APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Calvin Sanchez Amos, Defendant, was indicted for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell in a drug-free zone, possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and evading arrest. Defendant pled guilty to evading arrest and proceeded to trial on the remaining charges. A jury found Defendant guilty of the lesser included offenses of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine for resale and attempted possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. At the sentencing hearing, Defendant agreed to an effective sentence of 12 years. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of a video from Defendant’s phone in which he is seen cooking crack cocaine. After a full review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, William Lester Strickland, appeals from the revocation of his probationary sentence for aggravated burglary. The sole issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in fully revoking the Defendant’s probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his sentence in confinement. Upon review, we affirm.

This appeal challenges a grant of summary judgment to an insurance company on a breach of contract claim for failing to honor a life insurance policy.  The chancery court concluded the policy was void because of misrepresentations made by the decedent in obtaining coverage. The beneficiary, the spouse of the decedent, argues disputed facts exist both as to whether any misrepresentations were made and whether any of the purported misrepresentations increased the insurer’s risk of loss.  Accordingly, the beneficiary contends that the chancellor erred in awarding summary judgment.  We find no error and affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 

Petitioner, Marlez Wilson a/k/a, Marlez Wright, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that he received the effective assistance of counsel. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Appellant filed for disability benefits with the Appellee, Chattanooga Fire and Police Pension Fund (“CFPPF”). The CFPPF board denied Appellant’s application by letter dated October 27, 2020. On June 28, 2021, Appellant filed a request for rehearing with the board; the board denied rehearing by letter dated August 19, 2021. On September 10, 2021, Appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review in the trial court, and the CFPPF moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02. The trial court held that the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (“UAPA”) applied and further held that the board’s October 27, 2020 was not compliant with the UAPA requirements for final orders. Nonetheless, the trial court held that the October 27, 2020 letter was a final order so as to trigger the sixty-day time for filing for review in the trial court and dismissed Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Because the October 27, 2020 order was not UAPA-compliant, it did not constitute a final order so as to trigger the running of the sixty-day statute of limitations. As such, the trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s petition with prejudice. Reversed and remanded.

Petitioner, Glenn Sewell, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Karen Thomas, appeals the denial of her petition for post-conviction relief from her conviction of aggravated stalking, alleging that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel did not object to the State presenting rebuttal testimony at trial or the trial court’s jury instruction regarding the rebuttal testimony. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A mother appeals the trial court’s decision to terminate her parental rights based on the grounds of (1) abandonment by wanton disregard, (2) persistence of conditions, (3) sentenced to two or more years’ imprisonment for conduct against a child, (4) incarcerated under a sentence of ten or more years, and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility.  She further challenges the trial court’s finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of her parental rights was in the best interest of the child.  Finding that the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of fact for the failure to manifest an ability and willingness ground, we vacate that termination ground.  We affirm the trial court’s decision in all other respects.

A reverse mortgage borrower died.  The administrator of his estate petitioned the probate court to enjoin the lender from foreclosing and to set aside the loan and mortgage based on lack of capacity and fraud.  While the injunction against the lender was in place, the mortgaged property was sold.  On the administrator’s motion, the probate court ordered the administrator to escrow the payoff amount for the reverse mortgage pending the outcome of the litigation.  After a bench trial, the probate court dismissed the estate’s claims against the lender.  The administrator then asked the court for leave to release the escrowed funds in an amount equal to a payoff provided by the lender shortly before the sale.  The lender objected because the sale had occurred over four years before.  The lender requested payment of interest accruing since the sale and recovery of its attorney’s fees and costs.  The probate court sided with the administrator and denied the lender’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.  We affirm.

This appeal involves a long-running dispute between two groups of property owners in the real estate community development of Renegade Mountain over composition of the board of directors and resultant control of the community organization. Plaintiffs, members of the Renegade Mountain Community Club, Inc. (“RMCC”), a homeowner’s association, brought this action in 2011, seeking a declaratory judgment affirming their status as directors and officers of RMCC. The Defendants contested the validity of the election at which Plaintiffs were allegedly elected. Plaintiffs also sought a declaration of whether the purported developer possessed developer’s rights. After two prior appeals and a subsequent retrial, the trial court held that Defendant Moy Toy, Inc., a property owner, does not have developer’s rights. The trial court further ruled that Plaintiffs were properly elected as members of RMCC’s board and enforced an easement of enjoyment to use certain property in the development that was designated as “common areas,” in favor of Plaintiffs and all other members of RMCC. Defendants appeal. We vacate the trial court’s findings that the parties stipulated that the old golf course property was not “common property,” and that Plaintiffs “have no interest” in it because the parties agreed and stipulated only that the old golf course property was “not an issue” in this case. We affirm the judgment of the trial court in all other respects.

This is a termination of parental rights case involving two minor children.  Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s order terminating their parental rights to the children on multiple bases.  Having reviewed the record on appeal, we affirm the ruling of the trial court.

This appeal involves a counterclaim asserting defamation filed by the original defendant, a construction company, concerning statements that the original plaintiffs/homeowners made online and to third parties that were allegedly damaging to the construction company’s reputation. The homeowners sought dismissal of the defamation claims pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 20-17-101, et seq., known as the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the homeowners’ motion to dismiss and ultimately entered judgment against them. The homeowners have appealed solely the trial court’s denial of their motion to dismiss. Determining that the trial court should have analyzed the motion to dismiss pursuant to the provisions of the TPPA rather than applying a traditional Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12 analysis, we vacate the court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings. We also vacate the trial court’s monetary award to the defendant construction company and remand that issue for further consideration once the motion to dismiss has been properly adjudicated.

Following a trial, a Davidson County jury convicted Defendant, James Lee Simpson, of voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault resulting in death, and felon in possession of a firearm, for which he received a total effective sentence of fifteen years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred by providing incomplete and erroneous jury instructions on the issue of self-defense; (2) the trial court erred by preventing Defendant from cross-examining a witness regarding alleged prior acts of violence by the victims in violation of both Tennessee Rule of Evidence 405 and Defendant’s right to confrontation; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity; (4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Defendant; (5) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support convictions for voluntary manslaughter and aggravated assault resulting in death; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the State to cross-examine a witness regarding Defendant’s prior conviction for possessing a firearm after concluding that Defendant had “opened the door” to the cross-examination. Following a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse Defendant’s convictions and remand for a new trial.

Patient, by next of kin, sued hospital alleging negligence during his treatment. Trial court granted hospital’s motion to dismiss based on patient’s failure to file the complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Patient appealed the dismissal. Because the trial court correctly determined that the statute of limitations commenced running when the patient was discharged, we affirm.

Defendant, Jeffrey L. Crowe, was indicted by the Davidson County Grand Jury for reckless aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, second offense DUI by impairment, second offense DUI per se, and resisting arrest. Following a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of the charged offenses and sentenced to an effective sentence of two years to be suspended on probation after serving 32 days incarcerated. In this appeal as of right, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred when it restricted Defendant’s cross-examination of the victim; and that the trial court committed plain error when it allowed hearsay testimony. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The petitioner, Richard Cleophus Smith, appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief, which petition challenged his convictions of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, evading arrest, reckless endangerment, and leaving the scene of an accident involving injury, alleging that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel and due process. Because the petitioner’s post-conviction counsel also represented the petitioner on direct appeal, we remand to the post-conviction court to determine whether the petitioner knowingly and voluntarily agrees to waive post-conviction counsel’s conflict of interests.

This is an appeal following a four-day divorce trial. The husband raises nine issues on appeal regarding the grounds for divorce, the role and testimony of an expert witness, the valuation and division of marital property, judgments for attorney fees and accountant fees, and a finding of criminal contempt. For the following reasons, we affirm as modified and remand for further proceedings.

This is a contract dispute. The trial court dismissed Appellant's action for failure to state a claim based on the statutes of limitations prescribed by Tennessee Code Annotated section 47-2-725 and/or Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-3-109(a)(3). We reverse and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

George Green Taylor, III (“Father”) filed a petition to modify his permanent parenting plan in the Circuit Court for Hamilton County (the “trial court”). Father’s ex-wife, Jenny Sue Taylor (“Mother”), responded to the petition contending, inter alia, that Father’s proposed plan was not in the children’s best interests. Following a bench trial, the trial court determined that a slight change in the parties’ children’s summer schedule was warranted and ordered an upward deviation in Father’s child support for extraordinary educational expenses. Father appeals. The trial court’s ruling on Father’s child support is modified to reflect that Father’s base child support obligation is $731.00 per month, and we affirm as modified. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that an upward deviation in Father’s child support is warranted and in the children’s best interests, but we remand for entry of an order and child support worksheet reflecting the monthly amount owed for said upward deviation. Finally, we affirm the trial court’s ruling that Mother is entitled to her attorney’s fees incurred in the trial court pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c).

This appeal involves a contractual dispute related to the plaintiff’s employment. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The plaintiff appealed. We affirm.

In a previous appeal from a divorce, this Court vacated the trial court’s award of alimony to the wife.  We remanded for reconsideration of the amount of alimony after determining the husband’s ability to pay.  On remand, the parties stipulated that the husband’s gross income was less than the amount the trial court originally relied upon in setting alimony.  But the court made no change in its alimony award.  The husband appeals.  We affirm.

This appeal arises from a common-law writ of certiorari filed in the circuit court; however, the dispositive issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court, which was presiding over a dependency and neglect action, retained jurisdiction to enter a custodial order after a petition to adopt the children at issue had been filed in the chancery court. The adoption petition was filed after a contested evidentiary hearing for the change of custody had concluded but prior to the juvenile court announcing its decision or entering an order. After the adoption petition was filed, the juvenile court entered an order removing the children from their grandmother’s custody and awarding custody to the mother. The grandmother challenged the jurisdiction of the juvenile court to enter the order by filing a petition for a common-law writ of certiorari. The circuit court granted the writ but held “that the Juvenile Court had the authority to enter the [post-petition custodial order] owing to the fact that proof had been heard on [the petition to change custody].” We respectfully disagree. Tennessee Code Annotated § 37-1-103(c) unambiguously states, “when jurisdiction has been acquired [by dependency and neglect proceedings] under this part, such jurisdiction shall continue until . . . a petition for adoption is filed regarding the child in question as set out in § 36-1-116(f).” (emphasis added). Furthermore, Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1- 116(f)(2) directs that “any proceedings that may be pending seeking the custody . . . of the child . . . who is in the physical custody of the [adoption] petitioners on the date the petition is filed . . . shall be suspended pending the court’s orders in the adoption proceeding, and jurisdiction of all other pending matters concerning the child . . . shall be transferred to and assumed by the adoption court.” Here, the grandmother had legal and physical custody of the children when the adoption petition was filed. Accordingly, the juvenile court’s jurisdiction was automatically transferred to the chancery court upon the filing of the adoption petition. For these reasons, the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction to enter an order removing custody from the petitioner in the adoption case, the grandmother. Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and this matter is remanded with instructions for the circuit court to enter judgment holding that the juvenile court’s order changing custody is void for want of jurisdiction. 

Following the denial of a motion to suppress, the defendant, Ernest Seard, pled guilty to one count of driving under the influence (“DUI”) and was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days in jail with all but five days suspended to probation. As a condition of his plea, the defendant reserved the right to appeal a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(D), challenging the denial of his motion to suppress his “search, seizure and arrest.” Upon our review, we conclude the trial court erred in its application of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2)(D). Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court, reinstate count 2 of the indictment, and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Plaintiff appeals the trial court’s decision to exclude her proffered expert for failing to comply with the locality rule expressed in Shipley v. Williams, 350 S.W.3d 527 (Tenn. 2011). Plaintiff also appeals the trial court’s decision to grant the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Discerning no abuse of discretion, we affirm the decision of the trial court to exclude the expert. Additionally, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to defendants.