APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Ryan Robert Haase (“the Defendant”) was convicted by a jury of one count of criminal attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder, one count of aggravated assault, and one count of domestic assault.  The trial court merged the assault convictions into the attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder conviction and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to forty years in confinement.  In this direct appeal, the Defendant alleges errors in the admission of certain evidence; contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction of attempt to commit first degree premeditated murder; contends that the prosecutor engaged in improper argument; and argues that he should have been sentenced as a Range I offender.  Upon our thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Allen Massey, appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief by the Criminal Court of Bradley County. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the petitioner entered guilty pleas to promotion of manufacturing methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine, for which he received suspended sentences of four years and eleven months and twenty-nine days, respectively. In this appeal, the petitioner argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that his guilty pleas were involuntarily and unknowingly entered. Upon our review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The petitioner, Anthony Dean, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court dismissing the petition.

The defendant was convicted of felony murder, first degree premeditated murder, and especially aggravated robbery. After merging the murder convictions, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences of life for the murder and eighteen years for the especially aggravated robbery. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded to the trial court for a proper determination of whether the sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently. We hold that, when a trial court places findings on the record to support its sentencing decision, the applicable standard of appellate review for a challenge to the imposition of consecutive sentences is abuse of discretion with a presumption of reasonableness. Because, however, the trial court failed to address the factors required to impose consecutive sentences based on the dangerous offender classification, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remand to the trial court for a new sentencing hearing.

The Petitioner, Robert Charles Taylor, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2006 conviction for attempt to commit rape of a child. The Petitioner was originally sentenced to thirty years’ confinement, but the court granted post-conviction relief and reduced his sentence to twelve years. The Petitioner contends that he was prejudiced by (1) counsel’s failure to ensure his presence during jury selection, (2) counsel’s failure to request a hearing pursuant to Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 1999), and (3) the trial judge’s entry into the jury room during deliberations. We reverse the judgment of the trial court and vacate the conviction because the Petitioner was denied his right to be present for the jury selection process.

Mother of a third-grade student filed a common-law writ of certiorari seeking judicial review of school board’s decision to uphold a semester long expulsion of her child. The child was considered disabled due to his diagnosis of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) and was provided with an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”) as required under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). Mother argues that the school board was without authority to expel her child and that the school failed to appropriately administer his IEP which caused his misbehavior. After reviewing the record and relevant authorities, we reject Mother’s arguments and affirm the trial court’s order upholding the expulsion.

The Defendant was found guilty by a Sullivan County Criminal Court jury of five counts of rape of a child involving the daughter of the Defendant’s then-girlfriend. See T.C.A. § 39-13-522 (1997). She was sentenced as a Range I offender to twenty years for each conviction to be served at 100% as a child rapist. The trial court ordered partial consecutive sentencing, for an effective sixty-year sentence. In the Defendant’s previous appeal, she contended that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the convictions; (2) there was a material variance between the presentment, the bill of particulars, the election of offenses, and the proof; (3) the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss the charges due to pre-accusation delay; (4) the court erred in declining to conduct an in camera review of Department of Children’s Services (DCS) records; and (5) the court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Gwendolyn Hagerman, No. E2011-00233-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App. June 4, 2013), perm. app. granted, case remanded (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013). After we affirmed the Defendant’s convictions, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted her application for permission to appeal and remanded the case in order for this court to order that the record be supplemented with the victim’s DCS records and for reconsideration of the case in light of the supplemented record. State v. Gwendolyn Hagerman, No. E2011-00233-CCA-R3-SC (Tenn. Nov. 13, 2013) (per curiam) (order). Having ordered that the record be supplemented and having reviewed the DCS records, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

I respectfully, but with a lack of total commitment, disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s denial of Wife’s motion to alter or amend and to remand this matter for the trial court to further consider the motion.
 

Amir Karshenas, doing business as American Bonding Company, appeals his suspension as a bondsperson in the Twenty-First Judicial District.  Because the trial court did not provide the appellant notice pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-11-125(b) (Supp. 2011), we vacate the suspension and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

We granted permission to appeal to determine whether a provision of the unlawful detainer statute, which requires that a tenant appealing to the circuit court from a general sessions court’s judgment in favor of a landlord must post a bond equal to one year’s rent of the premises, applies regardless of whether the tenant has surrendered possession of the property prior to the appeal. We hold that the plain language of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-18-130(b)(2) (2012) does not require that a tenant appealing to the circuit court from an adverse general sessions court judgment in an unlawful detainer action post a bond corresponding to one year’s rent of the premises if the tenant has surrendered possession of the premises prior to the appeal. Accordingly, the cost bond that the tenants have already posted pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-5-103(a) (2000) is sufficient to perfect their appeal and confer subject matter jurisdiction on the Circuit Court. We affirm the Circuit Court’s judgment denying the landlords’ motion to dismiss and remand the case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Father filed petition to modify a parenting plan, asserting that a material change of circumstance had occurred since the entry of the original parenting plan and seeking to be named primary residential parent.  At the close of Father’s proof, Mother moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the evidence did not show a material change of circumstance; the court denied the motion and adjourned the hearing, expressing a desire to hear testimony from the child’s counselor and receive evidence regarding the child’s performance in school. Following the adjourned hearing, the court granted Father’s petition. Mother appeals, asserting that the court erred in denying the motion to dismiss and hearing further proof, in granting Father’s petition and in making certain evidentiary rulings. Father appeals the court’s award of attorney fees to Mother. We vacate the award of attorney fees and remand the case for entry of a supplemental order relative to the award; in other respects the judgment is affirmed.

The petitioner, Jonathan Wesley Stephenson, appeals the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of his sentence and conviction for conspiracy to commit first degree murder.  After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the petition was properly dismissed for failure to abide by the procedural requirements of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-21-107(b)(4), and we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

The minor beneficiary of a $100,000 life insurance policy filed suit against his financial guardian and the insurance company after the guardian misappropriated the insurance proceeds. The trial court entered judgments in favor of the minor against both the guardian and the insurance company. On appeal by the insurance company, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the insurance company breached its contractual duties by entrusting the proceeds to the guardian. The insurance company then applied for permission to appeal to this Court, contending that it could not be held liable for the loss to the minor because it had relied upon the validity of a juvenile court order of guardianship. Because the insurance company acted in good faith when it relied upon a facially valid court order establishing a financial guardianship in making payment of the life insurance proceeds, it is not liable for breach of contract. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is, therefore, reversed, and the claim against the insurance company is dismissed.

The petitioner, Lorenza Zackery, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief.  The petitioner pled guilty to two counts of rape of a child and received concurrent sentences of twenty years.  He contends that his plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. He claims he was coerced into accepting the plea by trial counsel’s actions and deficient performance.  Following review of the record, we affirm the denial of relief.
 

The Defendant, Leslie Dawn Hurst, pled guilty to seven counts of theft of property valued at $500 or less, a Class A misdemeanor; one count of possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class A misdemeanor; and one count of failure to appear, a Class E felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-14-103, -14-105, -16-609, -17-425. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years, eleven months, and twenty-six days to be served in confinement. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying her request for alternative sentencing and (2) that the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentences. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Musicologist and journalist plaintiff filed a complaint alleging companies that host media events interfered with her business relationships by refusing to issue her press credentials to the events Defendants host. Plaintiff also alleged Defendants invaded her privacy bycasting her in a false light when a representative made a statement to Plaintiff indicating she had not been invited to a particular media event. The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint upon Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. Plaintiff appeals, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In this divorce action, Wife appeals the denial of her Tenn. R. Civ. P. 59 motion to alter or amend the final decree of divorce. We vacate the order denying the motion and remand the case for the court to enter a supplemental order stating its basis for denying the motion.

The petitioner, George William Brady, appeals from the order of the Sevier County Criminal Court dismissing “all pro se actions and pleadings” filed in that court. Although the petitioner filed, and the criminal court denied, a plethora of pro se motions, the petitioner challenges only the denial of his motion to correct the judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A jury convicted Robert Brown, Sr. (“the Defendant”) of one count of rape of a child and one count of criminal exposure to HIV. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the Defendant to serve an effective term of twenty-five years’ incarceration. In this direct appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficient to support his convictions. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Residuary legatees appeal from the trial court’s denial of their motion to disallow compensation for executrix and estate’s attorney. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The issue presented in this premises liability case is whether a store owes a duty to protect its customer from a visibly intoxicated customer who was ordered to leave the store by store employees. A store patron sued a store for negligence after she was struck and injured in the store’s parking lot by a vehicle driven by another store patron. Store employees had refused to fill the other patron’s medical prescriptions because they believed she was intoxicated; she became belligerent, and store employees ordered her to leave the store knowing that she was alone and would be driving her vehicle. In response to the lawsuit, the store filed a motion to dismiss, contending that it did not have a legal duty to control the intoxicated patron after she left the store. The trial judge granted the store’s motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the store owed the injured patron a duty of care to protect her from the intoxicated patron. Taking the plaintiffs’ allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor, we hold that the foreseeability of harm and the gravity of harm to the injured patron outweighed the burden placed on the store to protect the patron against that harm. Therefore, the store patron’s complaint contains sufficient allegations which, taken as true, establish that the store owed a duty of care to the injured patron. The trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss.

The defendant, Jared Scott Aguilar, appeals from his Montgomery County Circuit Court jury convictions of six counts of sexual exploitation of a minor, see T.C.A. § 39-17-1003(a)(1), claiming that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain two of the convictions, that the counts of the indictment are multiplicitous, and that the 10-year effective sentence is excessive.  Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Archie Elliott, also known as Archie Elliott, III, was indicted for two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals while he was employed by the Memphis Animal Shelter. He entered open pleas of guilty to these offenses and was sentenced, in each count, to two years confinement, with the sentences to be served concurrently. On appeal, he asserts that the trial court erred in both the length and manner of service of the sentences, which were to be served, as a Range I, standard offender, at 30%; that the court showed bias in statements regarding the court’s feelings regarding animals; and that the court erred in weighing the impact of letters opposing alternative sentencing. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Inmate was serving a 47-year sentence for rape and attempted first degree murder. Inmate had a parole hearing in 2011, when he had 19 years of his sentence left to serve. Parole was denied, and Inmate’s next parole hearing was scheduled to take place six years later. Inmate challenged Parole Board’s decision to defer his next parole hearing for six years. The trial court held the Board acted lawfully in deferring Inmate’s next parole hearing for six years. We affirm the trial court’s judgment on appeal. Board members serve for staggered six-year terms, and Inmate will not be denied the opportunity for new Board members to review his request for parole six years from the date of his last hearing.

I fully concur in the majority’s conclusion that Wal-Mart owed a duty of reasonable care to its customers to prevent them from suffering harm and that the trial court erred in granting Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss. I write separately, however, to reaffirm my view that “any discussion of foreseeability in the context of duty encroaches upon the role of the finder of fact.” Giggers v. Memphis Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 372 (Tenn. 2009) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 375 (Tenn. 2008) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting)). See also Hale v. Ostrow, 166 S.W.3d 713, 720 (Tenn. 2005) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting); Burroughs v. Magee, 118 S.W.3d 323, 338 (Tenn. 2003) (Holder, J., concurring and dissenting); Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 92 (Tenn. 2000) (Holder, J., concurring).