APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The Defendant, Charles Larry Nichols, III, appeals the Davidson County Criminal Court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence or clerical error, arguing that he was entitled to “street time” credit for the time he served on community corrections but was being supervised by state probation. Upon review, we conclude that the trial court properly determined that the Defendant was not entitled to the street time credit because he was on supervised probation, not community corrections. However, we remand the case to the trial court for correction of a separate clerical error in the amended judgment of conviction.

This case involves the denial of a claim for pandemic unemployment assistance and the subsequent administrative proceedings before the Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development. The applicant failed to appear for his appeals hearing despite being notified of the hearing and the procedures required to participate in the hearing. The applicant’s request to reopen his case was denied because he failed to show good cause for his failure to attend. The applicant petitioned for judicial review in the chancery court. After finding substantial and material evidence to support the denial of benefits, the chancery court affirmed the decision of the Commissioner’s Designee. We affirm the chancery court’s decision

The Petitioner, Michael Brooks, appeals from the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial
of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for especially aggravated
kidnapping, facilitation of aggravated robbery, assault, and aggravated burglary, for
which he is serving an effective eighteen-year sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner
contends that the post-conviction court (1) erred in denying relief on his ineffective
assistance claims and (2) deprived him of due process in various respects. We affirm the
judgment of the post-conviction court.

This is an appeal from an order dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus. Because the appellant did not file his notice of appeal within thirty days after entry of the order as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a), we dismiss the appeal.

Katherine Sanko (“Mother”) and Clinton Sanko (“Father”) dispute custody of two of their
four children. The children have lived primarily with Mother in Pennsylvania. However,
following a petition filed by Father to change custody, the trial court concluded that a
material change in circumstances occurred and that Father should be the primary residential
parent. Because the trial court determined that the material change in circumstances was
Mother’s relocation from Tennessee to Pennsylvania and this Court sanctioned the
relocation in a prior appeal, the ruling must be vacated and the case remanded.

Husband appeals the trial court’s classification, valuation, and division of real property in
this divorce action. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this custody case, Father appeals the trial court’s order allowing Mother to relocate, from
Tennessee to Virginia, with the parties’ daughter. Father also appeals the trial court’s order
charging him with costs of the child’s airline travel expenses and the guardian ad litem’s
attorney’s fees. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm. Mother and the guardian ad
litem’s respective requests for appellate attorneys’ fees are granted.

This accelerated interlocutory appeal is taken from the trial court’s order denying
appellants’ motion for recusal. After considering the trial court’s ruling under the
Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B de novo standard of review, we affirm the judgment
of the trial court denying recusal.

Defendant, Clinton W. Bryant, was charged with five counts of rape of a child. Following the State’s proof at trial, the trial court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on one of the five counts, and a jury convicted Defendant of the remaining four counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an effective fifty-year sentence in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever all five counts; that the trial court erred in denying a new trial based on an incomplete trial transcript; and that the cumulation of these errors warrant relief. Following a review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child on the grounds of (1) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan; (2) abandonment by failure to establish a suitable home; (3) persistence of conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility. He also challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the child’s best interest. We affirm the trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports the aforementioned grounds for termination and that termination is in the child’s best interest.

This appeal arises from a complaint filed with the Claims Commission in which Christopher Turner (“Plaintiff”) seeks monetary damages for being incarcerated by the State of Tennessee (“the State”) beyond his sentence expiration date due to the failure of the Tennessee Department of Correction to award the pretrial jail credits and “street time” ordered by the criminal court as provided by his plea agreement. The amended complaint alleged “negligent care, custody, and control of persons,” “negligent care of personal property,” “negligent operation of machinery or equipment (computer systems),” and “breach of written contract.” The State filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Claims Commissioner granted the motion and dismissed the case on the ground that the Commission lacked jurisdiction because “the allegations in the Complaint fall outside the categories set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated § 9-8-307.” Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the Commission’s determination that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted. However, both parties contend, and we agree, that instead of dismissing Plaintiff’s claims for lack of jurisdiction, the Commission was required to transfer the case to the Board of Claims. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-402(a)(5) (“Claims not within the jurisdiction of the claims commission shall be sent to the board of claims.”). Accordingly, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to transfer the case to the Board of Claims.

The Defendant, Willie Taylor, was convicted of rape, assault, and promoting prostitution.
The Defendant appeals, contending that the trial court erred by not suppressing his
statement to the police and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
rape and assault. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Keith Ward, of rape of a child, and the trial
court sentenced him to 32.5 years in prison, to be served at 100%. The Petitioner appealed,
and this court affirmed the conviction. The Petitioner then filed a petition for postconviction
relief in which he alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
meet with him, review discovery with him, and develop an effective strategy before trial.
After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner
maintains his arguments. After our review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s
judgment.

This appeal concerns a dispute between a landlord and a tenant. 495 Kings Stable, LLC
(“Plaintiff”), through its owner, filed a forcible entry and detainer warrant against Kimberly
Pate (“Defendant”) in the General Sessions Court for Shelby County. Plaintiff prevailed,
and Defendant appealed to the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). After
a trial, the Trial Court ruled in Plaintiff’s favor, awarding it damages and attorney’s fees.
Defendant appeals arguing, among other things, that she was constructively evicted
because of conditions such as a raccoon in the house. Plaintiff raises separate issues. We
affirm the Trial Court’s determinations that Defendant was not constructively evicted and
that she breached the lease by failing to pay rent as required. Defendant did not afford
Plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to cure the alleged problems. However, we find that the
Trial Court erred in declining to award Plaintiff damages for the remaining months of the
lease. We vacate the Trial Court’s award of damages and remand for the Trial Court to
award Plaintiff additional damages for the remaining months of the lease. In addition,
although Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees under the lease, the Trial Court
erred by failing to apply the factors used for determining the reasonableness of attorney’s
fees found at Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5. We vacate the Trial Court’s award of attorney’s
fees to Plaintiff and remand for the Trial Court to award Plaintiff reasonable attorney’s
fees—including reasonable post-trial and appellate attorney’s fees—applying the Tenn.
Sup. Ct. R. 8, RPC 1.5 factors.

This appeal stems from a disputed strip of land along the edge of Norris Lake in Campbell County, Tennessee. The defendants in this case are lot owners of residential lakefront property in a planned development. The plaintiffs are the neighborhood home owner’s association and the company operating the marina in the development. The plaintiffs claim, based upon a note in the original plat map of the development, that a “one-foot buffer” zone along the defendants’ lots was reserved to the original developer. According to the plaintiffs, the marina company thus controls the shoreline in the area at issue and is at liberty, with permission from the Tennessee Valley Authority, to expand the existing marina. The defendants, on the other hand, dispute the existence of the buffer and claim that their lot boundaries extend right up to the shoreline. The plaintiffs filed a declaratory judgment action, and, following a bench trial, the trial court concluded that the plat note at issue did not reserve any interest in the disputed strip to the original developer. Plaintiffs appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm the trial court.

Father appeals the trial court’s termination of his parental rights. After reviewing the
record, we conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence provided at trial to
support the ground of abandonment by failure to visit, but not the ground of substantial
noncompliance with a permanency plan. We also conclude that the trial court failed to
make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law with regard to the ground of
failure to manifest a willingness and ability to assume custody or financial responsibility
of the child. Thus, we (1) affirm the trial court’s finding that the ground of abandonment
by failure to visit was established, (2) reverse the trial court’s finding that the ground of
substantial noncompliance was established, and (3) vacate the trial court’s finding that the
ground of failure to manifest was established. We also affirm the trial court’s finding that
terminating Father’s parental rights was in the best interest of the child.

Defendant, Jerry Lynn Huskey, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his sentence of
probation for aggravated domestic assault, theft under $1,000, evading arrest, and resisting
arrest, and ordering him to serve his original six-year sentence in confinement. Following
our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the
trial court.

The Defendant, Claude James Feagins, appeals the trial court’s denial of his request for an
alternative sentence. The Defendant pleaded guilty to burglary, misdemeanor theft, felony
theft (Class D), and reckless endangerment. A six-year effective sentence resulted, with
the manner of serviced to be determined by the trial court at a sentencing hearing. After a
sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of six years of
incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion
when it ordered him to serve his sentences in confinement. After review, we affirm the
trial court’s judgments.

The defendant, Leslie Lamont Coleman, was convicted of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to twenty years in the Department of Correction, to be served consecutively to his sentence in a prior felony murder case. On appeal, the defendant argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction because the only proof connecting him to the crime was the uncorroborated testimony of his alleged accomplice; (2) the trial court committed plain error by ruling the State could question the defendant about his prior felony murder conviction under Tennessee Rules of Evidence 608 and 609 if he chose to testify; and (3) the trial court erred in sentencing by imposing the maximum Range II sentence of twenty years. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal invoves a claim for adverse possession. Gilbert Lopez and his wife Wendy Lopez claimed ownership of a 1.25 acre parcel of land (“Lot 39”) adjacent to their property under the theory of common law adverse possession. Deidra Sharp, owner of a tract also adjacent to Lot 39, presented evidence of her unencumbered title to Lot 39. Ms. Sharp established that she and her predecessors in title had paid taxes on Lot 39 and argued that the Lopezes did not prove their possession was uninterrupted, continuous, exclusive, or adverse for the requisite twenty year period. After a bench trial, the trial court found that the Lopezes did not “indicate ownership of [Lot 39] nor did [they] do anything that would rise to the level of more than a trespass.” The trial court resolved the conflicting testimony by making explicit credibility determinations in favor of Ms. Sharp and her witnesses. The trial court also held that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-2-110(a), which generally bars a claim to real estate when the claimant has failed to pay taxes on the claimed property, applies to bar the adverse possession claim. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant city residents sued the City of Memphis for breach of contract, breach of implied
contract, unjust enrichment, and promissory estoppel related to inadequate garbage
collection services provided by the City. Residents also sought a constructive trust and a
declaratory judgment. The trial court dismissed the breach of contract action upon its
conclusion that the provision of garbage collection services was a government function that
did not create an enforceable contract between the city and its residents. The trial court
dismissed the residents’ other contractual claims on the basis that they were barred by
sovereign immunity. Finally, the trial court dismissed the claims for constructive trust and
declaratory judgment upon its conclusion that they did not state a claim for relief under the
circumstances. We affirm.

The Defendant, Vincent John Elliott, Jr., pled guilty to second degree murder and reserved a certified question of law concerning whether his right to a speedy trial was violated. Also on appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to eighteen years instead of the minimum sentence of fifteen years. Upon review, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review the Defendant’s certified question and respectfully dismiss that portion of the appeal. We further conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in sentencing the Defendant. Accordingly, we respectfully affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence in all respects.

Following his conviction for first degree murder, the Petitioner, Jose Lemanuel Hall, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied the petition after an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to meet with him adequately and failed to object to the State’s opening statement. He also argues that the requirement to show actual prejudice in post-conviction proceedings is overly burdensome and conflicts with constitutional protections. We respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiffs filed suit against the purchaser of real property, alleging that the purchase was a fraudulent conveyance. On a motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined on the undisputed facts that the purchase was in good faith and without notice of Plaintiffs’ claims and for reasonably equivalent value. We conclude that the undisputed facts show that the purchaser was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We also discern no abuse of discretion in a separate decision by the court to set aside the dismissal of the purchaser’s counterclaim against Plaintiffs. So we affirm.

Defendant, Johnny DeWayne Boyd, was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and incest. The trial court imposed an effective thirty-year sentence in the Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss due to the State’s failure to file a bill of particulars, and (2) that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to continue trial after a court security officer tested positive for COVID-19 and by failing to comply with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s Order on COVID-19 protocol. Following a review of the record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.