APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

Michael Vincent Ricco (“the Petitioner”) was convicted by a jury of rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. This conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The Supreme Court denied the Petitioner’s application for permission to appeal. See State v. Michael Vincent Ricco, No. W2008-00756-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 2191872 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 23, 2009), perm. app. denied, (Tenn. Dec. 14, 2009). The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief, claiming that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the decision of the post-conviction court.

Jesse L. Rogers (“Plaintiff”) appeals an order from the Chancery Court for Johnson County (“Chancery Court”) dismissing his Petition for Access to Public Records. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition.

After finding that cy pres relief was available to modify conditions imposed by donor of artwork which had been gifted to Fisk University, the trial court approved agreements whereby the Crystal Bridges Museum would purchase a fifty percent interest in the art for $30 million and would thereafter share in the display and maintenance of the artwork. The court conditioned approval of the agreements on the requirement that Fisk establish an endowment of $20 million from the proceeds of sale in furtherance of the donor’s intent to make the art available for the citizens of Nashville. The Attorney General of Tennessee appeals, contending that the trial court exceeded the scope of remand and that the court erred in determining that the agreement with the Crystal Bridges Museum most closely reflects the donor’sintent. Fisk seeks review of trialcourt’s requirementthatitestablish the endowment. We affirm the trial court’s decision in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
 

After twenty-five years of marriage, Marcella E. May (“Wife”) sued Donald B. May (“Husband”) for divorce. Husband’s adult son Donald P. May (“Son”) was added later to the suit as a defendant concerning a real property transfer. After a trial, the Trial Court entered its Final Decree of Divorce, inter alia, awarding Wife a divorce, dividing the marital property, awarding Wife transitional alimony, and awarding Wife judgment for attorney’s fees against Husband. After further hearing, the Trial Court entered subsequent orders awarding Wife $63,474.34 in attorney’s fees and $2,965.77 in costs against Husband, and $4,083.50 in attorney’s fees against Son. Husband and Son appeal to this Court raising issues regarding the classification and distribution of specific property, and the awards of alimony and attorney’s fees. We affirm with regard to the classification and distribution of property, the award of alimony, and the award of attorney’s fees against Husband. We find and hold that no contractual or statutory basis allowed for an award of attorney’s fees against Son, and we, therefore, vacate the award to Wife of a judgment for attorney’s fees against Son.

I concur with the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s grant of cy pres relief.
I write separately to state that I respectfully disagree with the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s limitation of the funds awarded to Fisk University to $10 million and the corresponding requirement that the University establish an endowment with the remaining $20 million.
 

At its core, this case is about the application of an offset provision in an uninsured motorist (“UM”) policy to an individual’s claim for damages arising out of an automobile accident in the course and scope of her employment. The plaintiff Becky Cooper’s workers’ compensation claim arising out of the accident, along with another workers’ compensation claim, this one for injuries sustained by the plaintiff “while getting a briefcase from her car,” were settled and approved by the Chancery Court for Hamilton County. The “final order” of that court recites that the court acted upon the “joint petition of the employer, . . . the insurer, . . . and the employee, . . . for the approval of a proposed settlement under the . . . Workers’ Compensation [Law].” The order does not expressly state that the plaintiff was paid any benefits for the injuries sustained in the automobile accident; but it does recite that she received all of the benefits to which she was due with respect to the two claims. The plaintiff filed the present action against the driver and owner of the other vehicle involved in the accident and served a copy of the complaint on Pacific Employers Insurance Company, the UM carrier of the company whose automobile the plaintiff was driving at the time of the accident. The UM carrier filed a motion for partial summary judgment asserting that it is entitled to an offset corresponding to the workers’ compensation benefits to which the plaintiff was entitled under the Workers’ Compensation Law with respect to the automobile accident. The trial court granted the UM carrier partial summary judgment in an order that states simply, without further elaboration, “[t]his is a final order.” For several reasons, we hold that the court’s order is not a final order under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 54.02. However, in the interest of the efficient administration of justice, see Tenn. R. App. P. 1, we exercise our discretion to treat this appeal as if it were before us pursuant to the provisions of Tenn. R. App. P. 9. With respect to the merits of this case, we affirm the trial court’s order granting partial summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

Corin Mucha Wilkinson (“Wife”) filed a petition for criminal contempt in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”) against Thomas Gregg Wilkinson (“Husband”). Wife and Husband were in the midst of a divorce. Wife, in her petition for contempt, alleged that Husband had willfully failed to pay his monthly pendente lite support as ordered. The Trial Court found Husband guiltyof two counts of criminal contempt. Husband appeals. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

This case was appealed pursuant to Tenn. R. App. P. 3. The appellee raised the issue that the appeal was not from a final judgment pursuant to any rules of the Court.

This case concerns the divorce of Thomas Gregg Wilkinson (“Husband”) and Corin Mucha Wilkinson (“Wife”). Wife filed for divorce in the Circuit Court for Davidson County (“the Trial Court”). The Trial Court, in its final decree granting the divorce, inter alia, divided the marital estate and awarded Wife alimony. Husband appeals, contesting the division of the marital estate, the award of alimony to Wife, the award of attorney’s fees to Wife, and a judgment against him for pendente lite support arrearages. We modify the judgment of the Trial Court as it relates to the Trial Court’s marital debt allocation/alimony in solido and the amount of arrearages Husband owes. Otherwise, we affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.
 

The Petitioner, Ivano Stamegna, pled guilty to attempt to possess more than 300 grams of cocaine, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years. In 2010, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition, concluding that he did not file his petition within the applicable statute of limitations. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred because either the statutory exception for new, retrospectively applicable constitutional rights or the constitutional exception for due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable authorities, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

Defendant-Appellant, Barry D. Harris, Jr., pled guilty in the Circuit Court of Williamson County to aggravated assault, a Class C felony, unlawful carrying or possession of a weapon, a Class E felony, and simple possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor. The trial court sentenced Harris as a Range I, standard offender to an effective term of six years’ imprisonment in the Department of Correction. Harris attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Rule 37 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, addressing whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence discovered as a result of a search of his residence. Because Harris failed to comply with the proper procedure for reserving such a question, we conclude that we are without jurisdiction to consider it. Additionally, Harris appeals the length of his sentence, arguing that the sentence does not conform to the statutory purposes of sentencing. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Williamson County Circuit Court jury convicted the defendant, Joni Michelle Osborne, of simple possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), see T.C.A. § 39-17-418(a) (2006), and violation of the seatbelt law, see id. § 55-9-603. Following the jury’s verdict, the trial court found the defendant guiltyof felonious simple possession based upon her prior history of drug convictions, see id. § 39-17-418(e),and imposed an effective sentence of two years consisting of 30 days’ incarceration in jail and the service of the remaining portion of her sentence on probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying her motion to suppress the fruits of the search of her vehicle, denying her motion to continue the trial, and referring to an exhibit as “illegal drugs” in its instructions to the jury, and that the cumulative effect of these errors deprived her of a fair trial. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgments of the trial court

The trial court dismissed Plaintiff’s action for fraud based on the statute of limitations. We affirm.

The defendant, Debra Elaine Moore Kirk, stands convicted of criminally negligent homicide, a Class E felony, and aggravated child abuse, a Class A felony. The trial court sentenced her as a Range I, standard offender to an effective sentence of 25 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. In a previous appeal, this court ruled that the defendant waived all issues other than sufficiency of the evidence by failing to file a timely motion for new trial and affirmed the judgments of the trial court. See State v. Debra Elaine Moore, No. E2007-00533-CCA-R3-CD (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, June 23, 2008). A postconviction court granted post-conviction relief in the form of a delayed appeal. In this appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by allowing certain testimony from the medical examiner and that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. Our previous determination that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendant’s convictions is the law of the case, and we do not consider this issue. Following our review of the remaining issues, we conclude that the trial court  committed no reversible error and affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The appellant, Montez Duncan, pled guilty in the Shelby County Criminal Court to attempted first degree murder, especially aggravated robbery, and especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court sentenced the appellant to a total effective sentence of twenty-five years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the appellant challenges the length of the sentences imposed by the trial court. Upon review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Landon Christopher McGahee, pled guilty to five counts of burglary of an automobile and was sentenced to serve six years on community corrections. He appeals as of right from the Hamilton County Criminal Court’s revocation of his community corrections sentence and order of incarceration. The Defendant contends that the trial court erred by ordering four years of the previously imposed sentence to be served in confinement. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner was convicted by a jury for possession of cocaine, possession of more than .5 grams of cocaine with the intent to deliver, and possession of marijuana. These convictions were sustained on appeal. The Petitioner subsequently filed for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Specifically, the Petitioner argues that his trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to file a motion to suppress the evidence obtained during a police search. Following an evidentiary hearing, the postconviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that the Petitioner has not met his burden of proving that he was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In May, 2007, Defendant, Jeremy Lieutenant Fuqua, pled guilty to various offenses, including three counts of aggravated burglary, a Class C felony, and one count of Class C felony theft. He received a sentence of four years for each conviction of aggravated burglary and a sentence of three years for the theft conviction, with all sentences to be served consecutively with each other for an effective sentence of fifteen years. Defendant was given the opportunity to serve the entire sentence on probation. Subsequently, there were three separate probation violation proceedings, but ultimately none resulted in revocation of the entire probation sentence. The fourth probation violation proceeding, which is the subject of this appeal, was filed based upon new criminal charges, failure to report arrests, and various technical violations. After a hearing the trial court revoked Defendant’s probation and ordered the entire effective sentence of fifteen years to be served by incarceration. On appeal, Defendant does not challenge the findings that he violated his probation; he does insist that he should not have been ordered to serve his entire sentence. We affirm the judgments of the trial court in each conviction.

A Sullivan County jury convicted the Defendant, Bryant Kelly Pride, of two counts of the sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine and two counts of the delivery of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of thirty-six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) there is insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions, (2) the trial court erred when it denied the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictments for the State’s failure to provide the Defendant a speedy trial, (3) the trial court improperly allowed the State’s expert witness to testify without proper notice to the Defendant, and (4) the Defendant’s sentence is excessive. After a thorough review of the record and the applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner filed for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with his trial that resulted in convictions of first degree felony murder and especially aggravated robbery. After an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner has appealed. After a thorough review of the record, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

A Hamilton County jury convicted the Defendant, Kenneth D. Gann, of second degree murder, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years, to be served at 100%. On appeal, the Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress a statement he gave while in the hospital. After a thorough review of the record and applicable authorities, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

A Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Ted Ormand Pate, of attempted rape of a child, a Class B felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. The trial court merged the convictions and sentenced the Defendant as a Range I offender to ten years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred when it: (1) admitted the Defendant’s tape recorded confession to his daughter; (2) limited the scope of an expert witness’s testimony regarding the Defendant’s susceptibility to suggestion; and (3) disallowed the expert witness’s testimony regarding the interview techniques used during the victim’s forensic interview. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Defendant-Appellant, Michael D. Johnson, was convicted by a Hardin County jury of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and aggravated sexual battery, a Class B felony. Johnson was sentenced to twenty-five years in the Department of Correction for rape of a child and ten years for aggravated sexual battery, to be served concurrently. On appeal, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal concerns the existence of an easement. The dispute between the two adjoining landowners began after the defendant landowners blocked the plaintiff neighboring landowner’s access to a roadway crossing over the defendants’ property. The plaintiff landowner filed this action seeking condemnation or a finding of an implied easement for access to the roadway over the defendants’ property, arguing that his property was landlocked. Upon the admission into evidence of severalaffidavits,the trialcourtfound both an easement implied from prior use and, in the alternative, an easement created by necessity. The defendant landowners now appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
 

The Department of Children's Services petitioned the Trial Court to terminate the parental rights of the mother, DJ, and the presumptive father, TH, who was married to the mother at the time of the child's birth. Following an evidentiary hearing, the Trial Court terminated the parental rights of the mother DJ and her husband at the time of the child's birth, TH. Both parties appealed to this Court and we affirm the termination of the mother's parental rights and vacate the Judgment terminating TH's parental rights on the grounds that the statutory grounds for termination was not established by the evidence.