APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS

The defendant, Robert Lee Adams, fled justice while the jury was deliberating numerous charges against him stemming from his participation in a drug-related shooting in 2007. The jury found the defendant guilty of attempted first degree murder, a Class A felony; especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; aggravated robbery, a Class B felony; and conspiracy to commit kidnapping, a Class D felony. The defendant was sentenced in absentia to an effective sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus twenty years. The defendant’s trial counsel filed a timely motion for new trial. In response, the State moved to dismiss the defendant’s motion on the grounds that the defendant had abandoned his right to proceed by absconding from the court’s jurisdiction. After a hearing held while the defendant was still in absentia, the trial court dismissed the defendant’s motion for a new trialpursuantto the fugitive disentitlement doctrine and allowed the defendant’s trialcounsel to withdraw soon thereafter. Weeks later, the defendant was returned to custody, filed a pro se notice of appeal, and was appointed new counsel. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred by dismissing his motion for a new trial; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (3) the trial court erred by denying his trial counsel’s motion for a continuance; and (4) the trial court applied improper enhancement factors when it sentenced him for his conspiracy and aggravated robbery convictions. The State argues that we must dismiss the defendant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that he was a fugitive from justice but that, nonetheless, we have jurisdiction to review his appeal now that he has been returned to custody. The absence of a motion for new trial, however, limits our appellate review to considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions and his sentencing. After thorough review, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the defendant’s convictions and thatthe trial court committed no error in sentencing the defendant for conspiracy to commit kidnapping. While we conclude that the trial court may have erroneously applied one of the several enhancement factors it used when it sentenced the defendant for aggravated robbery, in light of the applicable sentencing principles, remaining enhancement factors, and the particular facts of this case, we conclude that the sentence imposed by the trial judge was appropriate. Accordingly, the judgments of the trial court are affirmed.

This appeal concerns a note executed by Robert Denton (“Husband”) and Susan L. Denton (“Wife”) and payable to Husband’s sister, Carolyn L. Denton-Preletz (“Lender”). When Lender sought recovery of the note, Wife denied liability and filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the statute of limitations for recovery of the note had passed. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case as it related to Wife. Lender filed a motion to alter or amend the order and a motion to amend the complaint, which were denied. Lender appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

In this interlocutory appeal, the Defendant-Appellant, Susan A. Webb, appeals the Bradley County Criminal Court’s order denying her request for relief from the prosecutor’s denial of her application for pretrial diversion. On appeal, Webb argues: (1) the trial court erred in allowing the victim to testify at the hearing challenging the prosecutor’s denial of pretrial diversion; (2) the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to “fill in the gaps” in proof after determining that the prosecutor initially abused her discretion in denying pretrial diversion; (3) the trial court erred in suggesting and allowing her to file a second application for pretrial diversion; (4) the unfavorable factors regarding the circumstances of the case and the need for deterrence did not outweigh the favorable factors as stated in her application for pretrial diversion; (5) the prosecutor considered irrelevant factors and drew “conclusions based on conjecture and speculation” in evaluating her petition for pretrial diversion; (6) the prosecutor abused her discretion in using “conclusionary, flawed logic” in denying her application for pretrial diversion, which resulted in an “arbitrary and capricious” decision; and (7) appellate review of the denial of her two applications for pretrial diversion is improper. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case is before us for the second time on appeal. In our first Opinion, Kerney v. Endres, No. E2008-01476-COA-R3-CV, 2009 Tenn. App. LEXIS 408 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2009), no appl. perm. appeal filed (“Kerney I”), we found and held that defendants’ beauty salon violated the restrictive covenants of residential use only, vacated the Trial Court’s order to the contrary, and remanded the case for a determination of whether the restrictive covenants had been waived. On remand, the Trial Court entered its order finding and holding, inter alia, that the restrictive covenants of residential use only had been waived and were unenforceable. Plaintiffs appeal the finding of waiver to this Court. We find that the evidence preponderates against the Trial Court’s finding that the restrictive covenants had been waived. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s May 3, 2010 order.

Avis Budget Group, Inc. (“Avis”) sued James Hagood d/b/a Hagood & Sons Wrecker Service (“Hagood”) and, after a trial, the Trial Court entered its judgment on October 15, 2010 awarding a judgment in favor of Avis in the amount of $7,284 plus reasonable attorneys’ fees. Subsequently, Hagood filed a motion to alter or amend or for a new trial, which the Trial Court denied. Hagood appealed to this Court. Since the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees remains outstanding, we dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment.

The Petitioner, Charles Edward Cliff, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, contending that (1) his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and (2) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the postconviction court.

The defendant, Martarious Hoskins, appeals from his Shelby County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated robbery, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, John Wesley Wright, was convicted by a Dickson County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued at ten thousand dollars or more but less than sixty thousand dollars, a Class C felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14-103, -105 (2010). He was sentenced as a Range II,multiple offender to seven years’ confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) he was denied his right to a speedy trial, (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and (3) he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Davidson County Criminal Court denied the petitioner, Gdongalay P. Berry, post-conviction relief from his Davidson County Criminal Court convictions of two counts of first degree murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping but granted relief from his sentence of death in the form of a new capital sentencing hearing. The petitioner appeals the partial denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the State violated the tenets of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); that neither the State nor the trial court honored his constitutional right to a speedy trial; that the State’s pursuit of inconsistent theories violated his constitutional right to due process; that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel; and that the cumulative effect of the constitutional deprivations rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. The State appeals the post-conviction court’s grant of a new sentencing hearing, asserting that the error attending the petitioner’s original sentencing hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Shanta Jones, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of facilitation of aggravated robbery, a Class C felony; facilitation of aggravated burglary, a Class D felony; facilitation of aggravated assault, a Class D felony; and retaliation for past action, a Class E felony. See T.C.A. §§ 39-11-403 (2010), 39-13-402 (2010), 39-14-403 (2010), 39-13-102 (Supp. 2009) (amended 2010), 39-16-510 (2010). The trial court sentenced the Defendant as a Range I, standard offender to six years for facilitation of aggravated robbery, to four years each for the burglary and assault convictions, and to two years for retaliation for past action, to be served concurrently. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The defendant, Marlon McKay, was convicted by a Shelby County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder and attempted aggravated robbery and was sentenced by the trial court to consecutive terms of life plus six years in the Department of Correction. On appeal, the challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence and contends that the trial court committed plain error by granting the State’s request to omit a portion of the pattern jury instruction on criminal responsibility. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Chattanooga’s mayor, the subject of a recall petition, filed suit against the county election commission, seeking a declaratory judgment that the petition process was flawed and to enjoin the election commission from placing the recall issue on the November 2010 election ballot. The trial court found the election commission could not lawfully certify the recall petition due to noncompliance with applicable statutory provisions and enjoined the placement of the recall issue on the ballot. The leader of the recall effort appeals. We find that the trial court acted without jurisdiction in entering an injunction against the election commission. The judgment of the trial court is vacated and the complaint dismissed.

The Juvenile Court for Hamilton County (“the Juvenile Court”), upon a petition by the State of Tennessee, Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) and following a trial, terminated the parental rights of Troy L. (“Father”) to the minor child Breanna A. L. (“the Child”) pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3) (2010). Father appeals the termination of his parental rights. We find and hold that clear and convincing evidence existed to terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 13 (g)(1) and Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113 (g)(3), and that clear and convincing evidence existed such that the termination was in the Child’s best interest. We, therefore, affirm the Juvenile Court’s order terminating Father’s parental rights to the Child.

The defendant, Robert White, appeals his conviction of second offense driving under the influence, see T.C.A. § 55-10-401(a)(1); -403(a)(1)(A)(iv), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction in light of his acquittal on an alternative count also charging driving under the influence, see id. § 55-10-401(a)(2). Because the seemingly inconsistent verdicts in this case do not render the evidence of the defendant’s intoxication infirm or insufficient, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

In this divorce case involving a minor child of the parties and the appellant Charles Braun’s stepson, the record before us does not contain a permanent parenting plan certified by the trial court clerk as being entered by that court. Furthermore, the record affirmatively shows that the trial court has not yet made a final decision as to an amount of child support to be paid by Charles Braun. Therefore, we are persuaded that there is no final judgment in this case. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, Defendant, Mark Edward Coffey, pled guilty to facilitation of second degree murder. Defendant was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to eight years, suspended and placed on probation. Defendant was charged with a violation of probation, and after a hearing, the trial court revoked his probation and ordered him to serve his original sentence in confinement. Defendant appeals. Finding no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a divorce case. Gregory Herbert Helton appeals from the “final” judgment of divorce entered April 29, 2011. That judgment is not a final judgment. Accordingly, the appellant’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

This appeal is being pursued from the trial court’s order of August 9, 2011. That order is not a final order. Accordingly, the appellant Gloria G. Neuenschwander’s appeal is hereby dismissed.

Plaintiff Conservator filed an action seeking rescission of a warranty deed executed by her Ward prior to the establishment of the conservatorship. The deed conveyed real property in Nashville to Defendant without consideration, but retained a life-estate. Plaintiff alleged incapacity to contract as grounds for recision. Prior to the filing of Plaintiff’s action, Defendant and Appellee Intervener executed a contractfor sale of the property, subject to the life-estate. The trial court determined that the Intervener held superior title to the real property under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The trial court entered final judgment in favor of Intervener pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
 

This appeal involves the constitutionality of a statute on temporary disability benefits,T.C.A. § 50-6-238. The plaintiff employment agency refused to pay temporary disability benefits to an employee who claimed that she was disabled from an on-the-job injury. The employee filed a request for assistance with the defendant Tennessee Department of Labor and Workforce Development pursuant to T.C.A.§ 50-6-238. A workers’compensation specialist entered an order requiring the employer to pay temporary disability benefits to the employee. The employer filed an unsuccessful administrative appeal. The employer then filed the instant petition for common law writ of certiorari alleging, inter alia, that the procedures in T.C.A. § 50-6-238 violate the employer’s right to procedural due process. The trial court agreed and held the statute to be unconstitutional on its face. The State appeals. In light of this Court’s recent decision in Tyson Foods v. TDOL, No. M2010-0227-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 4790980 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2011), we reverse the decision of the trial court.
 

The petitioner, Timothy Casterlow, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as time-barred. In this appeal, he contends that principles of due process require the tolling of the statute of limitations. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Defendant, Paul Whetstone, was convicted of direct criminal contempt by the Jefferson County General Sessions Court, Judge Alfred Benjamin Strand, Jr., presiding. The Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari and supersedeas in the Jefferson County Circuit Court, which was granted. Following its review, the Jefferson County Circuit Court affirmed the Defendant’s conviction. In this appeal as of right, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Sellers of a house provided the purchasers with a Limited Warranty in which different aspects of the house were warranted to be without defects for a term not to exceed one year. The purchasers testified theycomplained two months following the closing that the windows did not operate properly, and the sellers testified the purchasers did not complain about the windows until after more than two years. The trial court found the purchasers’ testimony more credible, and based on the purchasers’ expert and other evidence, concluded the installation of the windows was defective. The court awarded the purchasers damages, consisting of the replacement cost for all the windows, even though not all the windows were defective. The sellers alleged the trial court erred by excluding its expert from testifying, by determining the window installation was defective, and in the way it calculated the purchasers’ damages. We affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified to correct a computational error in the calculation of damages.
 

This is a dispute concerning payment for website development services. The plaintiff, a website development company, filed suit against the defendants, an LLC and its managing member in his individual capacity, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The trial court found there was no express contract between the parties due to a lack of mutual assent. The court found there was a quasi-contract and that plaintiff was entitled to the reasonable value of its services, minus the costs incurred by defendants in attempting to repair the defects in the website. Last, the court held the individual defendant personally liable for the judgment. We affirm the finding of a quasi-contract and the personal liability of the individual defendant; however, we modify the trial court’s monetary award, finding the plaintiff is entitled to recover a judgment of $13,952.88. The court’s holding is affirmed in all other respects.
 

This is an appeal from a divorce decree entered on August 5, 2008. Because the appellant voluntarily dismissed her first appeal from the same divorce decree in 2008, and did not file her current notice of appeal with the trial court clerk within the time permitted by Tenn. R. App. P. 4, we dismiss the appeal.