basis” for the trial court’s decision. See Pollard, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1011, at *32.

A jury convicted Omar Biviano (“the Defendant”) of one count of aggravated robbery, one count of carjacking, and one count of facilitation of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. After a hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to an effective term of twelve years’ confinement. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions and that his sentence is excessive. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is a Governmental Tort Liability action. Plaintiff/Appellant was injured when his motorcycle hit a pothole. Appellant sued the Appellee The City of Memphis for negligence. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that Appellant had failed to rove that the City had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition on its roadway so as to lift immunity under ennessee Code Annotated §29-20-203(b). Accordingly, the court dismissed the lawsuit. We conclude that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the City had no notice of this dangerous condition. Affirmed and remanded.

Roosevelt Brice, Jr. (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of attempted premeditated first degree murder and aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to twenty-five years’ incarceration for his attempted premeditated first degree murder conviction and fifteen years’ incarceration for his aggravated assault conviction. The trial court ordered that the two sentences be served concurrently for a total effective sentence of twenty-five years. In this direct appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempted premeditated first degree murder. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Stephen McKinley, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that his guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary. Following our review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

In the wake of her firing from the University of Tennessee Regional Medical Center in Knoxville, Tennessee, a nurse brought an employment action raising numerous claims. At the time the nurse originally began working at the medical center, it was owned and managed by the University of Tennessee and she was considered an employee of the university. In 1999, the university executed a lease and transfer agreement pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-9-112, by which the operation of the medical center was transferred to a private, nonprofit corporation. Hospital personnel, like the nurse, who had been university employees prior to the transfer, were thereafter “leased” by the private, nonprofit corporation from the university. This interlocutory appeal stems from the trial court’s sua sponte ruling that Tennessee Code Annotated section 49-9-112(a) is unconstitutional. We reverse the determination of the trial court.

The appellant, Stanley Jason Daniels, pled guilty to sexual contact with an inmate and was sentenced as a Range I, standard offender to one year to be served on probation. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for judicial diversion. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The employee was injured when a concrete grinder he was operating exploded, breaking his jaw and several teeth. After his jaw was surgically repaired and he underwent extensive dental treatment, the employee did not return to work for his employer. The employee filed an action in the Chancery Court for Sullivan County seeking permanent disability benefits. The trial court found that the employee sustained a permanent vocational disability of 35%. The employer appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to exclude the testimony of the treating dentist and by finding that the employee sustained any permanent disability. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to a Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal calls into question the sufficiency of the evidence to support an award of workers’ compensation disability benefits related to the aggravation of a pre-existing cervical injury. After settling a claim for an earlier lumbar and cervical injury, the employee filed a new claim in the Circuit Court for Williamson County seeking compensation for aggravation of that injury. The employer insisted that the employee’s condition was a continuation of the prior injury. Following a bench trial, the trial court found that, as a result of performing repetitive tasks, the employee had sustained a new cervical injury and awarded the employee permanent total disability benefits. The employer appealed, asserting (1) that the evidence preponderates against the findings regarding causation and permanency and (2) that the testimony of the employee’s examining physician should be disregarded because it does not comply with the AMA Guides. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We have determined that the evidence does not support the trial court’s conclusion that the employee sustained a new injury and, therefore, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Antonio Dockery, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for aggravated assault, stalking, and aggravated kidnapping. After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the offenses as charged in the indictment. As a result of the convictions, Appellant was sentenced to a total effective sentence of thirty-four years in incarceration. After the denial of a motion for new trial, this appeal followed. On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions; (2) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on aggravated kidnapping; (3) the convictions for aggravated assault and stalking violate double jeopardy; and (4) the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior bad acts in violation of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). After a review of the record and the authorities, we determine: (1) that the evidence is sufficient to support the convictions; (2) Appellant’s convictions for aggravated assault and stalking do not violate double jeopardy where the trial court properly instructed the jury on the evidence to consider when reviewing the stalking charge; and (3) Appellant waived any issue with respect to the admission of prior bad acts for failing to raise the issue in a motion for new trial. Further, we determine that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on aggravated kidnapping by failing to give the instruction from State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn. 2012). The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, Appellant’s aggravated kidnapping conviction must be reversed, and he must receive a new trial at which the jury is instructed in accord with White. The remaining judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

The Defendant-Appellant, Brandi Clutts, appeals the trial court’s revocation of her probation and reinstatement of her original four-year sentence in the Department of Correction.  On appeal, Clutts argues that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a sentence of full confinement rather than imposing split confinement.  Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant, Mark Weatherly, was indicted by the Shelby County Grand Jury for vehicular homicide and two counts of aggravated assault. The jury acquitted Appellant of vehicular homicide and was unable to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of reckless homicide and the other charged offense of aggravated assault. The trial court declared a mistrial with regard to these offenses. Appellant’s request for pretrial diversion was denied by the prosecutor. Appellant filed a writ of certiorari with the trial court. The trial court granted Appellant’s writ of certiorari and concluded that the assistant district attorney general had abused his discretion and ordered the prosecutor to enter into a memorandum of understanding that placed Appellant on pretrial diversion. This Court granted the State’s application for interlocutory appeal. After a thorough review of the record, we find that the trial court’s decision is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and affirm.

The Petitioner, Bryan R. Milam, appeals the Wayne County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for first degree murder and second degree murder and resulting sentence of life plus twenty-three years.  On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred in denying relief because he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, at the motion for new trial hearing, and on appeal.  Specifically, the Petitioner argues that his various attorneys (1) failed to present rebuttal medical evidence concerning the “tight” nature of the victim’s wound or challenge the credibility of the medical examiner, Dr. Charles Harlan, who had lost his medical license following the Petitioner’s convictions; and (2) failed to present a firearms expert who had tested the condition of the murder weapon and determined that it was not working properly.  Following our review, we affirm the denial of relief.

An employee sustained a work-related injury to her shoulder while working as a licensed practical nurse at her employer’s hospital. After returning to work in a modified-duty position for several months after a second shoulder surgery, the employee elected to have knee replacement surgery to remedy pre-existing arthritis that was unrelated to her work. Unfortunately, the knee replacement surgery caused the employee to develop “foot drop.” The employee subsequently exhausted her available leave time because of a prolonged recovery, and the employer terminated her employment. The employee filed the present action seeking permanent total disability benefits. The trial court initially found that the employee had a meaningful return to work and capped her award at one and one-half times her anatomical impairment. The court, however, granted the employee’s motion to alter or amend and found that she did not have a meaningful return to work and  that she was permanently and totally disabled. The trial court apportioned the award between the employer and the Second Injury Fund, and both parties appealed. We conclude that the employee is not permanently and totally disabled and that she  made a meaningful return to work after her shoulder surgeries. We therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court.

Petitioner, Jermaine Mitchell Gray, was found guilty by a Madison County jury of aggravated robbery, and he was subsequently sentenced to serve 12 years as a Range I standard offender. This court affirmed the conviction, and our supreme court denied Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. State v. Jermaine Mitchell Gray, No. W2009-01260-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 4544395 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2010) perm. app. denied (Tenn. April 13, 2011). He subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief which was denied by the trial court following an evidentiary hearing. Petitioner appeals asserting that the trial court erred by denying him post-conviction relief because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court which denied post-conviction relief.

Continental Casualty Company (“CNA”) and Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”) filed this suit against Theraco, Inc.(“Theraco”) seeking compensation for additional workers’ compensation premiums.  Theraco’s insurance contracts with CNA and Travelers provided that it would pay premiums for employees and all other persons who posed a risk of workers’ compensation liability. Pursuant to the contracts, CNA and Travelers both charged Theraco premiums for physical therapists with whom Theraco had contracted. Theraco disputes that it is liable for paying premiums for the workers. After a hearing, the Department of Commerce and Insurance ruled that Theraco was not liable for the additional premiums because the physical therapists were independent contractors rather than employees. CNA and Travelers appealed the Department’s decision to the Chancery Court for Davidson County. The trial court upheld the Department’s ruling, not only concluding that the physical therapists were independent contractors, but also that they did not pose a risk of workers’ compensation liability. CNA and Travelers appealed to this Court. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.

An employee alleged he suffered a compensable injury to his lower back.  His employer disputed a compensable injury occurred.  In the alternative, the employer asserted any award of permanent disability benefits should be limited to one and one-half times the medical impairment because the employee had been terminated for misconduct. The trial court found employee had sustained a compensable injury and did not have a meaningful return  to work.  It awarded 42% permanent  partial disability (“PPD”), six times the medical impairment.  The employer has appealed, asserting the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings. The employer also contends the award was excessive and the trial court erred by denying its motion to stay a portion of the judgment requiring payment of certain medical expenses. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51.  We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Dennis Murphy (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of attempted rape. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting testimony regarding pictures not provided in discovery. He also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Finally, the Defendant contends that cumulative errors denied him a fair trial. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The trial court denied Defendant physician’s motion to recuse following the trial judge’s disclosure of an earlier patient-physician relationship with Defendant’s expert witness. Defendant filed an interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to Rule 10B of the Tennessee Supreme Court Rules. Finding that the circumstances require recusal, we reverse.

Appellant, Jennifer Hannah, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for four counts of child neglect, one count of first degree felony murder during the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate aggravated child neglect, and two counts of delivering a controlled substance to a minor.  At the conclusion of a jury trial, she was found guilty of all counts as charged.  The trial court sentenced her to an effective sentence of life imprisonment.  On appeal, Appellant argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Michael Orman under the provisions of Rule 404(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence; (2) the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for continuance; (3) the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers; (4) the trial court erred in denying her request for an instruction regarding lost or destroyed evidence; (5) the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the elements of aggravated child neglect; and (6) the trial court erred in allowing the admission of an audio recording of a deceased witness.  After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

An employee alleged that he sustained a gradual aggravation of a preexisting lower back condition during the eleven months he worked for his employer. The employer denied the claim, contending that the employee’s condition and symptoms were merely the natural progression of an injury that he had suffered many years earlier. The trial court found for the employer and dismissed the complaint. The employee has appealed that decision, asserting that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s decision. Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, the appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) filed a petition in the Juvenile Court for Sullivan County (“the Juvenile Court”) to terminate the parental rights of Amber B. (“Mother”) to the minor children Jayden B. and Kierra B. (“the Children,” collectively, or, “Jayden” and “Kierra” individually). DCS also sought to terminate the parental rights of Miguel C. (“Father”) to Kierra. After a trial, the Juvenile Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that clear and convincing evidence was proven that grounds existed to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the Children pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-1- 113 (g)(2) and (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in the Children’s best interest for Mother’s parental rights to be terminated. The Juvenile Court also found and held that clear and convincing evidence was proven that grounds existed to terminate Father’s parental rights to Kierra pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-102 (1)(A)(iv), and that clear and convincing evidence was proven that it was in Kierra’s best interest for Father’s parental rights to be terminated. Mother and Father appeal. Apart from certain grounds of abandonment pertaining to Father which we reverse for lack of adequate evidence, we affirm the judgment of the Juvenile Court terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children and Father’s parental rights to Kierra.