APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The two sons of decedent asked the Court to declare that their father died intestate and that his marriage to appellant a few days before he died was void because he was neither competent to make a will or enter into a marriage contract. Upon trial, the jury determined that the deceased was not of sound mind when he executed a will, a copy of which was filed in evidence, and the will was obtained through undue influence of appellant. The jury also found that the marriage between the decedent and appellant was invalid as well. The Trial Judge approved the jury verdict and appellant has appealed. We hold that material evidence supports the jury verdict as approved by the Trial Judge and remand.

The petitioner, Jerry W. Dickerson, filed in the Johnson County Circuit Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition, and the petitioner appeals. Upon review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition.

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., J., dissenting.
This case pits the biological children of the deceased, being two sons, against Linda Caraway, who claims to be the widow of the deceased by virtue of a marriage ceremony that occurred thirteen days before his death on July 7, 2009. What is “on the line” is apparently the entire estate of the deceased. One of his sons testified that his father’s will of April 16, 2009 – the original of which was never found – left the deceased’s entire estate to Ms. Caraway.

In this case, Kimberlie Lois Edmonson (“Ms. Edmonson”) filed suit against Terry Lynn Wilson (“Mr. Wilson”) for breach of an alleged partnership agreement. Prior to trial, the parties reached an agreement. Following the announcement of the agreement in court by counsel, Ms. Edmonson refused to honor the agreement. Mr. Wilson filed a motion to enforce the agreement, and the trial court denied the motion. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and the court held in favor of Ms. Edmonson. Mr. Wilson appeals. We hold that the court should have enforced the settlement agreement and reverse the decision of the court.

We granted permission to appeal in this post-conviction capital case to consider whether the courts below erred in holding that the state and federal constitutional right against self incrimination does not afford a post-conviction petitioner who chooses to testify the right to limit the scope of the State’s cross-examination. However, we need not decide whether and in what manner the constitutional right against self-incrimination applies in the post conviction context because this appeal can be resolved on non-constitutional grounds. We have concluded that the scope of cross-examination of a post-conviction petitioner is governed by Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 28, section 8(C)(1)(d). The judgments of the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals are vacated, and this matter is remanded for a new post-conviction hearing at which Petitioner shall be afforded the right to testify subject to the limited scope cross-examination provided by Rule 28, section 8(C)(1)(d).

The Petitioner, Erskine Leroy Johnson, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s dismissal of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis from his 1985 conviction for felony murder. He contends that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. He also contends that the trial court improperly weighed the newly discovered evidence and failed to assess that evidence in the context of the evidentiary record as a whole in determining whether the result of the trial may have been different. We reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate the Petitioner’s felony murder conviction, and remand the case for a new trial.

This case involves the valuation of assets for division of marital property and alimony. Wife filed for divorce, seeking an equitable division of the marital assets, including Husband’s one-half interest in a real estate partnership. At trial, each party introduced experts to testify as to the value of Husband’s interest in the partnership. The trial court valued the partnership at a fair market value that was between the values testified to by the experts. The court awarded Wife one-half of the value, awarded Wife one-half of a note that was based on property Husband owned prior to the marriage, and awarded Wife alimony. After a motion to alter or amend, the trial court reduced Wife’s interest in the partnership and the note to take into account Husband’s tax liability. Wife appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in valuing the partnership and in its alimony award. Affirmed.

This appeal centers on the effective date of a judgment against Appellant–2000 or 2004. Appellant argues that both the equitable estoppel and law of the case doctrines bar Plaintiff from arguing that the judgment was entered in 2004, and therefore, that it has not expired. The trial court found that the judgment had not expired, and we affirm.
 

Husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in holding a hearing on his wife’s petition for an order of protection when his attorney was not present. Finding no error, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

Purchasers of house sued sellers for breach of contract because, contrary to the sale agreement, the house was not connected to the sewer. After a trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the purchasers for the cost of connecting the house to the sewer. In this appeal, the sellers argue that the trial court erred in applying the wrong statute of limitations, in finding in favor of the purchasers, in using the wrong measure of damages, and in the award of attorney fees. We find no error in the trial court’s decision.
 

The petitioner, Markese Brooks, appeals the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After review, we affirm the denial of the petition.

This case arises from a will contest. Appellant, the executor and sole beneficiary of the contested will, appeals the trial court’s finding that Appellant did not met his burden to rebut, by clear and convincing evidence, the presumption of undue influence based upon the existence of a confidential relationship between Appellant and Decedent. Finding no error, we affirm.

This case arises from charges that Diane Forrest (“the Defendant”) concealed from police certain items used to make methamphetamine that her son had been using when his mobile methamphetamine lab exploded. A jury convicted the Defendant of one count of tampering with evidence and one count of accessory after the fact. The trial court merged the accessory after the fact conviction into the tampering with evidence conviction. The Defendant was sentenced to three years, with forty-five days incarceration to be served prior to her release on probation. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by: (1) excluding extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement made by an eyewitness; (2) admitting testimony about a second two-liter bottle found at the scene of the methamphetamine lab; (3) failing to dismiss the tampering with evidence charge at the close of the State’s proof; (4) rendering a sentence that was disproportionately harsh; and (5) increasing the Defendant’s appeal bond to $18,000. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant,Christine Caudle,pled guiltyto recklessendangerment with a deadly weapon and theft of merchandise over $500, Class E felonies. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-103, 39-14-146 (2010). She was sentenced as a Range II, multiple offender to three years for each conviction, to be served concurrently. On appeal, she contends that the trial court erred by failing to apply applicable mitigating factors and by failing to grant probation or an alternative sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court

The trial court entered judgment in favor of Defendants Shelby County and the City of Memphis upon determining that, under Tennessee Code Annotated 37-7-210, Defendants have authority to regulate billboards pursuant to private acts applicable to Memphis and Shelby County. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm entry of a judgment in favor of Defendants on the grounds of standing and ripeness.

The defendant, Kenneth Spencer, was convicted by a Shelby County jury of first degree premeditated murder and was sentenced by the trial court to life imprisonment. He raises the following four issues on appeal: (1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior bad acts; and (4) whether the trial court impermissibly commented upon the evidence by issuing an incomplete statement to the jury on the element of premeditation. Based on our review, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction and that the trial court did not err in its evidentiary rulings. We further conclude, however, that the trial court committed reversible error by improperly commenting on the evidence and giving an incomplete statement of the law in its expanded premeditation instruction. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial.

I concur in the results reached in the majority opinion. I, however, would affirm the trial court on the merits of its sentencing decision.

Following his guilty pleas to nine felonies, the appellant, Derrick Lamont Parrish, received a total effective sentence of sixteen and one-half years incarceration in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

Pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51, this workers’ compensation appeal has been referred to the Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law. The employee, a truck driver, filed suit for benefits, alleging that he developed bilateral rotator cuff tears and carpal tunnel syndrome as a result of his job responsibilities. His employer contended that his injuries were not related to his employment. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court found in favor of the employee and awarded 50% permanent partial disability to the body as a whole. The employer has appealed, contending that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s findings (1) that the injuries arose out of and in the course of employment, and (2) that five times the medical impairment was appropriate under the circumstances. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the findings of the trial judge, the judgment is affirmed.

Petitioner, Jerry McGaha, pled guilty in the Cocke County Circuit Court to nine counts of rape of a child. He was sentenced to twenty-five years on each count. After imposing consecutive sentences, Petitioner received an effective sentence of fifty years. After his direct appeal to this Court, his effective sentence was reduced to forty-six years. State v. Jerry McGaha, No. E2001-01547-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 499273, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knoxville, Apr. 3, 2002). After a delayed appeal to the supreme court, which was achieved through the filing of a petition for post-conviction relief, Petitioner filed a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that the enhancement of his sentence was illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The post-conviction court denied the petition. On appeal, Appellant argues that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel failed to raise Apprendi. We conclude that he must fail on this issue because at the time of the sentencing hearing our supreme court had held that Apprendi did not affect the Tennessee sentencing scheme. Therefore, trial counsel could not be ineffective for failing to raise the issue. Petitioner also argues that it was plain error for the trial court to not raise Apprendi. Because this issue was not a basis for relief included in his petition, this issue is waived. Therefore, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of the petition for post-conviction relief.

Appellant, Timothy Bryant Burton, appeals his Bedford County conviction for violation of the sex offender registry and the State’s use of his prior convictions to establish his status as a violent sex offender. After a review of the record, we conclude that Appellant failed to timely register with a law enforcement agency within forty-eight hours of his change of residence in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-39-203 or, in other words, that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. Additionally, Appellant waived any issue with regard to the admission of evidence by failing to object at trial or raise the issue in a motion for new trial and is not entitled to plain error review. As a result, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Appellee filed an action to set aside Defendant Homeowners’ Association non-judicial foreclosure sale of a condo unit for allegedly unpaid homeowners’ association fees. The trial court set aside the sale upon determining that there was no credible basis upon which to determine the amount due at the time of the sale. We affirm.

Defendant, Victor D. McMiller, was charged with two counts each of the sale and delivery of dihydrocodeinone, a Schedule III controlled substance. Defendant was convicted on all four counts. His convictions for delivery of a controlled substance were merged into his convictions for sale of a controlled substance, and Defendant was sentenced to 12 years for each conviction, and his convictions were ordered to be served consecutively for an effective sentence of 24 years. On appeal, Defendant argues that: 1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; 2) the trial court erred by allowing testimony of Defendant’s prior bad acts; 3) the presentment was facially invalid because it states that sale or delivery of a Schedule III controlled substance is a Class C, rather than Class D, felony; and 4) the trial court erred by ordering consecutive sentences. After a careful review of the record, we affirm Defendant’s convictions and sentences.

A Chester County Circuit Court jury convicted the appellant, Robert Charles Brown, of eighty-five counts of rape of a child, a Class A felony. After a sentencing hearing, the appellant received an effective one-hundred-year sentence to be served at one hundred percent. On appeal, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by (1) denying his motion to dismiss the indictment because he was deprived of his right to a speedy trial, (2) allowing a State witness to testify about an incriminating hearsay statement made by the appellant, and (3) failing to require the State to make an election of offenses. The State acknowledges that the trial court erred regarding the election of offenses but argues that the error is harmless. We conclude that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to require the State to make an election of offenses. Therefore, the appellant’s convictions are reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial.

The petitioner, Walter Leon Cross, pled guilty in the Tipton County Circuit Court to felony failure to appear, eleven counts of forgery, three counts of theft over $1,000, and two counts of identity theft. Pursuant to the plea agreement, he received an effective sentence of twenty years. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that his pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the petitioner now appeals. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.