APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

A Montgomery County jury convicted the defendant, Bobby Joe Young, Jr., of aggravated assault, a Class C felony. The trial court sentenced him, as a multiple offender, to serve six years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following a review of the parties’ briefs, the record, and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Gibson County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, David Hooper Climer, Jr., of first degree premeditated murder and abuse of a corpse, and the trial court sentenced him to consecutive sentences of life and two years, respectively. On appeal, the appellant contends that (1) the evidence is insufficient to support the premeditated murder conviction and shows he was insane when he abused the victim’s corpse, (2) the trial court should have granted his motion to sever, (3) the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress his statements to police, (4) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, and (5) the trial court should have dismissed a prospective juror for cause. Based upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the appellant’s conviction of first degree premeditated murder but that the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense of second degree murder. The appellant’s first degree murder conviction is reduced to second degree murder, and the case is remanded to the trial court for resentencing. The appellant’s conviction of abuse of a corpse is affirmed.

Ricky Nelson (“the Petitioner”) filed a motion for post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act of 2001, requesting DNA analysis of a knife used in the perpetration of a rape. After a non-evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After reviewing the record, we have determined, in light of the recent decision of the Tennessee Supreme Court in Powers v. State, 343 S.W.3d 36, 56 (Tenn. 2011), that a remand of the case to the postconviction court is necessary for the post-conviction court to consider and rule upon whether the Petitioner has satisfied the first of four factors necessary for the Petitioner to demonstrate his right to DNA analysis and to address whether the Powers decision would affect the postconviction court’s analysis and finding on the second of the four factors.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Leonard Brakefield, of driving under the influence of an intoxicant (“DUI”), fourth offense, and refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test (“BAC”). On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for DUI, fourth offense. After a thorough review of the record and relevant authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The case involves a lease-purchase agreement. The plaintiff truck driver worked for the defendant hauling company. He entered into a lease-purchase agreement with the codefendant leasing company, affiliated with the employer hauling company, to purchase the truck he drove in his employment. At the end of the lease, the leasing company refused to transfer title to the truck to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then filed this lawsuit against both defendant companies, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. The defendants asserted the affirmative defenses of set-off and recoupment based on the plaintiff’s employment agreement. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the plaintiff on all of his claims. However, based on an arbitration provision in the employment agreement, it granted the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration of the defendants’ affirmative defenses of set-off and recoupment. The defendants now appeal. In light of the trial court’s order compelling arbitration, we dismiss the appeal and remand for entry of an order staying the proceedings pending the arbitration.

The defendant, Christopher Black, was convicted by a Davidson County jury of two counts of aggravated rape, a Class A felony, and two counts of aggravated robbery, a Class B felony, and sentenced to an effective term of fifty years imprisonment. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the convictions but remanded for a resentencing hearing “regarding [the defendant’s] sentencing status with respect  to the 2005 sentencing act and regarding the issue of consecutive sentencing.” State v.Christopher M. Black, No.M2007-00970-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., at Nashville, Feb. 26, 2010). Following a hearing on remand, the trial court, applying the single enhancement factor for prior criminal history, sentenced the defendant to twenty-five years for each count of aggravated rape and to ten years for each count of aggravated robbery. The court further found the defendant to be a dangerous offender and ordered that the two aggravated rapes be served consecutively, but concurrently to the sentences for robbery, again resulting in an effective sentence of fifty years. On appeal, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in the imposition of consecutive sentences. Following review of the record, we find no error and affirm the sentences as imposed.

The Petitioner, Michelle Tipton,appeals the Davidson CountyCriminal Court’s denial of her petition for habeas corpus relief from her 2000 conviction for first degree felony murder and resulting life sentence. She claims her conviction is void because (1) the judgment fails to identify the date of her indictment, (2) the judgment lists a non-existent offense, (3) the judgment fails to list her release eligibility percentage, (4) the same aggravating circumstance was used during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial, (5) the State violated statutory sentencing guidelines, and (6) the judgment rendered a non-existent sentence. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Upon the defendant’s plea of guilty to theft, the trial court imposed a three-year sentence to be served in the community corrections program. Although the defendant violated a condition of his release shortly after September 30, 2003, the revocation warrant was not filed and issued until ten months later. While revoking the community corrections sentence and ordering the defendant to serve the duration of his sentence in prison, the trial court approved credit for time served only through September 30, 2003, the estimated date of the violation. The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, holding that the credit should have extended until the issuance of the revocation warrant. We hold that the filing date of the revocation warrant begins the tolling of sentence credits. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals is, therefore, affirmed.
 

This is an action to collect a debt and to recover collateral. The defendant LLC obtained a line of credit from the plaintiff bank. The LLC borrowed against the line of credit to purchase certain property, and the property was pledged as collateral. Several months later, the line of credit was converted into a fixed amount loan over a longer term, and a new security agreement was executed pledging the same collateral. On the same day, the LLC obtained another line of credit secured by the LLC’s accounts receivable. The next day, the LLC took an advance on the new line of credit. The LLC made monthly payments on both obligations for almost a year, and then it defaulted. The plaintiff bank filed this lawsuit against the LLC and its principal to collect on the loans and to recover the collateral. The LLC contended that the principal of the LLC did not sign key documents, did not authorize advances, and did not authorize the pledge of the collateral. After a bench trial, the trial court held in favor of the bank based on, among other things, its finding that the principal of the LLC had ratified any allegedly unauthorized advances made under the lines of credit. The defendants now appeal. We reverse the finding of ratification as to one advance and remand for further findings; in all other respects, the decision of the trial court is affirmed.
 

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Robert Page, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to serve thirty-eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. The Petitioner appealed, and this Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, concluding that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on facilitation was reversible error. State v. Robert Page, No. W2003-01342-CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 3352994, at *16 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Jackson, Aug. 26, 2004). Upon further review, our Supreme Court reversed the Court of Criminal Appeals judgment concluding that the failure to instruct on lesser-included offenses in the Petitioner’s case did not constitute plain error. State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Tenn. 2006). The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred when it dismissed his petition because he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Thomas H. Gilreath and Carol L. Gilreath (“Plaintiffs”) sued Donald G. Peters, II (“Defendant”) with regard to a right-of-way. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its order on February 17, 2010 finding and holding, inter alia, that Defendant had interfered with Plaintiffs’ use of the right-of-way, and that the right-of-way “should remain open and unobstructed ….” Defendant did not appeal this judgment. Plaintiffs later filed a motion for contempt. During a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion, Defendant made an oral motion seeking to set aside the February 17, 2010 order pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02(5). After the hearing, the Trial Court entered its order denying Defendant’s Rule 60.02(5) motion, and finding Defendant in contempt of the Trial Court’s February 17, 2010 order. Defendant appeals to this Court raising issues regarding the denial of his Rule 60.02(5) motion, and the finding of contempt. We affirm.

A Shelby County jury convicted Defendant-Appellant, Jimmie Royston, of two counts of prostitution near a school, a Class A misdemeanor. The two counts were merged into one judgment, and he received a sentence of nine months and a $1,000 fine. On appeal, Royston asserts that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions for prostitution, and (2) the trial court erred in allowing the State to impeach Royston at trial with prior misdemeanor theft convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Greene County jury convicted the Defendant, Jeremy Curtis Workman, of five counts of rape of a child and two counts of incest. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to twentyfive years confinement for each rape of a child conviction and six years for each incest conviction and ordered that the rape of a child sentences run concurrently to each other but consecutively to each incest conviction, for a total effective sentence of thirty-seven years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the offenses; (3) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the prosecutor’s failure to establish jurisdiction or proper venue of the trial court; (4) the trial court erred when it overruled his motion to exclude members of the clergy from testifying at trial; (5) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings; (6) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for mistrial based on improper, prejudicial testimony from a DCS investigator; and (7) the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on the prosecutor’s improper comments to the jury. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Timothy Christopher Pillow, of aggravated robbery, and the trial court sentenced him to ten years to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred when it failed to declare a mistrial based upon a detective’s testimony that the Defendant had previously been incarcerated; and (3) the trial court erred when it enhanced his sentence. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we conclude no error exists in the trial court’s judgment. The trial court’s judgment is,therefore, affirmed.

The Petitioner, Billy Lee Simmons, appeals the summary dismissal of his pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, wherein he seeks relief for his eight-year sentence for possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with the intent to sell and within 1,000 feet of a school. The crux of the Petitioner’s argument is that his Class A felony sentence is illegal because it was enhanced pursuant to the Drug-Free School Zone Act. We agree that the Petitioner’s sentence is illegal, albeit for a different reason—his sentence for a Class A felony not being authorized by law—and that the habeas corpus court erred in summarily dismissing the petition. We remand to the Johnson County Circuit Court for the appointment of counsel and a hearing to determine the proper remedy.

The Defendant, Thomas G. McConnell, pled guilty in the Circuit Court for Williamson County to driving under the influence, second offense, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. § 55-10-401 (2008) (amended 2010). He was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, with forty-five days of the sentence to be served. On appeal, he presents a certified question of law regarding the legality of the traffic stop that led to his arrest. Because the certified question was not properly reserved, we dismiss the appeal.

The employee, who sustained injuries while removing tree limbs at a job site, filed a claim for workers’ compensation. The employer denied benefits, contending that the injury was the result of the employee’s intoxication and misconduct. While concluding that the employee was not guilty of willful misconduct, the trial court ruled that his intoxication was a proximate cause of the injuries and, therefore, denied the claim. The employee appealed, alleging that the trial court erred by finding that he was intoxicated at the time of his injuries and that the intoxication was the proximate cause. This appeal was referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6- 225(e)(3) and Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s finding that the employee was intoxicated and his intoxication proximately caused his injuries, the judgment is affirmed.

Paternal Grandparents filed a motion to intervene in a divorce action between Mother and Father, seeking custody of the parties’ two minor children. The trial court ultimately awarded custody to Mother and ordered Grandparents to pay a portion of Mother’s attorney’s fees and costs. Grandparents appeal, arguing that Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-5-103(c) only provides for awards of attorney’s fees against spouses in a custody matter, and therefore, the trial court was not authorized to order them to pay Mother’s attorney’s fees. We affirm.

DCS filed a Petition to terminate the parental rights of the father. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court determined there were statutory grounds to terminate the father's parental rights, and that it was in the best interest of the children that his rights be terminated. The father appealed and did not question that statutory grounds existed for termination, but argued that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify the father with his children. We conclude the father failed to demonstrate that the Department did not make reasonable efforts for reunification. The evidence is clear and convincing that the Department made reasonable efforts for reunification. We affirm the Judgment of the Trial Court.

The two sons of decedent asked the Court to declare that their father died intestate and that his marriage to appellant a few days before he died was void because he was neither competent to make a will or enter into a marriage contract. Upon trial, the jury determined that the deceased was not of sound mind when he executed a will, a copy of which was filed in evidence, and the will was obtained through undue influence of appellant. The jury also found that the marriage between the decedent and appellant was invalid as well. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdict and appellant has appealed. We hold that material evidence supports the jury verdict as approved by the Trial Judge and remand.

The petitioner, Jerry W. Dickerson, filed in the Johnson County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., dissenting.
This case pits the biological children of the deceased, being two sons, against Linda Caraway, who claims to be the widow of the deceased by virtue of a marriage ceremony that occurred thirteen days before his death on July 7, 2009. What is “on the line” is apparently the entire estate of the deceased. One of his sons testified that his father’s will of April 16, 2009 – the original of which was never found – left the deceased’s entire estate to Ms. Caraway.

The president of a company signed a commercial credit application. The application contained language immediately above the signature line stating that the individual signing the contract personally guaranteed amounts owed to the vendor. The company defaulted on the balance of the account, and the vendor filed suit against both the company and the president. The trial court granted summary judgment to the vendor, holding that the president had signed the contract both personally and in a representative capacity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the president had signed the contract only in a representative capacity and granted summary judgment to the president. We hold that the application contained explicit language sufficient to bind the president as an individual guarantor of the contract. We reverse the Court of Appeals.
 

The Petitioner, Bryan Keith Good, appeals as of right from the Bledsoe County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Petitioner contends (1) that the judgment against him is void because the State failed to include the name of the victim in the indictment and (2) that subsequent amendment of the indictment did not cure the alleged defect. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A construction company entered into a contract with the State of Tennessee to restructure an interstate interchange. The contract provides that the contract completion date “may be extended in accordance with the Standard Specifications, however, no incentive payment will be made if work is not completed in its entirety by December 15, 2006.” The Claims Commission found that the contract contained a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract. The Claims Commission considered extrinsic evidence and concluded that the construction company was entitled to the maximum incentive payment and an extension of the contract completion date. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Claims Commission. We hold that the contract is unambiguous and does not permit an extension of the incentive date. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the Claims Commission for modification of the final judgment.